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The Inside Story of 

The Peace Conference 



The Inside Story of 

The Peace Conference 



by 
Dr. E/jf Dillon 




HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 
NEW YORK AND LONDON 



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6^ 



£ 






The Inside Story of the Peace Conference 



Copyright 1920. by Harper & Brothers 

Printed in the United States of America 

Published February, 1920 



/ /? 



fO^ 



To 

C. W. BARRON 

in memory of interesting conversations 

on historic occasions 

These pages are inscribed 



CONTENTS 

CHAP. p A G E 

FORWORD j x 

I. The city of the Conference i 

II. Signs of the times 45 

III. The delegates 5 8 

IV. Censorship and secrecy U7 

V. Aims and methods 136 

VI. The lesser states ' ^4 

VII. Poland's outlook in the future 264 

VIII. Italy 272 

IX. Japan 322 

X. Attitude toward Russia 344 

XI. Bolshevism 376 



XII. How Bolshevism was fostered 



399 



XIII. Sidelights on the Treaty 407 

XIV. The Treaty with Germany 455 

XV. The Treaty with Bulgaria 464 

XVI. The Covenant and minorities 469 



FOREWORD 

It is almost superfluous to say that this book does 
not claim to be a history, however summary, of the Peace 
Conference, seeing that such a work was made sheer 
impossible now and forever by the chief delegates them- 
selves when they decided to dispense with records of their 
conversations and debates. It is only a sketch — a sketch 
of the problems which the war created or rendered press- 
ing — of the conditions under which they cropped up; 
of the simplicist ways in which they were conceived by 
the distinguished politicians who volunteered to solve 
them; of the delegates' natural limitations and elec- 
tioneering commitments and of the secret influences by 
which they were swayed; of the peoples' needs and 
expectations; of the unwonted procedure adopted by 
the Conference and of the fateful consequences of its 
decisions to the world. 

In dealing with all those matters I aimed at impartial- 
ity, which is an unattainable ideal, but I trust that 
sincerity and detachment have brought me reasonably 
close to it. Having no pet theories of my own to champion, 
my principal standard of judgment is derived from the 
law of causality and the rules of historical criticism. 

The fatal tactical mistake chargeable to the Conference 
lay in its making the charter of the League of Nation^ 
and the treaty of peace with the Central Powers inter- 
dependent. For the maxims that underlie the former are 
irreconcilable with those that should determine the latter, 
and the efforts to combine them must, among other un- 



FOREWORD 

toward results, create a sharp opposition between the vita! 
interests of the people of the United States and the 
apparent or transient interests of their associates. The 
outcome of this unnatural union will be to damage the 
cause of stable peace which it was devised to further. 

But the surest touchstone by which to test the capacity 
and the achievements of the world-legislators is their 
attitude toward Russia in the political domain and toward 
the labor problem in the economic sphere. And in neither 
ease <\^c^ their action or inaction appear to have been 
the outcome o\' statesman like ideas, or, indeed, <■'( any 
higher consideration than that (•( evading the central 
issue and transmitting the problem to the League of 
Nations. The results are manifest to all. 

The continuity o( human progress depends at bottom 
upon labor, and it is becoming more ami more doubtful 
whether the civilized races o( mankind can be reckoned 
on to supply it for long on conditions akin to those which 
have in various forms prevailed ever since the institutions 
o\ ancient times and which alone render the present soeial 
structure viable. If this forecast should prove correct, 
the only alternative to a break disastrous in the con- 
tinuity o\' civilization is the frank recognition of the 
principle that certain inferior races an- destined to serve 
the cause o( mankind in those capacities for which alone 
they are qualified and to readjust soeial institutions to 
this axiom. 

In the meanwhile the Conference which ignored this 
problem o\ problems has transformed Europe into a 
seething mass ^( mutually hostile states powerless to 
face the economic competition of their overseas rivals 
and has set the very elements of society in flux. 

E. J. Dillon. 



The Inside Story of 

The Peace Conference 



THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE PEACE CONFERENCE 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

THE choice of Paris for the historic Peace Conference 
was an afterthought. The Anglo-Saxon govern- 
ments first favored a neutral country as the most appro- 
priate meeting-ground for the world's peace-makers. 
Holland was mentioned only to be eliminated without 
discussion, so obvious and decisive were the objections. 
French Switzerland came next in order, was actually 
fixed upon, and for a time held the field. Lausanne was 
the city first suggested and nearly chosen. There was a 
good deal to be said for it on its own merits, and in its 
vsuburb, Ouchy, the treaty had been drawn up which 
terminated the war between Italy and Turkey. But 
misgivings were expressed as to its capacity to receive 
and entertain the formidable peace armies without whose 
co-operation the machinery for stopping all wars could 
not well be fabricated. At last Geneva was fixed 
upon, and so certain were influential delegates of the 
ratification of their choice by all the Allies, that I felt 
justified in telegraphing to Geneva to have a house hired 
for six months in that picturesque city. 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

But the influential delegates had reckoned without the 
French, who in these matters were far and away the most 
influential. Was it not in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, 
they asked, that Teuton militarism had received its most 
powerful impulse? And did not poetic justice, which 
was never so needed as in these evil days, ordain that the 
chartered destroyer who had first seen the light of day 
in that hall should also he destroyed there? Was this 
not in accordance with the eternal fitness of things ? 
Whereupon the matter-of-fact Anglo-Saxon mind, unable 
to withstand the force of this argument and accustomed 
to give way on secondary matters, assented, and Paris 
was accordingly fixed upon. . . . 

"Paris herself again," tourists remarked, who had not 
been there since the fateful month when hostilities began 
—meaning that something of the wealth and luxury of 
bygone days was venturing to display itself anew as an 
afterglow of the epoch whose sun was setting behind 
banks of thunder-clouds. And there was a grain of truth 
in the remark. The Villc Lumiere was crowded as it 
never had been before. But it was mostly strangers 
who were within her gates. In the throng of Anglo- 
Saxon warriors and cosmopolitan peace-lovers following 
the trailing skirts of destiny, one might with an effort 
discover a Parisian now and again. But they were few 
and far between. 

They and their principal European guests made some 
feeble attempts to vie with the Vienna of 1814-15 in 
elegance and taste if not in pomp and splendor. But the 
general effect was marred by the element of the nouveaux- 
ridies and nouveaux-pauvres which was prominent, if not 
predominant. A few of the great and would-be great 
ladies outbade one another in the effort to renew the luxury 
and revive the grace of the past. But the atmosphere was 
numbing, their exertions half-hearted, and the smile of 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

youth and beauty was cold like the sheen of winter ice. 
The shadow of death hung over the institutions and 
survivals of the various civilizations and epochs which 
were being dissolved in the common melting-pot, and 
even the man in the street was conscious of its chilling 
influence. Life in the capital grew agitated, fitful, 
superficial, unsatisfying. Its gaiety was forced — some- 
thing between a challenge to the destroyer and a sad 
fa re well to the past and present. Men were instinctively 
aware that the morrow was fraught with bitter surprises, 
and they deliberately adopted the maxim, "Let us eat 
and drink, for to-morrow we die." None of these people 
bore on their physiognomies the dignified impress of the 
olden time, barring a few aristocratic figures from the 
Faubourg St.-Germain, who looked as though they had 
only to don the perukes and the distinctive garb of the 
eighteenth century to sit down to table with Voltaire 
and the Marquise du Chatelet. Here and there, indeed, 
a coiffure, a toilet, the bearing, the gait, or the peculiar 
grace with which a robe was worn reminded one that this 
or that fair lady came of a family whose life-story in the 
days of yore was one of the tributaries to the broad stream 
of European history. But on closer acquaintanceship, 
especially at conversational tournaments, one discovered 
that Nature, constant in her methods, distributes more 
gifts of beauty than of intellect. 

Festive banquets, sinful suppers, long-spun-out lunches 
were as frequent and at times as Lucullan as in the days 
of the Regency. The outer, coarser attributes of luxury 
abounded in palatial restaurants, hotels, and private man- 
sions; but the refinement, the grace, the brilliant con- 
versation even of the Paris of the Third Empire were 
seen to be subtle branches of a lost art. The people of 
the armistice were weary and apprehensive — weary of the 
war, weary of politics, weary of the worn-out framework 
2 3 



THE INSIDE STORY OF HIP PEACE CONFERENCE 

of existence, and filled with a vague, nameless apprehension 
of the unknown. They feared thai in the chaotic slough 
into which they had fallen they had no1 ye1 touched 
bottom. None the loss, with the exception of fervent 
Catholics and a number oi earnest sectarians, there wore 
few genuine seekers after anything essentially better. 

Not only did the general atmosphere oi Paris undergo 
radical changes, together with its population, but the 
thoroughfares, many oi them, officially changed their 
names since the outbreak oi the war. 

The Paris of the Conference ceased to be the capital 
oi France. It became a vast cosmopolitan caravanserai 
teeming with unwonted aspects oi life and turmoil, 

tilled with Curious samples oi the raees, tribes, and tongues 

oi four continents who came to watch and wait for the 
mysterious to-morrow. The intensity of life there was 
sheer oppressive; to the tumultuous striving of the living 

were added the silent influences of the dead. For it 
was also a trysting place for the ghosts of sovereignties 
and states, militarisms and racial ambitions, which were 
permitted to wander at large until their brief twilight, 
should be swallowed up in night. The dignified Turk 
passionately pleaded for Constantinople, and east an 

imploring look on the lone Armenian whose relatives he 
had massacred, and who was then waiting for political 
resurrection. Persian delegates wandered about like souls 
in pain, waiting to be admitted through the portals oi the 

Conference Paradise. Beggared Croesus passed famish- 
ing Lucullus in the street, and once mighty vi.iers shiv- 
ered under threadbare garments in the biting frost as 
they hurried over the crisp February snow. Waning 
and waxing Powers, vacant thrones, decaying domina- 
tions had, each of them, their accusers, special pleaders, 
and judges, in this multitudinous world-eenter on which 
tragedy, romance, and comedy rained down potent spellsvj 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

For the Confer'.""- city was also the clearing-house of 
the Fates, where the accounts of a whole epoch, the deeds 
and misdeeds oi an exhausted eivilization, were to be 
balanced and squared. 

Here strange yet familiar figures, survivals from the 
past, starter] up at every hand's turn and greeted one 
with smiles or sighs. Men on whom J last set eyes when 
we were boys at sehool, playing football together in the 
field or preparing lessons in the school room, would stop 
me in the street on their way to represent nations or 
peoples whose lives were out of chime, or to inaugurate 
the existence of new republics. One face I shall never 
forget. It was that of the self-made temporary dictator 
of a little country whose importance was dwindling to the 
dimensions of a footnote in the history of the century. I 
had been acquainted with him personally in the halcyon 
day of his transient glory. Like his picturesque land, 
he won the immortality of a day, was courted and sub- 
sidized by competing states in turn, and then suddenly 
cast aside like a sucked orange. Then he sank into the 
depths of squalor. He was eloquent, resourceful, imagi- 
native, and brimful of the poetry of untruth. One day 
through the asphalt streets of Paris he shuffled along in 
the procession of the doomed, with wan face and sunken 
eyes, wearing a tragically mean garb. And soon after I 
learned that he had vanished unwept into eternal oblivion. 

An Arabian Nights touch was imparted to the dissolv- 
ing panorama by strange visitants from Tartary and 
Kurdistan, Korea and Aderbeijan, Armenia, Persia, and 
the Iledjaz — men with patriarchal beards and scimitar- 
shaped noses, and others from desert and oasis, from 
Samarkand and Bokhara. Turbans and fezzes, sugar- 
loaf hats and headgear resembling episcopal miters, old 
military uniforms devised for the embryonic armies of 
new states on the eve of perpetual peace, snowy-white 

S 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

burnooses, flowing mantles, and graceful garments like 
the Roman toga, contributed to create an atmosphere of 
dreamy unreality in the city where the grimmest of 
realities were being faced and coped with. 

Then came the men of wealth, of intellect, of industrial 
enterprise, and the seed-bearers of the ethical new order- 
ing, members of economic committees from the United 
States, Britain, Italy, Poland, Russia, India, and Japan, 
representatives of naphtha industries and far-off coal 
mines, pilgrims, fanatics, and charlatans from all climes, 
priests of all religions, preachers of every doctrine, who 
mingled with princes, field-marshals, statesmen, anar- 
chists, builders-up, and pullers-down. All of them burned 
with desire to be near to the crucible in which the political 
and social systems of the world were to be melted and 
recast. Every day, in my walks, in my apartment, or at 
restaurants, I met emissaries from lands and peoples 
whose very names had seldom been heard of before in 
the West. A delegation from the Pont-Euxine Greeks 
called on me, and discoursed of their ancient cities of 
Trebizond, Samsoun, Tripoli, Kerassund, in which I 
resided many years ago, and informed me that they, too, 
desired to become welded into an independent Greek 
republic, and had come to have their claims allowed. 
The Albanians were represented by my old friend Turkhan 
Pasha, on the one hand, and by my friend Essad Pasha, 
on the other — the former desirous of Italy's protection, 
the latter demanding complete independence. Chinamen, 
Japanese, Koreans, Hindus, Kirghizes, Lesghiens, Cir- 
cassians, Mingrelians, Buryats, Malays, and Negroes and 
Negroids from Africa and America were among the tribes 
and tongues forgathered in Paris to watch the rebuilding 
of the political world system and to see where they 
"came in." 

One day I received a visit from an Armenian deputa- 

6 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

tion ; its chief was described on his visiting-card as Presi- 
dent of the Armenian Republic of the Caucasus. When 
he was shown into my apartment in the H6tel Vend6me, 
I recognized two of its members as old acquaintances 
with whom I had occasional intercourse in Erzerum, 
Kipri Keui, and other places during the Armenian mas- 
sacres of the year 1895. We had not met since then. 
They revived old memories, completed for me the life- 
stories of several of our common friends and acquaintances, 
and narrated interesting episodes of local history. And 
having requested my co-operation, the President and his 
colleagues left me and once more passed out of my life. 
Another actor on the world-stage whom I had encoun- 
tered more than once before was the "heroic" King of 
Montenegro. He often crossed my path during the Con- 
ference, and set me musing on the marvelous ups and 
downs of human existence. This potentate's life offers 
a rich field of research to the psychologist. I had watched 
it myself at various times and with curious results. For 
I had met him in various European capitals during the 
past thirty years, and before the time when Tsar Alexander 
III publicly spoke of him as Russia's only friend. King 
Nikita owes such success in life as he can look back on 
with satisfaction to his adaptation of St. Paul's maxim 
of being all things to all men. Thus in St. Petersburg 
he was a good Russian, in Vienna a patriotic Austrian, in 
Rome a sentimental Italian. He was also a warrior, a 
poet after his own fashion, a money-getter, and a speculator 
on 'Change. His alleged martial feats and his wily, 
diplomatic moves ever since the first Balkan war abound 
in surprises, and would repay close investigation. The 
ease with which the Austrians captured Mount Lovtchen 
and his capital made a lasting impression on those of his 
allies who were acquainted with the story, the conse- 
quences of which he could not foresee. What everybody 

7 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

seemed to know was that if the Teutons had defeated 
the Entente, King NiMta's son Mirko, who had settled 
down for the purpose in Vienna, would have been sot 

On the throne in place oi his father by the Anstrians; 
whereas if the Allies should win. the worldly-wise monarch 
would have retained his erown as their champion. Hut 
these well-laid plans went all agley. Prince Mirko died 
and King Nikitawas deposed. For a time he resided at 
a hotel, a few houses from me, and 1 passed him now and 
again as he was on his way to plead his lost cause before 
the distinguished wreckers of thrones and regimes. 

It seemed as though, in order to provide Paris with a 
cosmopolitan population, the world was drained o( its 
rulers, of its prosperous and luekless financiers, of its high 
and low adventurers, of its tribe of fortune-seekers, and 
its pushing men and women of every description. And 
the result was an odd blend of elasses and individuals 
worthy, it may be, of the new democratic era, but unprec- 
edented. It was welcomed as of good augury, for 
instance, that in the stately Hotel Majestic, where the 
spokesmen of the British Empire had their residence, 
monocled diplomatists mingled with Spry typewriters, 
smart amanuenses, and even with bright -eyed chamber- 
maids at the evening dances. 1 The British Premier him- 
self occasionally witnessed the cheering spectacle with 

manifest pleasure. Self-made statesmen, seions of fallen 

dynasties, ex-premiers, and ministers, who formerly 

swayed the fortunes of the world, whom one might have 
imagined capaces imperii nisi imperassent, were now the 
unnoticed inmates oi unpretending hotels. Ambassadors 
whose most trivial utterances had once been listened to 
with concentrated attention, sued days and weeks for an 
audience of the greater plenipotentiaries, and some of 
them sued in vain. Russian diplomatists were refused 

| Cf. The Daily Ms.il ^F.iris edition), Marco ia, 1919. 

8 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

permission to travel in France or were compelled to 
undergo more than average discomfort and delay there. 
More than once I sat down to lunch or dinner with 
brilliant commensals, one of whom was understood to 
have made away with a well-known personage in order 
to rid the state of a bad administrator, and another had, 
at a secret Vehmgericht in Turkey, condemned a friend of 
mine, now a friend of his, to be assassinated. 

In Paris, this temporary capital of the world, one felt 
the repercussion of every event, every incident of moment 
wheresoever it might have occurred. To reside there 
while the Conference was sitting was to occupy a comfort- 
able box in the vastest theater the mind of men has ever 
conceived. From this rare coign of vantage one could 
witness soul-gripping dramas of human history, the hap- 
penings of years being compressed within the limits of 
days. The revolution in Portugal, the massacre of 
Armenians, Bulgaria's atrocities, the slaughter of the 
inhabitants of Saratoff and Odessa, the revolt of the 
Koreans — all produced their effect in Paris, where official 
and unofficial exponents of the aims and ambitious, re- 
ligions and interests that unite or divide mankind were 
continually coming or going, working aboveground or 
burrowing beneath the surface. 

It was within a few miles of the place where I sat at 
table with the brilliant company alluded to above that a 
few individuals of two different nationalities, one of them 
bearing, it was said, a well-known name, hatched the 
plot that sent Portugal's strong man, President Sidonio 
Paes, to his last account and plunged that ill-starred 
land into chaotic confusion. The plan was discovered by 
the Portuguese military attache, who warned the Presi- 
dent himself and the War Minister. But Sidonio Paes, 
quixotic and foolhardy, refused to take or brook precau- 
tions. A few weeks later the assassin, firing three shots, 

9 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

had no difficulty in taking aim, but none of them took 
effect. The reason was interesting: so determined were 
the conspirators to leave nothing to chance, they had 
steeped the cartridges in a poisonous preparation, whereby 
they injured the mechanism of the revolver, which, in 
consequence, hung fire. But the adversaries of the re- 
form movement which the President had inaugurated 
again tried and planned another attempt, and Sidonio 
Paes, who would not be taught prudence, was duly shot, 
and his admirable work undone l by a band of semi- 
Bolshevists. 

Less than six months later it was rumored that a 
number of specially prepared bombs from a certain 
European town had been sent to Moscow for the speedy 
removal of Lenin. The casual way in which these and 
kindred matters were talked of gave one the measure of 
the change that had come over the world since the out- 
break of the war. There was nobody left in Europe 
whose death, violent or peaceful, would have made much 
of an impression on the dulled sensibilities of the reading 
public. All values had changed, and that of human life 
had fallen low. 

To follow these swiftly passing episodes, occasionally 
glancing behind the scenes, during the pauses of the acts, 
and watch the unfolding of the world-drama, was thrill - 
ingly interesting. To note the dubious source, the 
chance occasion of a grandiose project of world policy, 
and to see it started on its shuffling course, was a revela- 
tion in politics and psychology, and reminded one of the 
saying mistakenly attributed to the Swedish Chancellor 
Oxenstjern, "Quam parva sapientia regitur mmidns." 2 

The wire-pullers were not always the plenipotentiaries. 
Among those were also outsiders of various conditions, 

1 On December 1 8, 1918. 

- "With what little wisdom the world is governed." 

io 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

sometimes of singular ambitions, who were generally free 
from conventional prejudices and conscientious scruples. 
As traveling to Paris was greatly restricted by the govern- 
ments of the world, many of these unofficial delegates 
had come in capacities widely differing from those in 
which they intended to act. I confess I was myself taken 
in by more than one of these secret emissaries, whom I 
was innocently instrumental in bringing into close touch 
with the human levers they had come to press. I actu- 
ally went to the trouble of obtaining for one of them 
valuable data on a subject which did not interest him 
in the least, but which he pretended he had traveled 
several thousand miles to study. A zealous prelate, whose 
business was believed to have something to do with the 
future of a certain branch of the Christian Church in the 
East, in reality held a brief for a wholly different set of 
interests in the West. Some of these envoys hoped to 
influence decisions of the Conference, and they considered 
they had succeeded when they got their points of view 
brought to the favorable notice of certain of its delegates. 
What surprised me was the ease with which several of 
these interlopers moved about, although few of them spoke 
any language but their own. 

Collectivities and religious and political associations, 
including that of the Bolshevists, were represented in 
Paris during the Conference. I met one of the Bolshevists, 
a bright youth, who was a veritable apostle. He occu- 
pied a post which, despite its apparent insignificance, 
put him occasionally in possession of useful information 
withheld from the public, which he was wont to com- 
municate to his political friends. His knowledge of 
languages and his remarkable intelligence had probably 
attracted the notice of his superiors, who can have had 
no suspicion of his leanings, much less of his proselytizing 
activity. However this may have been, he knew a good 

1 1 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

deal of what was going on at the Conference, and he 
occasionally had insight into documents of a certain 

interest. He was a seemingly honest and enthusiastic 
Bolshevik, who spread the doctrine with apostolic zeal 
guided by the wisdom oi the serpent. He was ever ready 
to comment on events, but before opening his mind fully 
to a stranger on the subject next to his heart, he usually 
felt his way, and only when he had grounds for believing 
that the fortress was not impregnable did he open his 
batteries. Even among the initiated, few would suspect 
the role played by this young proselytizer within one of 
the strongholds of the Conference, so naturally and 
unobtrusively was the work done. I may add that 
luckily he had no direct intercourse with the delegates. 

Of all the collectivities whose interests were furthered 
at the Conference, the Jews had perhaps the most re- 
sourceful and certainly the most influential exponents. 
There were Jews from Palestine, from Poland, Russia. 
the Ukraine, Rumania, Greece, Britain, Holland, and 
Belgium; but the largest and most brilliant contingent 
was sent by the United States. Their principal mission, 
with which every fair-minded man sympathized heartily. 
was to secure for their kindred in eastern Europe rights 
equal to those of the populations in whose midst they 
reside. 1 And to the credit of the Poles, Rumanians, and 
Russians, who were to be constrained to remove all the 

1 " Mr. Bernard Richards, Secretary of the delegation from the American 
Jewish Congress to the Peace Conference, expressed much satisfaction with 
the work done in Tans for the protection of Jewish rights and the further- 
ance of the interests of other minorities involved in the peace settlement." 
(The X<~d' York Herald, July 20, IQ19.) How suecessful was the influence 
of the Jewish community at the Peace Conference may be inferred from 
the following: "Mr. Henry 11. Rosenfelt, Director of the American Jewish 
Relief Committee, announces that all Xew York agencies engaged in Jewish 
relief work will join in a united drive in Xew York in December to raise 
$7,500,000 (£1,500,000) to provide clothing, food, and medicines for the 
six million Jews throughout Eastern Europe as well as to make possible a 
comprehensive programme for t) ete rehabilitation. — American Radio 

News Service." Cf. The Daily Mail, August 19, 1919. 

[2 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

existing disabilities, they enfranchised the Hebrew ele- 
ments spontaneously. But the Western Jews, who cham- 
pioned their Eastern brothers, proceeded to demand a 
further concession which many of their own co-religionists 
hastened to disclaim as dangerous — a kind of autonomy 
which Rumanian, Polish, and Russian statesmen, as well 
as many of their Jewish fellow-subjects, regarded as 
tantamount to the creation of a state within the state. 
Whether this estimate is true or erroneous, the conces- 
sions asked for were given, but the supplementary treaties 
insuring the protection of minorities are believed to have 
little chance of being executed, and may, it is feared, 
provoke manifestations of elemental passions in the 
countries in which they are to be applied. 

Twice every day, before and after lunch, one met the 
"autocrats," the world's statesmen whose names were in 
every mouth — the wise men who would have been much 
wiser than they were if only they had credited their friends 
and opponents with a reasonable measure of political 
wisdom. These individuals, in bowler hats, sweeping 
past in sumptuous motors, as rarely seen on foot as 
Roman cardinals, were the destroyers of thrones, the 
carvers of continents, the arbiters of empires, the fash- 
ioners of the new heaven and the new earth — or were 
they only the flies on the wheel of circumstance, 
to whom the world was unaccountably becoming a 
riddle? 

This commingling of civilizations and types brought 
together in Paris by a set of unprecedented conditions 
was full of interest and instruction to the observer priv- 
ileged to meet them at close quarters. The average ob- 
server, however, had little chance of conversing with them, 
for, as these foreigners had no common meeting-place, 
they kept mostly among their own folk. Only now and 
again did three or four members of different races, when 

13 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

chanced to sj ge get 

A firiei 
ifted Fn type, a 

descendant ol Talleyrar and 

fifty yej opened 

the v tarl 
pressing demand. 

To the ie Vflle Lumiere resembled 

•■ >thing so much as a huge •■ ous 

avanserais, gigantic booths, gs erry-gCH 

squalid tx\ inns K r . il enter- 

ment was crowded, and congregati ntry 

awaited their tuni in the 

Kurdly high • for scant 

ace • and di at having r ers 

Extortion v is Lteering 

'\ Am fcish, 

dd bo >oo^ wandering, {kntm in hand, from post 

to p usly seeking wh< and 

lesperate by failure, fatigue, and nightfall. The 

cost of living which harass 

Past becoming the stumbling-1 governments and 

-: powerful Lever of revolutionaries. The chief of 
ice armies resid< 
luxuriously in dubious taste idown with 

ig lighl ' by day with the buzz of idle 

- ter, the shuffling o feet , the banging of doors, and the 
Music and I ted the in- 

mates when their day*s toil was over and time had to be 
killed. Thus, with oxious deliberation 

; . warm debate: v. it] risy revel and vulgar brawl. 

"Fate's - r; life's a dance." 

To few of those visitors did Paris seem what it really 
was — a nest of golden dreams, a mist of memories, a seed- 
plot of hopes, a storehouse . es. 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

THE PARIS CONFERENCE AND THE CONGRESS OP VIENNA 

There were no solemn pageants, no impressive cere- 
monies, such as those that rejoiced the hearts of the 
Viennese in 1S14-15 until the triumphal march of the 
Allied troops. 

The Vienna of Congress days was transformed into a 
paradise of delights by a brilliant court which pushed 
hospitality to the point of lavishncss. In the burg alone 
were two emperors, two empresses, four kings, one queen, 
two crown-princes, two archduchesses, and three princes. 
Every day the Emperor's table cost fifty thousand gulden 
— every Congress day cost him ten times that sum. 
Galaxies of Europe's eminent personages flocked to the 
Austrian capital, taking with them their ministers, secre- 
taries, favorites, and "confidential agents." So eager 
were these world-reformers to enjoy themselves that the 
court did not go into mourning for Queen Marie Caroline 
of Naples, the last of Marie Theresa's daughters. Her 
death was not even announced officially lest it should 
trouble the festivities of the jovial peace-makers ! 

The Paris of the Conference, on the other hand, was 
democratic, with a strong infusion of plutocracy. It 
attempted no such brilliant display as that which flat- 
tered the senses or fired the imagination of the Viennese. 
In 19 19 mankind was simpler in its tastes and perhaps 
less esthetic. It is certain that the froth of contemporary 
frivolity had lost its sparkling whiteness and was grown 
turbid. In Vienna, balls, banquets, theatricals, military 
reviews, followed one another in dizzy succession and en- 
abled politicians and adventurers to carry on their in- 
trigues and machinations unnoticed by all except the 
secret police. And, as the Congress marked the close of 
one bloody campaign and ushered in another, one might 
aptly term it the interval between two tragedies. For a 

15 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE V CONFEREN< 

3 - 

ig assem as, 
tag* bus, at the A 

Congress, the 
palling 
group tugging in .. 

aecesshY 

fell to 
squabbling an nsel esin I i Councj [ 

- they set about dft tding I i 
- . . a as ass 

i .'. ale . . - - - 

Men who knei 

ggates to the Quai d'Orsay were just as i ras 

s 

Another in: lis si 

by the .;-.: 

esentatives '.' stat* s 

THE CONGRESS CHIEF 

A relatively new Power took part 
of the Vienna Congress because 

intentions, in1 
of nations Russia was th< 

councils v'.\ \ at rec 

Her gifted Dsar Alexander 1. was 
idealist who wanted, i h peace with the - 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

quished enemy as a complete reform of the ordering of 

the whole world, so that wars should t heneeforward be 

abolished and the welfare of mankind be set developing 

like a soil o\' pacific perpetuum mobile. This Messed 
change, however, was to be compassed, not by the 
peoples or their representatives, but by the governments, 
led by himself ami deliberating in secret. At the Paris 
Conference it was even so. 

This curious type of public worker — a mixture of the 
mystical ami the practical was tin* terror of the Vienna 

delegates. He put spokes in everybody's wheel, be 
haved as the autoerat o( the Congress and felt as self 
complacent as a saint. Countess von Thnrhcim wrote of 
him: "He mistrusted his environment and let himself 
be led by others. But lie was thoroughly good and high- 
minded and sought, after the weal, not merely of his own 
country, but o( the whole world. Son cceur <•/)/ embrass6 le 
bonheur du monde." He realized in himself the dreams of 
the philosophers about love for mankind, but their 
Utopias o( human happiness were based upon the per- 
fection both of subjects and of prinees, and, as Alexander 
could fulfil only one-half of these conditions, his work 
remained unfinished and the poor Emperor died, a victim 
of his high minded illusions. 1 

The other personages, Metternich in particular, were 
greatly put out by Alexander's presence. They labeled 
him a marplot who eould not and would not enter into 
the spirit o( their game, but they dared not offend him. 
Without his brave troops they could not have been 
vietorious ami they did not know how soon they might 
need him again, for he represented a numerous and 
powerful people whose economic and military resources 
promised it in time the hegemony of the world. So, while 

_ • Countess Lulu von Thurheim, My Life, 1 788-1 852. German odi- 
tion, Munich, 1913-14. 

17 



THE INSIDE STORY OP THE P OONFEREN< 

- ••." g oat . . 

him. They all 

- v. • •••;'•.'•: ; ..-•.- --■ — ■; .-: . 

gain. The 
gre* 

■ .1 dissy men who ■ : ts set 

ink. His words 

m had : lenma] 

i system 

■ . . k it bo one raot 
■ ss being o 

sh people - ed thus at 

Congi ess, i - oes! claims •• 

and the 

. . 

: i a wholly d - - Its members 

i - • • 

or an ac sir stews 

> '•.-.■.• ..-■ e we::; m sarata 

: orate at home fh - ch* ck was 
pott - in Vienna Again i e Paris 

delegates did was Cor I sses, althoi 

■ 

• er be asso- 
ciated •• • was 
o£ the Conference rhe League of Nations scheme 
seemed des fundamentally the relations of 
>ples tow.- ar.othe: tar.ge w.is expected 
bo begin iminediatery after the Co 1 been voti 

Pv.: •.: was t-.ot rehshed by any 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

government except, that of the United States, and it was 
in order to enable the delegates to devise such a wording 
of the Covenant as would not bind them to an obnoxious 
principle or commit their electorates to any irksome 
sacrifice, that the peace treaty with Germany and the 
liquidation of the war were postponed. This delay caused 
profound dissatisfaction in continental Europe, but it, 
had the incidental advantage of bringing home to the 
victorious nations the marvelous recuperative powers 
of the German race. It also gave time for the drafting 
of a compact so admirably tempered to the human weak- 
nesses of the rival signatory nations, whose passions were 
curbed only by sheer exhaustion, that all their spokesmen 
saw their way to sign it. There was something almost 
genial in the simplicity of the means by which the eminent 
promoter of the Covenant intended to reform the peoples 
of the world. 1 [e gave them credit for virtues which would 
have rendered the League unnecessary and displayed in- 
dulgence for passions which made its speedy realization 
hopeless, thus affording a supcijlmms illustration of the 
truth that the one deadly evil to be shunned by those 
who would remain philanthropists is a practical knowledge 
of men, and of the truism that the statesman's bane is 
an inordinate fondness for abstract ideas. 

One of the decided triumphs of the Paris Peace Con- 
ference over the Vienna Congress lay in the amazing 
speed with which it got through the difficult task of 
solving offhandedly some of the most formidable problems 
that ever exercised the wit of man. One of the Paris 
journals contained the following remarkable announce- 
ment: ''The actual time consumed in constituting the 
League of Nations, which it is hoped will be the means 
of keeping peace in the world, was thirty hours. This 
doesn't seem possible, but it is true." x 

1 The New York Herald (Paris edition), Februaj-y 23, 1919. 
2 10 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

How provokingly slowly the dawdlers of Vienna moved 
in comparison may be read in the chronicles of that time. 
The peoples hoped and believed that the Congress would 
perform its tasks in a short period, but it was only after 
nine months' gestation and sore travail that it finally 
brought forth its offspring — a mountain of Acts which 
have been moldering in dust ever since. 

The Wilsonian Covenant, which bound together thirty- 
two states — a league intended to be incomparably more 
powerful than was the Holy Alliance — will take rank 
as the most rapid improvisation of its kind in diplomatic 
history. 

A comparison between the features common to the two 
international legislatures struck many observers as even 
more reassuring than the contrast between their dif- 
ferences. Both were placed in like circumstances, faced 
with bewildering and fateful problems to which an ex- 
hausting war, just ended, had imparted sharp actuality. 
One of the delegates to the Vienna Congress wrote: 

"Everything had to be recast and made new, the 
destinies of Germany, Italy, and Poland settled, a solid 
groundwork laid for the future, and a commercial system 
to be outlined." x Might not those very words have 
been penned at any moment during the Paris Conference 
with equal relevance to its undertakings? 

Or these: "However easily and gracefully the fine 
old French wit might turn the topics of the day, people 
felt vaguely beneath it all that these latter times were 
very far removed from the departed era and, in many 
respects, differed from it to an incomprehensible degree." 2 
And the veteran Prince de Ligne remarked to the Comte 
de la Garde: "From every side come cries of Peace, 



1 Grafen von Montgelas, Denunirdigkeiten des bayrischen Staatsministers 
Maximilian. See also Dr. Karl Soil, Per Wiener Kongress. 
3 Varnhagen von Ense. 

20 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

Justice, Equilibrium, Indemnity. . . . Who will evolve 
order from this chaos and set a dam to the stream of 
claims?" How often have the same cries and queries 
been uttered in Paris? 

When the first confidential talks began at the Vienna 
Congress, the same difficulties arose as were encountered 
over a century later in Paris about the number of states 
that were entitled to have representatives there. At the 
outset, the four Cabinet Ministers of Austria, Russia, 
England, and Prussia kept things to themselves, excluding 
vanquished France and the lesser Powers. Some time 
afterward, however, Talleyrand, the spokesman of the 
worsted nation, accompanied by the Portuguese Minister, 
Labrador, protested vehemently against the form and 
results of the deliberations. At one sitting passion rose 
to white heat and Talleyrand spoke of quitting the Con- 
gress altogether, whereupon a compromise was struck 
and eight nations received the right to be represented. 
In this way the Committee of Eight was formed. 1 In 
Paris discussion became to the full as lively, and on the 
first Saturday, when the representatives of Belgium, 
Greece, Poland, and the other small states delivered 
impassioned speeches against the attitude of the Big 
Five they were maladroitly answered by M. Clemenceau, 
who relied, as the source from which emanated the 
superior right of the Great Powers, upon the twelve mill- 
ion soldiers they had placed in the field. It was unfor- 
tunate that force should thus confer privileges at a Peace 
Conference which was convoked to end the reign of 
force and privilege. In Vienna it was different, but so 
were the times. 

Many of the entries and comments of the chroniclers 
of 1815 read like extracts from newspapers of the first 
three months of 19 19. "About Poland, they are fighting 

1 Friedrich von Gentz. 

21 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

fiercely and, down to the present, with no decisive result," 
writes Count Carl von Nostitz, a Russian military ob- 
server. . . . "Concerning Germany and her future feder- 
ative constitution, nothing has yet been done, absolutely 
nothing." ! Here is a gloss written by Countess Elise 
von Bernstorff, wife of the Danish Minister: "Most 
comical was the mixture of the very different individuals 
who all fancied they had work to do at the Congress. . . . 
One noticed noblemen and scholars who had never trans- 
acted any business before, but now looked extremely con- 
sequential and took on an imposing bearing, and pro- 
fessors who mentally set down their university chairs 
in the center of a listening Congress, but soon turned 
peevish and wandered hither and thither, complaining 
that they could not, for the life of them, make out what 
was going on." Again: "It would have been to the 
interest of all Europe — rightly understood — to restore 
Poland. This matter may be regarded as the most 
important of all. None other could touch so nearly the 
policy of all the Powers represented/ 1 - wrote the Bavarian 
Premier, Graf von Montgelas, just as the Entente press 
was writing in the year 191 9. 

The plenipotentiaries of the Paris Conference had for a 
short period what is termed a good press, and a rigorous 
censorship which never erred on the side of laxity, whereas 
those of the Vienna Congress were criticized without 
ruth. For example, the population of Vienna, we are 
told by Bavaria's chief delegate, was disappointed when 
it discerned in those whom it was wont to worship as 
demigods, only mortals. "The condition of state af- 
fairs," writes Von Gentz. one of the clearest heads at the 
Congress, "is weird, but it is not, as formerly, in con- 
sequence of the crushing weight that is hung around our 

1 Dr. Karl Soil, Count Carl von Nostitz. 
* Ci. Dr. Karl Soil, Der Wiener Kongress. 

22 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

necks, but by reason of the mediocrity and clumsiness 
of nearly all the workers." l One consequence of this 
state of things was the constant upspringing of new and 
unforeseen problems, until, as time went on, the be- 
wildered delegates were literally overwhelmed. "So 
many interests cross each other here," comments Count 
Carl von Nostitz, "which the peoples want to have 
mooted at the long-wished-for League of Nations, that 
they fall into the oddest shapes. . . . Look wheresoever 
you will, you are faced with incongruity and confusion. 
. . . Daily the claims increase as though more and more 
evil spirits were issuing forth from hell at the invocation 
of a sorcerer who has forgotten the spell by which to 
lay them." 2 It was of the Vienna Congress that those 
words were written. 

In certain trivial details, too, the likeness between the 
two great peace assemblies is remarkable. For example, 
Lord Castlereagh, who represented England at Vienna, 
had to return to London to meet Parliament, thus incon- 
veniencing the august assembly, as Mr. Wilson and Mr. 
George were obliged to quit Paris, with a like effect. 
Before Castlereagh left the scene of his labors, unchari- 
table judgments were passed on him for allowing home 
interests to predominate over his international activities. 

The destinies of Poland and of Germany, which were 
then about to become a confederation, occupied the fore- 
front of interest at the Congress as they did at the Con- 
ference. A similarity is noticeable also in the state of 
Europe generally, then and now. "The uncertain con- 
dition of all Europe," writes a close observer in 1815, "is 
appalling for the peoples: every country has mobilized 
. . . and the luckless inhabitants are crushed by taxa- 
tion. On every side people complain that this state of 

1 Dr. Karl Soil, Friedrich von Gentz, 

3 Dr. Karl Soil, Count Carl von Nostitz, p. 109. 

23 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

peace is worse than war . . . individuals who despised Na- 
poleon say that under him the suffering was not greater 

. . . every country is sapping its own prosperity, so that 
financial conditions, in lieu of improving since Napoleon's 
collapse, are deteriorating everywhere." ' 

In i Si 5. as in 1919, the world pacifiers had their court 
painters, arid Isabey. the French portraitist, was as much 
run after as was Sir William Orpen in 1010. In some 
respects, however, there was a difference. '"Isabey." said 
the Prince de Eigne, "is the Congress become painter. 
Come! His talk is as clever as his brush." But Sir 
William Orpen was so absorbed by his work that he never 
uttered a word during a sitting. The contemporaries of 
the Paris Conference were luckier than their forebears of 
the Vienna Congress — for they could behold the lifelike 
features of their benefactors in a cinema. "It is under- 
stood," wrote a Paris journal, "that the necessity of pre- 
serving a permanent record of the personalities arid pro- 
ceedings at the Peace Conference has riot been lost sight 
of. Very shortly a series of cinematographic films of the 
principal delegates and of the commissions is to be made 
on behalf of the British government, so that, side by side 
with the Treaty of Paris, posterity will be able to study the 
physiognomy of the men who made it." - In no case is it 
likely to forget them. 

So the great heart oi Paris, even to a greater degree 
than that of Vienna over a hundred years ago. beat and 
throbbed to cosmic measures while its brain worked 
busily at national, provincial, and economic questions. 

Side by side with the good cheer prevalent that kept the 
eminent lawgivers of the Vienna Congress in buoyant 
spirits went the cost of living, prohibitive outside the 
charmed circle in consequence of the high and rising prices. 

1 Jean Gabriel Bynard — the re p resentative of Geneva. 
1 The Daily Mail (Paris edition), March 22, 1919. 

-4 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

"Every article," writes the Comte de la Garde, one of the 
chroniclers of the Vienna Congress, "but more especially 
fuel, soared to incredible heights. The Austrian govern- 
ment found it necessary, in consequence, to allow all its 
officials supplements to their salaries and indemnities." 1 
In Paris things were worse. Greed and disorganization 
combined to make of the French capital a vast fleecing- 
machine. The sums of money expended by foreigners in 
France during all that time and a much longer period is 
said to have exceeded the revenue from foreign trade. 
There was hardly any coal, and even the wood fuel gave 
out now and again. Butter was unknown. Wine was 
bad and terribly dear. A public conveyance could not be 
obtained unless one paid "double, treble, and quintuple 
fares and a gratuity." The demand was great and the 
supply sometimes abundant, but the authorities con- 
trived to keep the two apart systematically. 

THE COST OF LIVING 

In no European country did the cost of living attain the 
height it reached in France in the year iqiq. Not only 
luxuries and comforts, but some of life's necessaries, were 
beyond the reach of home-coming soldiers, and this was 
currently ascribed to the greed of merchants, the disor- 
ganization of transports, the strikes of workmen, and the 
supineness of the authorities, whose main care was to keep 
the nation tranquil by suppressing one kind of news, 
spreading another, and giving way to demands which 
could no longer be denied. There was another and more 
effectual cause : the war had deprived the world of twelve 
million workmen and a thousand milliard francs' worth 
of goods. But of this people took no account. The 
demobilized soldiers who for years had been well fed and 

1 Count de Li Garde. 

25 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

ode far the morrow r 
flushed with victory, proud of the commanding position 
which they the 

rewards of their sacrifices. But they wore bitterly dis- 
illusioned. They t intry fit for heroes to 

live in. and wha them was a condition of things 

to which only a le could be asked to resign 

it. The food to which the poilu had, for nearly rive 
years. I uned at the front was become, since 

the armistice, the exclusive monopry of the ca] itafist or 
the noM9MH To obtain b ration of 

sugar he or his wife had to stand in a long queue for 
hours, perhaps go away empty-handed and return on the 
folic ling. When his sugar-card was eventually 

handed to him he had again to stand in line outside the 
grocer's deer and. when ins tun: came to cater it. was 
frequently told that the supply was exhausted and would 
not be repl< I tor a week or longer. Yet his news- 

paper is a him that there was plenty of colonial 

sugar, ready tor shipment, but forbidden by the au- 
thorities to be imported into France. I met many p 
people from the provinces and some re- ris who 

for four years had not once eaten a morsel of SUg 
although the well-to-do were always amply supplied. In 
many places even bread was lacking, while biscuits, short- 
bread, and Fancy cakes, available at exorbitant prices, were 
exhibited in the shop windows. Tokens of unbridled 
luxury and glaring evidences ot wanton waste were 
flaunted daily and hourly in the faces of the humbled men 
who had sao ind wanted the nation to 

the fact. Lucullan banquets, opulent lunches, all-night 
dances, high revels of an exotic character testified to the 
peculiar ps; . v .is well as to the la] pros- 

perk) of the passive elements of the community and stung 
the poilus to the quick. "But stice." these asked. 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

"can the living hope for, when the glorious dead are so 
soon forgotten?" For one ghastly detail remains to com- 
plete a picture to which Boecaceio could hardly have done 
justice. ""While all this wild dissipation was going on 
among the moneyed class in the capital the corpses of 
many gallant soldiers lay unburied and uncovered on the 
shell-plowed fields of battle near Rhcims, on the road to 
Neuville-sur-Margival and other places — sights pointed 
out to visitors to tickle their interest in the grim spectacle 
of war. In vain individuals expostulated and the press 
protested. As recently as May persons known to me — 
my English secretary was one — looked with the fascina- 
tion of horror on the bodies of men who, when they 
breathed, were heroes. They lay there where they had 
fallen and agonized, and now, in the heat of the May sun, 
were moldering in dust away — a couple of hours' motor 
drive from Paris. . . ." 1 

The soldiers mused and brooded. Since the war began 
they had undergone a great psychic transformation. 
Stationed at the very center of a sustained fiery crisis, 
they lost their feeling of acquiescence in the established 
order and in the place of their own class therein. In the 
sight of death they had been stirred to their depths and 
volcanic fires were found burning there. Resignation had 
thereupon made way for a rebellious mood and rebellion 
found sustenance everywhere. The poilu demobilized 
retained his military spirit, nay. he carried about with him 
the very atmosphere of the trenches. He had rid him- 
self of the sentiment of fear and the faculty of reverence 
went with it. His outlook on the world had changed 



1 Cf. Le Matin, May 31, 1010. A noteworthy example of the negligence 
of the authorities was narrated by this journal on the same day. To a 
wooden cross with an inscription recording that the grave was tenanted by 
"an unknown Frenchman" was hung a disk containing his name and regi- 
ment! And here and there the skulls of heroes protruded from the grass, 
but the German tombs were piously looked after by Boehe prisoners. 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

pletely and his inn< J order 

which he beheld, as the eye reverses the ol 

is. Respect utions survived 

in relatively few instances the sacrceincss of lite and 
fear lie was impressed, too, with the all- 

imp of his class, which he had learned during the 

to leek upon as the Atlas on whose shoulders rest 
the Republic and its empire overseas, He had saved the 

be in war and he remained in peace-time its principal 
mainstay. With his value as measured by these priceless 
services he compared the low estimate put upon him 
by those who continued to identify themselves with the 
state the over fed, lasy, self-seeking money-getters who 
wed to themselves the fruits of his toil. 
One can well imagine — I have actually heard — the 
poilus putting their ease somewhat as follows: "'So 

g as we tilled the gap between the de. .ling 

Teutons and our privileged compatriots we were well fed, 
warmly clad, made much of. During the war we were 
raised to the rank of pillars of the state, saviors of the 
nation, arbiters of the world's destinies. So long as we 
faced the enemy's guns nothing was too good for us. 
We had meat, white bread, eggs. wine, sugar in plenty. 
But, now that we have accomplished our task, we have 
fallen from our high estate and are expected to become 
pariahs anew. We are to work on for the old gang 
ass from which it comes, until they plunge us 
into another war. Eor what : What is the reward for 
what we have achieved, what the incentive tor what 
we are expected to accomplish? We cannot afford as 
much food as before the war, nor of the same quality. 
We are in wan: even of necessaries. Is it for this that we 
have fought? A thousand times no. If we saved our 
nation we can also save our class. We have the will 
and the power. Why should we not exert them'" The 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

purpose of the section of the community to which these 
demobilized soldiers mainly belonged grew visibly definite 
as consciousness of their collective force grew and became 
keener. Occasionally it manifested itself openly in symp- 
tomatic spurts. 

One dismal night, at a brilliant ball in a private man- 
sion, a select company of both sexes, representatives 
of the world of rank and fashion, were enjoying them- 
selves to their hearts' content, while their chauffeurs 
watched and waited outside in the cold, dark streets, 
chewing the cud of bitter reflections. Between the 
hours of three and four in the morning the latter held 
an open-air meeting, and adopted a resolution which they 
carried out forthwith. A delegation was sent upstairs 
to give notice to the light-hearted guests that they must 
be down in their respective motors within ten minutes 
on pain of not finding any conveyances to take them 
home. The mutineers were nearly all private chauffeurs 
in the employ of the personages to whom they sent this 
indelicate ultimatum. The resourceful host, however, 
warded off the danger and placated the rebellious drivers 
by inviting them to an improvised little banquet of 
pdtcs de foie gras } dry champagne, and other delicacies. 
The general temper of the proletariat remained un- 
changed. Tales of rebellion still more disquieting were 
current in Paris, which, whether true or false, were aids 
to a correct diagnosis of the situation. 

A dancing mania broke out during the armistice, 
which was not confined to the French capital. In Berlin, 
Rome, London, it aroused the indignation of those whose 
sympathy with the spiritual life of their respective na- 
tions was still a living force. It would seem, however, 
to be the natural reaction produced by a tremendous 
national calamity, under which the mainspring of the 
collective mind temporarily gives way and the psychical 

29 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

equilibrium is upset. Disillusion, despondency, and con- 
tempt for the passions that lately stirred them drive 
the people to seek relief in the distractions of pleasures, 
among which dancing is perhaps one of the mildest. 
It was so in Paris at the close of the long period of stress 
which ended with the rise of Napoleon. Dancing then 
went on uninterruptedly despite national calamities and 
private hardships. ''Luxury," said Victor Hugo, "is a 
necessity of great states and great civilizations, but there 
are moments when it must not be exhibited to the masses." 
There was never a conjuncture when the danger of such 
an exhibition was greater or more imminent than during 
the armistice on the Continent — for it was the period of 
incubation preceding the outbreak of the most malignant 
social disease to which civilized communities are subject. 

The festivities and amusements in the higher circles 
of Paris recall the glowing descriptions of the fret and 
fever of existence in the Austrian capital during the 
historic Vienna Congress a hundred years ago. Dancing 
became epidemic and shameless. In some salons the 
forms it took were repellent. One of my friends, the 
Marquis X., invited to a dance at the house of a plutocrat, 
was so shocked by what he saw there that he left almost 
at once in disgust. Madame Machin, the favorite 
teacher of the choreographic art, gave lessons in the new 
modes of dancing, and her fee was three hundred francs 
a lesson. In a few weeks she netted, it is said, over one 
hundred thousand francs. 

The Prince de Ligne said of the Vienna Congress: "Le 
Congres danse mais il ne marche pas." The French press 
uttered similar criticisms of the Paris Conference, when 
its delegates were leisurely picking up information about 
the countries whose affairs they were forgathered to 
settle. The following paragraph from a Paris journal — 
one of many such — describes a characteristic scene: 

30 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

The domestic staff at the H6tel Majestic, the headquarters of the 
British Delegation at the Peace Conference, held a very successful 
dance on Monday evening, attended by many members of the British 
Mission and Staff. The ballroom was a medley of plenipotentiaries 
and chambermaids, generals and orderlies, Foreign Office attaches 
and waitresses. All the latest forms of dancing were to be seen, 
including the jazz and the hesitation waltz, and, according to the 
opinion of experts, the dancing reached an unusually high standard of 
excellence. Major Lloyd George, one of the Prime Minister's sons, 
was among the dancers. Mr. G. H. Roberts, the Food Controller, 
made a very happy little speech to the hotel staff. 1 

The following extract is also worth quoting: 

A packed house applauded ' Hullo, Paris 1" from the rise of the curtain 
to the finale at. the new Palace Theater (in the rue Mogador), Paris, 
last night. . . . President Wilson, Mr. A. J. Balfour, and Lord Derby 
all remained until the fall of the curtain at 12.15 • • • and . . . were 
given cordial cheers from the dispersing audience as they passed 
through the line of Municipal Guards, who presented arms as the 
distinguished visitors made their way to their motor-cars. 2 

Juxtaposed with the grief, discontent, and physical 
hardships prevailing among large sections of the popula- 
tion which had provided most of the holocausts for the 
Moloch of War, the ostentatious gaiety of the prosperous 
few might well seem a challenge. And so it was con- 
strued by the sullen lack-alls who prowled about the 
streets of Paris and told one another that their turn 
would come soon. 

When the masses stare at the wealthy with the eyes 
one so often noticed during the eventful days of the 
armistice one may safely conclude, in the words of Victor 
Hugo, that "it is not thoughts that are harbored by 
those brains; it is events." 

By the laboring classes the round of festivities, the 
theatrical representations, the various negro and other 

1 The Daily Mail (Continental edition), March 12, 191 9. 
3 Ibid., April 23, 1919. 

31 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

foreign dances, and the less-refined pleasures of the world's 
blithest capital were watched with ill-concealed resent- 
ment. One often witnessed long lines of motor-cars 
driving up to a theater, fashionable restaurant, or concert- 
hall, through the opening portals of which could be caught 
a glimpse of the dazzling illumination within, while, a 
few yards farther off, queues of anemic men and women 
were waiting to be admitted to the shop where milk or 
eggs or fuel could be had at the relatively low prices fixed 
by the state. The scraps of conversation that reached 
one's ears were far from reassuring. 

I have met on the same afternoon the international 
world - regenerators, smiling, self-complacent, or pre- 
occupied, flitting by in their motors to the Quai d'Orsay, 
and also quiet, determined-looking men, trudging along 
in the snow and slush, wending their way toward their 
labor conventicles, where they, too, were drafting laws 
for a new and strange era, and I voluntarily fell to gaging 
the distance that sundered the two movements, and 
asked myself which of the inchoate legislations would 
ultimately be accepted by the world. The question 
since then has been partially answered As time passed, 
the high cost of living was universally ascribed, as we 
saw, to the insatiable greed of the middlemen and the 
sluggishness of the authorities, whose incapacity to or- 
ganize and unwillingness to take responsibility increased 
and augured ill of the future of the country unless men 
of different type should in the meanwhile take the reins. 
Practically nothing was done to ameliorate the carrying 
power of the railways, to utilize the waterways, to em- 
ploy the countless lorries and motor-vans that were lying 
unused, to purchase, convey, and distribute the provisions 
which were at the disposal of the government. Various 
ministerial departments would dispute as to which should 
take over consignments of meat or vegetables, and while 

32 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

reports, notes, and replies were being leisurely written and 
despatched, weeks or months rolled by, during which the 
foodstuffs became unfit for human consumption. In the 
middle of May, to take but one typical instance, 2,401 
cases of lard and 1,418 cases of salt meat were left rotting 
in the docks at Marseilles. In the storage magazines at 
Murumas, 6,000 tons of salt meat were spoiled because 
it was nobody's business to remove and distribute them. 
Eighteen refrigerator-cars loaded with chilled meat ar- 
rived in Paris from Havre in the month of June. When 
they were examined at the cold-storage station it was 
discovered that, the doors having been negligently left 
open, the contents of the cases had to be destroyed. 1 
From Belgium 108,000 kilos of potatoes were received and 
allowed to lie so long at one of the stations that they went 
bad and had to be thrown away. When these and 
kindred facts were published, the authorities, who had 
long been silent, became apologetic, but remained through- 
out inactive. In other countries the conditions, if less 
accentuated, were similar. 

One of the dodges to which unscrupulous dealers re- 
sorted with impunity and profit was particularly ingenious. 
At the central markets, whenever any food is condemned, 
the public-health authorities seize it and pay the owner 
full value at the current market rates. The marketmen 
often turned this equitable arrangement to account by 
keeping back large quantities of excellent vegetables, for 
which the population was yearning, and when they rotted 
and had to be carted away, received their money value 
from the Public Health Department, thus attaining their 
object, which was to lessen the supply and raise the prices 
on what they kept for sale. 2 The consequence was that 
Paris suffered from a continual dearth of vegetables and 

1 Cf. The New York Herald (Paris edition), June 8, 19 19. 
2 Cf. The New York Herald, June 2, 191 9. 

33 



Hit- INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Statistics >tates gov- 

he cost of 
as Prance, 13 5 
5 pei ceu 
United 

le\ d as t 

is, Mara 

.- ove ! do per cent . 
.\ •■ . j eat 15 -. .:. cost 50* b ancs ■ 

could less than $oc 

ics 

1st ol v 

luxury 

i 

■ • 

ctails k : 5 BSS 

S expostu ges 

A> it cfc 

in- 

Hving, . ...v..; a: 

'.- k d 

re dr ess, 

.. .-. relv.:e 01 150 
. s ; 
Not 

iV . .-. v.:rv..i' whose 

•- 919 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

representative made a special inquiry into the whole 
question of the cost of living- 1 "I was dining the other 
day at. a restaurant of the Hois de Boulogne. There was 
a long queue of people waiting at the door, some sixty 
persons all told, mostly ladies, who pressed one another 
closely. From time to time a voice cried: 'Two places, 1 
whereupon a door was held opened, two patients entered, 
and then it was loudly slammed, smiting some of those 

who stood next \o it. At lasl my turn came, and T went 
in. The quests were sitting so close to one another that 
they could not move their elbows. Only the hands and 
fingers were free. There sat women half naked, and men 
whose voices and dress betrayed newly acquired wealth. 
Not one of them questioned the hills which were presented. 
And what bills! The hors d'oeuvre, 20 francs. Fish, go 
francs. A chicken, 150 francs. Three cigars, 45 francs. 
The repast came to 250 francs a person at the very low r est." 
Another journalist, commented upon this story as follows: 
"Since the end of last June," he said, "445,000 quintals 
of vegetables, the superfluous output of the Palatinate, 
were offered to France at nominal prices. And the cost 
of vegetables here at home is painfully notorious. Well, 
the deal was accepted by the competent Commission in 
Paris. Everything was ready for despatching the con- 
signment. The necessary trains were secured. All that 
was wanting was the approval of the French authorities, 
who were notified. Their answer has not yet been 
given and already the vegetables arc rotting in the 
magazines." 

The authorities pleaded the insufficiency of rolling 
stock, but the press revealed the hollowness of the excuse 
and the responsibility of those who put it forward, and 
showed that thousands of wagons, lorries, and motor-vans 
were idle, deteriorating in the open air. For instance, 

1 L'Humanilt, Tulv 10, 1919. 

4 35 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

between Cognac and Jarnac the state railways had left 
about one thousand wagons unused, which were fast 
becoming unusable. 1 An J this was but one of many 
similar instances 

It would be hard to find a parallel in history for the 
rapacity combined with unscrupulousness and ingenuity 
displayed during that fateful period by dishonest indi- 
viduals, and left unpunished by the state. Doubtless 
France was not the only country in which greed was 
insatiable and its manifestations disastrous. From other 
parts of the Continent there also came bitter complaints 
of the rathlessness of profiteers, and in Italy their heart- 
less vampirism contributed materially to the revolu- 
tionary outbreaks throughout thai country in July 
Even Britain was not exempt from the scourge. But 
the presence of whole armies of well-paid, easy-going 
foreign troops and officials on French soil stimulated 
greed by feeding it, and also their complaints occasionally 
bared it to the world. The impression it left on certain 
units of the American forces was deplorable. When 
United States soldiers who had long been stationed in a 
French town were transferred to Germany, where charges 
were low, the revulsion of feeling among the straightfor- 
ward, honest Yankees was complete and embarrassing. 
And by way of keeping it within the bounds of political 
orthodoxy, they were informed that the Germans had 
conspired to hoodwink them by selling at undercost 
prices, in order to turn them against the French. It was 
an insidious form of German propaganda ! 

On the other hand, the experience of British and 
American warriors in France sometimes happened to be 
so unfortunate that many of them gave credence to the 
absurd and mischievous legend that their governments 
were made to pay rent for the trenches in which their 

1 La Democratic Nouvelle, June 14, 1919. 

36 



THE ( ITV Of THE OONFEREM E 

troops fought and died, and i ren foi the graves if] which 
i in glain ■//< -i<- btn ted. 

An acquaintance oi mine, an Americas] delegate, 
wanted an abodt to himseli during the Conference, and, 
having found one suitable foi which fifteen to twenty 
five thousand franca a yeai were deemed a fair rent, he 
inquired the price, and the proprietor, knowing that he 
had to do with a really wealthy American, answered, 
"A quartei oi a million francs " Subsequently the land 
lord sent to asfc whethei the distinguished pisitoi would 
take the place; but theanewei he received ran, "No, I 
have too mu< h sell respei t " 

Hotel prices in Paris, beginning from December, [9x8, 
were prohibitive to all but the wealthy. Vet they were 
raised several times during the Conference Again, 
despite the high level they had reached by the beginning 
Oi July, they v/i-ic ;k tually quintupled in some hotels and 
doubled in many foi about a week at the time of the 
peace celebrations. Rents foi flats and house soared 
propoi tionately. 

On*- explanation oi the fantastic rise in rents is chai 
a< t'i istic. I )ui ing the war and the ai mist i< e, the govern- 
ment, and not, only the French government pro 
claimed a moratorium, and no rents at all wen paid, 
in consequence of which many house own* rsw< n impover- 
ished and others eu tually beggared And it was with a 
view to recoup themselves foi these losses that they 
fleeced thei] tenants, French and foreign, as soon as the 
opportunity presented itself. An amusing incident aris 
ing out of the moratorium came to light in the course oi 
:i lawsuit. An ingenious tenant, smi1 ten with the passion 
of greed, not content with occupying iii:. flat without 
paying rent, sublet it- at a high figure to a man who paid 
him well and in advan< e, but by mischance set fire to the 

place and died. Thereupon the Icriwut demanded and 

37 



THE [NSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

received a considerable sum from the insurance company 
in which the defunct occupant had had to insure the 
flat and its contents. He then entered an action at law 
against the proprietor of the house for the value of the 
damage caused by the tire, and he won his case. The 
unfortunate owner was condemned to pay the sum 
claimed, and also the costs of the action. 1 But he could 
not recover his rent. 

Disorganization throughout Prance, and particularly in 
Paris, verged on the border of chaos. Every one felt 
its effects, but none so severely as the men who had won 
the war. The work of demobilization, which began soon 
after the armistice, but was early interrupted, proceeded 
at snail-pace. The homecoming soldiers sent hundreds 
of letters to the newspapers, complaining of the wearisome 
delays on the journey and the sharp privations which 
they were needlessly forced to endure. Thus, whereas 
they took but twenty-eight hours to travel from Hanover 
to Cologne — the lines being German, and therefore rela- 
tively well organized they were no less than a fortnight 
on the way between Cologne and Marseilles.- During 
the German section of the journey they were kept warm, 
supplied with hot soup and coffee twice daily; but during 
the second half, which lasted fourteen days, they received 
no beverage, hot or cold. ' ' The men were eared for much 
less than horses." That these poilus turned against the 
government and the class responsible for this gross neglect 
was hardly surprising. One of them wrote: "They [the 
authorities] are frightened of Bolshevism. But we who 
have not got home, we all await its coming. I don't, 
of course, mean the real Bolshevism, but even that kind 
which they paint in such repellent hues." s The condi- 
tions of telegraphic and postal communications were on a 

-.-. March 6, [919. 
S L':. M.iv .\;, 1010. *2bii, 

38 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

par with everything else. There was no guarantee that 
a message paid for would even be sent by the telegraph- 
operators, or, if withheld, that the sender would be 
apprised of its suppression. The war arrangements were 
retained during the armistice. And they were superla- 
tively bad. A committee appointed by the Chamber of 
Deputies to inquire into the matter officially, reported 
that, 1 at the Paris Telegraph Bureau alone, 40,000 de- 
spatches were held back every day — 40,000 a day, or 
58,400,000 in four years! And from the capital alone. 
The majority of them were never delivered, and the 
others were distributed after great delay. The despatches 
which were retained were, in the main, thrown into a 
basket, and, when the accumulation had become too 
great, were destroyed. The Control Section never made 
any inquiry, and neither the senders nor those to whom 
the despatches were addressed were ever informed. 2 
Even important messages of neutral ambassadors in Rome 
and London fell under the ban. The recklessness of these 
censors, who ceased even to read what they destroyed, 
was such that they held up and made away with state 
orders transmitted by the great munitions factories, and 
one of these was constrained to close down because it was 
unable to obtain certain materials in time. 

The French Ambassador in Switzerland reported that, 
owing to these holocausts, important messages from that 
country, containing orders for the French national loan, 
never reached their destination, in consequence of which 
the French nation lost from ten to twenty million francs. 
And even the letters and telegrams that were actually 
passed were so carelessly handled that many of them were 
lost on the way or delayed until they became meaningless 



1 Le Gaulois, March 23, 1919. The New York Herald (Paris edition), 
March 22, 1919. L'Echo de Paris, June 12, 1919. 
- The New York Herald, March 22, 1919. 

39 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

to the addressee. So. for instance, an official letter 
despatched by the Minister of Commerce to the Minister 
of Finance in Paris was sent to Calcutta, where the French 
Consul-Genera] Came across it. and had it directed h 
to Paris. The correspondent of the /•'. 10 d$ Parts, who 
was sent to Switzerland by his journal, was forbidden by 
law to carry more than one thousand francs over the 
frontier, nor was the management of the journal per- 
mitted to forward to him more than two hundred francs 
■ time. And when a telegram was given tip in Paris. 
Crediting him with two hundred francs, it was stopped 
by the censor Eleven days were let go by without in- 
forming the persons concerned. When the administrator 
of the journal questioned the chief censor, he declined 
responsibility . having had nothing to do with the matter, 
but he indicated the Central Telegraph Control as the 
■petent depi There, too, however, they were 

•-. . having never heard of the suppression. It took 
ther day to elicit the fact that the economic section 
of the War Ministry was alone answerable for the de- 
em, The to nager of the '. .- aY F.:'i.< 
applied to the department in question, but only to learn 
that it, tco. was without any knowledge of what had 

happened, but it promised to find out Soon afterward 
it informed th< uis manager that the department 

which had given the could only be the Exchange 

Commission of the Ministry of Finances. And during 
all the time the correspondent was in Zurich without 
cey to pay for telegrams or to settle his hotel and 
restaurant bills. 1 

e Ministry of Ford its itself, in a report on 

: the section of Tele] 
Control as disorder which 

engendered extra uses, and risked com- 

1 I'. IS, 1010. 

40 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

promising the government seriously." 1 It did not merely 
risk, it actually went far to compromise the government 
and the entire governing class as well. 

It looked as though the rulers of France were still un- 
consciously guided by the maxim of Richelieu, who wrote 
in his testament, "If the peoples were too comfortable 
there would be no keeping them to the rules of duty." 
The more urgent the need of resourcefulness and guidance, 
the greater were the listlessncss and confusion. "There 
is neither unity of conduct," wrote a press organ of the 
masses, "nor co-ordination of the Departments of War, 
Public Works, Revictualing, Transports. All these ser- 
vices commingle, overlap, clash, and paralyze one another. 
There is no method. Thus, whereas France has coffee 
enough to last her a twelvemonth, she has not sufficient 
fuel for a week. Scruples, too, are wanting, as are 
punishments; everywhere there is a speculator who offers 
his purse, and an official, a station-master, or a subaltern 
to stretch out his hand. . . . Shortsightedness, disorder, 
waste, the frittering away of public moneys and irre- 
sponsibility: that is the balance. . . ." 2 

That the spectacle of the country sinking in this ad- 
ministrative quagmire was not conducive to the mainte- 
nance of confidence in its ruling classes can well be 
imagined. On all sides voices were uplifted, not merely 
against the Cabinet, whose members were assumed to be 
actuated by patriotic motives and guided by their own 
lights, but against the whole class from which they sprang, 
and not in France only, but throughout Europe. Noth- 
ing, it was argued, could be worse than what these 
leaders had brought upon the country, and a change from 
the bourgeoisie to the proletariat could not well be in- 
augurated at a more favorable conjuncture. 

1 The New York Herald, March 22, 191 9. 
3 L'Hwnaniti, May 23, 1919. 

41 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE "CONFERENCE 

In truth the bourgeoisie were often as impatient of the 
restraints and abuses as the homecoming poilu. The 
middle class during the armistice was subjected to some 
of the most galling restraints that only the war could 
justify. They were practically bereft of communications. 
To use the telegraph, the post, the cable, or the telephone 
was for the most part, an exhibition of childish faith, 
which generally ended in the loss of time and money. 

This state of affairs called for an immediate and drastic 
remedy, for, so long as it persisted, it irritated those whom 
it condemned to avoidable hardship, and their name was 
legion. It was also part of an almost imperceptible 
revolutionary process similar to that which was going on 
in several other countries for transferring wealth and 
competency from one class to another and for goading 
into rebellion those who had nothing to lose by "violent 
change in the politico-social ordering." The govern- 
ment, whose powers were concentrated in the hands of 
M. Clemenceau, had little time to attend to these griev- 
ances. For its main business was the re-establishment of 
peace. What it did not fully realize was the gravity of 
the risks involved. For it was on the cards that the 
utmost it could achieve at the Conference toward the 
restoration of peace might be outweighed and nullified 
by the consequences of what it was leaving undone and 
unattempted at home. At no time during the armistice 
was any constructive policy elaborated in any of the 
Allied countries. Rhetorical exhortations to keep down 
expenditure marked the high-water level of ministerial 
endeavor there. 

The strikes called by the revolutionary organizations 
whose aim was the subversion of the regime under which 
those monstrosities flourished at last produced an effect 
on the parliament. One day in July the French Chamber 
left the Cabinet in a minority by proposing the following 

42 



THE CITY OF THE CONFERENCE 

resolution: "The Chamber, noting that the cost of liv- 
ing in Belgium has diminished by a half and in England 
by a fourth since the armistice, while it has continually 
increased in France since that date, judges the govern- 
ment's economic policy by the results obtained and 
passes to the order of the day." 1 

Shortly afterward the same Chamber recanted and gave 
the Cabinet a majority. In Great Britain, too, the House 
of Commons put pressure on the government, which at 
last was forced to act. 

On the other hand, extravagance was systematically 
encouraged everywhere by the shortsighted measures 
which the authorities adopted and maintained as well 
as by the wanton waste promoted or tolerated by the 
incapacity of their representatives. In France the mora- 
torium and immunity from taxation gave a fillip to reck- 
lessness. People who had hoarded their earnings before 
the war, now that they were dispensed from paying rent 
and relieved of fair taxes, paid out money ungrudgingly 
for luxuries and then struck for higher salaries and wages. 

Even the Deputies of the Chamber, which did nothing to 
mitigate the evil complained of, manifested a desire to have 
their own salaries — six hundred pounds a year — aug- 
mented proportionately to the increased cost of living; 
but in view of the headstrong current of popular opinion 
against parliamentarism the government deemed it im- 
politic to raise the point at that conjuncture. 

Most of the working-men's demands in France as in 
Britain were granted, but the relief they promised was 
illusory, for prices still went up, leaving the recipients of 
the relief no better off. And as the wages payable for 
labor are limited, whereas prices may ascend to any 
height, the embittered laborer fancied he could better his 
lot by an appeal to the force which his organization 

1 On July 1 8, 1919. Cf. Matin, Echo de Paris, Figaro, July 10, 19 19. 

43 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

wielded. The only complete solution of the problem, he 
was assured, was to be found in the supersession of the 
governing classes and the complete reconstruction of the 
soeial fa brie on wholly new foundations. 1 And some of 
the leaders rashly declared that they were unable to 
discern the elements oi any other. 

1 Cf. UHumomti (French Syndicalist organ), July II, 1919. 



II 

SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

SOCIETY during the transitional stage through which 
it has for some years been passing underwent an 
unprecedented change the extent and intensity of which 
are as yet but imperfectly realized. Its more striking 
characteristics were determined by the gradual decom- 
position of empires and kingdoms, the twilight of their 
gods, the drying up of their sources of spiritual energy, 
and the psychic derangement of communities and indi- 
viduals by a long and fearful war. Political principles, 
respect for authority and tradition, esteem for high 
moral worth, to say nothing of altruism and public spirit, 
either vanished or shrank to shadowy simulacra. In 
contemporary history currents and cross-currents, eddies 
and whirlpools, became so numerous and bewildering 
that it is not easy to determine the direction of the main 
stream. Unsocial tendencies coexisted with collectivity 
of effort, both being used as weapons against the larger 
community and each being set down as a manifestation 
of democracy. Against every kind of authority the 
world, or some of its influential sections, was up in revolt, 
and the emergence of the passions and aims of classes and 
individuals had freer play than ever before. 

To this consummation conservative governments, and 
later on their chiefs at the Peace Conference, systemati- 
cally contributed with excellent intentions and efficacious 
measures. They implicitly denied, and acted on the 

45 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

denial, that a nation or a race, like an individual, has 
something distinctive, inherent, and enduring that may 
aptly be termed soul or character. They ignored the 
fact that all nations and races are not of the same age 
nor endowed with like faculties, some being young and 
helpless, others robust and virile, and a third category 
senescent and decrepit, and that there are some raees 
which Nature has wholly and permanently unfitted for 
service among the pioneers of progress. In consequence 
of these views, which I venture to think erroneous, they 
applied the same treatment to all states. Just as Presi- 
dent Wilson, by striving to impose his pinched con- 
eeption of democracy and his lofty ideas of political 
morality on Mexico, had thrown that country into 
anarchy, the two Anglo-Saxon governments by enforcing 
their theories about the protection of minorities and 
other political conceptions in various states of Europe 
helped to loosen the cement of the politico-social struc- 
ture there. 

Through these as well as other channels virulent poison 
penetrated to the marrow of the social organism. Lan- 
guage itself, on which all human intercourse hinges, was 
twisted to suit unwholesome ambitions, further selfish 
interests, and obscure the vision of all those who wanted 
real reforms and unvarnished truth. During the war 
the armies were never told plainly what they were strug- 
gling for; officially they were said to be combating for 
justice, right, self-determination, the sacredness of treaties, 
and other abstract nouns to which the heroic soldiers 
never gave a thought and which a section of the civil 
population misinterpreted. Indeed, so little were these 
shibboleths understood even by the most intelligent 
among the politicians who launched them that one half 
of the world still more or less conscientiously labors to 
establish their contraries and is anathematizing the other 

46 



SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

half for championing injustice, might, and unveracity — 
under various misnomers. 

Anglo-Saxondom, taking the lead of humanity, imitated 
the Catholic states of by-past days, and began to impose 
on other peoples its own ideas, as well as its practices 
and institutions, as the best fitted to awaken their dormant 
energies and contribute to the social reconstruction of the 
world. In the interval, language, whether applied to 
history, journalism, or diplomacy, was perverted and 
words lost their former relations to the things connoted, 
and solemn promises were solemnly broken in the name 
of truth, right, or equity. For the new era of good faith, 
justice and morality was inaugurated, oddly enough, 
by a general tearing up of obligatory treaties and an 
ethical violation of the most binding compacts known to 
social man. This happened coincidently to be in keeping 
with the general insurgence against all checks and 
restraints, moral and social, for which the war is mainly 
answerable, and to be also in harmony with the regular 
supersession of right by might which characterizes the 
present epoch and with the disappearance of the sense of 
law. In a word, under the auspices of the amateur 
world-reformers, the tendency of Bolshevism throve and 
spread — an instructive case of people serving the devil 
at the bidding of God's best friends. 

As in the days of the Italian despots, every individual 
has the chance of rising to the highest position in many 
of the states, irrespective of his antecedents and no 
matter what blots may have tarnished his 'scutcheon. 
Neither aristocratic descent, nor public spirit nor even a 
blameless past is now an indispensable condition of 
advancement. In Germany the head of the Republic 
is an honest saddler. In Austria the chief of the govern- 
ment until recently was the assassin of a prime minister. 
The chief of the Ukraine state was an ex-inmate of an 

47 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

asylum. Trotfky, one of the Russian duumvirs, is said 
to have a record which might of itself have justified his 
change oi name from Braunstein. Bela Kuhn, the 
Semitic Dictator of Hungary, had the reputation of a 
thief before rising to the height Of ruler of the Magyars. 
... In a word. Napoleon's ideal is at last realized, "La 

carriere est ouverte aux talents." 

Among the peculiar traits of this evanescent epoch 
may be mentioned inaccessibility to the teaching of facts 
which run counter to cherished prejudices, aims, and 
interests. People draw from facts which they cannot 
dispute only the inferences which they desire. An amus- 
ing instance of this occurred in Paris, where a Syn- 
dicalist organ 1 published an interesting and on the whole 
truthful account of the chaotic confusion, misery, and 
discontent prevailing in Russia and of the brutal violence 
and foxy wiles of Lenin. The dreary picture included 
the cost of living; the disorganisation of transports; the 
terrible mortality caused by the after-effects of the war; 
the crowding oi prisons, theaters, cinemas, and dancing- 
saloons; the eagerness of employers to keep their war 
prisoners employed while thousands of demobilized soldiers 
were roaming about the cities and villages vainly looking 
for work; the absence of personal liberty; the numerous 
arrests, and the relative popularity withal of the Dictator. 
This popularity, it was explained, the press contributed 
to keep alive, especially since the abortive attempt made 
on his life, when the journals declared that he was indis- 
pensable for the time being to his country. 

He himself was described as a hard despot, ruthless as 
a tiger who strikes his fellow-workers numb and dumb 
with fear. "But he is under no illusions as to the real 
sentiments of the members of the Soviet who back him, 
nor does he deign to conceal those winch he entertains 

' L Humf.il:. March 6 and iS, 1010. 

♦« 



SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

toward them. . . . Whenever Lenin himself is concerned 
justice is expeditious. Some men will be delivered from 
prison after many years of preventive confinement with- 
out having been brought to trial, others who fired on 
Kerensky will be kept untried for an indefinite period, 
whereas the brave Russian patriot who aimed his re- 
volver at Lenin, and whom the French press so justly 
applauded, had only three weeks to wait for his con- 
demnation to death." 

This article appearing in a Syndicalist organ seemed 
an event. Some journals summarized and commented it 
approvingly, until it was discovered to be a skit on the 
transient conditions in France, whereupon the "admirable 
expose based upon convincing evidence " and the "forcible 
arguments" became worthless. 1 

An object-lesson in the difficulty of legislating in Anglo- 
Saxon fashion for foreign countries and comprehending 
their psychology was furnished by two political trials 
which, taking place in Paris during the Conference, 
enabled the delegates to estimate the distance that 
separates the Anglo-Saxon from the Continental mode 
of thought and action in such a fundamental problem 
as the administration of justice. Raoul Villain, the 
murderer of Jean Jaures — France's most eminent states- 
man — was kept in prison for nearly five years without a 
trial. He had assassinated his victim in cold blood. He 
had confessed and justified the act. The eye-winesses all 
agreed as to the facts. Before the court, however, a 
long procession of ministers of state, politicians, his- 
torians, and professors defiled, narrating in detail the 
life-story, opinions, and strivings of the victim, who, 
in the eyes of a stranger, unacquainted with its methods, 
might have seemed to be the real culprit. The jury 
acquitted the prisoner. 

1 Cf. L'Humaniti, April 10, 19 1 9. 

49 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The other accused man was a flighty youth who had 
fired on the French Premier and wounded him. He, 
however, had not long to wait for his trial. He was 
taken before the tribunal within three weeks of his arrest 
and was promptly condemned to die. 1 Thus the assassin 
was justified by the jury and the would-be assassin con- 
demned to be shot. "Suppose these trials had taken 
place in my country," remarked a delegate of an Eastern 
state, "and that of the two condemned men one had been 
a member of the privileged minority, what an uproar the 
incident would have created in the United States and 
England! As it happened in western Europe, it passed 
muster." 

How far removed some continental nations are from 
the Anglo-Saxons in their mode of contemplating and 
treating another momentous category of social problems 
may be seen from the circumstance that the Great 
Council in Basel adopted a bill brought in by the Socialist 
Welti, authorizing the practice of abortion down to the 
third month, provided that the husband and wife are 
agreed, and in cases where there is no marriage provided 
it is the desire of the woman and that the operation is 
performed by a regular physician. - 

Another striking instance of the difference of concep- 
tions between the Anglo-Saxon and continental peoples is 
contained in the following unsavory document, which the 
historian, whose business it is to flash the light of criticism 
upon the dark nooks of civilization, can neither ignore 
nor render into English. It embodies a significant de- 
cision taken by the General Staff of the 256th Brigade of 
the Army of Occupation 3 and was issued on June 21, 1919. 4 

1 The sentence was subsequently commuted. 
8 La Gazette de Lausanne, May 26, 1919. 
3 128th Division. 

4 It was reproduced by the French Syndicalist organ, VHumaniU, of 
July 7, 1 91 9. 

SO 



SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

EXPLOITATION ET POLICE DE LA MAISON PUBLIQUE DE 
MUNCHEN-GLADBACH 

(i.) Les deux femmes composant 1 'unique personnel de la maison 
publique de Gladbach (2, Gasthausstrasse), sont venues en delega- 
tion declarer qu'elles ne pouvaient suffire a la nombreuse clientele, 
qui envahit leur maison, devant laquelle stationneraient en per- 
manence de nombreux groupes de clients affames. 

Elles declarent que defalcation faite du service qu'elles doivent 
assurer a leurs abonnes beiges et allemands, elles ne peuvent 
fournir a la division qu'un total de vingt entries par jour (10 pour 
chacuned'elle). 

L'eteblissement d'ailleurs ne travaille pas la nuit et observe 
Etrictement le repos dominical. D'autre part les ressources de la 
ville ne permettent pas, paralt-il, d'augmenter le personnel. Dans 
ces conditions, en vue d'eviter tout desordre et de ne pas demander 
a ces femmes un travail audessus de leurs forces, les mesures 
suivantes seront prises: 
(2.) JOURS DE TRAVAIL: Tous les jours de la semaine, sauf le 
dimanche. 

RENDEMENT MAXIMUM: Chaque jour chaque femme 
recoit 10 hommes, soit 20 pour les deux persounes, 120 par semaine. 
HEURES D'OUVERTURE: 17 heures a 21 heures. Aucune 
reception n'aura lieu en dehors de ces heures. 

TARIF: Pour un sdjour d'un quart heure (entree et sortie de 
l'^tablissement comprises) ... 5 marks. 

CONSOMMATIONS: La maison ne vend aucune boisson. U 
n'y a pas de salle d'attente. Les clients doivent done se presenter 
par deux. 
(3.) REPARTITION: Les 6 jours de la semaine sont donnes: 
Le lundi — ier bat. du 164 et C.H.R. 
Le mardi — ier bat. du 169 et C.H.R. 
Le mercredi — 2e bat. du 164 et C.H.R. 
Le jeudi — 2e bat. du 169 et C.H.R. 
Le vendredi — 3e bat. du 164. 
Le samedi — 3e bat. du 169. 
(4.) Dans chaque bataillon il sera £tabli le jour qui leur est fix6, 20 
tickets ddposes aux bureaux des sergents-majeur a raison de 5 par 
compagnie. Les hommes desireux de rendre visite & l'6tablisse- 
ment reclamerout au bureau de leur Bergent-majeur, 1 ticket qui 
leur donnera driot de priority. 

6 SI 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The value of that document derives from its having 
been issued as an ordinary regulation, from its having 
been reproduced in a widely circulated journal of the 
capital without evolving comment, and from the strong 
light which it projects upon one of the darkest corners 
of the civilization which has been so often and so elo- 
quently eulogized. 

Manifestly the currents of the new moral life which the 
Conference was to have set flowing are as yet somewhat 
weak, the new ideals are still remote, and the foreshadow- 
in gs of a nobler future are faint. Another token of the 
change which is going forward in the world was reported 
from the Far East, but passed almost unnoticed in 
Europe. The Chinese Ministry of Public Instruction, 
by an edict of November 3, 191 9, officially introduced in 
all secondary schools a phonetic system of writing in 
place of the ideograms theretofore employed. This is 
undoubtedly an event of the highest importance in the 
history of culture, little though it may interest the 
Western world to-day. At the same time, as a philologist 
by profession, I agree with a continental authority l 
who holds that, owing to the monosyllabic character of 
the Chinese language and to the further disadvantage that 
it lacks wholly or partly several consonants, 2 it will be 
practically impossible, as the Japanese have already 
found, to apply the new alphabet to the traditional 
literary idiom. Neither can it be employed for the needs 
of education, journalism, of the administration, or for 
telegraphing. It will, however, be of great value for 
elementary instruction and for postal correspondence. 
It is also certain to develop and extend. But its main 
significance is twofold: as a sign of China's awakening 



1 R. de Saussure. Cf. Journal de Gendoe, August 18, and also May 26, 
1919. 

* d, r, t, 1, g (pertly) and p, except at the beginning o£ a word. 

52 



SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

and as an innovation, the certain effect of which will be to 
weaken national unity and extend regionalism at its 
expense. From this point of view the reform is portentous. 

Another of the signs of the new times which calls for 
mention is the spread and militancy of the labor move- 
ment, to which the war and its concomitants gave a 
potent impulse. It is differentiated from all previous 
ferments by this, that it constitutes merely an episode 
in the universal insurgency of the masses, who are fast 
breaking through the thin social crust formed by the 
upper classes and are emerging rapidly above the surface. 
One of the most impressive illustrations of this general 
phenomenon is the rise of wages, which in Paris has set 
the municipal street-sweepers above university professors, 
the former receiving from 7,600 to 8,000 francs a year, 
whereas the salary of the latter is some 500 francs less. 1 

This general disturbance is the outcome of many 
causes, among which are the over-population of the 
world, the spread of education and of equal opportunity, 
the anonymity of industrial enterprises, scientific and 
unscientific theories, the specialization of labor and its 
depressing influence. 2 These factors produced a labor 
organization which the railways, newspapers, and tele- 
graph contributed to perfect and transform into a prole- 
tarian league, and now all progressive humanity is tend- 
ing steadily and painfully to become one vast collectivity 
for producing and sharing on more equitable lines the 
means of living decently. This consummation is coming 
about with the fatality of a natural law, and the utmost 
the wisest of governments can do is to direct it through 
pacific channels and dislodge artificial obstacles in its 
course. 

1 Cf . the French papers generally for the month of May — also Bonsoir, 
July 26, 1919. 

2 Walther Rathenau has dealt with this question in several of his recent 
pamphlets, which are not before me at the moment. 

S3 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

One of the first reforms toward which labor is tending 
with more or less conscious effort is the abolition of the 
hereditary principle in the possession of wealth and in- 
fluence and of the means of obtaining them. The division 
of labor in the past caused the dissociation of the so- 
called nobler avocations from manual work, and gradually 
those who followed higher pursuits grew into a sort of 
hereditary caste which bestowed relative immunity from 
the worst hardships of life's struggle and formed a ruling 
class. To-day the masses have their hands on the 
principal levers for shattering this top crust of the social 
sphere and seem resolved to press them. 

The problem for the solution of which they now 
menacingly clamor is the establishment of an approxi- 
mately equitable principle for the redistribution of the 
world's resources — land, capital, industries, monopolies, 
mines, transports, and colonies. Whether socialization 
— their favorite prescription — is the most effectual way 
of achieving this object may well be doubted, but must 
be thoroughly examined and discussed. The end once 
achieved, it is expected that mankind will have become 
one gigantic living entity, endowed with senses, nerves, 
heart, arteries, and all the organs necessary to operate 
and employ the forces and wealth of the planet. The 
process will be complex because the factors are numerous 
and of various orders, and for this reason few political 
thinkers have realized that its many phases are aspects of 
one phenomenon. That is also a partial explanation of 
the circumstance that at the Conference the political 
questions were separated from the economic and treated 
by politicians as paramount, the others being relegated 
to the background. The labor legislation passed in Paris 
reduced itself, therefore, to counsels of perfection. 

That the Conference was incapable of solving a prob- 
lem of this magnitude is self-evident. But the delegates 

54 



SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

•could and should have referred it to an international 
parliament, fully representative of all the interests con- 
cerned. For the best way of distributing the necessaries 
and comforts of life, which have been acquired or created 
by manual toil, is a problem that can neither be ignored 
nor reasoned away. So long as it remains a problem it 
will be a source of intermittent trouble and disorder 
throughout the civilized world. The titles, which the 
classes heretofore privileged could invoke in favor of 
possession, are now being rapidly acquired by the workers, 
who in addition dispose of the force conferred by or- 
ganization, numbers, and resolve. At the same time 
most of the stimuli and inventives to individual enter- 
prise are being gradually weakened by legislation, which 
it would be absurd to condemn and dangerous to regard 
as a settlement. In the meanwhile productivity is 
falling off, while the demand for the products of labor 
is growing proportionately to the increase of population 
and culture. 

Hitherto the laws of distribution were framed by the 
strong, who were few and utilized the many. To-day 
their relative positions have shifted ; the many have waxed 
strong and are no longer minded to serve as instruments 
in the hands of a class, hereditary or selected. But the 
division of mankind into producers and utilizers has ever 
been the solid and durable mainstay of that type of 
civilization from which progressive nations are now fast 
moving away, and the laws and usages against which the 
proletariat is up in arms are but its organic expression. 

From the days of the building of the Pyramids down to 
those of the digging of the Panama Canal the chasm be- 
tween the two social orders remained open. The aboli- 
tion of slavery changed but little in the arrangement — 
was, indeed, effected more in the interests of the old 
economics than in deference to any strong religious or 

55 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

moral sentiment. In substance the traditional ordering 
continued to exist in a form better adapted to the modi- 
fied conditions. But the filling up of that chasm, which 
is now going forward, involves the overthrow of the 
system in its entirety, and the necessity of either rearing 
a wholly new structure, of which even the keen-sighted 
are unable to discern the outlines, or else the restoration 
of the old one on a somewhat different basis. And the 
only basis conceivable to-day is that which would start 
from the postulate that some races of men come into the 
world devoid of the capacity for any more useful part in 
the progress of mankind than that which was heretofore 
allotted to the proletariat. It cannot be gainsaid that 
there are races on the globe which arc incapable of as- 
similating the higher forms of civilization, but which 
might well be made to render valuable services in the 
lower without cither suffering injustice themselves or 
demoralizing others. And it seems nowise impossible 
that one day these reserves may be mobilized and sys- 
tematically employed in virtue of the principle that the 
weal of the great progressive community necessitates 
such a distribution of parts as will set each organ to 
perform the functions for which it is best qualified. 

Since the close of the war internationalism was in the 
air, and the labor movement intensified it. It stirred 
the thought and wanned the imagination alike of ex- 
ploiters and exploited. Reformers and pacifists yearned 
for it as a means of establishing a well-knit society of 
progressive and pacific peoples and setting a term to 
sanguinary wars. Some financiers may have longed for 
it in a spirit analogous to that in which Nero wished that 
the Roman people had but one neck. And the Con- 
ference chiefs seemed to have pictured it to themselves 
— if, indeed, they meditated such an abstract matter — 
in the guise of a pax Anglo-Saxon tea, the distinctive 

56 



SIGNS OF THE TIMES 

feature of which would lie in the transfer to the two 
principal peoples — and not to a board representing all 
nations — of those attributes of sovereignty which the other 
states would be constrained to give up. Of these three 
currents flowing in the direction of internationalism only 
one — that of finance — appears for the moment likely to 
reach its goal. . . . 



Ill 

THE DELEGATES 

THE plenipotentiaries, who became the world's arbiters 
for a while, were truly representative men. But they 
mirrored forth not so much the souls of their respective 
peoples as the surface spirit that flitted over an evanescent 
epoch. They stood for national grandeur, territorial ex- 
pansion, party interests, and even abstract ideas. Ex- 
ponents of a narrow section of the old order at its lowest 
ebb, they wore in no sense heralds of the new. Amid a 
labyrinth of ruins they had no clue to guide their foot- 
steps, in which the peoples of the world were told to 
follow. Only true political vision, breadth of judgment, 
thorough mastery of the elements of the situation, an 
instinct for discerning central issues, genuine concern 
for high principles of governance, and the rare moral 
courage that disregards popularity as a mainspring of 
action — could have fitted any set of legislators to tackle 
the complex and thorny problems that pressed for settle- 
ment and to effect the necessary preliminary changes. 
That the delegates of the principal Powers were devoid 
of many of these qualities cannot fairly be made a sub- 
ject of reproach. It was merely an accident. But it 
was as unfortunate as their honest conviction that they 
could accomplish the grandiose enterprise of remodeling 
the communities of the world without becoming con- 
versant with their interests, acquainted with their needs, 
or even aware of their whereabouts. For their failure, 

58 



THE DELEGATES 

which was inevitable, was also bound to be tragic, inas- 
much as it must involve, not merely their own ambition 
to live in history as the makers of a new and regenerate 
era, but also the destinies of the nations and races which 
confidently looked up to them for the conditions of future 
pacific progress, nay, of normal existence. 

During the Conference it was the fashion in most 
European countries to question the motives as well as 
to belittle the qualifications of the delegates. Now that 
political passion has somewhat abated and the atmosphere 
is becoming lighter and clearer, one may without pro- 
voking contradiction pay a well-deserved tribute to their 
sincerity, high purpose, and quick response to the calls of 
public duty and moral sentiment. They were animated 
with the best intentions, not only for their respective 
countries, but for humanity as a whole. One and all they 
burned with the desire to go as far as feasible toward 
ending the era of destructive wars. Steady, uninter- 
rupted, pacific development was their common ideal, 
and they were prepared to give up all that they reasonably 
could to achieve it. It is my belief, for example, that if 
Mr. Wilson had persisted in making his League project 
the cornerstone of the new world structure and in apply- 
ing his principles without favor, the Italians would 
have accepted it almost without discussion, and the other 
states would have followed their example. All the 
delegates must have felt that the old order of things, 
having been shaken to pieces by the war and its con- 
comitants, could not possibly survive, and they naturally 
desired to keep within evolutionary bounds the process 
of transition to the new system, thus accomplishing by 
policy what revolution would fain accomplish by violence. 
It was only when they came to define that policy with a 
view to its application that their unanimity was broken 
up and they split into two camps, the pacifists and the mili- 

59 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

tarists, or the democrats and imperialists, as they have 
been roughly labeled. Here, too, each member of the 
assembly worked with eommendable single-mindedness, 
and under a sense of high responsibility, for that solution 
of the problem which to him seemed the most conducive 
to the general weal. And they wrestled heroically one 
with the other for what they held to be right and true 
relatively to the prevalent conditions. The circumstance 
that the cause and effects of this clash of Opinions and 
sentiments were SO widely at variance with early antici- 
pations had its roots partly in their limited survey of the 
complex problem, and partly, too. in its overwhelming 
vastness and their own unfitness to cope with it. 

The delegates who aimed at disarmament and a society 
of pacific peoples made out as good a ease — once their 
premises were admitted — as those who insisted upon 
guarantees, economic and territorial. Everything de- 
pended, for the theory adopted, upon each individual's 
breadth o\ view, arid for its realization upon the temper 
oi the peoples and that of their neighbors. As under 
the given circumstances either solution was sure to 
encounter formidable opposition, which only a doughty 
spirit would dare to atTront, compromise, offering a side- 
exit Out of the quandary, was avidly taken. In this way 
the collective sagacities, working in materials the nature 
Of which they hardly understood, brought forth strange 
products. Some of the incongruities of the details, such, 
for instance, as the invitation to Prinkipo, despatched 
anonymously, occasionally surpass satire, but their 
bewildered authors are entitled to the benefit of extenuat- 
ing circumstances. 

On the momentous issue of a permanent peace based 
on Mr. Wilson's pristine concept of a league oi Tuitions, 
and in accordance with rigid principles applied equally 
to all the states, there was no discussion. In other words, 

60 



THE DELEGATES 

it was tacitly agreed that the fourteen points should not 
form a bar to the vital postulates of any of the Great 
Powers. It was only on the subject of the lesser states 
and the equality of nations that the debates were intense, 
protracted, and for a long while fruitless. At times words 
flamed perilously high. For months the solutions of the 
Adriatic, the Austrian, Turkish, and Thracian problems 
hung in poignant suspense, the public looking on with 
diminishing interest and waxing dissatisfaction. The 
usual optimistic assurances that all would soon run 
smoothly and swiftly fell upon deaf ears. Faith in the 
Conference was melting away. 

The plight of the Supreme Council and the vain exhorta- 
tions to believe in its efficiency reminded me of the fol- 
lowing story. 

A French parish priest was once spiritually comforting 
a member of his flock who was tormented by doubts 
about the goodness of God as measured by the imper- 
fection of His creation. Having listened to a vivid 
account of the troubled soul's high expectation of its 
Maker and of its deep disappointment at His work, the 
pious old cure said: "Yes, my child. The world is 
indeed bad, as you say, and you are right to deplore it. 
But don't you think you may have formed to yourself an 
exaggerated idea of God?" An analogous reflection 
would not be out of place when passing judgment on the 
Conference which implicitly arrogated to itself some 
of the highest attributes of the Deity, and thus heightened 
the contrast between promise and achievement. Cer- 
tainly people expected much more from it than it could 
possibly give. But it was the delegates themselves who 
had aroused these expectations announcing the coming 
of a new epoch at their fiat. The peoples were publicly 
told by Mr. Lloyd George and several of his colleagues 
that the war of 1914-18 would be the last. His "Never 

61 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE C0NFERENC1 

Bgain n became a winged phrase, and the more buoyant 
optimists expected to see over the palace of arbitration 
which was to be substituted for the battlefield, the inspir- 
ing inscription: "A la dcrniere des guerres, l'humanitc 
reconnaissante." ' Mr. Wilson's vast project was still 
more attractive. 

Mr. Lloyd George is too well known in his capacity of 
British parliamentarian to need to be characterized. 
The splendid services he rendered the Empire during' the 
war, when even his defects proved occasionally helpful, 
will never be forgotten. Typifying not only the aims, 
but also the methods, of the British people, he never 
seems to distrust his own counsels whencesoever they 
spring nor to lack the courage to change them in a twin- 
kling. He stirred the soul of the nation in its darkest 
hour and communicated his own glowing faith in its 
star. During the vicissitudes of the world struggle he 
was the right man for the responsible post which he 
occupied, and I am proud of having been one of the first 
to work in my own modest way to have him placed there. 
But a good war-leader may be a poor peace-negotiator, 
and, as a matter of fact, there are few tasks concerned 
with the welfare of the nation which Mr. Lloyd George 
could not have tackled with incomparably greater chances 
of accomplishing it than that of remodeling the world. 
His antecedents were all against him. His lack of general 
equipment was prohibitive; even his inborn gifts were 
disqualifications. One need not pay too great heed to 
acrimonious colleagues who set him down as a word- 
weaving trimmer, between whose utterances and thoughts 
there is no organic nexus, who declines to take the initia- 
tive unless he sees adequate forces behind him ready to hie 
to his support, who lacks the moral courage that serves 

1 Cf. Ls TmtPs, May 2^, 1919. It is an adaptation of the inscription over 
the Pantheon, "Aux grands hommes, la Patrie reconnaissante." 

62 



THE DELEGATES 

as a parachute for a fall from popularity, but possesses in 
abundance that of taking at the flood the rising tide 
which balloon-like lifts its possessor high above his fellows. 
But judging him in the light of the historic events in 
which he played a prominent part, one cannot dismiss 
these criticisms as groundless. 

Opportunism is an essential element of statecraft, which 
is the art of the possible. But there is a line beyond 
which it becomes shiftiness, and it would be rash to assert 
that Mr. Lloyd George is careful to keep on the right 
side of it. At the Conference his conduct appeared to care- 
ful observers to be traced mainly by outside influences, 
and as these were various and changing the result was a 
zigzag. One day he would lay down a certain proposition 
as a dogma not to be modified, and before the week was 
out he would advance the contrary proposition and 
maintain that with equal warmth and doubtless with 
equal conviction. Guided by no sound knowledge and 
devoid of the ballast of principle, he was tossed and 
driven hither and thither like a wreck on the ocean. Mr. 
Melville Stone, the veteran American journalist, gave his 
countrymen his impression of the first British delegate. 
"Mr. Lloyd George," he said, "has a very keen sense of 
humor and a great power over the multitude, but with 
this he displays a startling indifference to, if not ignorance 
of, the larger affairs of nations." In the course of a walk 
Mr. Lloyd George expressed surprise when informed 
that in the United States the war-making power was 
invested in Congress. "What!" exclaimed the Premier, 
"you mean to tell me that the President of the United 
States cannot declare war? I never heard that before." 
Later, when questions of national ambitions were being 
discussed, Mr. Lloyd George asked, "What is that place 
Rumania is so anxious to get?" meaning Transylvania. 1 

1 The Daily Mail, April 25, 1919 (Paris edition). 

63 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The stories current of his praiseworthy curiosity about 
i he places which he was busy distributing to the peoples 
whose destinies he was forging would be highly amusing 
if the subject were only a private individual and his 
motive a desire for useful information, but on the repre- 
sentative of a great Empire they shed a light in which 
the dignity of his country was necessarily affected and 
his own authority deplorably diminished. For moral 
authority at that conjuncture was the sheet anchor of the 
principal delegates. Although without a program, Mr. 
Lloyd George would appear to have had an instinctive 
feeling, if not a reasoned belief, that in matters of general 
policy his safest course would be to keep pace with the 
President of the United States. For he took it for 
granted that Mr. Wilson's views were identical with 
those of the American people. One of his colleagues, 
endeavoring to dispel this illusion, said : ' ' Your province 
at this Conference is to lead. Your colleagues, including 
Mr. Wilson, will follow. You have the Empire behind 
you. Voice its aspirations. They coincide with those 
of the English-speaking peoples of the world. Mr. Wil- 
son has lost his elections, therefore he does not stand 
for as much as you imagine. You have won your elec- 
tions, so you are the spokesman of a vast community 
and the champion of a noble cause. You can knead the 
Conference at your will. Assert your will. But even 
if you decide to act in harmony with the United States, 
that does not mean subordinating British interests to the 
President's views, which are not those of the majority of 
his people." But Mr. Lloyd George, invincibly diffident 
— if diffidence it be — shrank from marching alone, and 
on certain questions which mattered much "Mr. Wilson 
had his way. 

One day there was an animated discussion in the twi- 
light of the Paris conclave while the press was belauding 

64 



THE DELEGATES 

the plenipotentiaries for their touching unanimity. The 
debate lay between the United States as voiced by 
Mr. Wilson and Great Britain as represented by Mr. 
Lloyd George. On the morrow, before the conversation 
was renewed, a colleague adjured the British Premier 
to stand firm, urging that his contention of the previous 
day was just in the abstract and beneficial to the Empire 
as well. Mr. Lloyd George bowed to the force of these 
motives, but yielded to the greater force of Mr. Wilson's 
resolve. "Put it to the test," urged the colleague. "I 
dare not," was the rejoinder. "Wilson won't brook it. 
Already he threatens, if we do, to leave the Conference 
and return home." "Well then, let him. If he did, 
we should be none the worse off for his absence. But 
rest assured, he won't go. He cannot afford to return 
home empty-handed after his splendid promises to his 
countrymen and the world." Mr. Lloyd George insisted, 
however, and said, "But he will take his army away, 
too." "What!" exclaimed the tempter. "His army? 
Well, I only , . ." but it would serve no useful purpose 
to quote the vigorous answer in full. 

This odd mixture of exaggerated self-confidence, mis- 
measurement of forces, and pliability to external influences 
could not but be baleful in one of the leaders of an assembly 
composed, as was the Paris Conference, of men each with 
his own particular ax to grind and impressible only to 
high moral authority or overwhelming military force. 
It cannot be gainsaid that no one, not even his own 
familiars, could ever foresee the next move in Mr. Lloyd 
George's game of statecraft, and it is demonstrable that 
on several occasions he himself was so little aware of what 
he would do next that he actually advocated as indis- 
pensable measures diametrically opposed to those which 
he was to propound, defend, and carry a week or two 
later. A conversation which took place between him and 

65 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

one of his fellow-workers gives one the measure of his 
irresolution and fitfulness. "Do toll me," said this col- 
laborator, "why it is that you members of the Supremo 
Council are hurriedly changing to-day the decisions you 
-.0 to after live months' study, which you say was 
time well spent ? M 

"Because of fresh information we have received in 
the meanwhile. We know more now than we knew then 
and the different data necessitate different treatment**' 

"Yes. but the conditions have not changed since the 
Conference opened, Surety they were the same in 
January as they .ire in June. Is not that so? " 

"No doubt, no doubt, but we did not ascertain them 
before June, so we could not act upon them until now." 

With the leading delegates thus drifting and the pieces 
on the political chessboard bewilderingly disposed, out- 
siders came to look upon the Cc .v as a lottery. 
Unhappily, it was a lottery in which there wen no mere 
blanks, but only prizes or heavy forfeits. 

To sum up: the first British delegate, essentially a man 
of expedients and shifts, wa og more 

than an arc of the polj ne. A com] 

hensive survey of a complicated situation was beyond his 
reach. He relied upon u id intuition 

substitutes for precise knowledge and .1 skill. 

Hence he hints,', could never be sure that his decision, 
however carefully worked out, would be final, seeing that 
in June tacts might come to his cognisance with which 
five months' investigations had left him unacquainted. 
This incertitude about the elements of the problem in- 
tensified the ingrained hesitancy that had characterised 
his entire public carer and warped his judgment ef- 
fectually. The on! . to a guiding principle one 
can find in his work at the Conference was the loosely 
held maxim that Great Britain's best policy wa» to 



THE DELEGATES 

stand in with the United States in all momentous issues 
and to identify Mr. Wilson with the United States for 
most purposes of the Congress. Within these limits 
Mr. Lloyd George was unyielding in fidelity to the cause 
of France, with which he merged that of civilization. 

M. Clemen ceau is the incarnation of the tireless spirit of 
destruction. Pulling down has ever been his delight, 
and it is largely to his success in demolishing the defective 
work of rivals — and all human work is defective — that he 
owes the position of trust and responsibility to which 
the Parliament raised him during the last phase of the war. 
Physically strong, despite his advanced age, he is men- 
tally brilliant and superficial, with a bias for paradox, 
epigram, and racy, unconventional phraseology. His 
action is impulsive. In the Dreyfus days I saw a good 
deal of M. Clemenceau in his editorial office, when he 
would unburden his soul to M. M. Vaughan, the poet 
Quillard, and others. Later on I approached him while 
he was chief of the government on a delicate matter of 
international combined with national politics, on which 
I had been requested to sound him by a friendly govern- 
ment, and I found him, despite his developed and sobering 
sense of responsibility, whimsical, impulsive, and credulous 
as before. When I next talked with him he was the 
rebellious editor of L'Homme Enchaine, whose corrosive 
strictures upon the government of the day were the 
terror of Ministers and censors. Soon afterward he 
himself became the wielder of the great national gagging- 
machine, and in the stringency with which he manipulated 
it he is said by his own countrymen to have outdone the 
government of the Third Empire. His alter ego, Georges 
Mandel, is endowed with qualities which supplement 
and correct those of his venerable chief. His grasp of 
detail is comprehensive and firm, his memory retentive, 
and his judgment bold and deliberate. A striking illus- 
6 67 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

tratlOO of the audacity of his resolve was given in the 
early part of iqiS. Marshal Joffre sent a telegram to 
President Wilson in Washington, and because he had 
omitted to despatch it through the War Ministry. M. 
Mandel, who is a strict disciplinarian, proposed that he 
be placed under arrest. It was with difficulty that some 
public men moved him to leniency. 

M. Clemenceau, the professional destroyer, who can 
boast that he overthrew eighteen Cabinets, or nineteen 
if we include his own, was unquestionably the right man 
to carry on the war. He acquitted himself of the task 
superbly. His faith in the Allies' victory was unwaver- 
ing. He never doubted, never flagged, never was in- 
timidated by obstacles nor wheedled by persons. Once 
daring the armistice, in May or June, when Marshal Foch 
expressed his displeasure that the Premier should have 
issued military orders to troops under his command ' 
without first consulting him. he was on the point of dis- 
missing the Nfarshal and appointing General Petain to 
succeed him. 3 Whether the qualities which stood him in 
such good stead during the world struggle could be of 
equal, or indeed of much, avail in the general constructive 
work for which the Conference was assembled is a ques- 
tion that needs only to be formulated. But in securing 
every advantage that could be conferred on his own 
country lus influence on : ' *ates was decisive. M. 

Clemenceau, who before the war was the intimate friend 
of Austrian ilists, hated his country's enemies with 

undying hate. And he loved France passionately. I 
rememV Is of his. uttered at the end of 

the year iSoe to an enterprising young man who h 
founded a Franco-German review in Munich and craved 
his moral support. "Is it ss Me," he exclaimed, "that 

■ G i ion. 

58 



THE DELEGATES 

it has already come to that? Well, a nation is not con- 
quered until it accepts defeat. Whenever France gives 
up she will have deserved her humiliation." 

At the Conference M. Clemenceau moved every lever 
to deliver his country for all time from the danger of 
further invasions. And, being a realist, he counted only 
on military safeguards. At the League of Nations he was 
wont to sneer until it dawned upon him that it might be 
forged into an effective weapon of national defense. And 
then he included it in the litany of abstract phrases about 
right, justice, and the self-determination of peoples 
which it became the fashion to raise to the inaccessible 
heights where those ideals are throned which are to be 
worshiped but not incarnated. The public somehow 
never took his conversion to Wilsonianism seriously, 
neither did his political friends until the League bade 
fair to become serviceable in his country's hands. M. 
Clemenceau's acquaintanceship with international politics 
was at once superior to that of the British Premier and 
very slender. But his program at the Conference was 
simple and coherent, because independent of geography 
and ethnography : France was to take Germany's leading 
position in the world, to create powerful and devoted 
states in eastern Europe, on whose co-operation she could 
reckon, and her allies were to do the needful in the way 
of providing due financial and economic assistance so as 
to enable her to address herself to the cultural problems 
associated with her new r61e. And he left nothing undone 
that seemed conducive to the attainment of that object. 
Against Mr. Wilson he maneuvered to the extent which 
his adviser, M. Tardieu, deemed safe, and one of his most 
daring speculations was on the President's journey to the 
States, during which M. Clemenceau and his European 
colleagues hoped to get through a deal of work on their own 
lines and to present Mr. Wilson with the decisions ready 

69 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

for ratification on his return. But the stratagem was 
not merely apparent ; it was bruited abroad with indiscreet 
details, whereupon the first American delegate on his 
return broke the tables of their laws — one of which 
separated the Treaty from the Covenant. — and obliged 
them to begin anew. It is fair to add that M, Clemenceau 
was no uncompromising partisan of the conquest of the 
left bank of the Rhine, nor of colonial conquests. These 
currents took their rise elsewhere. "We don't want 
protesting deputies in the French Parliament," he once 
remarked in the presence of the French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 1 Offered the choice between a number 
of bridgeheads in Germany and the military protection 
of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, he unhesitatingly decided 
for the latter, which had been offered to him by President 
Wilson after the rejection of the Rhine frontier. 

M. Clemenceau. whose remarkable mental alacrity, self- 
esteem, and love of sharp repartee occasionally betrayed 
him Into tactless sallies and epigrammatic retorts, deeply 
wounded the pride of more than one delegate of the lesser 
Powers in a way which they deemed incompatible alike 
with circumspect statesmanship and the proverbial hos- 
pitality of his country. For he is incapable of resisting 
the temptation to launch a bon mot, however stinging. 
It would be ungenerous, however, to attach more impor- 
tance to such quickly forgotten utterances than he meant 
them to cany. An instance of how he behaved toward 
the representatives of Britain and France is worth record- 
ing, both as characterizing the man mid as extenuating 
his offense against the delegates of the lesser Powers. 

One morning - M, Clemenceau appeared at the Con- 
ference door, and seemed taken aback by the large number 
of unfamiliar faces and figures behind Mr. Balfour, 

• i . t9&me ann€e, p 4.61. 
• It was either Friday, the 4th, or Saturday, the 5th ot July. 

70 



THE DELEGATES 

toward whom he sharply turned with the brusque in- 
terrogation: "Who are those people behind you? Are 
they English ?" " Yes, they are, ' ' was the answer. ' ' Well, 
what do they want here?" "They have come on the 
same errand as those who are now following you." 
Thereupon the French Premier, whirling round, beheld 
with astonishment and displeasure a band of Frenchmen 
moving toward him, led by M. Pichon, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. In reply to his question as to the motive 
of their arrival, he was informed that they were all experts, 
who had been invited to give the Conference the benefit 
of their views about the revictualing of Hungary. "Get 
out, all of you. You are not wanted here," he cried in a 
commanding voice. And they all moved away meekly, 
led by M. Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Their 
services proved to be unnecessary, for the result reached 
by the Conference was negative. 

M. Tardieu cannot be separated from his chief, with 
whom he worked untiringly, placing at his disposal his 
intimate knowledge of the nooks and crannies of profes- 
sional and unprofessional diplomacy. He is one of the 
latest arrivals and most pushing workers in the sphere of 
the Old World statecraft, affects Yankee methods, and 
speaks English. For several years political editor of the 
Temps, he obtained access to the state archives, and 
wrote a book on the Agadir incident which was well re- 
ceived, and also a monograph on Prince von Bulow, be- 
came Deputy, aimed at a ministerial portfolio, and was 
finally appointed Head Commissary to the United States. 
Faced by difficulties there — mostly the specters of his 
own former utterances evoked by German adversaries — 
his progress at first was slow. He was accused of having 
approved some of the drastic methods — especially the 
U-boat campaign — which the Germans subsequently 
employed, because in the year 191 2, when he was writing 

7i 



nil- tNSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

on the subject, Prance believed that she herself pos- 
sessed the best submarines, and she to employ 
them. He was also challenged to deny that he had writ- 
ten, in Augiist. lei -\ that in every war churches and monu- 
ments of art must suffer, and that **uo army, whatever 
its nationality, eau renounce this." Re was further 
charged with having taken a kindly i in air-war 
and bomb-dropping, and given it as his opinion that it 
would be absurd "to deprive of this advantage those who 
had made most progress in perfecting tins weapon." 
But M. Tardieu successfully exorcised these and other 
ghosts. And on his return from the United States he was 
charged with organising a press bureau of his own, to 
supply American journalists with material for tV 
cablegrams, while at the same time he collaborated with 
M. Qemenceau in reorgani ting the pol ommunil 
ol the world. It is only in the French Chamber, of which 
he is a disl it M. Tardieu foiled to 
score a brilliant success. Few !>phets in their 
own country, and he is m. A: 
the Conference, in its late-, phases, he found himself in 

of the It chart delegation, 
Signor Tittoni, One of the -•-. ects on which they 

disagreed was the fate i tan Austria and the political 

structure and orientation < immunities 

which arose on the ruins of the Dual M M. Tar- 

d'.eu favored an arrangemenl which would bring these 

- closely i the whole art 

: -.-Teutonic impress. If Germany could 

up ■ tte states, as in the days of her 

weakness, ad the c. les in the territories 

against her. and at 
the least hindered from making common cause with her. 
The unification of Germany he considered b grave danger. 
e to crea Duntervaifing state system. 



THE DELEGATES 

To the execution of this project there were formidable 
difficulties. For one thing, none of the peoples in ques- 
tion was distinctly anti-German. Each one was for it- 
self. Again, they were not particularly enamoured of one 
another, nor were their interests always concordant, and 
to constrain them by force to unite would have been not 
to prevent but to cause future wars. A Danubian federa- 
tion — the concrete shape imagined for this new bulwark 
of European peace — did not commend itself to the Italians, 
who had their own reasons for their opposition besides 
the Wilsonian doctrine, which they invoked. If it be 
true, Signor Tittoni argues, that Austria does not desire 
to be amalgamated with Germany, why not allow her to 
exercise the right of self-determination accorded to other 
peoples? M. Tardieu, on the other hand, not content 
with the prohibition to Germany to unite with Austria, 
proposed ' that in the treaty with Austria this coun- 
try should be obliged to repress the unionist movement 
in the population. This amendment was inveighed 
against by the Italian delegation in the name of every 
principle professed and transgressed by the world-mending 
Powers. Even from the French point of view he de- 
clared it perilous, inasmuch as there was, and could be, 
no guarantee that a Danubian confederation would not 
become a tool in Germany's hands. 

Two things struck me as characteristic of the principal 
plenipotentiaries: as a rule, they eschewed first-rate men 
as fellow-workers, one integer and several zeros being their 
favorite formula, and they took no account of the flight 
of time, planning as though an eternity were before them 
and then suddenly improvising as though afraid of being 
late for a train or a steamer. These peculiarities were 
baleful. The lesser states, having mainly first-class men 
to represent them, illustrated the law of compensation, 

1 At the end of August, 1919. 

73 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

• Gtv.i: Powers 

abounded 

- • 
w.r- . o v\ ere 

So id dur» 

i ices •■■■ . e bein j Germans h 

BS t)Q be 

. raments i 

ted the tdios 
choose . st 11 ft] s 

bo . . And 

game 

One gave assent to the ixfom thai modem 

wou bed 

fide ■ . -. » mam : . to 

i.\C.i:os. whose :.;<ks 
. ■ 

ftd tht 

tal arb 

geograp 
ses of '.v. C rfere ice 
M Veni *s the 

For* G eece wi era it who is 



■ 

act 



THE DELEGATES 

as soon as that statesman arrived in Europe, and, to the 
surprise oi many, the two remained a long time closeted 

together. "Whatever did yon talk about?" asked a col- 
league of the ( iieek Premier. " I low did you keep Wilson 
interested in your national claims all that time? You 
must liav< — " "()li no," interrupted the modest 
statesman. " I disposed of our claims succinctly enough. 
A matter of two minutes. Not more. I asked him to 

dispense me from taking up his time with SUCh complicated 
issues Which he and his Colleagues would have ample Op- 
portunity for studying. The rest of the time 1 was getting 
him bo give me I he benefit of his familiarity with the sub- 
|ed of the League of Nations. And he was good enough 
to enumerate the reasons why it should be realized, and 

the way in which if must be worked. I was greatly im- 
pressed by wh.it he said." "Just fancy!" exclaimed a 
colleague, " wast ingall that time in talking about a scheme 
which will never come to anything!" But M. Venizelos 
knew that the time was, not misspent. President Wilson 
was at first nowise disposed to lend a favorable ear to 
the claims of Greece, which he thought exorbitant, and 

down to the very last he gave his support to Bulgaria 

againsl Greece whole heartedly. The Cretan statesman 

passed many an hour of doubt and misgiving before he 
Came within sight of his goal. But he contrived to win 
the President over to his way of envisaging many Oriental 
questions. He is a past-master in practical psychology. 

The first, experiments of M. Venizelos, however, were 
not wholly encouraging. For all the care he lavished on 
the chief Luminaries of the Conference seemingly went to 

Supplement their education and (ill up a few of the geo- 
graphical, historical, philological, ethnological, and politi- 
cal gaps i>i their early instruction rather than to guide 
them in their concrete decisions, which it was expected 
would be always left to the "commissions of experts," 

75 



rHE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

But the fruit which took long to mature ripened at last. 
and e had many of her claims allowed. Thus m 

reorganizing the communities of the world the personal 
factor played a predominant part. Yeni.vlos was. so to 
say. a fixed star in the firmament, and his light burned 
bright through every rift in the clouds. His moderation 
astonished friends and opponents. Every one admired 
his <\ posi of his case as a masterpiece. His statesman-like 
setting, in perspective, the readiness with which he put 
himself in the place of his competitor and struck up a fair 
•promise, endeared him to many, and his praises were 
in every one's mouth. His most critical hour — it lasted 
for months — struck when he found himself struggling with 
the President of the United States, who was for refusing 
the coast of rhrace to Greece and bestowing it on Bul- 
But with that dispute I deal in another place. 
Of Italy's two plenipotentiaries during the first five 
months one was the most supple and the other the most 
indexible of h< smen, Signor Orlando and Baron 

Sonnino. If her case was presented to the Conference 
with less force than was attainable, the reasons are obvi- 
ous. Her delegates had a formal treaty on which they 
relied: to the attitude of their country from the outbreak 
of the war to its finish they rightly ascribed the possibility 
of the Allies' victory, and they expected to see this price- 
less service recognised .ally: the moderation and 
suppleness of Signor Orlando were neutralized by the un- 
compromising attitude of Baron Sonnino, arid, lastly, the 

ga e of both si smen was fixed upon territorial ques 

is and s ens to the neglect of eco- 

nomic interests vital to t: \ -in other words, they 

beheld the issues in wrong .etive. But one of the 

mos liar figures among the delegates was Signor 

Orlando, whose eloquence and imagination gave him . 
vantages which would have been increased a hundredfold 



THE DELEGATES 

if he might have employed his native language in the con- 
clave. For he certainly displayed resourcefulness, humor, 
a historic sense, and the gift of molding the wills of men. 
But he was greatly hampered. Some of his countrymen 
alleged that Baron Sonnino was his evil genius. One of 
the many sayings attributed to him during the Conference 
turned upon the quarrels of some of the smaller peoples 
among themselves. "They are," the Premier said, "like 
a lot of hens being held by the feet and carried to market. 
Although all doomed to the same fate, they contrive to 
fight one another while awaiting it." 

After the fall of Orlando's Cabinet, M. Tittoni repaired 
to Paris as Italy's chief delegate. His reputation as one 
of Europe's principal statesmen was already firmly estab- 
lished; he had spent several years in Paris as Ambassa- 
dor, and he and the late Di San Giuliano and Giolitti were 
the men who broke with the Central Empires when these 
were about to precipitate the World War. In French 
nationalist circles Signor Tittoni had long been under a 
cloud, as the man of pro-German leanings. The suspicion 
— for it was nothing more — was unfounded. On the con- 
trary, M. Tittoni is known to have gone with the Allies 
to the utmost length consistent with his sense of duty 
to his own country. To my knowledge he once gave 
advice which his Italian colleagues and political friends 
and adversaries now bitterly regret was disregarded. 
The nature of that counsel will one day be disclosed. . . . 

Of Japan's delegates, the Marquis Saionji and Baron 
Makino, little need be said, seeing that their qualifications 
for their task were demonstrated by the results. Mainly 
to statesmanship and skilful maneuvering Japan is 
indebted for her success at the Paris Conference, where 
her cause was referred by Mr. Lloyd George and M. 
Clemenceau to Mr. Wilson to deal with. The behavior 
of her representatives was an illuminating object-lesson 

77 



iiiF INSIDE STORY OF nil- PEACE CONFERENCE 

in the worth of psychological tactics in practical politics. 
They hardly ever appeared in the footlights, remained 
constantly silent and observant, and were almost ignored 
by the press. But they kept their eyes fixed on the goal. 
Their program was simple. Amid the flitting shadows 
of political events they marched together with the Allies, 
until these disagreed among themselves, and then they 
voted with Great Britain and the United States Occa- 
sionally they went farther and proposed measures 
the lesser states which Britain framed, but desired to 
second rather than propose. Japan, at the Conference, 
was a stanch collaborator of the two English-speaking 
principals until her own opportunity came, and then she 
threw all her hoarded energies into her cause, and by 
her firm resolve dispelled any opposition that Mr. Wilson 
may have intended to otter. One of the most striking 
episodes of the Cor was the swift, silent, and suc- 

cessful campaign by which Japan had Iter secret treaty 
with China hall-marked by the puritanical President of 
the United States, whose sense of morality could not 
brook the secret treaties concluded by Italy and Rumania 
with the Greater and Greatest Towers of Europe. Again, 
it was with statesman-like sagacity that the Japanese 
judged the Russian situation and made the best of it — 
first, shortly before the invitation to Prinkipo. and. later, 
before the celebrated eight questions were submitted to 
Admiral Kolchak. I was especially struck by an occur- 
rence, trivial in appearance, which demonstrated the 
weight which they rightly attached to the psychological 
side of politics. Everybody in Paris remarked, and many 
vainly complained of. the indifference, or rather, unfriend- 
liness, of which Russians were the innocent victims. 
Among the Allied troops who marched under the Arc de 
Triomphe on July 14th there were Rumanians, Greeks, 
Portuguese, and Indians, but not a single Russian. A 



THE DELEGATES 

Russian general drove about in the forest of flags and 
banners that day looking eagerly for symbols of his own 
country, but for hours the quest was fruitless. At last, 
when passing the Japanese Embassy, he perceived, to his 
delight, an enormous Russian flag waving majestically 
in the breeze, side by side with that of Nippon. "I shed 
tears of joy," he told his friend that evening, "and I 
vowed that neither I nor my country would ever forget 
this touching mark of friendship." 

Japanese public opinion criticized severely the failure 
of their delegates to obtain recognition of the equality 
of races or nations. This judgment seems unjust, for 
nothing that they could have done or said would have 
wrung from Mr. Wilson and Mr. Hughes their assent 
to the doctrine, nor, if they had been induced to proclaim 
it, would it have been practically applied. 

In general, the lawyers were the most successful in 
stating their cases. But one of the delegates of the lesser 
states who made the deepest impression on those of the 
greater was not a member of the bar. The head of the 
Polish delegation, Roman Dmowski, a picturesque, 
forcible speaker, a close debater and resourceful pleader, 
who is never at a loss for an image, a comparison, an 
argumentum ad hominem, or a repartee, actually won 
over some of the arbiters who had at first leaned toward 
his opponents — a noteworthy feat if one realizes all that 
it meant in an assembly where potent influences were 
working against some of the demands of resuscitated 
Poland. His speech in September on the future of eastern 
Galicia was a veritable masterpiece. 

M. Dmowski appeared at the Conference under all the 
disadvantages that could be heaped upon a man who has 
incurred the resentment of the most powerful interna- 
tional body of modern times. He had the misfortune to 
have the Jews of the world as bis adversaries. His Polish 

79 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

ed this hostility as follows. His ardent 
nationalist sentiments placed him in antagonism to every 
movement thai .inter to the progress of his country 

on list lines. For he is above all things a Pole 

and a patriot. And as the Hebrew population of Poland, 
disbelieving in the resnrreetion of that nation, had long 
since Struck up B cordial understanding with the states 
that held it in bondage, the gifted author of a book on the 
s of No ■■■:. which went through four 

editions, was regarded by the Hebrew elements of the 
population as an irreconcilable enemy. In truth, he 
was only the leader of a movement that was a historical 

essity. One i theses of the work was the neces- 

sity of cultivating an anti-German spirit in Poland ..< 
the onl\ ist I he Teuton virus introduced from 

Berlin through economic and other channels. And as the 
Polish Jews, whose idiom is a corrupted German dialect 
and whose leanings are often Teutonic, felt that the 
attl D the whole was an attack on the part, they 

anathematised the author and held him up to universal 
obloquy. And there has been no reconciliation ever 
since. In the United States, where the Jewish community 
is numerous and influential, M. Dmowski found spokes 
in his wheel at every stage of his journey, and in Paris, 

\ he had to full -front a tremendous opposition, open 
and covert. Whatever unbiased people may think of 
this explanation and of his hostility to the Germans and 
their agents. Roman Dmowski deservedly enjoys the 
reputation of a straightforward and loyal tighter for his 
country's cause, a man who scorns underhand machina- 
tions and proclaims aloud— perhaps too frankly — the 
principles for which he is tight ing, Polish Jews who 
appeared in Paris, some of them his bitterest antagonists. 
recognised the chivalrous way in which he conducts his 
electoral and other campaigns. Among the delegates his 

So 



THE DELEGATES 

practical acquaintanceship with East European politics 
entitled him to high rank. For he knows the world 
better than any living statesman, having traveled over 
Europe, Asia, and America. He undertook and success- 
fully accomplished a delicate mission in the Far East 
in the year 1905, rendering valuable services to his 
country and to the cause of civilization. 

"M. Dmowski's activity," his friends further assert, 
"is impassioned and unselfish. The ambition that in- 
spires and nerves him is not of the personal sort, nor is 
his patriotism a ladder leading to place and power. 
Polish patriotism occupies a category apart from that of 
other European peoples, and M. Dmowski has typified 
it with rare fidelity and completeness. If Wilsonianism 
had been realized, Polish nationalism might have become 
an anachronism. To-day it is a large factor in European 
politics and is little understood in the West. M. Dmow- 
ski lives for his country. Her interests absorb his 
energies. He would probably agree with the historian 
Paolo Sarpi, who said, 'Let us be Venetians first and 
Christians after.' Of the two widely divergent currents 
into which the main stream of political thought and 
sentiment throughout the world is fast dividing itself, 
M. Dmowski moves with the national away from the 
international championed by Mr. Wilson. The fre- 
quency with which the leading spirits of Bolshevism turn 
out to be Jews — to the dismay and disgust of the bulk of 
their own community — and the ingenuity they displayed 
in spreading their corrosive tenets in Poland may not 
have been without effect upon the energy of M. Dmow- 
ski's attitude toward the demand of the Polish Jews to be 
placed in the privileged position of wards of the League 
of Nations. - But the principle of the protection of minority 
— Jewish or Gentile — is assailable on grounds which have 
nothing to do with race or religion." Some of the most 

81 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

interesting and characteristic incidents at the Conference 
had the Polish statesman '."or tfc al actor, and to 

him Poland owes some of the most solid and enduring bene- 
fits conferred on her at the Conference. 

Of a different temper is M. Paderewski, who appeared 
in P.-ris to plead his country's caus< iter stage of the 

ars of the Conference. This eminent artist *s energies 
wore all blended into one harmonious whole, so that his 
meetings with the great plenipotentiaries wore never dis- 
turbed by a jarring note. As soon as it was borne in 
upon him that their decisions were as irrevocable as de- 
es of Fate, ho bowed to them and treated the authors 
as Olympians who had no choice but to utter the stern 
fiat. Even when called upon to the obnoxious 

clause protecting religious and ethnic minorities against 
which his colleague had vainly fought. M. Paderewski 
sunk political passion in reason and attuned himself to 
the helpful role of harmonizer. He held that it would 
have been worse than useless to do otherwise. He was 
grieved that his country must acquiesce in that decree, 
he regretted intensely the necessity which constrained such 
proven friends of Poland as the Pour to pass what ho con- 
sidered a severe sentence on her; but he resigned himself 
gracefully to the inevitable and thanked Fate's exf i 

sonal sympathy. This attitude 
evoked oiration from Messrs. Lloyd George 

and Wilson, and the atmosphere of the conclave seen] 
perrj with a induced calm satisfaction 

and the joy of elevated its. M, Paderewski made a 

deep and Eavoi i b Supreme ( oL 

Belgium sent ber most brilliant parliamentarian, M. 
Hymans, as first plenipotentiary to the Conference. He 
was assisted by the cine:' of the Socialist party, M. Van 
dervelde. and by an eminent authority on internatic 
law, M. Van den Heuvel. But for reasons which elude 

8a 



THE DELEGATES 

analysis, none of the three delegates hit it off with the 
duumvirate who were spinning the threads of the world's 
destinies. M. Hymans, however, by his warmth, sin- 
cerity, and courage impressed the representatives of the 
lesser states, won their confidence, became their natural 
spokesman, and blazed out against all attempts — and 
they were numerous and deliberate — to ignore their 
existence. It was he who by his direct and eloquent 
protest took M. Clemenceau off his guard and elicited 
the amazing utterance that the Powers which could 
put twelve million soldiers in the field were the 
world's natural arbiters. In this way he cleared the 
atmosphere of the distorting mists of catchwords and 
shibboleths. 

How decisive a r61e internal politics played in the 
designation of plenipotentiaries to the Conference was 
shown with exceptional clearness in the case of Rumania. 
That country had no legislature. The Constituent 
Assembly, which had been dissolved owing to the German 
invasion, was followed by no fresh elections. The King, 
with whom the initiative thus rested, had reappointed 
M. Bratiano Chief of the Government, and M. Bratiano 
was naturally desirous of associating his own historic 
name with the aggrandizement of his country. But he 
also desired to secure the services of his political rival, 
M. Take Jonescu, whose reputation as a far-seeing states- 
man and as a successful negotiator is world-wide. Among 
his qualifications are an acquaintanceship with European 
countries and their affairs and a rare facility for give and 
take which is of the essence of international politics. He 
can assume the initiative in pourparlers, however uncom- 
promising the outlook; frame plausible proposals; con- 
ciliate his opponents by showing how thoroughly he 
understands and appreciates their point of view, and by 
these means he has often worked out seemingly hopeless 

7 S3 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

negotiations to a satisfactory issue. M. Clemenceau 
wrote of him, "'Cost un grand Europeen." 1 

M. Bratiano's bid for the services of his eminent op- 
ponent was coupled with the offer of certain portfolios in 
the Cabinet to M. Jonescu and to a number of his parlia- 
mentary supporters. While negotiations were slowly pro- 
ceeding by telegraph, M. Jonescu. who had already taken 
up his abode in Paris, was assiduously weaving his plans. 
He began by assuming what everybody knew, that the 
Powers would refuse to honor the secret treaty with 
France. Britain, and Russia, which assigned to Rumania 
all the territories to which she had laid claim, and he pro- 
posed first striking up a compromise with the other inter- 
ested states, then compacting Rumania, Jugoslavia. 
Poland. Czechoslovakia, and Greece into a solid block, 
and asking the Powers to approve and ratify the new 
league. Truly it was a genial conception worthy of a 
broad-minded statesman. It aimed at a durable peace 
based on what he considered a fair settlement of claims 
satisfactory to all. and it would have lightened the burden 
of the Big Four. But whether it could have been realized 
by peoples moved by turbid passions and represented by 
trustees, some of whom were avowedly afraid to relin- 
quish claims which they knew to be exorbitant, may well 
b>^ doubted. 

But the issue was never put to the test. The two 
statesmen failed to agree on the Cabinet question; M. 
Jonescu kept aloof from office, and the post of second 
delegate fell to Rumania's greatest diplomatist and phil- 
ologist, M. Mishu, who had for years admirably repre- 
sented his country as Minister in the British capital. 
Prom the outset M. Bratiano's position was unenviable, 
because he based his country's case on the claims of the 
secret treaty, and to Mr. Wilson every secret treaty 

1 V Homme EnthaSv.-. Dtoombv 14, IQ14. 

84 



THE DELEGATES 

which he could effectually veto was anathema. Between 
the two men, in lieu of a bond of union, there was only a 
strong force of mutual repulsion, which kept them per- 
manently apart. They moved on different planes, spoke 
different languages, and Rumania, in the person of her 
delegates, was treated like Cinderelja by her stepmother. 
The Council of Three kept them systematically in the 
dark about matters which it concerned them to know, 
negotiated over their heads, transmitted to Bucharest 
injunctions which only they were competent to receive, 
insisted on their compromising to accept future decrees 
of the Conference without an inkling as to their nature, 
and on their admitting the right of an alien institution — 
the League of Nations — to intervene in favor of minori- 
ties against the legally constituted government of the 
country. M. Bratiano, who in a trenchant speech in- 
veighed against these claims of the Great Powers to take 
the governance of Europe into their own hands, withdrew 
from the Conference and laid his resignation in the hands 
of the King. 

One of the most remarkable debaters in this singular 
parliament, where self-satisfied ignorance and dullness of 
apprehension were so hard to pierce, was the youthful 
envoy of the Czechoslovaks, M. Benes. This politician, 
who before the Conference came to an end was offered 
the honorable task of forming a new Cabinet, which he 
wisely declined, displayed a masterly grasp of Continental 
politics and a rare gift of identifying his country's aspira- 
tions with the postulates of a settled peace. A systematic 
thinker, he made a point of understanding his case at the 
outset. He would begin his cxpos£ by detaching himself 
from all national interests and starting from general as- 
sumptions recognized by the Olympians, and would lead 
his hearers by easy stages to the conclusions which he 
wished them to draw from their own premises. And two 

85 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of them, who had no great sympathy with his thesis, 
assured me that they could detect no logical flaw in his 
argument. Moderation and sincerity were the virtues 
which he was most eager to exhibit, and they were un- 
questionably the best trump cards he could play. Not 
only had he a firm grasp of facts and arguments, but he 
displayed a sense of measure and open-mindedness which 
enabled him to implant his views on the minds of his 
hearers. 

Armenia's cause found a forcible and suasive pleader in 
Boghos Pasha, whose way of marshaling arguments in 
favor of a contention that was frowned upon by many 
commanded admiration. The Armenians asked for a vast 
stretch of territory with outlets on the Black Sea and the 
Mediterranean, but they were met with the objections 
that their total population was insignificant; that only 
in one province were they in a majority, and that their 
claim to Cilicia clashed with one of the reserved rights of 
France. The ice. therefore, was somewhat thin in parts, 
but Boghos Pasha skated over it gracefully. His descrip- 
tion of the Armenian massacres was thrilling. Altogether 
his exposi was a masterpiece, and was appreciated by Mr. 
Wilson and M. Clemenceau. 

The Jugoslav delegates. MM. Vesnitch and Trumbitch, 
patriotic, tenacious, uncompromising, had an early oppor- 
tunity of showing the stuff of which they were made. 
When they were told that the Jugoslav state was not yet 
recognized and that the kingdom of Serbia must content 
itself with two delegates, they lodged an indignant protest 
against both decisions, and refused to appear at the Con- 
ference unless they were allowed an adequate number of 
representatives. Thereupon the Great Powers compro- 
mised the matter by according them three, and with 
stealthy rage they submitted to the refusal of recognition. 
They were not again heard of until one day they proposed 

S6 



THE DELEGATES 

that their dispute with Italy about Fiume and the Dal- 
matian coast should be solved by submitting it to Presi- 
dent Wilson for arbitration. The expedient was original. 
President Wilson, people remembered, had had an ani- 
mated talk on the subject with the Italian Premier, 
Orlando, and it was known that he had set his face against 
Italy's claim and against the secret treaty that recognized 
it. Consequently the Serbs were running no risk by chal- 
lenging Signor Orlando to lay the matter before the Ameri- 
can delegate. Whether, all things considered, it was a 
wise move to make has been questioned. Anyhow, the 
Italian delegation declined the suggestion on a number 
of grounds which several delegates considered convincing. 
The Conference, it urged, had been convoked precisely 
for the purpose of hearing and settling such disputes as 
theirs, and the Conference consisted, not of one, but of 
many delegates, who collectively were better qualified to 
deal with such problems than any one man. Europeans, 
too, could more fully appreciate the arguments, and the 
atmosphere through which the arguments should be con- 
templated, than the eminent American idealist, who had 
more than once had to modify his judgment on European 
matters. Again, to remove the discussion from the inter- 
national court might well be felt as a slight put upon the 
men who composed it. For why should their verdict be 
less worth soliciting than that of the President of the 
United States? True, Italy's delegates were themselves 
judges in that tribunal, but the question to be tried was 
not a matter between two countries, but an issue of much 
wider import — namely, what frontiers accorded to the 
embryonic state of Jugoslavia would be most conducive 
to the world's peace. And nobody, they held, could offer 
a more complete or trustworthy answer than they and 
their European colleagues, who were conversant with all 
the elements of the problem. Besides — but this objection 

37 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

was not expressly formulated — had not Mr. Wilson already- 
decided against Italy? On these and other grounds, then, 
they decided to leave the matter to the Conference. It 
was a delicate subject, and few onlookers cared to open 
their minds on its merits. 

Albania was represented by an old friend of mine, the 
venerable Turkhan Pasha, who had been in diplomacy 
ever since the Congress of Berlin in the 'seventies of last 
century, and who looked like a modernized Nestor. I 
made his acquaintance many years ago, when he was 
Ambassador of Turkey in St. Petersburg. He was then 
a favorite everywhere in the Russian capital as a con- 
scientious Ambassador, a charming talker, and a profes- 
sional peace-maker, who wished well to everybody. The 
Young Turks having recalled him from St. Petersburg, he 
soon afterward became Grand Vizier to the Mbret of 
Albania. Far resonant events removed the Mbret from 
the throne, Turkhan Pasha from the Vizierate, and Al- 
bania from the society of nations, and I next found my 
friend in Switzerland ill in health, eating the bitter bread 
of exile, temporarily isolated from the world of politics 
and waiting for something to turn up. A few years more 
gave the Allies an unexpectedly complete victory and 
brought back Turkhan Pasha to the outskirts of diplo- 
macy and politics. He suddenly made his appearance at 
the Paris Conference as the representative of Albania 
and the friend of Italy. 

Another Albanian friend of mine, Essad Pasha, whose 
plans for the regeneration of his country differed widely 
from those of Turkhan, was for a long while detained in 
Saloniki. By dint of solicitations and protests, he at last 
obtained permission to repair to Paris and lay his views 
before the Conference, where he had a curious interview 
with Mr. Wilson. The President, having received from 
Albanians in the United States many unsolicited judg- 

88 



THE DELEGATES 

ments on the character and antecedents of Essad Pasha, 
had little faith in his fitness to introduce and popularize 
democratic institutions in Albania. And he unburdened 
himself of these doubts to friends, who diffused the news. 
The Pasha asked for an audience, and by dint of patience 
and perseverance his prayer was heard. Five minutes 
before the appointed hour he was at the President's house, 
accompanied by his interpreter, a young Albanian named 
Stavro, who converses freely in French, Greek, and Turk- 
ish, besides his native language. But while in the ante- 
chamber Essad, remembering that the American Presi- 
dent speaks nothing but pure English, suggested that 
Stavro should drive over to the Hdtel Crillon for an inter- 
preter to translate from French. Thereupon one of the 
secretaries stopped him, saying: "Although he cannot 
speak French, the President understands it, so that a sec- 
ond interpreter will be unnecessary." Essad then ad- 
dressed Mr. Wilson in Albanian, Stavro translated his 
words into French, and the President listened in silence. 
It was the impression of those in the room that, at any 
rate, Mr. Wilson understood and appreciated the gist of 
the Pasha's sharp criticism of Italy's behavior. But, to 
be on the safe side, the President requested his visitor to 
set down on paper at his leisure everything he had said 
and to send it to him. 

PRESIDENT WILSON 

President Wilson, before assuming the redoubtable r61e 
of world arbiter, was hardly more than a name in Europe, 
and it was not a synonym for statecraft. His ethical 
objections to the rule of Huerta in Mexico, his attempt to 
engraft democratic principles there, and the anarchy that 
came of it were matters of history. But the President of 
the nation to whose unbounded generosity and altruism 

89 



rHE [NSIDE STORY OF VHF PEACE CONFERENCE 

world owes a dob: of gratitude that can only be 
acknowledged, not repaid, deservedly enjoyed a superla- 
tivo measure of respect from his foreign colleagues, and 

the author of the project which was to link all nations 
together by ties of moral kinship was literally idolized by 
the nuissos. Never has it fallen to my lot to see any 
so enthusiastically, so spontaneously welcomed by 
dejected peoples of the universe lbs most casual 
erances wore caught up as oracles. He occupied a 
^ht sv^ :. : the vicissitudes of everyday life 

and the contingencies of politics seemingly could not 
ich him. He was given credit I re degree of self- 

lessness in his conceptions and actions and far a balance 
udgment which no storms of passion could upset So 
as one could judge by innumerable symptoms, Presi- 

: Wilson was COl a with an Opportunity for i:.\\l 

incomparably vaster than had ever before been within 
the reach of man. 
Soon after the opening of the Conference the shadowy 

outlines Of bis [an to till in. slowly at first, and 

public be- 
held it fairly complete, with many of its '.".. 

\ of an active politician is never more 

out than v.' sed to an eminent place, 

he is set luous feat in sight of the multitude, Mr. 

\Y.' isk was manifestly c .'. to him. for it was 

deb by himself, and it comprised the m 

Lous problems ever tackled by man bora of woman. 
The means by which he so: bo wo: an were 

startlingry simple the regeneration of the human race was 
be compassed bj means of magiste cts secretly 

dra L sternly im] iterested peoples, to- 

gether^ ithanew andnot wholly approp menclature, 

la bis own country, wl er adversariefi as 

well as de> Mr. Wilson was regi 

90 



THE DELEGATES 

as a composite being made up of preacher, teacher, and 
politician. To these diverse elements they refer the fervor 
and unction, the dogmatic tone, and the practised shrewd- 
ness that marked his words and acts. Independent Amer- 
ican opinion doubted his qualifications to be a leader. As 
a politician, they said, he had always followed the crowd. 
He had swum with the tide of public sentiment in cardinal 
matters, instead of stemming or canalizing and guiding it. 
Deficient in courageous initiative, he had contented him- 
self with merely executive functions. No new idea, no 
fresh policy, was associated with his name. His singular 
attitude on the Mexican imbroglio had provoked the 
sharp criticism even of friends and the condemnation of 
political opponents. His utterances during the first stages 
of the World War, such as the statement that the American 
people were too proud to fight and had no concern with 
the causes and objects of the war, 1 when contrasted with 
the opposite views which he propounded later on, were 
ascribed to quick political evolution — but were not taken 
as symptoms of a settled mind. He seemed a pacifist 
when his pride revolted at the idea of settling any intelli- 
gible question by an appeal to violence, and a semi- 
militarist when, having in his own opinion created a 
perfectly safe and bloodless peace guarantee in the shape 
of the League of Nations, he agreed to safeguard it by a 
military compact which sapped its foundation. He owed 
his re-election for a second term partly, it was alleged, to 
the belief that during the first he had kept his country out 
of the war despite the endeavors of some of its eminent 
leaders to bring it in ; yet when firmly seated in the saddle, 
he followed the leaders whom he had theretofore with- 
stood and obliged the nation to fight. 



1 "With its causes und objects we have no concern." Speech delivered 
by Mr. Wilson before the League to Enforce Peace in Washington on May 
24, 1916. 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

As chief of the great country, his domestic critics add, 
which had just turned victory's scale in favor of the 
Allies, Mr. Wilson saw a superb opportunity to hitch his 
wagon to a star, and now for the first time he made a 
determined bid for the leadership of the world. Here 
the idealist showed himself at his best. But by the 
way of preparation he asked the nation at the elections 
to refuse their votes to his political opponents, despite 
the fact that they were loyally supporting his policy, 
and to return only men of his own party, and in order 
to silence their misgivings he declared that to elect 
Republican Senators would be to repudiate the adminis- 
tration of the President of the United States at a critical 
conjuncture. This was urged against him as the in- 
expiable sin. The electors, however, sent his political 
opponents to the Senate, whereupon the President or- 
ganized his historic visit to Europe. It might have be- 
come a turning-point in the world's history had he 
transformed his authority and prestige into the driving- 
power requisite to embody his beneficent scheme. But he 
wasted the opportunity for lack of moral courage. Thus 
far American criticism. But the peoples of Europe 
ignored the estimates of the President made by his fellow- 
countrymen, who, as such, may be forgiven for failing to 
appreciate his apostleship, or set the full value on his 
humanitarian strivings. The war-weary masses judged 
him not by what he had achieved or attempted in the past, 
but by what he proposed to (?.c in the future. And measured 
by this standard, his spiritual statue grew to legendary 
proportions. 

Europe, when the President touched its shores, was as 
clay ready for the creative potter. Never before were the 
nations so eager to follow a Moses who would take them 
to the long-promised land where wars are prohibited and 
blockades unknown. And to their thinking he was that 

92 



THE DELEGATES 

great leader. In France men bowed down before him 
with awe and affection. Labor leaders in Paris told me 
that they shed tears of joy in his presence, and that their 
comrades would go through fire and water to help him to 
realize his noble schemes. 1 To the working classes in 
Italy his name was a heavenly clarion at the sound of 
which the earth would be renewed. The Germans re- 
garded him and his humane doctrine as their sheet-anchor 
of safety. The fearless Herr Muehlon said, "If President 
Wilson were to address the Germans, and pronounce a 
severe sentence upon them, they would accept it with 
resignation and without a murmur and set to work at 
once." In German-Austria his fame was that of a savior, 
and the mere mention of his name brought balm to the 
suffering and surcease of sorrow to the afflicted. A 
touching instance of this which occurred in the Austrian 
capital, when narrated to the President, moved him to 
tears. There were some five or six thousand Austrian 
children in the hospitals at Vienna who, as Christmas 
was drawing near, were sorely in need of medicaments 
and much else. The head of the American Red Cross 
took up their case and persuaded the Americans in France 
to send two million dollars' worth of medicaments to 
Vienna. These were duly despatched, and had got as 
far as Berne, when the French authorities, having got 
wind of the matter, protested against this premature 

1 The testimony of a leading French press organ is worth reproducing 
here: "La situation du President Wilson dans nos democraties est mag- 
nifique, souveraine et extremement perilleuse. On ne connait pas 
d'hommes, dans les temps contemporains, ayant eu plus d'autorite et de 
puissance; la popularit6 lui a donne ce que le droit divin ne conferait pas 
toujours aux monarques her£ditaires. En revanche et par le fait du choc 
en retour, sa responsabilit6 est supeYieure a celle du prince le plus absolu. 
S'il r6ussit a organiser le monde d'apres ses r6ves, sa gloire dominera les 
plus hautes gloires; mais il faut dire hardiment que s'il echouait il plon- 
gerait le monde dans un chaos dont le bolchevisme russe ne nous offre 
qu'une faible image; et sa responsabilite' devant la conscience humaine 
d6passerait ce que peut supporter un simple mortel. Redoutable alterna- 
tive!" — Cf. Le Figaro, February 10, 1919. 

93 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

assistance to infant enemies on grounds which the other 
Allies had to recognize as technically tenable, and the 
medicaments were ordered back to France from Berne. 
Thereupon Doctor Ferries, of the International Red Cross, 
became wild with indignation and laid the matter before 
the Swiss government, which undertook to send some 
medicaments to the children, while the Americans were 
endeavoring to move the French to allow at least some of 
the remedies to go through. The children in the hospitals, 
when told that they must wait, were bright and hopeful. 
' ' It will be all right, ' ' some of them exclaimed. ' ' Wilson is 
coming soon, and he will bring us everything." 

Thus Mr. Wilson had become a transcendental hero to 
the European proletarians, who in their homely way 
adjusted his mental and moral attributes to their own 
ideal of the latter-day Messiah. His legendary figure, 
half saint, half revolutionist, emerged from the transparent 
haze of faith, yearning, and ignorance, as in some ecstatic 
vision. In spite of his recorded acts and utterances the 
mythopeic faculty of the peoples had given itself free 
scope and created a messianic democrat destined to free 
the lower orders, as they were called, in each state from the 
shackles of capitalism, legalized thraldom, and crushing 
taxation, and each nation from sanguinary warfare. 
Truly, no human being since the dawn of history has ever 
yet been favored with such a superb opportunity. Mr. 
Wilson might have made a gallant effort to lift society 
out of the deep grooves into which it had sunk, and dis- 
lodge the secular obstacles to the enfranchisement and 
transfiguration of the human race. At the lowest it was 
open to him to become the center of a countless multitude, 
the heart of their hearts, the incarnation of their noblest 
thought, on condition that he scorned the prudential 
motives of politicians, burst through the barriers of the 
old order, and deployed all his energies and his full will- 

94 



THE DELEGATES 

power in the struggle against sordid interests and dense 
prejudice. But he was cowed by obstacles which his will 
lacked the strength to surmount, and instead of receiving 
his promptings from the everlasting ideals of mankind 
and the inspiriting audacities of his own highest nature 
and appealing to the peoples against their rulers, he felt 
constrained in the very interest of his cause to haggle and 
barter with the Scribes and the Pharisees, and ended by 
recording a pitiful answer to the most momentous prob- 
lems couched in the impoverished phraseology of a 
political party. 

Many of his political friends had advised the President 
not to visit Europe lest the vast prestige and influence 
which he wielded from a distance should dwindle un- 
utilized on close contact with the realists' crowd. Even 
the war-god Mars, when he descended into the ranks of 
the combatants on the Trojan side, was wounded by a 
Greek, and, screaming with pain, scurried back to Olympus 
with paling halo. But Mr. Wilson decided to preside and 
to direct the fashioning of his project, and to give Europe 
the benefit of his advice. He explained to Congress that 
he had expressed the ideals of the country for which its 
soldiers had consciously fought, had had them accepted 
"as the substance of their own thoughts and purpose" 
by the statesmen of the associated governments, and now, 
he concluded: "I owe it to them to see to it, in so far 
as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is 
put upon them, and no possible effort omitted to realize 
them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making 
good what they offered their lives and blood to obtain. 
I can think of no call to service which could transcend 
this." 1 No intention could well be more praiseworthy. 

Soon after the George Washington, flying the presidential 

1 From Mr. Wilson's address to Congress read on December 2, 1918. 
Cf. The Times, December 4, 191 8. 

95 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Bag, had steamed out of the Bay on her way to Europe, 
the United Press received from its correspondent on 
board, who was attached to Mr. Wilson's person, a mes- 
sage which invigorated the hopes of the world and 
evoked warm outpourings of the seared soul of suffering 
man in gratitude toward the bringer of balm. It began 
thus : "The President sails for Europe to uphold American 
ideals, and literally to tight for his Fourteen Points. The 
President, at the Peace Table, will insist on the freedom of 
the seas and a general disarmament. . . . The seas, he 
holds, ought to be guarded by the whole world." 

Since then the world knows what to think of the literal 
fighting at the Peace Table. The freedom of the seas 
was never as much as alluded to at the Peace Table, for 
the announcement of Mr. "Wilson's militant championship 
brought him a wireless message from London to the 
effect that that proposal, at all events, must be struck 
out of his program if he wished to do business with 
Britain. And without a tight or a remonstrance the 
President struck it out. The Fourteen Points were not 
discussed at the Conference. 1 One may deplore, but one 
cannot misunderstand, what happened. Mr. Wilson, too, 
had his own fixed aim to attain: intent on associating his 
name with a grandiose humanitarian monument, he was 
resolved not to return to his country without some sort 
of a covenant of the new international life. He could 
not afford to go home empty-handed. Therein lay his 
weakness and the source of his failure. For whenever his 
attitude toward the Great Powers was taken to mean, 
' ' Unless you give me my Covenant, you cannot have your 
Treaty." the retort was read}'-: "Without our Treaty 
there will be no Covenant." 

Like Dejoces, the first king of the Medes, who, having 

1 Cf. Secretary Lansing's evidence before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. The Chicago Tribune, Augnst 27, 1919. 

96 



THE DELEGATES 

built his palace at Ecbatana, surrounded it with seven 
walls and permanently withdrew his person from the 
gaze of his subjects, Mr. Wilson in Paris admitted to his 
presence only the authorized spokesmen of states and 
causes, and not all of these. He declined to receive 
persons who thought they had a claim to see him, and h( 
received others who were believed to have none. During 
his sojourn in Paris he took many important Russian 
affairs in hand after having publicly stated that no peaa 
could be stable so long as Russia was torn by internal 
strife. And as familiarity with Russian conditions wa 
not one of his accomplishments, he presumably needed 
advice and help from those acquainted with them. Nov. 
a large number of Russians, representing all political 
parties and four governments, were in Paris waiting to be 
consulted. But between January and May not one of 
them was ever asked for information or counsel. Nay, 
more, those who respectfully solicited an audience were 
told to wait. In the meanwhile men unacquainted with 
the country and people were sent by Mr. Wilson to report 
on the situation, and to begin by obtaining the terms of 
an acceptable treaty from the Bolshevik government. 

The first plenipotentiary of one of the principal lesser 
states was for months refused an audience, to the delight of 
his political adversaries, who made the most of the 
circumstance at home. An eminent diplomatist who 
possessed considerable claims to be vouchsafed an inter- 
view was put off from week to week, until at last, by dint 
of perseverance, as it seemed to him, the President con- 
sented to see him. The diplomatist, pleased at his suc- 
cess, informed a friend that the following Wednesday 
would be the memorable day. "But are you no1 
aware," asked the friend, "that on that day the Presided 
will be on the high seas on his way back to the United 
States?" He was not aware of it. But when he learned 

97 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

that the audience had been deliberately fixed for a day 
when Mr. Wilson would no longer be in France he felt 
aggrieved. 

In Italy the President's progress was a veritable 
triumph. Emperors and kings had roused no such 
enthusiasm. One might fancy him a deity unexpectedly 
discovered under the outward appearance of a mortal 
and now being honored as the god that he was by ecstatic 
worshipers. Everything he did was well done, every- 
thing he said was nobly conceived and worthy of being 
treasured up. In these dispositions a few brief months 
wrought a vast difference. 

In this respect an instructive comparison might be 
made between Tsar Alexander I at the Vienna Congress 
and the President of the United States at the Conference 
of Paris. The Russian monarch arrived in the Austrian 
capital with the halo of a Moses focusing the hopes of all 
the peoples of Europe. His reputation for probity, public 
spirit, and lofty aspirations had won for him the good- 
will and the anticipatory blessings of war-weary nations. 
He, too, was a mystic, believed firmly in occult influences, 
so firmly indeed that he accepted the fitful guidance of 
an ecstatic lady whose intuition was supposed to transcend 
the sagacity of professional statesmen. And yet the 
Holy Alliance was the supreme outcome of his endeavors, 
as the League of Nations was that of Mr. Wilson's. In 
lieu of universal peace all eastern Europe was still warring 
and revolting in September and the general outlook was 
disquieting. The disheartening effect of the contrast 
between the promise and the achievement of the American 
statesman was felt throughout the world. But Mr. 
Wilson has the solace to know that people hardly ever 
reach their goal — though they sometimes advance fairly 
near to it. They either die on the way or else it changes 
or they do. 

98 



THE DELEGATES 

It was doubtless a noble ambition that moved the 
Prime Ministers of the Great Powers and the chief of the 
North American Republic to give their own service to 
the Conference as heads of their respective missions. 
For they considered themselves to be the best equipped 
for the purpose, and they were certainly free from such 
prejudices as professional traditions and a confusing 
knowledge of details might be supposed to engender. 
But in almost every respect it was a grievous mistake 
and the source of others still more grievous. True, in 
his own particular sphere each of them had achieved 
what is nowadays termed greatness. As a war leader 
Mr. Lloyd George had been hastily classed with Marl- 
borough and Chatham, M. Clemenceau compared to 
Danton, and Mr. Wilson set apart in a category to him- 
self. But without questioning these journalistic certifi- 
cates of fame one must admit that all three plenipoten- 
tiaries were essentially politicians, old parliamentary 
hands, and therefore expedient-mongers whose highest 
qualifications for their own profession were drawbacks 
which unfitted them for their self-assumed mission. Of 
the concrete world which they set about reforming their 
knowledge was amazingly vague. "Frogs in the pond," 
says the Japanese proverb, "know naught of the ocean." 
There was, of course, nothing blameworthy in their 
unacquaintanceship with the issues, but only in the off- 
handedness with which they belittled its consequences. 
Had they been conversant with the subject or gifted with 
deeper insight, many of the things which seemed particu- 
larly clear to them would have struck them as sheer 
inexplicable, and among these perhaps their own leader- 
ship of the world-parliament. 

What they lacked, however, might in some perceptible 
degree have been supplied by enlisting as their helpers 
men more happily endowed than themselves. But they 
8 99 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

deliberately chose mediocrities. It is a mark of genial 
spirits that they are well served, but the plenipotentiaries 
of the Conference were not characterized by it. Away 
in the background some of them had familiars or casual 
prompters to whose counsels they were wont to listen, 
but many of the adjoints who moved in the limelight of the 
world-stage were gritless and pithless. 

As the heads of the principal governments implicitly 
claimed to be the authorized spokesmen of the human race 
and endowed with unlimited powers, it is worth noting 
that this claim was boldly challenged by the peoples' 
organs in the press. Nearly all the journals read by the 
masses objected from the first to the dictatorship of the 
group of Premiers, Mr. Wilson being excepted. "The 
modern parasite," wrote a respectable democratic news- 
paper, 1 "is the politician. Of all the privileged beings 
who have ever governed us he is the worst. In that, 
however, there is nothing surprising ... he is not only 
amoral, but incompetent by definition. And it is this 
empty-headed individual who is intrusted with the task 
of settling problems with the very rudiments of which 
he is unacquainted." Another French journal 2 wrote : 
"In truth it is a misfortune that the leaders of the Con- 
ference are Cabinet chiefs, for each of them is obsessed 
by the carking cares of his domestic policy. Besides, the 
Paris Conference takes on the likeness of a lyrical drama 
in which there are only tenors. Now would even the 
most beautiful work in the world survive this excess of 
beauties?" 

The truth as revealed by subsequent facts would seem 
to be that each of the plenipotentiaries recognizing parlia- 
mentary success as the source of his power was obsessed, 
by his own political problems and stimulated by his own 

1 La Democrat ie Nouvelle, May 27, 1919 

2 Le Figaro, March .26, 1919. 

100 



THE DELEGATES 

immediate ends. As these ends, however incompatible 
with each other, were believed by each one to tend toward 
the general object, he worked zealously for their attain- 
ment. The consequences are notorious. M. Clemenceau 
made France the hub of the universe. Mr. Lloyd George 
harbored schemes which naturally identified the welfare 
of mankind with the hegemony of the English-speaking 
races. Signor Orlando was inspired by the "sacred 
egotism" which had actuated all Italian Cabinets since 
Italy entered the war, and President Wilson was burning 
to associate his name and also that of his country with 
the vastest and noblest enterprise inscribed in the annals 
of history. And each one moved' over his own favorite 
route toward his own goal. It was an apt illustration 
of the Russian fable of the swan, the crab, and the pike 
being harnessed together in order to remove a load. 
The swan flew upward, the crab flrawled backward, the 
pike made with all haste for the water, and the load 
remained where it was. 

A lesser but also a serious disadvantage of the delega- 
tion of government chiefs made itself felt in the procedure. 
Embarrassing delays were occasioned by the unavoidable 
absences of the principal delegates whom pressure of 
domestic politics called to their respective capitals, as 
well as by their tactics, and their colleagues profited by 
their absence for the sake of the good cause. Thus all 
Paris, as we saw, was aware that the European chiefs, 
whose faith in Wilsonian orthodoxy was still feeble at that 
time, were prepared to take advantage of the President's 
sojourn in Washington to speed up business in their own 
sense and to confront him on his return with accomplished 
facts. But when, on his return, he beheld their handi- 
work he scrapped it, and a considerable loss of time en- 
sued for which the world has since had to pay very 
heavily. 

zoi 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Again, when Premier Orlando was in Rome after Mr. 
Wilson's appeal to the Italian people, a series of measures 
was passed by the delegates in Paris affecting Italy, 
diminishing her importance at the Conference, and modify- 
ing the accepted interpretation of the Treaty of London. 
Some of these decisions had to be canceled when the 
Italians returned. These stratagems had an undesirable 
effect on the Italians. 

Not the least of the Premiers' disabilities lay in the 
circumstance that they were the merest novices in inter- 
national affairs. Geography, ethnography, psychology, 
and political history were sealed books to them. Like 
the rector of Louvain University who told Oliver Gold- 
smith that, as he had become the head of that institution 
without knowing Greek, he failed to see why it should be 
taught there, the chiefs of state, having attained the 
highest position in their respective countries without more 
than an inkling of international affairs, were unable to 
realize the importance of mastering them or the im- 
possibility of repairing the omission as they went along. 

They displayed their contempt for professional diplo- 
macy and this feeling was shared by many, but they ex- 
tended that sentiment to certain diplomatic postulates 
which can in no case be dispensed with, because they are 
common to all professions. One of them is knowledge 
of the terms of the problems to be solved. No con- 
juncture could have been less favorable for an experiment 
based on this theory. The general situation made a 
demand on the delegates for special knowledge and ex- 
perience, whereas the Premiers and the President, al- 
though specialists in nothing, had to act as specialists in 
everything. Traditional diplomacy would have shown 
some respect for the law of causality. It would have sent 
to the Conference diplomatists more or less acquainted 
with the issues to be mooted and also with the mentality 

102 



THE DELEGATES 

Of the other negotiators, and it would have assigned to 
them a number of experts as advisers. It would have 
formed a plan similar to that proposed by the French 
authorities and rejected by the Anglo-Saxons. In this 
way at least the technical part of the task would have 
been tackled on right lines, the war would have been 
liquidated and normal relations quickly re-established 
among the belligerent states. It may be objected that 
this would have been a meager contribution to the new 
politico-social fabric. Undoubtedly it would, but, how- 
ever meager, ij: would have been a positive gain. Pos- 
sibly the first stone of a new world might have been laid 
once the ruins of the old were cleared away. But even 
this modest feat could not be achieved by amateurs 
working in desultory fashion and handicapped by their 
political parties at home. The resultant of their ap- 
parent co-operation was a sum in subtraction because 
dispersal or effort was unavoidably substituted for 
concentration. 

Whether one contemplates them in the light of their 
public acts or through the prism of gossip, the figures 
cut by the delegates of the Great Powers were pathetic. 
Giants in the parliamentary sphere, they shrank to the 
dimensions of dwarfs in the international. In matters 
of geography, ethnography, history, and international 
politics they were helplessly at sea, and the stories told 
of certain of their efforts to keep their heads above water 
while maintaining a simulacrum of dignity would have 
been amusing were the issues less momentous. "Is it 
after Upper or Lower Silesia that those greedy Poles are 
hankering?" one Premier is credibly reported to have 
asked some months after the Polish delegation had pro- 
pounded and defended its claims and he had had time to 
familiarize himself with them. "Please point out to me 
Dalmatia on the map," was another characteristic request, 

103 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

"and tell me what connection there is between it and 
Fiume." One of the principal plenipotentiaries addressed 
a delegate who is an acquaintance of mine approximately 
as follows: "I cannot understand the spokesmen of the 
smaller states. To me they seem stark mad. They single 
out a strip of territory and for no intelligible reason flock 
round it like birds of prey round a corpse on the field of 
battle. Take Silesia, for example. The Poles are clamor- 
ing for it as if the very existence of their country de- 
ponded on their annexing it. The Germans are still more 
crazy about it. But for their eagerness I suppose there is 
some solid foundation. But how in Heaven's name do 
the Armenians come to claim it? Just think of it, the 
Armenians! The world has gone mad. No wonder 
France has set her foot down and warned them off the 
ground. But what does France herself want with it? 
What is the clue to the mystery?" My acquaintance, in 
reply, pointed out as considerately as he could that 
Silesia was the province for which Poles and Germans 
were contending, whereas the Armenians were pleading 
for Cilicia, which is farther east, and were, therefore, 
frowned upon by the French, who conceive that they 
have a civilizing mission there and men enough to ac- 
complish it. 

It is characteristic of the epoch, and therefore worthy 
of the historian's attention, that not only the members 
of the Conference, but also other leading statesmen of 
Anglo-Saxon countries, were wont to make a very little 
knowledge of peoples and countries go quite a far way. 
Two examples may serve to familiarize the reader with the 
phenomenon and to moderate his surprise at the defects 
of the world-dictators in Paris. One English-speaking 
statesman, dealing with the Italian government l and 
casting around for some effective way of helping the 

1 Both of them occurred before the armistice, but during the war. 

104 



THE DELEGATES 

Icalian people out of their pitiable economic plight, 
fancied he hit upon a felicitous expedient, which he un- 
folded as follows. "I venture," he said, "to promise that 
if you will largely increase your cultivation of bananas 
the people of my country will take them all. No matter 
how great the quantities, our market will absorb them, 
and that will surely make a considerable addition to your 
balance on the right side." At first the Italians believed 
he was joking. But finding that he really meant what he 
said, they ruthlessly revealed his idea to the nation under 
the heading, "Italian bananas!" 

Here is the other instance. During the war the Polish 
people was undergoing unprecedented hardships. Many 
of the poorer classes were literally perishing of hunger. 
A Polish commission was sent to an English-speaking 
country to interest the government and people in the 
condition of the sufferers and obtain relief. The envoys 
had an interview with a Secretary of State, who inquired 
to what port they intended to have the foodstuffs con- 
veyed for distribution in the interior of Poland. They 
answered : ' ' We shall have them taken to Dantzig. There 
is no other way." The statesman reflected a little and 
then said : ' ' You may meet with difficulties. If you have 
them shipped to Dantzig you must of course first obtain 
Italy's permission. Have you got it?" "No. We had 
not thought of that. In fact, we don't yet see why Italy 
need be approached." "Because it is Italy who has 
command of the Mediterranean, and if you want the 
transport taken to Dantzig it is the Italian government 
that you must ask!" * 

The delegates picked up a good deal of miscellaneous 
information about the various countries whose future they 
were regulating, and to their credit it should be said that 

1 For the accuracy of this and the preceding story I vouch absolutely. I 
have the names of persons, places, and authorities, which are superfluous here. 

I05 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

they put questions to their informants without a trace of 
false pride. One of the two chief delegates wending home- 
ward from a sitting at which M. Jules Cambon had 
spoken a good deal about those Polish districts which, 
although they contained a majority of Germans, yet be- 
longed of right to Poland, asked the French delegate why 
he had made so many allusions to Frederick the Great. 
"What had Frederick to do with Poland?" he inquired. 
The answer was that the present German majority of the 
inhabitants was made up of colonists who had immigrated 
into the districts since the time of Frederick the Great and 
the partition of Poland. "Yes, I see," exclaimed the 
statesman, "but what had Frederick the Great to do with 
the partition of Poland?" ... In the domain of ethnogra- 
phy there were also many pitfalls and accidents. During 
an official cxpost of the Oriental situation before the 
Supreme Council, one of the Great Four, listening to a 
narrative of Turkish misdeeds, heard that the Kurds had 
tortured and killed a number of defenseless women, chil- 
dren, and old men. He at once interrupted the speaker 
with the query: "You now call them Kurds. A few 
minutes ago you said they were Turks. I take it that the 
Kurds and the Turks are the same people?" Loath to 
embarrass one of the world's arbiters, the delegate respect- 
fully replied, "Yes, sir, they are about the same, but the 
worse of the two are the Kurds." l 

Great Britain's first delegate, with engaging candor 
sought to disarm criticism by frankly confessing in the 
House of Commons that he had never before heard of 
Teschen, about which such an extraordinary fuss was then 
being made, and by asking: "How many members of 

1 The Kurds are members of the great Indo-European family to which 
the Greeks, Italians, Celts, Teutons, Slavs, Hindus, Persians, and Afghans 
belong, whereas the Turks are a branch of a wholly different stock, the 
Ural-Altai group, of which the Mongols, Turks, Tartars, Finns, and Mag- 
yars are members. 



THE DELEGATES 

the House have ever heard of Teschen? Yet," he added 
significantly, "Teschen very nearly produced an angry 
conflict between two allied states." ' 

The circumstance that an eminent parliamentarian had 
never heard of problems that agitate continental peoples 
is excusable. Less so was his resolve, despite such a capi- 
tal disqualification, to undertake the task of solving those 
problems single-handed, although conscious that the fate 
of whole peoples depended on his succeeding. It is no 
adequate justification to say that he could always fall 
back upon special commissions, of which there was no 
lack at the Conference. Unless he possessed a safe cri- 
terion by which to assess the value of the commissions' 
conclusions, he must needs himself decide the matter 
arbitrarily. And the delegates, having no such criterion, 
pronounced very arbitrary judgments on momentous 
issues. One instance of this turned upon Poland's claims 
to certain territories incorporated in Germany, which were 
referred to a special commission under the presidency of 
M. Cambon. Commissioners were sent to the country 
to study the matter on the spot, where they had received 
every facility for acquainting themselves with it. After 
some weeks the commission reported in favor of the Polish 
claim with unanimity. But Mr. Lloyd George rejected 
their conclusions and insisted on having the report sent 
back to them for reconsideration. Again the commis- 
sioners went over the familiar ground, but felt obliged to 
repeat their verdict anew. Once more, however, the Brit- 
ish Premier demurred, and such was his tenacity that, 
despite Mr. Wilson's opposition, the final decision of the 
Conference reversed that of the commission and non- 
suited the Poles. By what line of argument, people 
naturally asked, did the first British delegate come to 
that conclusion? That he knew more about the matter 

1 April 16, 1919. 

107 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

than the special Inter-Allied commission is hardly to be 
supposed. Indeed, nobody assumed that he was any 
better informed on that subject than about Teschen. 
The explanation put in circulation by interested persons 
was that, like Socrates, he had his own familiar demon to 
prompt him, who, like all such spirits, chose to flourish, 
like the violet, in the shade. That this source of light was 
accessible to the Prime Minister may, his apologists hold, 
one day prove a boon to the peoples whose fate was thus 
being spun in darkness and seemingly at haphazard. 
Possibly. But in the meanwhile it was construed as an 
affront to their intelligence and a violation of the promise 
made to them of "open covenants openly arrived at." 
The press asked why the information requisite for the 
work had not been acquired in advance, as these semi- 
mystical ways of obtaining it commended themselves to 
nobody. Wholly mystical were the methods attributed 
to one or other of the men who were preparing the advent 
of the new era. For superstition of various kinds was 
supposed to be as well represented at the Paris Conference 
as at the Congress of Vienna. Characteristic of the epoch 
was the gravity with which individuals otherwise well 
balanced exercised their ingenuity in finding out the true 
relation of the world's peace to certain lucky numbers. 
For several events connected with the Conference the 
thirteenth day of the month was deliberately, and some 
occultists added felicitously, chosen. It was also noticed 
that an effort was made by all the delegates to have the 
Allies' reply to the German counter-proposals presented 
on the day of destiny, Friday, June 13th. When it mis- 
carried a flutter was caused in the dovecotes of the illumi- 
nated. The failure was construed as an inauspicious omen 
and it caused the spirits of many to droop. The prin- 
cipal clairvoyante of Paris, Madame N- , who plumes 

herself on being the intermediary between the Fates that 

108 



THE DELEGATES 

rule and some of their earthly executors, was consulted on 
the subject, one knows not with what result. 1 It was 
given out, however, as the solemn utterance of the oracle 
in vogue that Mr. Wilson's enterprise was weighted with 
original sin ; he had made one false step before his arrival 
in Europe, and that had put everything out of gear. By 
enacting fourteen commandments he had countered the 
magic charm of his lucky thirteen. One of the fourteen, it 
was soothsaid, must therefore be omitted — it might be, say, 
that of open covenants openly arrived at, or the freedom of 
the seas — in a word, any one so long as the mystic number 
thirteen remained intact. But should that be impossible, 
seeing that the Fourteen Points had already become house- 
hold words to all nations and peoples, then it behooved the 
President to number the last of his saving points 13a. 2 

This odd mixture of the real and the fanciful — a symp- 
tom, as the initiated believed, of a mood of fine spiritual 
exaltation — met with little sympathy among the impatient 
masses whose struggle for bare life was growing ever 
fiercer. Stagnation held the business world, prices were 
rising to prohibitive heights, partly because of the daw- 
dling of the world's conclave; hunger was stalking about 
the ruined villages of the northern departments of France, 
destructive wars were being waged in eastern Europe, and 
thousands of Christians were dying of hunger in Bessa- 
rabia. 3 Epigrammatic strictures and winged words barbed 
with stinging satire indicated the feelings of the many. 
And the fact remains on record that streaks of the mysti- 
cism that buoyed up Alexander I at the Congress of 

1 Madame N showed a friend of mine an autograph letter which she 

claims to have received from one of her clients, "a world's famous man." 
I was several times invited to inspect it at the clairvoyante's abode, or at 
my own, if I preferred. 

2 Articles on the subject appeared in the French press. To the best of 
my recollection there was one in Bonsoir. 

3 The American Red Cross buried sixteen hundred of them in August, 
1919. The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 30, 1919. 

109 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Vienna, and is supposed to have stimulated Nicholas II 
during the first world-parliament at The Hague, were 
noticeable from time to time in the environment of the 
Paris Conference. The disclosure of these elements of 
superstition was distinctly harmful and might have been 
hindered easily by the system of secrecy and censorship 
which effectively concealed matters much less mischievous. 
The position of the plenipotentiaries was unenviable at 
best and they well deserve the benefit of extenuating 
circumstances. For not even a genius can efficiently 
tackle problems with the elements of which he lacks 
acquaintanceship, and the mass of facts which they had 
to deal with was sheer unmanageable. It was distressing 
to watch them during those eventful months groping and 
floundering through a labyrinth of obstacles with no Ari- 
adne clue to guide their tortuous course, and discovering 
that their task was more intricate than they had imagined. 
The ironic domination of temper and circumstance over 
the fitful exertions of men struggling with the partially 
realized difficulties of a false position led to many incon- 
gruities upon which it would be ungracious to dwell. One 
of them, however, which illustrates the situation, seems 
almost incredible. It is said to have occurred in January. 
According to the current narrative, soon after the arrival 
of President Wilson in Paris, he received from a French 
publicist named M. B. a long and interesting memoran- 
dum about the island of Corsica, recounting the history, 
needs, and aspirations of the population as well as the 
various attempts they had made to regain their inde- 
pendence, and requesting him to employ his good offices 
at the Conference to obtain for them complete autonomy. 
To this demand M. B. is said to have received a reply x 
to the effect that the President "is persuaded that this 

1 The reply, of which I possess what was given to me as a copy, is dated 
Paris, January 9, 1919, and is in French. 

no 



THE DELEGATES 

question will form the subject of a thorough examination 
by the competent authorities of the Conference"! Cor- 
sica, the birthplace of Napoleon, and as much an integral 
part of France as the Isle of Man is of England, seeking 
to slacken the ties that link it to the Republic and receiv- 
ing a promise that the matter would be carefully considered 
by the delegates soun ds more like a mystification than a sober 
statement of fact. The story was sent to the newspapers 
for publication, but the censor very wisely struck it out. 

These and kindred occurrences enable one better to 
appreciate the motives which prompted the delegates to 
shroud their conversations and tentative decisions in a 
decorous veil of secrecy. 

It is but fair to say that the enterprise to which they 
set their hands was the vastest that ever tempted lofty 
ambitions since the tower-builders of Babel strove to 
bring heaven within reach of the earth. It transcended 
the capacity of the contemporary world's greatest men. 1 



I Imagine, for instance, the condition of mind into which the following 
day's work must have thrown the American statesman, beset as he was 
with political worries of his own. The extract quoted is taken from The 
Daily Mail of April 18, 191 9 (Paris edition). 

President Wilson had a busy day yesterday, as the following list of engagements shows: 

II A.M. Dr. Wellington Koo, to present the Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference. 
1 1. 10 A.M. Marquis de Vogue had a delegation of seven others, representing the Congres 

Francais, to present their view as to the disposition of the left bank of the Rhine. 

11.30 a.m. Assyrian and Chaldean Delegation, with a message from the Assyrian- 
Chaldean nation. 

11.4S a.m. Dalmatian Delegation, to present to the President the result of the plebiscite 
of that part of Dalmatia occupied by Italians. 

Noon. M. Bucquet, Charge d'Affairea of San Marino, to convey the action of the 
Grand Council of San Marino, conferring on the President Honorary Citizenship in the 
Republic of San Marino. 

12.10 P.M. M. Colonder, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

12.20 p.m. Miss Rose Schneidennan and Miss Mary Anderson, delegates of the National 
Women's Trade Union League of the United States. 

12.30 p.m. The Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox Eastern Church. 

12.45 p.m. Essad Pasha, delegate of Albania, to present the claims of Albania. 

1 p.m. M. M. L. Coromilas, Greek Minister at Rome, to pay his respects. 

Luncheon. Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary for War. 

4 p.m. Mr. Herbert Hoover. 

4. IS p.m. M. Bratiano. of the Rumanian Delegation. 

4.30 p.m. Dr. Affonso Costa, former Portuguese Minister, Portuguese Delegate to 
the Peace Conference. 

4.4S p.m. Boghos Nubar Pasha, president of the Armenian National Delegation, 
accompanied by M. A. Aharoman and Professor A. Der Hagopian, of Robert College. 

5. IS P.M. M. Pasitch, of the Serbian Delegation. 

5.30 PJd. Mr. Frank Walsh, of the Irish-American Delegation. 

Ill 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

It was a labor for a wonder-worker in the pristine days 
of heroes. But although to solve even the main problems 
without residue was beyond the reach of the most genial 
representatives of latter-day statecraft, it needed only 
clearness of conception, steadiness of purpose, and the 
proper adjustment of means to ends, to begin the work 
on the right lines and give it an impulse that might 
perhaps carry it to completion in the fullness of time. 

But even these postulates were wanting. The eminent 
parliamentarians failed to rise to the gentle height of 
average statecraft. They appeared in their new and 
august character of world-reformers with all the roots 
still clinging to them of the rank electoral soil from which 
they sprang. Their words alone were redolent of idealism, 
their deeds were too often marred by pettifogging com- 
promises or childish blunders — constructive phrases and 
destructive acts. Not only had they no settled method 
of working, they lacked even a common proximate aim. 
For although they all employed the same phraseology 
when describing the objects for which their countries had 
fought and they themselves were ostensibly laboring, 
no two delegates attached the same ideas to the words 
they used. Yet, instead of candidly avowing this root- 
defect and remedying it, they were content to stretch the 
euphemistic terms until these covered conflicting con- 
ceptions and gratified the ears of every hearer. Thus, 
"open covenants openly arrived at" came to mean 
arbitrary ukases issued by a secret conclave, and "the 
self-determination of peoples " connoted implicit obedience 
to dictatorial decrees. The new result was a bewildering 
phantasmagoria. 

And yet it was professedly for the purpose of obviating 
such misunderstandings that Mr. Wilson had crossed the 
Atlantic. Having expressed in plain terms the ideals 
for which American soldiers had fought, and which became 

112 



THE DELEGATES 

the substance of the thoughts and purposes of the asso- 
ciated statesmen, "I owe it to them," he had said, "to 
see to it, in so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken 
interpretation is put upon them and no possible effort 
omitted to realize them." And that was the result 
achieved 

No such juggling with words as went on at the Con- 
ference had been witnessed since the days of medieval 
casuistry. New meanings were infused into old terms, 
rendering the help of "exegesis" indispensable. Expres- 
sions like "territorial equilibrium" and "strategic fron- 
tiers" were stringently banished, and it is affirmed that 
President Wilson would wince and his expression change 
at the bare mention of these obnoxious symbols of the 
effete ordering which it was part of his mission to do 
away with forever. And yet the things signified by 
those words were preserved withal under other names. 
Nor could it well be otherwise. One can hardly conceive 
a durable state system in Europe under the new any more 
than the old dispensation without something that cor- 
responds to equilibrium. An architect who should 
boastingly discard the law of gravitation in favor of a 
different theory would stand little chance of being 
intrusted with the construction of a palace of peace. 
Similarly, a statesman who, while proclaiming that the 
era of wars is not yet over, would deprive of strategic 
frontiers the pivotal states of Europe which are most 
exposed to sudden attack would deserve to find few 
disciples and fewer clients. Yet that was what Mr. 
Wilson aimed at and what some of his friends affirm he 
has achieved. His foreign colleagues re-echoed his 
dogmas after having emasculated them. It was instruc- 
tive and unedifying to watch how each of the delegates, 
when his own country's turn came to be dealt with on 
the new lines, reversed his tactics and, sacrificing sound 

113 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

to substance, insisted on safeguards, relied on historic 
rights, invoked economic requirements, and appealed to 
common sense, but all the while loyally abjured "ter- 
ritorial equilibrium" and "strategic guarantees." Hence 
the fierce struggles which MM. Orlando, Dmowski, 
Bratiano, Venizelos, and Makino had to carry on with 
the chief of that state which is the least interested in 
European affairs in order to obtain all or part of the ter- 
ritories which they considered indispensable to the 
security and well-being of their respective countries. 

At the outset Mr. Wilson stood for an ideal Europe of a 
wholly new and undefined type, which would have done 
away with the need for strategic frontiers. Its contours 
were vague, for he had no clear mental picture of the 
concrete Europe out of which it was to be fashioned. He 
spoke, indeed, and would fain have acted, as though the 
old Continent were like a thinly inhabited territory of 
North America fifty years ago, unencumbered by awk- 
ward survivals of the past and capable of receiving any 
impress. He seemingly took no account of its history, 
its peoples, or their interests and strivings. History 
shared the fate of Kolchak's government and the Ukraine ; 
it was not recognized by the delegates. What he brought 
to Europe from America was an abstract idea, old and 
European, and at first his foreign colleagues treated it as 
such. Some of them had actually sneered at it, others 
had damned it with faint praise, and now all of them 
honestly strove to save their own countries' vital interests 
from its disruptive action while helping to apply it to their 
neighbors. Thus Britain, who at that time had no 
territorial claims to put forward, had her sea-doctrine to 
uphold, and she upheld it resolutely. Before he reached 
Europe the President was notified in plain terms that his 
theory of the freedom of the seas would neither be enter- 
tained nor discussed. Accordingly, he abandoned it with- 

114 



THE DELEGATES 

out protest. It was then explained away as a journalistic 
misconception. That was the first toll paid by the 
American reformer in Europe, and it spelled failure to his 
entire scheme, which was one and indivisible. It fell 
to my lot to record the payment of the tribute and the 
abandonment of that first of the fourteen commandments. 
The mystic thirteen remained. But soon afterward an- 
other went by the board. Then there were twelve. 
And gradually the number dwindled. 

This recognition of hard realities was a bitter disap- 
pointment to all the friends of the spiritual and social 
renovation of the world. It was a spectacle for cynics. 
It rendered a frank return to the ancient system unavoid- 
able and brought grist to the mill of the equilibrists. And 
yet the conclusion was shriked. But even the tough 
realities might have been made to yield a tolerable peace 
if they had been faced squarely. If the new conception 
could not be realized at once, the old one should have 
been taken back into favor provisionally until broader 
foundations could be laid, but it must be one thing or the 
other. From the political angle of vision at which the 
European delegates insisted on placing themselves, the 
Old World way of tackling the various problems was 
alone admissible. Their program was coherent and their 
reasoning strictly logical. The former included strategic 
frontiers and territorial equilibrium. Doubtless this angle 
of vision was narrow, the survey it allowed was inadequate, 
and the results attainable ran the risk of being ultimately 
thrust aside by the indignant peoples. For the world 
problem was not wholly nor even mainly political. Still, 
the method was intelligible and the ensuing combinations 
would have hung coherently together. They would have 
satisfied all those — and they were many — who believed 
that the second decade of the twentieth century differs 
in no essential respect from the first and that latter-day 
9 115 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

world problems may oe solved by judicious territorial 
redistribution. But even that conception was not con- 
sistently acted on Deviations were permitted here and 
insisted upon there, only they were spoken of unctuously 
as sacrifices incumbent on the lesser states to the Fourteen 
Points. For the delegates set great store by their reputa- 
tion for logic and coherency. Whatever other charges 
against the Conference might be tolerated, that of in- 
consistency was bitterly resented, especially by Mr. 
Wilson. For a long while he contended that he was as 
true to his Fourteen Points as is the needle to the pole. 
It was not until after his return to Washington, in the 
summer, that he admitted the perturbations caused by 
magnetic currents — sympathy for France he termed them. 
The effort of imagination required to discern consistency 
in such of the Council's decisions as became known from 
time to time was so far beyond the capacity of average 
outsiders that the ugly phrase "to make the world safe 
for hypocrisy" was early coined, uttered, and propagated. 



IV 

CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

NEVER was political veracity in Europe at a lower 
ebb than during the Peace Conference. The blind- 
ing dust of half-truths cunningly mixed with falsehood 
and deliberately scattered with a lavish hand, obscured 
the vision of the people, who were expected to adopt or 
acquiesce in the judgments of their rulers on the various 
questions that arose. Four and a half years of continuous 
and deliberate lying for victory had disembodied the 
spirit of veracity and good faith throughout the world of 
politics. Facts were treated as plastic and capable of 
being shaped after this fashion or that, according to the 
aim of the speaker or writer. Promises were made, not 
because the things promised were seen to be necessary 
or desirable, but merely in order to dispose the public 
favorably toward a policy or an expedient, or to create 
and maintain a certain frame of mind toward the enemies 
or the Allies. At elections and in parliamentary dis- 
courses, undertakings were given, some of which were 
known to be impossible of fulfilment. Thus the ministers 
in some of the Allied countries bound themselves to compel 
the Germans not only to pay full compensation for 
damage wantonly done, but also to defray the entire cost 
of the war. 

The notion that the enemy would thus make good all 
losses was manifestly preposterous. In a century the 
debt could not be wiped out, even though the Teutonic 

117 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

people could be got to work steadily and selflessly for the 
purpose. For their productivity would be unavailing if 
their victorious adversaries were indisposed to admit the 
products to their markets. And not only were the 
governments unwilling, but some of the peoples announced 
their determination to boycott German wares on their 
own initiative. None the less the nations were for 
months buoyed up with the baleful delusion that all their 
war expenses would be refunded by the enemy. 1 

It was not the governments only, however, who, after 
having for over four years colored and refracted the 
truth, now continued to twist and invent "facts." The 
newspapers, with some honorable exceptions, buttressed 
them up and even outstripped them. Plausible unve- 
racity thus became a patriotic accomplishment and a 
recognized element of politics. Parties and states em- 
ployed it freely. Fiction received the hall-mark of truth 
and fancies were current as facts. Public men who had 
solemnly hazarded statements belied by subsequent 
events denied having ever uttered them. Never before 
was the baleful theory that error is helpful so systemati- 
cally applied as during the war and the armistice. If the 
falsehoods circulated and the true facts suppressed were 
to be collected and published in a volume, one would 
realize the depth to which the standard of intellectual 
and moral integrity was lowered. 2 

The censorship was retained by the Great Powers during 
the Conference as a sort of soft cushion on which the self- 



1 The French Minister of Finances made this the cornerstone of his 
policy and declared that the indemnity to be paid by the vanquished Teu- 
tons would enable him to set the finances of France on a permanently sound 
basis. In view of this expectation new taxation was eschewed. 

2 A selection of the untruths published in the French press during the 
war has been reproduced by the Paris journal, Bonsoir. It contains abun- 
dant pabulum for the cynic and valuable data for the psychologist. The 
example might be followed in Great Britain. The title is: "Anthologie 
du Bourrage de Crane." It began in the month of Julv, 1919. 

Il8 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

constituted dispensers of Fate comfortably reposed. In 
Paris, where it was particularly severe and unreasoning, 
it protected the secret conclave from the harsh strictures 
of the outside world, concealing from the public, not only 
the incongruities of the Conference, but also many of the 
warnings of contemporary history. In the opinion of 
unbaised Frenchmen no such rigorous, systematic, and 
short-sighted repression of press liberty had been known 
since the Third Empire as was kept up under the rule of 
the great tribune whose public career had been one con- 
tinuous campaign against every form of coercion. This 
twofold policy of secrecy on the part of the delegates and 
censorship on the part of the authorities proved incon- 
gruous as well as dangerous, for, upheld by the eminent 
statesmen who had laid down as part of the new gospel 
the principle of "open covenants openly arrived at," 
it furnished the world with a fairly correct standard by 
which to interpret the entire phraseology of the latter-day 
reformers. Events showed that only by applying that 
criterion could the worth of their statements of fact and 
their promises of amelioration be gaged. And it soon 
became clear that most of their utterances like that about 
open covenants were to be construed according to the 
maxim of lucus a non lucendo. 

It was characteristic of the system that two American 
citizens were employed to read the cablegrams arriving 
from the United States to French newspapers. The 
object was the suppression of such messages as tended to 
throw doubt on the useful belief that the people of the 
great American Republic were solid behind their President, 
ready to approve his decisions and acts, and that his 
cherished Covenant, sure of ratification, would serve as a 
safe guarantee to all the states which the application 
of his various principles might leave strategically exposed. 
In this way many interesting items of intelligence from 

ii9 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

the United States were kept out of the newspapers, while 
others were mutilated and almost all were delayed. Pro- 
tests were unavailing. Nor was it until several months 
were gone by that the French public became aware of the 
existence of a strong current of American opinion which 
favored a critical attitude toward Mr. Wilson's policy 
and justified misgivings as to the finality of his decisions. 
It was a sorry expedient and an unsuccessful one. 

On another occasion strenuous efforts are reported to 
have been made through the intermediary of President 
Wilson to delay the publication in the United States of a 
cablegram to a journal there until the Prime Minister of 
Britain should deliver a speech in the House of Commons. 
An accident balked these exertions and the message 
appeared. 

Publicity was none the less strongly advocated by the 
plenipotentiaries in their speeches and writings. These 
were as sign-posts pointing to roads along which they 
themselves were incapable of moving. By their own 
accounts they were inveterate enemies of secrecy and 
censorship. The President of the United States had 
publicly said that he "could not conceive of anything 
more hurtful than the creation of a system of censorship 
that would deprive the people of a free republic such as 
ours of their undeniable right to criticize public officials." 
M. Clemenceau, who suffered more than most publicists 
from systematic repression, had changed the name of his 
newspaper from the U Homme Libre to U Homme En- 
chaini, and had passed a severe judgment on "those 
friends of liberty" (the government) who tempered free- 
dom with preventive repression measured out accord- 
ing to the mood uppermost at the moment. 1 But as 
soon as he himself became head of the government 
he changed his tactics and called his journal U Homme 

1 Cf. The New York Herald (Paris edition), June 2, 1919. 

120 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

Libre again. In the Chamber he announced that "pub- 
licity for the 'debates' of the Conference was generally 
favored," but in practice he rendered the system of gag- 
ging the press a byword in Europe. Drawing his own 
line of demarcation between the permissible and the 
illicit, he informed the Chamber that so long as the Con- 
ference was engaged on its arduous work "it must not 
be said that the head of one government had put forward 
a proposal which was opposed by the head of another 
government." * As though the disagreements, the bicker- 
ings, and the serious quarrels of the heads of the govern- 
ments could long be concealed from the peoples whose 
spokesmen they were! 

That bargainings went on at the Conference which a 
plain-dealing world ought to be apprised of is the con- 
clusion which every unbiased outsider will draw from the 
singular expedients resorted to for the purpose of con- 
cealing them. Before the Foreign Relations Committee 
in Washington, State-Secretary Lansing confessed that 
when, after the treaty had been signed, the French Senate 
called for the minutes of the proceedings on the Commis- 
sion of the League of Nations, President Wilson tele- 
graphed from Washington to the Peace Commission re- 
questing it to withhold them. He further admitted that 
the only written report of the discussions in existence was 
left in Paris, outside the jurisdiction of the United States 
Senate. When questioned as to whether, in view of this 
system of concealment, the President's promise of "open 
covenants openly arrived at" could be said to have been 
honestly redeemed, Mr. Lansing answered, "I consider 
that was carried out." 2 It seems highly probable that in 
the same and only in the same sense will the Treaty and 
the Covenant be carried out in the spirit or the letter. 

1 Cf. The Daily Mail (Paris edition), January 17, 1919. 

2 Cf. The Chicago Tribune, August 27, 1919. 

121 



THE INSIDE STORY OF nit" PEACE CONFERENCE 

Dm : .\s of the Conference prevent ve 

censorship was practised v ee of rigoi equaled 

only by its - As Late .is the ■ of June, 

columns < n ' the newspapers were checks h blank 

ces "Scared) a news ears uncen- 

wrote. ''Some papers 
rot* - > . Bin \ Bin " l 

"Practically . . word .is to the nature of the Peace 
ten nost vital to her existence 

complained a 
time s hen e\ en the Germans were fully in- 
formed of what was 1 ad« On one occasion B( tow 
was \ Lew that the Treaty embodied 
an Anglo Saxon peat v.' her forreproducmg an inter- 
view with N already appeared in a 
widerj c l aris newspaper.* By way of justifj 

of these seiaures the French censor alleged that an 
article i was deemed uncomplimentary to Mr. 

Lloyd George rhc editor in a letter to the Brit- 

ish Premier affirming that there was nothing in the article 
but what v.v I loyd George could and should be proud 
In .' only commended him "tor having served the 

admirably and having had 
precedence given to them ove hers." The letter 

concluded: "We art tsive that in the whole busi- 

ness; there is but one thing truly uncomplimentary, and 
I is that the F censorship, for the purpose ol 

strangling the French press, should employ your name, the 
ne of him wi censorship many weeks ago." * 

Even when Brit ish »ts were dealing with matters 

bo cause trouble . ; .s a description of the histo 
s at Versailles at which the Germans received 
1 C: . n), June 10, 1010. 

. .v. 1010. 

' v 

[one ii, ioio. 



CENSORSHIP AND 5E( RECY 

the Peace Treaty, the 'ensor held back their rri': ;" . 

from five o'clock in the oon till three the next mo 

big. 1 Strange though it d i ded 

that no oewspapei men should be allowed to witness the 
formal handing of the Treaty to the enemy delegj 
Poi it was deemed advisable in the info n oi the world 

that even that ceremonial should I/' rj^u 

larmethodi were impressively illustrated and zed 

in s cartoon represei ting Mr. Wilson as "The new wr< 

lin;{ champion," tbrov/jn;^ dov/n hi:; adversary, the pre/., 

whose j^arh, composed of journals, was being scattered in 
scraps oi paper to the floor, and under the picture was the 
legend: "It is forbidden to publish what Marshal Poch 
says. It is forbidden to publish what Mr. George thii 
It is forbidden to publish the Treaty oi Peace with Gi ..■ 
many. It is forbidden to publish what happened at . . . 
and to make sure that nothing else will be published, the 
censoi systematically delay, the transmission oi <■//•-.:■/ 
telegram." * 

In the Chamber the government was adjured to sup- 
press the institution of censorship or/ e the Treaty was 
signed by the Germans, and Ministers ware reminded of 
the diatribes which they had pro d against that 

institution in the years oi their an 
in vain Deputies described and deplo process oi 

demoralization that was bang furthered by the methods 
of the government. "In the provinces as well as in the 

Capital the journals that disple; zed, eaves- 

droppers listen to telephonic conversations, I rets 

of private letters -;.re violated. Arrangements are 

that certain telegrams shall arrive tOO late, and spies are 

delegated to the most private meetings. At a recent 



' The 1,'i-vj York Herald. Sin/ ; -, l'jl'j. 

2 rfo ./Ve-v./ K/-/r/< Herald (Parii edition), May 3, 1919. 

'/A" ,\v -, ;v/.. Herald, Jtme 6, ' r >j'; 

1 2 3 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEAfE CONFERENCE 

gathering of members of the National Press, two spies 
wore surprised, and another was discovered at the Fed- 
eration of the Radical Committees of the Oise." * But 
neither the signature of the Treaty nor its ratification by 
Germany occasioned the slightest modification in the sys- 
tem of restrictions. Paris continued in a state of siege 
and the censors were the busiest bureaucrats in the capital. 

One undesirable result of this regime of keeping the 
public in the dark and indoctrinating it in the views always 
narrow, and sometimes mischievous, which the authorities 
desired it to hold, was that the absurdities which were 
allowed to appear with the hall-mark of censorship were 
often believed to emanate directly from the government. 
Britons and Americans versed in the books of the New 
Testament were shocked or amused when told that the 
censor had allowed the following passage to appear in an 
eloquent speech delivered by the ex-Premier, AI. Painleve: 
"As Hall Caine, the great American poet, has put it, 'O 
death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy vic- 
tory?'" - 

Every conceivable precaution was taken against the 
leakage of information respecting what was going on in 
the Council of Ten. Notwithstanding this, the French 
papers contrived now and again, during the first couple 
of months, to publish scraps of news calculated to convey 
to the public a faint notion of the proceedings, until one 
day a Nationalist organ boldly announced that the British 
Premier had disagreed with the expert commission and 
with his own colleagues on the subject of Dantzig and 
refused to give way. This paragraph irritated the British 
statesman, who made a scene at the next meeting of the 
Council. "There is," he is reported to have exclaimed, 



1 Cf. Le Matin, July 9, 1919. The chief speakers alluded to were MM. 
Renaudel, Deshayes, Lafont, Paul Meunier, Yandame. 
8 The New York Herald (Paris edition), April 29, 191 9. 

124 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

' ' some one among us here who is unmindful of his obliga- 
tions," and while uttering these and other much stronger 
words he eyed severely a certain mild individual who is 
said to have trembled all over during the philippic. He 
also launched out into a violent diatribe against various 
French journals which had criticized his views on Poland 
and his method of carrying them in council, and he went 
so far as to threaten to have the Conference transferred 
to a neutral country. In conclusion he demanded an 
investigation into the origin of the leakage of information 
and the adoption of severe disciplinary measures against 
the journalists who published the disclosures. 1 Thence- 
forward the Council of Ten was suspended and its place 
taken by a smaller and more secret conclave of Five, 
Four, or Three, according as the state of the plenipoten- 
tiaries' health, the requirements of their home politics, or 
their relations among themselves caused one or two to 
quit Paris temporarily. 

This measure insured relative secrecy, fostered rumors 
and gossip, and rendered criticism, whether helpful or 
captious, impossible. It also drove into outer darkness 
those Allied states whose interests were described as 
limited, as though the interests of Italy, whose delegate 
was nominally one of the privileged five, were not being 
treated as more limited still. But the point of this last 
criticism would be blunted if, as some French and Italian 
observers alleged, the deliberate aim of the "representa- 
tives of the twelve million soldiers ' ' was indeed to enable 
peace to be concluded and the world resettled congruously 
with the conceptions and in harmony with the interests 
of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. But the supposition is 
gratuitous. There was no such deliberate plan. After 
the establishment of the Council of Five, Mr. Lloyd 
George and Mr. Wilson made short work of the reports 

1 Quoted in the Paris Temps of March 28, 191 9. 

125 



THE INSIDE STORY OV THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of the expert commissions whenever these put forward 
reasoned views differing from their own. In a word, they 
became the world's supreme and secret arbiters without 
ceasing to be the official champions of the freedom of the 
lesser states and of "open covenants openly arrived at." 
They constituted, so to say, the living synthesis of 
contradictories. 

The Council of Five then was a superlatively secret 
body. No secretaries were admitted to its gatherings and 
no official minutes of its proceedings were recorded. 
Communications were never issued to the press. It re- 
sembled a gang of benevolent conspirators, whose debates 
and resolutions were swallowed up by darkness and 
mystery. Even the most modest meeting of a provincial 
taxpayers' association keeps minutes of its discussions. 
The world parliament kept none. Eschewing traditional 
usages, as became naive shapers of the new world, and 
ignoring history, the Five, Four, or Three shut themselves 
up in a room, talked informally and disconnectedly with- 
out a common principle, program, or method, and sepa- 
rated again without having reached a conclusion. It is 
said that when one put forth an idea, another would 
comment upon it, a third might demur, and that some- 
times an appeal would be made to geography, history, or 
ethnography, and as the data were not immediately 
accessible either competent specialists were sent for or the 
conversation took another turn. They very naturally 
refused to allow these desultory proceedings to be put on 
record, the only concession which they granted to the 
curiosity of future generations being the fixation of their 
own physical features by photography and painting. 
When the sitting was over, therefore, no one could be 
held to aught that he had said; there was nothing to bind 
any of the individual delegates to the views he had ex- 
pressed, nor was there anything to mark the line to which 

126 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

the Council as a whole had advanced. Each one was free 
to dictate to his secretary his recollections of what had 
gone on, but as these precis were given from memory they 
necessarily differed one from the other on various impor- 
tant points. On the following morning, or a few days 
later, the world's workers would meet again, and either 
begin at the beginning, traveling over the same familiar 
field, or else break fresh ground. In this way in one day 
they are said to have skimmed the problems of Spitzbergen, 
Morocco, Dantzig, and the feeding of the enemy popula- 
tions, leaving each problem where they had found it. 
The moment the discussion of a contentious question ap- 
proached a climax, the specter of disagreement deterred 
them from pursuing it to a conclusion, and they passed 
on quickly to some other question. And when, after 
months had been spent in these Penelopean labors, definite 
decisions respecting the peace had to be taken lest the 
impatient people should rise up and wrest matters into 
their own hands, the delegates referred the various prob- 
lems which they had been unable to solve to the wisdom 
and tact of the future League of Nations. 

When misunderstandings arose as to what had been said 
or done it was the official translator, M. Paul Mantoux — 
one of the most brilliant representatives of Jewry at the 
Conference — who was wont to decide, his memory being 
reputed superlatively tenacious. In this way he attained 
the distinction of which his friends are justly proud, 
of being a living record — indeed, the sole available record — 
of what went on at the historic council. He was the re- 
cipient and is now the only repository of all the secrets of 
which the plenipotentiaries were so jealous, lest, being a 
kind of knowledge which is in verity power, it should be 
used one day for some dubious purpose. But M. Man- 
toux enjoyed the esteem and confidence not only of 
Mr. Wilson, but also of the British Prime Minister, who, 

127 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

it was generally believed, drew from his entertaining 
narratives and shrewd appreciations whatever informa- 
tion he possessed about French polities and politicians. 
It was currently affirmed that, being a man o\ method 
and foresight, M. Mantoux committed everything to 
writing for his own behoof. Doubts, however, were en- 
tertained and publicly expressed as to whether affairs of 
this magnitude, involving the destinies of the world, 
should have been handled in sueh secret and unbusiness- 
like fashion. But on the supposition that the general 
outcome, if not the preconceived aim, o( the policy o\ the 
Anglo-Saxon plenipotentiaries was to confer the benetieent 
hegemony of the world upon its peoples, there eould, it 
was argued, be no real danger in the procedure followed. 
For, united, those nations have nothing to fear. 

Although the translations were done rapidly, elegantly, 
and lucidly, allegations were made that they lost some- 
what by undue compression and even by the proeess 
of toning down, o\ which the praiseworthy object was to 
spare delieate susceptibilities. For a limited number 
of delieate susceptibilities were treated considerately by 
the Conference. A defective rendering made a curious 
impression on the hearers onee. when a delegate said: 
"My country, unfortunately, is situated in the midst of 
states which are anything but peace-loving- in fact, the 
chief danger to the peaee of Europe emanates from them." 
M. Mantoux's translation ran, "The country repre- 
sented by M, X. unhappily presents the greatest danger 
to the peaee of Europe." 

On several occasions passages of the discourses of the 
plenipotentiaries underwent a certain transformation 
in the well-informed brain of M. Mantoux before being 
done into another language. They were plunged, so to 
say, in the stream o( history before their exposure to the 
light of day. This was especially the ease with the 

128 



( ENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

remarks of the English-speaking delegates, some of whom 
were wont to make extensive use of the license taken by 
their great national poet in matters oi geography and 

history. One of them, for example, when alluding to the 
ex-Emperor Franz Josef and his successor, said: "It 
would be unjust to visit the sins of the father on the head 
of his innoeent son. Charles I should not be made to 
suffer for Franz Josef." M. Mantoux rendered the sen- 
tence, "It would be unjust to visit the sins of the uncle 
on the innoeent nephew," and M. Clemenceau, with a 
merry twinkle in his eye, remarked to the ready inter- 
preter, "You will lose your job if you go on making these 
wrong translations." 

But those details are interesting, if at all, only as means 
of eking out a mere sketch which can nevr become a 
complete and faithful picture. It was the desire of the 
eminent lawgivers that the source of the most beneficent 
reforms chronicled in history should be as well hidden as 
thd e of the greatest boon bestowed by Providence upon 
man. And their motives appear to have been sound 
enough. 

The pains thus taken to create a haze between them- 
selves and the peoples whose implicit confidence they were 
continuously craving constitute one of the most striking 
ethico-psychological phenomena of the Conference. They 
demanded unreasoning faith as well as blind obedience. 
Any statement, however startling, was expected to carry 
conviction once it bore the official hall-mark. Take, for 
example, the demand made by the Supreme Four to 
Bela Kuhn to desist from his offensive against the Slovaks. 
The press expressed surprise and disappointment that he, 
a Bolshevist, should have been invited even hypothet- 
ically by the "deadly enemies of Bolshevism" to delegate 
representatives to the Paris Conference from which the 
leaders of the Russian constructive elements were ex- 

129 



THE INSIDE STORY OE THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

eluded. Thereupon the Supreme Four, which had taken 
the step in secret, had it denied categorically that such 
an invitation had been issued. The press was put up to 
state that, far from making such an undignified advance, 
the Council had asserted its authority and peremptorily 
summoned the misdemeanant Kuhn to withdraw his 
troops immediately from Slovakia under heavy pains and 
penalties. 

Subsequently, however, the official correspondence was 
published, when it was seen that the implicit invitation 
had really been issued and that the denial ran directly 
counter to fact. By this exposure the Council of Four, 
which still sued for the full confidence of their peoples, 
was somewhat embarrassed. This embarrassment was not 
allayed when what purported to be a correct explanation 
of their action was given out and privately circulated 
by a group which claimed to be initiated. It was sum- 
marized as follows: "The Israelite, Bela Kuhn, who is 
leading Hungary to destruction, has been heartened by 
the Supreme Council's indulgent message. People are at 
a loss to understand why, if the Conference believes, 
as it has asserted, that Bolshevism is the greatest scourge 
of latter-day humanity, it ordered the Rumanian troops, 
when nearing Budapest for the purpose of overthrowing 
it in that stronghold, first to halt, and then to withdraw. 1 
The clue to the mystery has at last been found in a secret 
arrangement between Kuhn and a certain financial group 
concerning the Banat. About this more will be said later. 
In one of my own cablegrams to the United States I wrote : 
"People are everywhere murmuring and whispering that 
beneath the surface of things powerful undercurrents 
are flowing which invisibly sway the policy of the 
secret council, and the public believes that this ac- 

1 This explanation deals exclusively with the first advance of the Ru- 
manian army into Hungary. 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY e 

counts for the sinister vacillation and delay of which it 
complains." l 

In the fragmentary utterances of the governments and 
their press organs nobody placed the slightest confidence. 
Their testimony was discredited in advance, on grounds 
which they were unable to weaken. The following 
example is at once amusing and instructive. The French 
Parliamentary Committee of the Budget, having asked 
the government for communication of the section of the 
Peace Treaty dealing with finances, were told that their 
demand could not be entertained, every clause of the 
Treaty being a state secret. The Committee on Foreign 
Affairs made a like request, with the same results. The 
entire Chamber next expressed a similar wish, which 
elicited a firm refusal. The French Premier, it should be 
added, alleged a reason which was at least specious. 
"I should much like," he said, "to communicate to you 
the text you ask for, but I may not do so until it has been 
signed by the President of the Republic. For such is the 
law as embodied in Article 8 of the Constitution." Now 
nobody believed that this was the true ground for his 
refusal. His explanation, however, was construed as a 
courteous conventionality, and as such was accepted. 
But once alleged, the fiction should have been respected, 
at any rate by its authors. It was not. A few weeks 
later the Premier ordered the publication of the text of 
the Treaty, although, in the meantime, it had not been 
signed by M. Poincare. "The excuse founded upon 
Article 8 was, therefore, a mere humbug," flippantly 
wrote an influential journal. 2 

An amusing joke, which tickled all Paris, was per- 
petrated shortly afterward. The editor of the Bonsoir 
imported six hundred copies of the forbidden Treaty 

1 Cabled to The Public Ledger of Philadelphia, April 20, 191 9. 

2 Bonsoir, June 21, 1919. 

10 131 



nil- INSIDE STORY OF [HE PEACE CONFERENCE 

from Switzerland, and sent them as a present to the 
Deputies of the Chamber, whereupon the parliamentary 
authorities posted up a notice informing all Deputies who 

desired a copy to call at the quest or's office, where they 
would receive it gratuitously as a present from the BoHSOtf. 
Accordingly the Deputies, including the Speaker, Descha 
nel, thronged to the questor's office. Even solemn faced 
Ministers received a copy of the thick volume which I 
possessed ever since the day it was issued. 

Another glaring instance of the lack of straightforward- 
ness which vitiated the dealings of the Conference with the 
public turned upon the Bullitt mission to Russia. Mr. 
Wilson, who in the depths of his heart seems to haw- 
cherished a vague fondness for the Bolshevists there, 
which he sometimes manifested in utterances that startled 
the foreigners to whom they were addressed, despatched 
through Colonel House some fellow-countrymen of his to 
Moscow to ask for peace proposals which, according to 
the Moscow government, were drafted by himself and 
Messrs. House and Lansing. Mr. Bullitt, however, who 
must know, affirms that the draft was written by Mr. 
Lloyd George's secretary, Mr. Philip Kerr, and himself and 
presented to Lenin by Messrs. Bullitt, Stettins. and Petit. 
If the terms of this document should prove acceptable the 
American envoys were empowered to promise that an 
official invitation to a new peace conference would be sent 
to them as well as to their opponents by April 15th. The 
conditions — eleven in number — with a few slight modifica- 
tions in which the Americans acquiesced -were accepted by 
the dictator, who was bound, however, not to permit their 
publication. The facts remained secret until Mr. Bullitt, 
thrown over by Mr. Wilson, who recoiled from taking the 
final and decisive step, resigned, and in a letter reproduced 
by the press set forth the reasons for his decision. 1 

1 Ci. The Daily News, July 5, 1919. L'Humanitt, July 8, 1919. 

13 = 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

Now, vague report:; that there was such a mission had 
found its way into the Paris newspapers at a relatively 
early date. But an authoritative denial was published 
without delay. The statement, the public was assured, 
was without foundation. And the public believed the 
assurance, for it was confirmed authoritatively in Eng- 
land. Sir Samuel Hoare, in the House of Commons, 
asked for information about a report that "two Americans 
have recently returned from Russia bringing offers of 
peace from Lenin," and received from Mr. Bonar Law 
this noteworthy reply: "I have said already that there is 
not the shadow of foundation for this information, other- 
wise I would have known it. Moreover, I have com- 
municated with Mr. Lloyd George in Paris, who also 
declares that he knows nothing about the matter." ' 
E pur si muove. Mr. Lloyd George knew nothing about 
President Wilson's determination to have the Covenant 
inserted in the Peace Treaty, even after the announce- 
ment was published to the world by the I lavas Agency, 
and the confirmation given to pressmen by Lord Robert 
Cecil. The system of reticence and concealment, coupled 
with the indifference of this or that delegation to questions 
in which it happened to take no special interest, led to 
these unseemly air-tight compartments. 

From this rank soil of secrecy, repression, and unve- 
racity sprang noxious weeds. False reports and menda- 
cious insinuations were launched, spread, and credited, 
impairing such prestige as the Conference still enjoyed, 
while the fragmentary announcements ventured on now 
and again by the delegates, in sheer self-defense, were 
summarily dismissed as "eye-wash" for the public. 

For a time the disharmony between words and deeds 
passed unnoticed by the bulk of the masses, who were 
edified by the one and unacquainted with the other. 

1 Cf. The New York Herald (Paris edition), April 4, 1919. 

U3 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

But gradually the lack of consistency in policy and of 
manly straightforwardness and moral wholeness in method 
became apparent to all and produced untoward conse- 
quences. Mr. Wilson, whose authority and iniluence were 
supposed to be paramount, came in for the lion's share of 
criticism, except in the Polish policy of the Conference, 
which was traced to Mr. Lloyd George and his unofficial 
prompters. The American press was the most censorious 
of all. One American journal appearing in Paris gave 
utterance to the following comments on the President's 
rdle: 1 

President Wilson is conscious of his power of persuasion. That 
power enables him to say one thing, do another, describe the act as 
conforming to the idea, and, with act and idea in exact contradiction 

bo each other, convince the people, not only that he has been consistent 
throughout, but that his act cannot be altered without peril to the 
nation and danger to the world. 

We do not know which Mr. Wilson to follow — the Mr, Wilson who 
says he will not do a thing or the Mr. Wilson who does that precise 
thing. 

A great many Americans have one fixed idea. That idea is that the 
President is the only magnanimous, clear-visioned, broad-minded 
statesman in the United States, or the entire world, for that matter. 

When he uses his powers of persuasion Americans become as the 
children of Hamelin Town. Inasmuch as Mr. Wilson of the word 
and Mr. Wilson of the deed seem at times to be two distinct identities, 
some of his most enthusiastic supporters for the League of Nations, 
being unfortunately gifted with memory and perception, are fairly 
standing on their heads in dismay. 

And yet Mr. Wilson himself was a victim of the policy 
of reticence and concealment to which the Great Powers 
were incurably addicted. At the time when they were 
moving heaven and earth to induce him to break with 
Germany and enter the war, they withheld from him the 
existence of their secret treaties. Possibly it may not be 
thought fair to apply the test of ethical fastidiousness to 

1 The Chicago Tribune (.Paris edition), July 31, 1919. 

134 



CENSORSHIP AND SECRECY 

their method of bringing the United States to their side, 
and to their unwillingness to run the risk of alienating the 
President. But it appears that until the close of hos- 
tility the secret was kept inviolate, nor was it until Mr. 
Wilson reached the shores of Europe for the purpose of 
executing his project that he was faced with the huge 
obstacles to his scheme arising out of those far-reaching 
commitments. With this depressing revelation and the 
British non possumus to his demand for the freedom of 
the seas, Mr. Wilson's practical difficulties began. It 
was probably on that occasion that he resolved, seeing 
that he could not obtain everything he wanted, to content 
himself with the best he could get. And that was not a 
society of peoples, but a rough approximation to the 
hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon nations. 



AIMS ami METHODS 

THE policy of the Anglo-Saxon plenipotentiaries was 
never put into words. For that reason it has to 
be judged by their acts, despite the circumstance that 
these were determined by motives which varied greatly at 
different times, and so far as one can conjecture were 
not often practical corollaries of fundamental principles. 
From these acts one may draw a few conclusions which 
will enable us to reconstruct such policy as there was. 
One is that none of the sacrifices imposed upon the mem- 
bers of the League of Nations was obligatory on the 
Anglo-Saxon peoples. These were beyond the reach oi 
all the new cations which might clash with their interests 
or run counter to their aspirations. They were the givers 
and administrators of the saving law rather than its ob- 
servers. Consequently they were free to hold all that was 
theirs, however doubtful their title; nay. they were be 
sought to accept a good deal more under the mandatory 
system, which was molded on their own methods of 
governance. It was especially taken for granted that the 
architects would be called to contribute naught to the 
new structure but their ideas, and that they need renounce 
none of their possessions, however shady its origin, how- 
ever galling to the population its retention. It was in 
deference to this implicit doctrine that President Wilson 
withdrew without protest or discussion his demand tor 
the freedom of the seas, on which he had been wont to lay 
such stress. 

136 



AIMS AND METHODS 

Another way of putting the matter is this. The prin- 
cipal aim of the Conference was to create condition'; 
favorable to the progress of civilization on new lines. 
And the seed-bearers of true, as distinguished from spuri- 
ous, civilization and culture being the Anglo-Saxons, it 
is the realization of their broad conception';, the further- 
ance of their beneficent strivings, that are most conducive 
to that ulterior aim. The men of this race in the widest 
sense of the term are, therefore, so to say, independent 
ends in themselves, whereas the other peoples are to be 
utilized as means. Hence the difference of treatment 
meted out to the two categories. In the latter were im- 
plicitly included Italy and Russia. Unquestionably the 
influence of Anglo-Saxondom is eminently beneficial. It 
tends to bring the rights and the dignity as well as the 
duties of humanity into broad day. The farther it ex- 
tends by natural growth, therefore, the better for the 
human race. The An; on mode of administering 

colonies, for instance, is exemplary, and for this reason 
was deemed worthy to receive the hall-mark of the Con- 
ference as one of the institutions of the future League 
But even benefits may be transformed into evils if im- 
posed by force. 

That, in brief, would seem to be the clue — one can 
hardly speak of any systematic conception — to the un- 
ordered improvisations and incongruous decisions of the 
Conference. 

I am not now concerned to discuss whether this unfor- 
mulated maxim, which had strong roots that may not 
always have reached the realm of consciousness, calls for 
approval as an instrument of ethico-politieal progress or 
connotes an impoverishment of the aims originally pro- 
pounded by Mr. Wilson. Excellent reasons may be 
assigned why the two English-speaking statesmen pro- 
ceeded without deliberation on these lines and no other. 

13 7 



IBE IXSIOK STORY OF 111E PEACE CONFERENCE 

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aim:; and METHODS 

plicated, adjourned, and finally botched by interweaving 

it wii.li a tilated Bcheme foi the complete readjustment 

oi the politic o so< ial fori es oi the planet. The result was 
.1. tangled Bkein oi problems, most oi them still unsolved, 

ftnd BOme insoluble by government.;; alone Out of I, lie 

confusion of clashing forces towered aloft the two domi 

riant Powers who command the eeonomie resoun <-. ol the 

world, and whose democratic institutions and internal 
ordering are unquestionably more conducive to the large 
humanitarian end than those of any other, and gradually 
their overlordship oi the world began to assert itself. 
But iiii. tendency was not the outcome of deliberate 
endeavor. Bach representative oi those vast states 
solicitous in ill 1, in .1. place about the future of his own 
country, and then about the regeneration of the human 
race. One would like to be able to add that all were 
wholly inaccessible to the promptings of party interests 
and personal ambitions. 

Planlessness naturally characterized the exertions "I 
i.Ik; Anglo-Saxon delegates from start to finish. It. )•• a 
racial trait. Their hosts, who were experts in the tra 
ditions of diplomacy, had before the opium;; oi i he ( -on 
ference prepared a plan for their behoof, which at the 
lowest estimate would have connoted a vast improvement 
on their own desultory way oi proceeding. The French 
proposed to distribute •ill the preparatory worli among 
eighteen commissions, Leaving to the chief plenipotentiaries 
the requisite time to arrange preliminaries and become 
acquainted with the essential elements of the problems 
lini. Messn;. Wilson and Lloyd George are said to have 
preferred their informal conversations, involving the loss 
of three and a half months, during which no results were 
reached in Paris, while turmoil, bloodshed, and hungei 
fed the smoldering fires of discontent throughout the 

world. 

",n 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The British Premier, like his French colleague, was 
citous chiefly about making peace with the enemy 

and redeeming as tar as possible his election pledges to his 
supporters. To that end everything else would appear to 
have been subordinated. To the ambitious project oi a 
world reform he and M. Clemenceau gave what was 
currently construed as a nominal assent, but for a long 
time they had no inkling of Mr. Wilson's intention to 
interweave the peace conditions with the Covenant. So 
far. indeed, were they both from entertaining the notion 
that the two Premiers expressly denied — and allowed 
their denial to be circulated in the press — that the two 
documents were or could be made mutually interdepen- 
dent. M. Pichon assured a group of journalists that no 
such intention was harbored. 1 Mr. Lloyd George is 
understood to have gone farther and to have asked what 
degree of relevancy a Covenant for the members of the 
League could be supposed to possess to a treaty concluded 
with a nation which for the time being was denied admis- 
sion to that sodality. And as we saw, lie was incurious 
enough not to read the narrative of what had been done 
by his own American colleagues even after the Havas 
Agency announced it. 

To President Wilson, on the other hand, the League 
was the *us of his life. It was to be the crown 

of his political career, to mark the attainment of an end 
toward which all that was best in the human race had for 
centuries been consciously or unconsciously wending 
without moving perceptibly nearer. Instinctively he 
must have felt that the Laodicean support given to him 
by his colleagues would not carry him much farther and 
that their fervor would speedily evaporate once the Con- 
ference broke up and their own special aims were definitely 
achieved or missed. With the shrewdness of an experi- 

x In March. 

140 



AIMS AND METHODS 

enced politician he grasped the fact that if he was ever 
to present his Covenant to the world clothed with the 
authority of the mightiest states, now was his opportunity. 
After the Conference it would be too late. And the only 
contrivance by which he could surely reckon on success 
was to insert the Covenant in the Peace Treaty and set 
before his colleagues an irresistible incentive for elaborat- 
ing both at the same time. 

He had an additional motive for these tactics in the 
attitude of a section of his own countrymen. Before 
starting for Paris he had, as we saw, made an appeal to 
the electorate to return to the legislature only candidates 
of his own party to the exclusion of Republicans, and the 
result fell out contrary to his expectations. Thereupon 
the oppositional elements increased in numbers and dis- 
played a marked combative disposition. Even moderate 
Republicans complained in terms akin to those employed 
by ex-President Taft of Mr. Wilson's "partizan exclusion 
of Republicans in dealing with the highly important 
matter of settling the results of the war. He solicited a 
commission in which the Republicans had no representa- 
tion and in which there were no prominent Americans 
of any real experience and leadership of public opinion." 1 

The leaders of this opposition sharply watched the 
policy of the President at the Conference and made no 
secret of their resolve to utilize any serious slip as a 
handle for revising or rejecting the outcome of his labors. 
Seeing his cherished cause thus trembling in the scale, 
Mr. Wilson hit upon the expedient of linking the Covenant 
with the Peace Treaty and making of the two an insepa- 
rable whole. He announced this determination in a 
forcible speech 2 to his own countrymen, in which he said, 



1 Quoted by The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 10, 19 19. 

2 Delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on March 
4, 19*9- 

141 



THE INSIDE STORY OF YUY V CONFERENCE 

••"\Y . ie Treaty comes back, gen lemer ■ this 
will b Covena ads 

ofti ytiedtotheCo it you cannot dissect 

Covenant from th< nit destroying 

re " enounced by 

Mr. Wilson's opponents as a . ck, but the his will 

. ■■. as a maneuver, * ■ ■ Bless or 

ious its motive, was entable 

sequences o sts the 

President was \ solicitous. To 

example. The misgh 

tion of the Peace [reaty by the - 
States Senate, in consequence of which the Turkish 

Mom had to be postponed until the Washington 
government was authorised to accept or compelled to 

use a ma the Sultan's dominions, and in the 

anwhile mass massacres of Greeks and Armenians 
wore organu ed anew. 

A largo section of majority of the 

delegates strongly condemned the of the 

Covenant. Whatthey wasfirsl the conclusion 

oi a solid peace and then the esti aent of suitable 

international safeguards For to bo safeguarded, peace 
must first exist *'A suit of armor without the wan 
inside is but a useless < it," wrote one of the 

American journals. 1 

But the course advocated by Mr, Wilson was open to 

other direct and telling «n. Peace between the 

belligerent adversaries was. in the circumstances, con- 
ceivable only on the old linos ot* strategic frontiers and 
military guaranties. The Supreme Council implied as 
much in its official reply to the a offered by the 

Austrians to the conditions imposed on them, making the 
admission that Italy's now northern frontiers were de- 

if I 19, 1919 V- «0i 

14: 



AIMS AND METHODS 

termlned by considerations of Strategy. The plan for the 
governance of the world by a league of pacific peoples, on 
the other hand, postulated the abolition of war prepara- 
tions, including strategic frontiers. Consequently the 
more satisfactory the Treaty the more unfavorable would 
be the outlook for the moral reconstitution of the family 
of nation:;, and vice versa. And to interlace the two 
would be to necessitate a compromise which would neces- 
sarily mar both. 

In effect the split among the delegates respecting their 
aims and interests led to a tacit understanding among the 
leaders on the basis of give-and-take, the French and 
British acquiescing in Mr. Wilson's measures for working 
out his Covenant — the draft of which was contributed by 
the British — and the President giving way to them on 
matters said to affect their countries' vital interests. 
How smoothly this method worked when great issues were 
not at stake may be inferred from the perfunctory way 
in which it was decided that the Kaiser's trial should take 
place in London. A few days before the Treaty was 
signed there was a pause in the proceedings of the Supreme 
Council during which the secretary was searching for a 
mislaid document. Mr. Lloyd George, looking up casu- 
ally and without addressing any one in particular, re- 
marked, "I suppose none of you has any objection to 
the Kaiser being tried in London?" M. Clemenceau 
shrugged his shoulders, Mr. Wilson raised his hand, and 
the matter was assumed to be settled. Nothing more 
was said or written on the subject. But when the news 
was announced, after the President's departure from 
France, it took the other American delegates by surprise 
and they disclaimed all knowledge of any such decision. 
On inquiry, however, they learned that the venue had 
in truth been fixed in this offhand way. 1 

1 C£. The New York Herald, July 8, 1919. 

143 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Mr. Wilson found it a hard task at first to obtain ac- 
ceptance for his ill-defined tenets by Prance, who declined 

to accept the protection of his League of Nations in 
lieu of strategic frontiers and military guaranties. Insur- 
mountable obstacles barred his way. The French go\ 
eminent and people, while moved by decent respect for 
their American benefactors' to assent to the establishment 
of a League, flatly refused to trust themselves to its protec- 
tion against Teuton aggression. But they were quite pre- 
pared to second Mr. Wilson's endeavors to oblige some 
of the other states to content themselves with the guar- 
anties it offered, only, however, on condition that their 
own country was first safeguarded in the traditional way. 
Territorial equilibrium and military protection were the 
imperative provisos on which they insisted. And as 
Prance was specially favored by Mr. Wilson on sentimental 
grounds which outweighed his doctrine, and as she was 
also considered indispensable to the Anglo Saxon peoples 
as their continental executive, she had no difficulty in 
securing their support. On this point, too, therefore, the 
President found himself constrained to give way. And 
not only did he abandon his humanitarian intentions and 
allow his strongest arguments to be lightly brushed aside, 
but he actually recoiled so far into the camp of his oppo- 
nents that he gave his approval to an indefensible clause 
in the Treaty which would have handed over to France 
the German population of the Saar as the equivalent of a 
certain sum in gold. Coming from the world-reformer 
who. a short time before, had hurled the thunderbolts 
of his oratory against those who would barter human 
beings as chattels, this amazing compromise connoted a 
strange falling off. Incidentally it was destructive of all 
1 The semi-official journals manifested a steady tendency to loan toward 

the Republican opposition in the United States, down to the month of 
August, when the amendments proposed by various Senators bade fair to 
jeopardise the Treaties and render the promised military SUCCOT doubtful. 

14! 



AIMS AND MhTHODS 

faith in the spirit that had actuated his world-crusade. 
It also went far to convince unbiased ol that the 

only framework of ideas with decisive reference to which 
Mr. Wilson considered every project and every objection 
as it arose, was that which centered round his own goal - 
the establishment, if not of a league of nations cemented 
by brotherhood and fellowship, at least of the nearest 
approaeh to that whieh he could secure, even though it 
fell far short of the original design. These were the first- 
fruits of the interweaving of the Covenant with the 
Treaty. 

In view of this readiness to split differences and sacrifice 
principles to expediency it became impossible even to the 
least observant of Mr. Wilson's adherents in the Old 
World to cling any longer to the belief that his cosmic 
policy was inspired by firm intellectual attachment to the 
sublime ideas of which he had made himself the eloquent 
exponent and had been expected to make himself the 
uncompromising champion. In every such surrender to 
the Great Powers, as in every stern enforcement of his 
principles on the lesser states, the same practical spirit of 
the professional politician visibly asserted itself. ( >ne 
can hardly acquit him of having lacked the moral courage 
to disregard the veto of interested statesmen and govern- 
ments and to appeal directly to the peoples when the con- 
sequence of this attitude would have been the sacrifice of 
the makeshift of a Covenant which he was ultimately 
content to accept as a substitute for the complete re- 
instatement of nations in their rights and dignity. 

The general tendency of the labors of the Conference 
then was shaped by those two practical maxims, the im- 
munity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples and of their French 
ally from the restrictions to be imposed by the new 
politico-social ordering in so far as these ran counter to 
their national interests, and the determination of the 

HS 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

American President to get and accept such a league of 
nations as was feasible under extremely inauspicious con- 
ditions and to content himself with that. 

To this estimate exception may be taken on the ground 
that it underrates an effort which, however insufficient, 
was well meant and did at any rate point the way to a 
just resettlement of secular problems which the war had 
made pressing and that it fails to take account of the 
formidable obstacles encountered. The answer is, that 
like efforts had proceeded more than once before from 
rulers of men whose will, seeing that they were credited 
with possessing the requisite power, was assumed to be 
adequate to the accomplishment of their aim, and that 
they had led to nothing. The two Tsars, Alexander I 
at the Congress of Vienna, and Nicholas II at the first 
Conference of The Hague, are instructive instances. 
They also, like Mr. Wilson, it is assumed, would fain 
have inaugurated a golden age of international right and 
moral fellowship if verbal exhortations and arguments 
could have done it. The only kind of fresh attempt, 
which after the failure of those two experiments could 
fairly lay claim to universal sympathy, was one which 
should withdraw the proposed politico-social rearrange- 
ment from the domain alike of rhetoric and of empiricism 
and substitute a thorough systematic reform covering all 
the aspects of international intercourse, including all the 
civilized peoples on the globe, harmonizing the vital 
interests of these and setting up adequate machinery 
to deal with the needs of this enlarged and unified state 
system. And it would be fruitless to seek for this in 
Mr. Wilson's handiwork. Indeed, it is hardly too much 
to affirm that empiricism and opportunism were among 
the principal characteristics of his policy in Paris, and 
that the outcome was what it must be. 

Disputes and delays being inevitable, the Conference 

146 



AIMS AND METHODS 

began its work at leisure and was forced to terminate it 
in hot haste. Having spent months chaffering, making 
compromises, and unmaking them again while the peoples 
of the world were kept in painful suspense, all of them 
condemned to incur ruinous expenditure and some to 
wage sanguinary wars, the springs of industrial and com- 
mercial activity being kept sealed, the delegates, menaced 
by outbreaks, revolts, and mutinies, began, after months 
had been wasted, to speed up and get through their work 
without adequate deliberation. They imagined that they 
could make up for the errors of hesitancy and ignorance 
by moments of lightning-like improvisation. Improvisa- 
tion and haphazard conclusions were among their chronic 
failings. Even in the early days of the Conference they 
had promulgated decisions, the import and bearings of 
which they missed, and when possible they canceled them 
again. Sometimes, however, the error committed was 
irreparable. The fate reserved for Austria was a case in 
point. By some curious process of reasoning it was 
found to be not incompatible with the Wilsonian doctrine 
that German-Austria should be forbidden to throw in her 
lot with the German Republic, this prohibition being in 
the interest of France, who could not brook a powerful 
united Teuton state. The wishes of the Austrian-Ger- 
mans and the principle of self-determination accordingly 
went for nothing. The representations of Italy, who 
pleaded for that principle, were likewise brushed aside. 

But what the delegates appear to have overlooked was 
the decisive circumstance that they had already "on 
strategic grounds" assigned the Brenner line to Italy and 
together with it two hundred and twenty thousand Tyro- 
lese of German race living in a compact mass — although 
a much smaller alien element was deemed a bar to an- 
nexation in the case of Poland. And what was more to 
the point, this allotment deprived Tyrol of an indepen- 
11 147 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

dent economic existence, cutting it off from the southern 
Valley and making it tributary to Bavaria. Mr. Wilson, 
the public was credibly informed, "took this grave de- 
cision without having gone deeply into the matter, and 
he repents it bitterly. None the less, he can no longer go 
back." x 

Just as Tyrol's loss of Botzen and Meran made it de- 
pendent on Bavaria, so the severance of Vienna from 
southern Moravia — the source of its cereal supplies, sit- 
uated at a distance of only thirty-six miles — transformed 
the Austrian capital into a head without a body. But 
on the eminent anatomists who were to perform a variety 
of unprecedented operations on other states, this spectacle 
had no deterrent effect. 

Whenever a topic came up for discussion which could 
not be solved offhand, it was referred to a commission, 
and in many cases the commission was assisted by a mis- 
sion which proceeded to the country concerned and within 
a few weeks returned with data which were assumed to 
supply materials enough for a decision, even though most 
of its members were unacquainted with the language of 
the people whose condition they had been studying. How 
quick of apprehension these envoys were supposed to be 
may be inferred from the task with which the American 
mission under General Harbord was charged, and the 
space of time accorded him for achieving it. The mem- 
bers of this mission started from Brest in the last decade 
of August for the Caucasus, making a stay at Constanti- 
nople on the way, and were due back in Paris early in 
October. During the few intervening weeks "the mis- 
sion," General Harbord said, "will go into every phase of 
the situation, political, racial, economic, financial, and 
commercial. I shall also investigate highways, harbors, 
agricultural and mining conditions, the question of raising 

1 Journal de Geneve, May i8, 1919. 

14$ 



AIMS AND METHODS 

an Armenian army, policing problems, and the raw mate- 
rials of Armenia. ' ' * Only specialists who have some prac- 
tical acquaintanceship with the Caucasus, its conditions, 
peoples, languages, and problems, can appreciate the 
herculean effort needed to tackle intelligently any one of 
the many subjects all of which this improvised commis- 
sion under a military general undertook to master in four 
weeks. Never was a chaotic world set right and reformed 
at such a bewildering pace. 

Bad blood was caused by the distribution of places on 
the various commissions. The delegates of the lesser 
nations, deeming themselves badly treated, protested 
vehemently, and for a time passion ran high. Squabbles 
of this nature, intensified by fierce discussions within the 
Council, tidings of which reached the ears of the public 
outside, disheartened those who were anxious for the 
speedy restoration of normal conditions in a world that 
was fast decomposing. But the optimism of the three 
principal plenipotentiaries was beyond the reach of the 
most depressing stumbles and reverses. Their buoyant 
temper may be gaged from Mr. Balfour's words, reported 
in the press: "It is true that there is a good deal of dis- 
cussion going on, but there is no real discord about ideas 
or facts. We are agreed on the principal questions and 
there only remains to find the words that embody the 
agreements." 2 These tidings were welcomed at the time, 
because whatever defects were ascribed to the distin- 
guished statesmen of the Conference by faultfinders, a 
lack of words was assuredly not among them. This cheery 
outlook on the future reminded me of the better grounded 
composure of Pope Pius IX during the stormy proceed- 
ings at the Vatican Council. A layman, having expressed 



1 The New York Herald (Paris edition), August 14, 1919. 

2 Cf. Paris papers of February 2, 1919, and The Public Ledger (Phila- 
delphia), February 4, 1 919. 

149 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

his disquietude at the unruly behavior of the prelates, 
the Pontiff replied that it had ever been thus at eccle- 
siastical councils. "At the outset," he went on to ex- 
plain, "the members behave as men, wrangle and quarrel, 
and nothing that they say or do is worth much. That is 
the first act. The second is ushered in by the devil, who 
intensifies the disorder and muddles things bewilderingly. 
But happily there is always a third act in which the Holy 
Ghost descends and arranges everything for the best." 

The first two phases of the Conference's proceedings 
bore a strong resemblance to the Pope's description, but 
as, unlike ecclesiastical councils, it had no claim to in- 
fallibility, and therefore no third act, the consequences to 
the world were deplorable. The Supreme Council never 
knew how to deal with an emergency and every week 
unexpected incidents in the world outside were calling for 
prompt action. Frequently it contradicted itself within 
the span of a few days, and sometimes at one and the same 
time its principal representatives found themselves in 
complete opposition to one another. To give but one 
example: In April M. Clemenceau was asked whether 
he approved the project of relieving famine-stricken Rus- 
sia. His answer was affirmative, and he signed the docu- 
ment authorizing it. His colleagues, Messrs. Wilson, 
Lloyd George, and Orlando, followed suit, and the matter 
seemed to be settled definitely. But at the same time 
Mr. Hoover, who had been the ardent advocate of the 
plan, officially received a letter from the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs signifying the refusal of the French 
government to acquiesce in it. 1 On another occasion 2 the 
Supreme Council thought fit to despatch a mission to Asia 
Minor in order to ascertain the views of the populations 
of Syria and Mesopotamia on the regime best suited to 
them. France, whose secular relations with Syria, where 

1 Cf. L'Echo de Paris, April 19, 1919. ; In April, 1919. 

15° 



AIMS AND METHODS 

she maintains admirable educational establishments, are 
said to have endeared her to the population, objected to 
this expedient as superfluous and mischievous. Super- 
fluous because the Francophil sentiments of the people 
are supposed to be beyond all doubt, and mischievous 
because plebiscites or substitutes for plebiscites could 
have only a bolshevizing effect on Orientals. Seemingly 
yielding to these considerations, the Supreme Council 
abandoned the scheme and the members of the mission 
made other plans. 1 After several weeks' further reflection, 
however, the original idea was carried out, and the mis- 
sion visited the East. 

The reader may be glad of a momentary glimpse of the 
interior of the historic assembly afforded by those who 
were privileged to play a part in it before it was trans- 
formed into a secret conclave of five, four, or three. 
Within the doors of the chambers whence fateful decrees 
were issued to the four corners of the earth the delegates 
were seated, mostly according to their native languages, 
within earshot of the special pleaders. M. Clemenceau, 
at the head of the table, has before him a delegate charged 
with conducting the case, say, of Greece, Poland, Serbia, 
or Czechslovakia. The delegate, standing in front of the 
stern but mobile Premier, and encircled by other more or 
less attentive plenipotentiaries, looks like a nervous school- 
boy appearing before exacting examiners, struggling with 
difficult questions and eager to answer them satisfactorily. 
Suppose the first language spoken is French. As many 
of the plenipotentiaries do not understand it, they cannot 
be blamed for relaxing attention while it is being employed, 
and keeping up a desultory conversation among them- 
selves in idiomatic English, which forms a running bass 
accompaniment to the voice, often finely modulated, of 
the orator. Owing to this embarrassing language diffi- 

1 About April io, 1919. 

151 



THE INSIDE STORY OF HIF PEACE CONFERENCE 

v. .is sex his 

by M. Mantoux 

ge in .. 
width has 

Pre is into 

igly, & 

agate wl ; this 

wholly out of - the 

bo my country's arbiters I Celt I was 

■■■•: 
quickly ally, 

isive 
ged 
\ it dawned c nent would 

: would 
. I to a commissia 

ack aga i to >ten- 

es " 
An< agate remarked: "Many years have ela 

oy last examina k to 

me in all its vividness when 1 \ nier 

ishing ej es 
I sa yself: Who:- last 1 was ex; >ain- 

rulry a nore about 

d, but now 1 an ially av, 

dry anythin 

. is ardu as tt 
n\ic ever, sa\ eti labor if the delegates would 

typ e wr i t t en dissertations, hem quietly 

in their respective h 

i5« 



AIMS ANJ) METHODS 

on the data 1.1 u-y supply. Failing that, I should like at 

Leasl i" provide them with a criterion of truth, for after 
me will conic .-in opponent who will flatly contradict me, 
and how can they sift truth from error when the winnow 
is wanting? tt is hard to feel that one La in the presence 
of greal satraps of destiny, but I made an act of faith 
in the possibilities of genial quantities Lurking behind 
those everyday faces and of a soi t <»i magic power of calling 
into being new relations of peace and fellow:. hip between 
individual classes and peoples. Ct was an act of faith." 
If the members of the Supreme Council lacked the 
graces with which to draw their humbler colleagues and 
were incapable of according hospitality to any of the 
more or less revolutionary ideas floating in the air, they 

were also nl Icily powerless to enforce their behest:; in 

eastern Europe against serious opposition. Thus, al- 
though i hey kept considerable [nter-Allied force:-, in Ger- 
many, they failed to impose their decrees there, notwith- 
standing the circumstance that Germany was disorgan- 
ized, nearly disarmed, and distracted by internal fends. 
The Conference gave way when Germany refused to let 

the Polish hoop:; disembark at Danlzig, although if had 

proclaimed its resolve to insist on their using that port. 
It allowed Odessa to be evacuated and its inhabitants 

to be decimated by the bloodthirsty Holshcviki. Jt 
Ordered the Ukrainian:; and the Poles tocen.se hostilities, 1 
but hostilities went <>n for months afterward. An 

American general was despatched to the warring peoples 
to put an end to the fighting, but he returned despond- 
ent, leaving things as he had found them. General 
Smuts was sent to Budapest to strike up an agreement 
with Kuhn and the Magyar Bolshevists, but he, too, 
came back alter a fruitless conversation. The Supreme 
Council's writ ran in none of those places. 

1 On Manh 19, uyuy. 

*53 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Abom March 19th the Inter-Allied commission gave Er«- 
berger twenty-four hours iu which to ratify the convention 
between Germany and Poland and to carry out the con- 
ditions of the armistice. But Eraberger declined to 

ratify it and the Allies were unable or unwilling to impose 

their will on him. From this state of things the Rumanian 
delegates drew the obvious corollary. Exasperated by 
the treatment they received, they quitted the Conference, 

pursued their own policy, occupied Budapest, presented 
their own peace conditions to Hungary, and relegated, 
with courteous phrases and a polite bow to the Council, 
the directions elaborated for their guidance to the region 
of pious counsels. 

In these ways the well-meant and well-advertised 
endeavors to substitute a moral relationship of nations 
for the state of latent warfare known as the balance of 
power were steadily wasted. On the one side the subtle 
skill of Old World diplomacy was toiling hard and suc- 
cessfully to revive under specious names its lost and 
failing causes, while on the other hand the New World 
policy, naively ignoring historical forces and secular 
prejudices, was boldly reaching out toward rough and 
ready modes of arranging things and taking no account 
of concrete circumstances. denerous idealists were thus 
pitted against old diplomatic stagers and both secret ly 
strove to conclude hastily driven bargains outside the 
Council chamber with their opponents. As early as the 
first days of January I was present at some informal 
meetings where such transactions were being talked over, 
and I afterward gave it as my impression that "if things 
go forward as they are moving to-day the outcome will 
fall far short of reasonable expectations. The first strik- 
ce between the transatlantic idealists and the 
Old World politicians lies in their different ways of 
appreciating expeditiousness, on the one hancj, and the 

rS4 



AIMS AND METHODS 

bases of the European state-system, on the other hand. 
A statesman when dealing with urgent, especially revo- 
lutionary, emergencies should never take his eyes from 
the clock. The politicians in Paris hardly ever take 

account of time or opportunity. The overseas reformers 
contend that the territorial and political balance of forces 
has utterly broken down and must be definitely scrapped 
in favor of a league of nations, and the diplomatists hold 
that the principle of equilibrium, far from having spent 
its force, still affords the only groundwork of interna- 
tional stability and requires to be further intensified." x 

Living in the very center of the busy world of destiny- 
weavers, who were generously, if unavailingly, devoting 
time and labor to the fabrication of machinery for the 
good government of the entire human race out of scanty 
and not wholly suitable materials, a historian in presence 
of the manifold conflicting forces at work would have 
found it difficult to survey them all and set the daily 
incidents and particular questions in correct perspective. 
The earnestness and good- will of the plenipotentiaries 
were highly praiseworthy and they themselves, as we saw, 
were most hopeful. Nearly all the delegates were char- 
acterized by the spirit of compromise, so valuable in 
vulgar politics, but so perilous in embodying ideals. 
Anxious to reach unanimous decisions even when una- 
nimity was lacking, the principal statesmen boldly had 
recourse to ingenious formulas and provisional agreements, 
which each party might construe in its own way, and paid 
scant attention to what was going on outside. I wrote 
at the time : 2 

"But parallel with the Conference and the daily lectures 
which its members are receiving on geography, ethnog- 



1 Cf. my cablegram published in The Public Ledger (Philadelphia), 
January 12, 19 19. 
3 Cf. The Public Ledger (Philadelphia), February 5, 1919, 

155 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

raphy, and history there are other councils at work, some 
publicly, others privately, which represent the vast masses 
who are in a greater hurry than the political world to 
have their urgent wants supplied. For they are the 
millions of Europe's inhabitants who care little about 
strategic frontiers and much about life's necessaries which 
they find it increasingly difficult to obtain. Only a visitor 
from a remote planet could fully realize the significance of 
the bewildering phenomena that meet one's gaze here 
every day without exciting wonder. . . . The sprightly 
people who form the rind of the politico-social world . . . 
are wont to launch winged words and coin witty epigrams 
when characterizing what they irreverently term the efforts 
of the Peace Conference to square the circle; they con- 
trast the noble intentions of the delegates with the grim 
realities of the workaday world, which appear to mock 
their praiseworthy exertions. They say that there never 
were so many wars as during the deliberations of these 
famous men of peace. Hard fighting is going on in Siberia ; 
victories and defeats have just been reported from the 
Caucasus; battles between Bolshevists and peace-lovers 
are raging in Esthonia; blood is flowing in streams in the 
Ukraine ; Poles and Czechs have only now signed an agree- 
ment to sheath swords until the Conference announces its 
verdict; the Poles and the Germans, the Poles and the 
Ukrainians, the Poles and the Bolshevists, are still decimat- 
ing each other's forces on territorial fragments of what 
was once Russia, Germany, or Austria." 

Sinister rumors were spread from time to time in Paris, 
London, and elsewhere, which, wherever they were credited, 
tended to shake public confidence not only in the dealings 
of the Supreme Council with the smaller countries, but 
also in the nature of the occult influences that were be- 
lieved to be occasionally causing its decisions to swerve 
from the orthodox direction. And these reports were 

156 



AIMS AND METHODS 

believed by many even in Conference circles. Time and 
again I was visited by delegates complaining that this or 
that decision was or would be taken in response to the 
promptings not of land-grabbing governments, but of 
wealthy capitalists or enterprising captains of industry. 
' ' Why do you suppose that there is so much talk now of an 
independent little state centering around Klagenfurt?" 
one of them asked me. "I will tell you: for the sake of 
some avaricious capitalists. Already arrangements are 
being pushed forward for the establishment of a bank of 
which most of the shares are to belong to X." Another 
said: "Dantzig is needed for politico-commercial reasons. 
Therefore it will not be made part of Poland. 1 Already 
conversations have begun with a view to giving the owner- 
ship of the wharves and various lucrative concessions to 
English-speaking pioneers of industry. If the city were 
Polish no such liens could be held on it because the state 
would provide everything needful and exploit its re- 
sources." The part played in the Banat Republic by 
motives of a money-making character is described else- 
where. 

A friend and adviser of President Wilson publicly 
affirmed that the Fiume problem was twice on the point 
of being settled satisfactorily for all parties, when the 
representatives of commercial interests cleverly inter- 
posed their influence and prevented the scheme from going 
through in the Conference. I met some individuals who 
had been sent on a secret mission to have certain subjects 
taken into consideration by the Supreme Council, and 
a man was introduced to me whose aim was to obtain 
through the Conference a modification of financial legis- 

1 Doctor Bunke, Councilor at the court of Dantzig, endeavors in The Dant- 
zig Neueste Nachrichten to prove that the problem of Dantzig was solved 
exclusively in the interests of the Naval Powers, America and Britain, 
who need it as a basis for their commerce with Poland, Russia, and Ger- 
many. Cf. also Le Temps, August 23, 19 19 

157 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

lation respecting the repayment of debts in a certain 
republic of South America. This optimist, however, re- 
turned as he had come and had nothing to show for his 
plans. The following significant passage appeared in a 
leading article in the principal American journal pub- 
lished in Paris ! on the subject of the Prinkipo project 
and the postponement of its execution: 

' ' From other sources it was learned that the doubts and 
delays in the matter are not due so much to the declina- 
tion [sic] of several of the Russian groups to participate 
in a conference with the Bolshevists, but to the pulling 
against one another of the several interests represented by 
the Allies. Among the Americans a certain very in- 
fluential group backed by powerful financial interests 
which hold enormously rich oil, mining, railway, and 
timber concessions, obtained under the old regime, and 
which purposes obtaining further concessions, is strongly 
in favor of recognizing the Bolshevists as a dc facto 
government. In consideration of the visa of these old 
concessions by Lenin and Trotzky and the grant of new 
rights for the exploitation of rich mineral territory, they 
would be willing to finance the Bolshevists to the tune of 
forty or fifty million dollars. And the Bolshevists are 
surely in need of money. President Wilson and his sup- 
porters, it is declared, are decidedly averse from this 
pretty scheme." 

That President Wilson would naturally set his face 
against any such deliberate compromise between Mam- 
mon and lofty ideals it was superfluous to affirm. He 
stood for a vast and beneficent reform and by exhorting 
the world to embody it in institutions awakened in some 
people — in the masses were already stirring — thoughts 
and feelings that might long have remained dormant. 
But beyond this he did not go. His tendencies, or, say, 

1 The New York Herald (Paris edition), March I, 1919. 

158 



AIMS AND METHODS 

rather velleities — for they proved to be hardly more — 
were excellent, but he contrived no mechanism by which 
to convert them into institutions, and when pressed by 
gainsayers abandoned them. 

An economist of mark in France whose democratic 
principles are well known * communicated to the French 
public the gist of certain curious documents in his posses- 
sion. They let in an unpleasant light on some of the 
whippers-up of lucre at the expense of principle, who 
flocked around the dwelling-places of the great continent- 
carvers and lawgivers in Paris. His article bears this 
repellent heading : "Is it true that English and American 
financiers negotiated during the war in order to secure 
lucrative concessions from the Bolsheviki? Is it true 
that these concessions were granted to them on February 
4, 1919? Is it true that the Allied governments played 
into their hands?" 2 

The facts alleged as warrants for these questions are 
briefly as follows: On February 4, 1919, the Soviet of the 
People's Commissaries in Moscow voted the bestowal of a 
concession for a railway linking Ob-Kotlass-Saroka and 
Kotlass-Svanka, in a resolution which states "(1) that 
the project is feasible; (2) that the transfer of the con- 
cession to representatives of foreign capital may be 
effected if production will be augmented thereby; (3) that 
the execution of this scheme is indispensable ; and (4) that 
in order to accelerate this solution of the question the 
persons desirous of obtaining the concession shall be 
obliged to produce proofs of their contact with Allied and 
neutral enterprises, and of their capacity to financing the 
work and supply the materials requisite for the construc- 
tion of the said line." On the other hand, it appears from 

1 Lysis, author of Demain, and many other remarkable studies of eco- 
nomic problems, and editor of Le DemocraPie Nouvelle, May 30, 1919. 

2 For an account of analogous bargainings with Bela Kuhn, see the 
Chapter on Rumania. 

159 



[HE [NSIDE STORY OF Y\\Y. PEACE CONFERENCE 

an o date of Juno :o. ioiS. 

the concession of this line was lodged 

by two individuals — the painter A. A. Borissoff (who 

- ago received from mo a lot tor of introduction 

to President Roosevelt asking him to patronize this 

nan's exhibiti ings in the United States), 

and Rorr Bdvard Hannevig. Desirous of ascertaining 

whether these petitioners po s ^ SS( Al the qualifications 

demanded, the Bolshevist authorities made inquii 

received from the Royal Norwegian Consulate at 
Moscow a i o '" setti ten Hanne- 

vig was of the large banks Hannevig situ- 

ated in London and in America." Consequently negotia- 
farward. The document adds: "In 
October Borissofi and Hannevig renewed their request, 
whereupon the journals 

she* . v urn discussed the subject with animation. At 

tting held on October iath the project was approved 

with certain modifications, and on February i. ioio. the 

Supreme Soviet of National Economy approved it anew." 

magnitude of the concession may be inferred from 

.v that one of its clauses ooneeded ' 

.:' which even 
to-day. 

■ I ..:•." 
"What it comes to, therefore, assuming that these 
..-'. documents are as they seem, based on facts, is 
that from June 26th, that is to say during the war. the 
Bolshevist government was petitioned to accord an im- 
portant railway concession and also the exploitation of a 
( s; capable of yielding three hundred million rubles 
a year to a Russian citizen who alleged that he was acting 
on behalf of English and American capitalists, and that 
Edvard Hannevig. having proved that he was really the 

1 Roaring the number 3882. 

160 



AIMS AND METHOD i 

mandatory of these great allied financiers, the conces : 
was first approved by two successive commissions l and 
then definitely conferred by the Soviet of the People's 
Commissari' 

The eminent author of the article pre o ask 

whether this can indeed be true; whether English and 
American capitalists petitioned the B Id : .'^r vast 

concessions during the war; whether they obtained them 
while the Conference was at its work and soldiers of their 
respective countries were fighting in Russia against the 
Bolsheviki who were h g them. "] ue," he 

makes bold to ask further, "that that is the explanation of 
the incredible friendliness displayed by the Allied govern- 
ments toward the Bolshevist bandits with whom th 
were willing to strike up a cor. e, whom they were 

minded to recognize by organizing a cor. 
Princes' Island? . . . Many times already rank-smelling 
whirls of air have blown upon us; they suggested tl 
belief that behind the Peace Conferer.' lurked i 

merely what people feared, but something 
an immense political Panama. If this is not true, gentle- 
men, deny it. Otherwise one day you will surely ha 
an explosion." 8 

Whether these grave innuendoes, togeth b the 

statement made by Mr. George Herron, 4 the incident 

1 On October 12, 1918, and February 1, 1919 

2 On February 4, 1919. 

3 La Democratic Nouvelle, May 30, IQig 

4 See his admirable article in The New York Herald ''. 
May 21, [9x9, from v. ':.: 

said that certain great I 01 

man peace. But I mean, in -national finance to 

which all - . and of th 

ual soul are contributory. The influer finance I 

the Conference, delaying the decision;, 
divisions between : 

peace-makers and peace-i . .: to achie\ - 

two ends are one and the same. 
"The firs t manipulate peace-makers, of 

161 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

the Banat Republic and the ultimatum respecting the 
oil-fields unofficially presented to the Rumanians suffice 
to establish a prima facie case may safely be left to the 
judgment of the public. The conscientious and impartial 
historian, however firm his faith in the probity of the 
men representing the powers, both of unlimited and 
limited interests, cannot, pass them over in silence. 

One of the shrewdest delegates in Paris, a man who 
allowed himself to be breathed upon freely by the old 
spirit of nationalism, but was capable withal of appreciat- 
ing the passionate enthusiasm of others for a more 
altruistic dispensation, addressed me one evening as 
follows: "Say what you will, the Secret Council is a 
Council of Two. and the Covenant a charter conferred 
upon the English-speaking peoples for the government 
of the world. The design — if it be a design — may be 
excellent, but it is not relished by the other peoples. It 
is a less odious hegemony than that of imperialist Ger- 
many would have been, but it is a hegemony and odious. 
Surely in a quest of this kind after the most effectual 
means of overcoming the difficulties and obviating the 
dangers of international intercourse, more even than in 
the choice of a political regime, the principle of self- 
determination should be allowed free play. Was that 
not to have been one of the choicest fruits of victory? 
But no; force is being set in motion, professedly for the 
good of all, but only as their good is understood by the 
'all-powerful Two.' And to all the others it is force and 
nothing more. Is it to be wondered at that there are so 
many discontented people or that some of them are 



their hordes of retainers and 'experts,' as to bring about, if possible, a peace 
that would not be destructive to industrial Germany. The second end was 
so to delay the Russian question, so to complicate and thwart every pro- 
posed solution, that, at last, either during or after the Peace Conference, 
a recognition of the Bolshevist power as the de facto government of Russia 
would be the only possible solution." 

162 



AIMS AND METHODS 

already casting about for an alternative to the Anglo- 
Saxon hegemony misnamed the Society of Nations?" 

It cannot be gainsaid that the two predominant part- 
ners behaved throughout as benevolent despots, to whom 
despotism came more easily than benevolence. As we 
saw, they kept their colleagues of the lesser states as much 
in the dark as the general public and claimed from them 
also implicit obedience to all their behests. They went 
farther and demanded unreasoning acquiescence in de- 
cisions to be taken in the future, and a promise of prompt 
acceptance of their injunctions — a pretension such as was 
never before put forward outside the Catholic Church, 
which, at any rate, claims infallibility. Asked why he 
had not put up a better fight for one of the states of 
eastern Europe, a sharp-tongued delegate irreverently 
made answer, "What more could you expect than I did, 
seeing that I was opposed by one colleague who looks 
upon himself as Napoleon and by another who believes 
himself to be the Messiah." 

Among the many epigrammatic sayings current in Paris 
about the Conference, the most original was ascribed to 
the Emir Faissal, the son of the King of the Hedjaz. 
Asked what he thought of the world's areopagus, he is said 
to have answered: "It reminds me somewhat of one of 
the sights of my own country. My country, as you 
know, is the desert. Caravans pass through it that may 
be likened to the armies of delegates and experts at the 
Conference — caravans of great camels solemnly trudging 
along one after the other, each bearing its own load. They 
all move not whither they will, but whither they are led. 
For they have no choice. But between the two there is 
this difference: that whereas the big caravan in the 
desert has but one leader — a little ass — the Conference in 
Paris is led by two delegates who are the great Ones of 
the earth." In effect, the leaders were two, and no one 
12 163 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

can say which of them had the upper hand. Now it 
seemed to be the British Premier, now the American 
President. The former scored the first victory, on the 
freedom of the seas, before the Conference opened. The 
latter won the next, when Mr. Wilson firmly insisted on 
inserting the Covenant in the Treaty and finally over- 
rode the objections of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Cle- 
menceau, who scouted the idea for a while as calculated to 
impair the value of both charters. There was also a 
moment when the two were reported to have had a serious 
disagreement and Mr. Lloyd George, having suddenly 
quitted Paris for rustic seclusion, was likened to Achilles 
sulking in his tent. But one of the two always gave way 
at the last moment, just as both had given way to M. 
Clemenceau at the outset. When the difference between 
Japan and China cropped up, for example, the other dele- 
gates made Mr. Wilson their spokesman. Despite M. 
Clemenceau's resolve that the public should not "be 
apprized that the head of one government had ever put 
forward a proposal which was opposed by the head of 
another government," it became known that they occa- 
sionally disagreed among themselves, were more than 
once on the point of separating, and that at best their 
unanimity was often of the verbal order, failing to take 
root in identity of views. To those who would fain predi- 
cate political tact or statesmanship of the men who thus 
undertook to set human progress on a new and ethical 
basis, the story of these bickerings, hasty improvisations, 
and amazing compromises is distressing. The incertitude 
and suspense that resulted were disconcerting. Nobody 
ever knew what was coming. A subcommission might 
deliver a reasoned judgment on the question submitted 
to it, and this might be unanimously confirmed by the 
commission, but the Four or Three or Two or even One 
could not merely quash the report, but also reverse the 

164 



AIMS AND METHODS 

practical consequences that followed. This was done over 
and over again. 

And there were other performances still more amazing. 
When, for example, the Polish problem became so press- 
ing that it could not be safely postponed any longer, the 
first delegates were at their wits' ends. Unable to agree 
on any of the solutions mooted, they conceived the idea 
of obtaining further data and a lead from a special com- 
mission. The commission was accordingly appointed. 
Among its members were Sir Esme Howard, who has since 
become Ambassador in Rome, the American General 
Kernan, and M. Noulens, the ex-Ambassador of France 
in Petrograd. These envoys and their colleagues set out 
for Poland to study the problem on the spot. They 
exerted themselves to the utmost to gather data for a 
serious judgment, and returned to Paris after a sojourn 
of some two months, legitimately proud of the copious 
and well-sifted results of their research. And then they 
waited. Days passed and weeks, but nobody took the 
slightest interest in the envoys. They were ignored. At 
last the chief of the commission, M. Noulens, taking the 
initiative, wrote direct to M. Clemenceau, informing him 
that the task intrusted to him and his colleagues had been 
achieved, and requesting to be permitted to make their 
report to the Conference. The reply was an order dis- 
solving the commission unheard. 

Once when the relations between Messrs. Wilson and 
Lloyd George were somewhat spiced by antagonism of 
purpose and incompatibility of methods, a political 
friend of the latter urged him to make a firm stand. 
But the British Premier, feeling, perhaps, that there 
were too many unascertained elements in the matter, or 
identifying the President with the United States, drew 
back. More than once, too, when a certain delegate was 
stating his case with incisive emphasis Mr. Wilson, who 

165 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

was listening with attention and in silence, would suddenly 
ask, "Is this an ultimatum?" The American President 
himself never shrank from presenting an ultimatum 
when sure of his ground and morally certain of victory. 
On one such occasion a proposal had been made to Mr. 
Lloyd George, who approved it whole-heartedly. But 
it failed to receive the placet of the American statesman. 
Thereupon the British Premier was strongly urged to 
stand firm. But he recoiled, his plea being that he had 
received an ultimatum from his American colleague, 
who spoke of quitting France and withdrawing the Ameri- 
can troops unless the point were conceded. And Mr. 
Wilson had his way. One might have thought that 
this success would hearten the President to other and 
greater achievements. But the leader who incarnated 
in his own person the highest strivings of the age, and 
who seemed destined to acquire pontifical ascendancy 
in a regenerated world, lacked the energy to hold his own 
when matters of greater moment and high principle 
were at stake. 

These battles waged within the walls of the palace 
on the Quai d'Orsay were discussed out-of-doors by an 
interested and watchful public, and the conviction was 
profound and widespread that the President, having 
set his hand to the plow so solemnly and publicly, and 
having promised a harvest of far-reaching reforms, would 
not look back, however intractable the ground and how- 
ever meager the crop. But confronted with serious 
obstacles, he flinched from his task, and therein, to my 
thinking, lay his weakness. If he had come prepared 
to assert his personal responsibility, to unfold his scheme, 
to have it amply and publicly discussed, to reject pusil- 
lanimous compromise in the sphere of execution, and to 
appeal to the peoples of the world to help him to carry 
it out, the last phase of his policy would have been worthy 

1 66 



AIMS AND METHODS 

of the first, and might conceivably have inaugurated the 
triumph of the ideas which the indolent and the men of 
little faith rejected as incapable of realization. To this 
hardy course, which would have challenged the approba- 
tion of all that is best in the world, there was an alter- 
native: Mr. Wilson might have confessed that his judg- 
ment was at fault, mankind not being for the moment 
in a fitting mood to practise the new tenets, that a speedy 
peace with the enemy was the first and most pressing 
duty, and that a world-parliament should be convened 
for a later date to prepare the peoples of the universe 
for the new ordering. But he chose neither alternative. 
At first it was taken for granted that in the twilight 
of the Conference hall he had fought valiantly for the 
principles which he had propounded as the groundwork 
of the new politico-social fabric, and that it was only when 
he found himself confronted with the insuperable antag- 
onism of his colleagues of France and Britain that he 
reluctantly receded from his position and resolved to 
show himself all the more unbending to the envoys of 
the lesser countries. But this assumption was refuted 
by vState-Secretary Lansing, who admitted to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that the President's Four- 
teen Points, which he had vowed to carry out, were not 
even discussed at the Conference. The outcome of this 
attitude — one cannot term it a policy — was to leave the 
best of the ideas which he stood for in solution, to embitter 
every ally except France and Britain, and to scatter 
explosives all over the world. 

To this dwarfing parliamentary view of world-policy 
Mr. Lloyd George likewise fell a victim. But his fault 
was not so glaring. For it should in fairness be remem- 
bered that it was not he who first preached the advent of 
the millennium. He had only given it a tardy and cold 
assent, qualified by an occasional sally of keen pleasantry. 

167 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Down to the last moment, as we saw, he not only was 
unaware that the Covenant would be inserted in the 
Peace Treaty, but he was strongly of the opinion, as 
indeed were M. Pichon and others, that the two instru- 
ments were incompatible. He also apparently inclined 
to the belief that spiritual and moral agencies, if not 
wholly impotent to bring about the requisite changes in 
the politico-social world, could not effect the transforma- 
tion for a long while to come, and that in the interval it 
behooved the governments to fall back upon the old 
system of so-called equilibrium, which, after Germany's 
collapse, meant an informal kind of Anglo-Saxon over- 
lordship of the world and a pax Britannica in Europe. 
As for his action at the Conference, in so far as it did not 
directly affect the well-being of the British Empire, which 
was his first and main care, one might describe it as one 
of general agreement with Mr. Wilson. He actually 
threw it into that formula when he said that whenever 
the interests of the British Empire permitted he would 
like to find himself at one with the United States. It was 
on that occasion that the person addressed warned him 
against identifying the President with the people of the 
United States. 

In truth, it was difficult to follow the distinguished 
American idealist, because one seldom knew whither 
he would lead. Neither, apparently, did he himself. 
Some of his own countrymen in Paris held that he had 
always been accustomed to follow, never to guide. Cer- 
tainly at the Conference his practice was to meet the more 
powerful of his contradictors on their own ground and 
come to terms with them, so as to get at least a part of 
what he aimed at, and that he accepted, even when the 
instalment was accorded to him not as such, but as a 
final settlement. So far as one can judge by his public 
acts and by the admissions of State-Secretary Lansing, 

168 



AIMS AND METHODS 

he cannot have seriously contemplated staking the suc- 
cess of his mission on the realization of his Fourteen 
Points. The manner in which he dealt with his Covenant, 
with the French demand for concrete military guaranties 
and with secret treaties, all afford striking illustrations 
of his easy temper. Before quitting Paris for Washington 
he had maintained that the Covenant as drafted was 
satisfactory, nay, he contended that "not even a period 
could be changed in the agreement." The Monroe 
Doctrine, he held, needed no special stipulation. But as 
soon as Senator Lodge and others took issue with him 
on the subject, he shifted his position and hedged that 
doctrine round with defenses which cut off a whole con- 
tinent from the purview of the League, which is nothing 
if not cosmic in its functions. 1 Again, there was to be no 
alliance. The French Premier foretold that there would 
be one. Mr. Wilson, who was in England at the time, 
answered him in a speech declaring that the United 
States would enter into no alliance which did not include 
all the world: "no combination of power which is not a 
combination of all of us." Well, since then he became a 
party to a kind of triple alliance and in the judgment of 
many observers it constitutes the main result of the 
Conference. In the words of an American press organ: 
"Clemenceau got virtually everything he asked. Presi- 
dent Wilson virtually dropped his own program, and 
adopted the French and British, both of them imperial- 
istic." 2 

Again, when the first commission of experts reported 
upon the frontiers of Poland, the British Premier objected 



1 "What confidence can be commanded by men who, asserting one week 
that the ultimate of human wisdom has been attained in a document, con- 
fess the next week that the document is frail? When are we to believe 
that their confessions are at an end? " — The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), 
August 23, 191 9. 

2 The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), July 31, 1919. 

169 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

to a section of the "corridor," on the ground that as cer- 
tain districts contained a majority of Germans their an- 
nexation would be a danger to the future peace and there- 
fore to Poland herself, and also on the ground that it 
would run counter to one of Mr. Wilson's fundamental 
points; the President, who at that time dissented from 
Mr. Lloyd George, rose and remarked that his principles 
must not be construed too literally. "When I said that 
Poland must be restored, I meant that everything indis- 
pensable to her restoration must be accorded. Therefore, 
if that should involve the incorporation of a number of 
Germans in Polish territory, it cannot be helped, for it 
is part of the restoration. Poland must have access to 
the sea by the shortest route, and everything else which 
that implies." None the less, the British Premier, whose 
attitude toward the claims of the Poles was marked by a 
degree of definiteness and persistency which could hardly 
be anticipated in one who had never even heard of Teschen 
before the year 19 19, maintained his objections with em- 
phasis and insistence, until Mr. Wilson and M. Clemen- 
ceau gave in. 

Or take the President's way of dealing with the non- 
belligerent states. Before leaving Paris for Washington, 
Mr. Wilson, officially questioned by one of his colleagues 
at an official sitting as to whether the neutrals would also 
sign the Covenant, replied that only the Allies would be 
admitted to affix their signatures. "Don't you think it 
would be more conducive to the firm establishment of the 
League if the neutrals were also made parties to it now?" 
insisted the plenipotentiary. "No, I do not," answered 
the President. "I think that it would be conferring too 
much honor on them, and they don't deserve it." The 
delegate was unfavorably impressed by this reply. It 
seemed lacking in breadth of view. Still, it was tenable 
on certain narrow, formal grounds. But what he could 

170 



AIMS AND METHODS 

not digest was tne eagerness with which Mr. Wilson, on 
his return from Washington, abandoned his way of think- 
ing and adopted the opposite view. Toward the end of 
April the delegates and the world were surprised to learn 
that not only would Spain be admitted to the orthodox 
fold, but that she would have a voice in the management 
of the flock with a seat in the Council. The chief of the 
Portuguese delegation 1 at once delivered a trenchant pro- 
test against this abrupt departure from principle, and as 
a jurisconsult stigmatized the promotion of Spain to a 
voice in the Council as an irregularity, and then retired 
in high dudgeon. 

Thus the grave reproach cannot be spared Mr. Wilson 
of having been weak, vague, and inconsistent with him- 
self. He constituted himself the supreme judge of a 
series of intricate questions affecting the organization and 
tranquillity of the European Continent, as he had pre- 
viously done in the case of Mexico, with the results we 
know. This authority was accorded to him — with cer- 
tain reservations — in virtue of the exalted position which 
he held in a state disposing of vast financial and economic 
resources, shielded from some of the dangers that con- 
tinually overhang European nations, and immune from 
the immediate consequences of the mistakes it might 
commit in international politics. For every continental 
people in Europe is in some measure dependent on the 
good-will of the United States, and therefore anxious to 
deserve it by cultivating the most friendly relations with 
its chief. This predisposition on the part of his wards 
was an asset that could have been put to good account. 
It was a guaranty of a measure of success which would 
have satisfied a generous ambition ; it would have enabled 
him to effect by a wise policy what revolution threatened to 

1 M. Affonso Costa, who shortly before had succeeded the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, M. Monas Egiz. 

171 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

accomplish by violence, and to canalize and lead to fruitful 
fields the new-found strength of the proletarian masses. 

The compulsion of working with others is often a whole- 
some corrective. It helps one to realize the need of ac- 
commodating measures to people's needs. But Mr. Wil- 
son deliberately segregated himself from the nations for 
whose behoof he was laboring, and from some of their 
authorized representatives. And yet the aspirations and 
conceptions of a large section of the masses differed very 
considerably from those of the two statesmen with whom 
he was in close collaboration. His avowed aims were at 
the opposite pole to those of his colleagues. To reconcile 
internationalism and nationalism was sheer impossible. 
Yet instead of upholding his own, taking the peoples into 
his confidence, and sowing the good seed which would 
certainly have sprouted up in the fullness of time, he set 
himself, together with his colleagues, to weld contradic- 
tories and contributed to produce a synthesis composed 
of disembodied ideas, disintegrated communities, embit- 
tered nations, conflicting states, frenzied classes, and a 
seething mass of discontent throughout the world. 

Mr. Wilson has fared ill with his critics, who, when in 
quest of explanations of his changeful courses, sought for 
them, as is the wont of the average politician, in the least 
noble parts of human nature. In his case they felt espe- 
cially repelled by his imperial aloofness, the secrecy of his 
deliberations, and the magisterial tone of his judgments, 
even when these were in flagrant contradiction with one 
another. Obstinacy was also included among the traits 
which were commonly ascribed to him. As a matter of 
fact he was a very good listener, an intelligent questioner, 
and amenable to argument whenever he felt free to give 
practical effect to the conclusions. When this, was not 
the case, arguments necessarily failed of their effect, and 
on these occasions considerations of expediency proved a 

172 



AIMS AND METHODS 

lever sufficient to sway his decision. But, like his more 
distinguished colleagues, he had to rely upon counsel from 
outside, and in his case, as in theirs, the official adviser 
was not always identical with the real prompter. He, too, 
as we saw, set aside the findings of the commissions when 
they disagreed with his own. In a word, Mr. Wilson's 
fatal stumble was to have sacrificed essentials in order to 
score on issues of secondary moment; for while success 
enabled him to obtain his paper Covenant from his co- 
delegates in Paris, and to bring back tangible results to 
Washington, it lost him the leadership of the world. The 
cost of this deplorable weakness to mankind can be esti- 
mated only after its worst effects have been added up 
and appraised. 

In matters affecting the destinies of the lesser states 
Mr. Wilson was firm as a rock. From the position once 
taken up nothing could move him. Their economic 
dependence on his own country rendered their arguments 
pointless and lent irresistible force to his injunctions. 
Greece's dispute with Bulgaria was a classic instance. 
The Bulgars repaired to Paris more as claimants in sup- 
port of indefeasible rights than as vanquished enemies 
summoned to learn the conditions imposed on them by 
the nations which they had betrayed and assailed. Vic- 
tory alone could have justified their territorial pretensions; 
defeat made them grotesque. All at once, however, it 
was bruited abroad that President Wilson had become 
Bulgaria's intercessor and favored certain of her exor- 
bitant claims. One of these was for the annexation of 
part of the coast of western Thrace, together with a sea- 
port at the expense of the Greeks, the race which had 
resided on the seaboard for twenty-five hundred consecu- 
tive years. M. Venizelos offered them instead one com- 
mercial outlet 1 and special privileges in another, and the 

1 Dedeagatch. 

173 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Japan 
considered the offer adequate. 

But Mr. Wilson demurred. A commercial outlet 
through foreign territory, he said, might possibly be as 
good as a direct outlet through one's own territory in 
peace-time, but not in time of war, and, after all, one 
must bear in mind the needs of a country during hostilities. 
In the mouth of the champion of universal peace that was 
an unexpected argument. It had been employed by 
Italy in favor of her claim to Fiume. Mr. Wilson then 
met it by invoking the economic requirements of Jugo- 
slavia, and by declaring that the Treaty was being devised 
for peace, not for war, that the League of Nations would 
hinder wars, or at the very least supply the deficiencies 
of those states which had sacrificed strategical positions 
for humanitarian aims. But in the case of Bulgaria he 
was taking what seems the opposite position and trans- 
gressing his own principle of nationality in order to 
maintain it. 

Mr. Wilson, pursuing his line of argument, further 
pointed out that the Supreme Council had not accepted 
as sufficient for Poland an outlet through German terri- 
tory, but had created the city-state of Dantzig in order 
to confer a greater degree of security upon the Polish 
republic. To that M. Venizelos replied that there was no 
parity between the two instances. Poland had no outlet 
to the sea except through Dantzig, and could not, there- 
fore, allow that one to remain in the hands of an un- 
friendly nation, whereas Bulgaria already possessed two 
very commodious ports, Varna and Burgas, on the Black 
Sea, which becomes a free sea in virtue of the international- 
ization of the straits. The possession of a third outlet on 
the ^Egean could not, therefore, be termed a vital question 
for his protegee. Thus the comparison with Poland was 
irrelevant. 

i74 



AIMS AND METHODS 

If Poland, which is a very much greater state than 
Bulgaria, can live and prosper with a single port, and that 
not her own — if Rumania, which is also a much more 
numerous and powerful nation, can thrive with a single 
issue to the sea, by what line of argument, M. Venizelos 
asked, can one prove that little Bulgaria requires three 
or four exits, and that her need justifies the abandonment 
to her tender mercies of seven hundred and fifty thousand 
Greeks and the violation of one of the fundamental prin- 
ciples underlying the new moral ordering. 

Compliance with Bulgaria's demand would prevent 
Greece from including within her boundaries the three- 
quarters of a million Greeks who have dwelt in Thrace 
for twenty-five centuries, preserving their nationality in- 
tact through countless disasters and tremendous cata- 
clysms. Further, the Greek Premier, taking a leaf from 
Wilson's book, turned to the aspect which the problem 
would assume in war-time. Bulgaria, he argued, is es- 
sentially a continental state, whose defense does not de- 
pend upon naval strength, whereas Greece contains an 
island population of nearly a million and a half and looks 
for protection against aggression chiefly to naval pre- 
cautions. In case of war, Bulgaria, if her claim to an 
issue on the ^Egean were allowed, could with her sub- 
marines delay or hinder the transport and concentration 
in Macedonia of Greek forces from the islands and thus 
place Greece in a position of dangerous inferiority. 

Lastly, if Greece's claims in Thrace were rejected, she 
would have a population of 1,790,000 souls outside her 
national boundaries — that is to say, more than one-third 
of the population which is within her state. Would this 
be fair? Of the total population of Bulgarian and 
Turkish Thrace the Turks and Greeks together form 
85 per cent., the Bulgars only 6 per cent., and the latter 
nowhere in compact masses. Moreover — and this ought 

i75 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

to have clinched the matter — the Hellenic population 
formed an absolute as well as a relative majority in the 
year 1919. 

These arguments and various other considerations 
drawn from the inordinate ambitions, the savage cruelty, 1 
and the Punic faith of the Bulgars convinced the British, 
French, and Japanese delegates of the soundness of 
Greece's pleas, and they sided with M. Venizelos. But 
Mr. Wilson clung to his idea with a tenacity which could 
not be justified by argument, and was concurrently 
explained by motives irrelevant to the merits of the case. 
Whether the influence of Bulgarophil American mission- 
aries and strong religious leanings were at the root of his 
insistence, as was generally assumed, or whether other 
considerations weighed with him, is immaterial. And 
yet it is worth recording that a Bulgarian journal 2 
announced with the permission of the governmental cen- 
sor that the American missionaries in Bulgaria and the 
professors of Robert College of Constantinople had so 
primed the American delegates at the Conference on the 
question of Thrace, and generally on the Bulgarian 
problem, that all M. Venizelos's pains to convince them 
of the justice of his contention would be lost labor." 3 

However this may be, Mr. Wilson's attitude was the 
subject of adverse comment throughout Europe. His 
implied claim to legislate for the world and to take over 



1 See Rapports et Enquetes de la Commission Interalliee sur les Violations 
du droit des gens commises en Macedoine Orientate par les armees bulgares. 
The conclusion of the report is one of the most terrible indictments ever 
drawn up by impartial investigators against what is practically a whole 
people. 

2 Zora, August nth. Cf. Le Temps, August 28, 1919. 

3 Mr. Charles House published a statement in the press of Saloniki to 
the effect that the Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions forbids 
missionaries to take an active part in politics. He added that if this in- 
junction was transgressed — and in Paris the current belief was that it had 
been — it would not be tolerated by the Missionary Board, nor recognized 
by the American government. 

176 



AIMS AND METHODS 

its moral leadership earned for him the epithet of "Dic- 
tator," and provoked such epigrammatic comments among 
his own countrymen and the French as this: "Louis XIV 
said, 'I am the state!' Mr. Wilson, outdoing him, ex- 
claimed, 'I am all the states!'" 

The necessity of winning over dissentient colleagues to 
his grandiose scheme of world reorganization and of satis- 
fying their demands, which were of a nature to render 
that scheme abortive, was the most influential agency in 
impairing his energies and upsetting his plans. This re- 
mark assumes what unhappily seems a fact, that those 
plans were mainly mechanical. It is certain that they 
made no provision for directly influencing the masses, for 
giving them sympathetic guidance, and enabling them to 
suffuse with social sentiments the aspirations and striv- 
ings which were chiefly of the materialistic order, with a 
view to bringing about a spiritual transformation of the 
social basis. Indeed we have no evidence that the need 
of such a transformation of the basis of political thought, 
which was still rooted in the old order, was grasrjed by 
any of those who set their hand to the legislative part of 
the work. 

These unfavorable impressions were general. Almost 
every step subsequently taken by the Conference con- 
firmed them, and long before the Treaty was presented to 
the Germans, public confidence was gone in the ability 
of the Supreme Council to attain any of the moral vic- 
tories over militarism, race-hatred, and secret intrigues 
which its leaders had encouraged the world to expect. 

"The leaders of the Conference," wrote an influential 
press organ, 1 "are under suspicion. They may not know 
it, but it is true. The suspicion is doubtless unjust, but 
it exists. What exists is a fact; and men who ignore 
facts are not statesmen. The only way to deal with facts 

1 The Daily Mail (Paris edition), March 31, 1919. 

177 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

is to face them. The more unpleasant they are the more 
they need to be faced. 

"Some of the Conference leaders are suspected of hav- 
ing, at various times and in various circumstances, thought 
more of their own personal and political positions and 
ambitions than of the rapid and practical making of peace. 
They are suspected, in a word, of a tendency to subordi- 
nate policy to politics. 

"In regard to some important matters they are sus- 
pected of having no policy. They are also suspected of 
unwillingness to listen to their own competent advisers, 
who could lay down for them a sound policy. Some of 
them are even suspected of being under the spell of some 
benumbing influence that paralyzes their will and befogs 
their minds, when high resolve and clear visions are 
needful." 

Another accusation of the same tenor was thus formu- 
lated: "In various degrees 1 and with different qualities 
of guilt all the Allied and Associated leaders have dallied 
with dishonesty. While professing to seek naught save 
the welfare of mankind, they have harbored thoughts of 
self-interest. The result has been a progressive loss of 
faith in them by their own peoples severally, and by the 
Allied, Associated, and neutral peoples jointly. The tide 
of public trust in them has reached its lowest ebb." 

At the Conference, as we saw, the President of the 
United States possessed what was practically a veto on 
nearly all matters which left the vital interests of Britain 
and France intact. And he frequently exercised it. Thus 
the dispute about the Thracian settlement lay not between 
Bulgaria and Greece, nor between Greece and the Supreme 
Council, but between Greece and Mr. Wilson. In the 
quarrel over Fiume and the Dalmatian coast it was the 
same. When the Shantung question came up for settle- 

1 Tlie Daily Mail (Paris edition), April 6, 1919. 

178 



AIMS AND METHODS 

ment it was Mr. Wilson alone who dealt with it, his col- 
leagues, although bound by their promises to support 
Japan, having made him their mouthpiece. The rigor he 
displayed in dealing with some of the smaller countries 
was in inverse ratio to the indulgence he practised toward 
the Great Powers. Not only were they peremptorily bid- 
den to obey without discussion the behests which had 
been brought to their cognizance, but they were ordered, 
as we saw, to promise to execute other injunctions which 
might be issued by the Supreme Council on certain mat- 
ters in the future, the details of which were necessarily 
undetermined. 

In order to stifle any velleities of resistance on the part 
of their governments, they were notified that America's 
economic aid, of which they were in sore need, would 
depend on their docility. It is important to remember 
that it was the motive thus clearly presented that deter- 
mined their formal assent to a policy which they depre- 
cated. A Russian statesman summed up the situation in 
the words: "It is an illustration of one of our sayings, 
'Whose bread I eat, his songs I sing.'" Thus it was re- 
ported in July that an agreement come to by the financial 
group Morgan with an Italian syndicate for a yearly 
advance to Italy of a large sum for the purchase of Ameri- 
can food and raw stuffs was kept in abeyance until the 
Italian delegation should accept such a solution of the 
Adriatic problem as Mr. Wilson could approve. The 
Russian and anti-Bolshevists were in like manner com- 
pelled to give their assent to certain democratic dogmas 
and practices. It is also fair, however, to bear in mind 
that whatever one may think of the wisdom of the policy 
pursued by the President toward these peoples, the mo- 
tives that actuated it were unquestionably admirable, and 
the end in view was their own welfare, as he understood it. 
It is all the more to be regretted that neither the argu- 
13 179 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

ments nor the example of the autocratic delegates were 
calculated to give these the slightest influence over the 
thought or the unfettered action of their unwilling wards. 
The arrangements carried out were entirely mechanical. 

In the course of time after the vital interests of Britain, 
France, and Japan had been disposed of, and only those 
of the "lesser states," in the more comprehensive sense of 
this term, remained, President Wilson exercised supreme 
power, wielding it with firmness and encountering no 
gainsayer. Thus the peace between Italy and Austria 
was put off from month to month because he — and only 
he — among the members of the Supreme Council rejected 
the various projects of an arrangement. Into the merits 
of this dispute it would be unfruitful to enter. That 
there was much to be said for Mr. Wilson's contention, 
from the point of view of the League of Nations, and also 
from that of the Jugoslavs, will not be denied. That 
some of the main arguments to which he trusted his case 
were invalidated by the concessions which he had made 
to other countries was Italy's contention, and it cannot 
be thrust aside as untenable. 

At last Mr. Wilson ventured on a step which challenged 
the attention and stirred the disquietude of his friends. 
He despatched a note 1 to Turkey, warning her that if the 
massacres of Armenians were not discontinued he would 
withdraw the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, which pro- 
vides for the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over 
undeniable Turkish territories. The intention was excel- 
lent, but the necessary effects of his action were contrary 
to what the President can have aimed at. He had not 
consulted the Conference on the important change which 
he was about to make respecting a point which was 



1 Somewhere between August 17 and 20, 1919. It was transmitted by- 
Admiral Bristol, American member of the Inter-Allied Inquiry Mission at 
Smyrna. 

180 



AIMS AND METHODS 

supposed to be part of the groundwork of the new order- 
ing. This from the Conference point of view was a 
momentous decision, which could be taken only with the 
consent of the Supreme Council. Even as a mere threat 
it was worthless if it did not stand for the deliberate 
will of that body which the President had deemed it 
superfluous to consult. As it happened, the British 
authorities were just then organizing a body of gendarmes 
to police the Turkish territories in question, and they were 
engaged in this work with the knowledge and approval 
of the Supreme Council. Mr. Wilson's announcement 
could therefore only be construed — and was construed — 
as the act of an authority superior to that of the Council. 1 
The Turks, who are shrewd observers, must have drawn 
the obvious conclusion from these divergent measures 
as to the degree of harmony prevailing among the Allied 
and Associated Powers. 

M. Clemenceau had a conversation on the subject with 
Mr. Polk, who explained that the note was informal and 
given verbally, and conveyed the idea only of one nation 
in connection with the Armenian situation. This explana- 
tion, accepted by the French government, did not com- 
mend itself to public opinion, either in France or elsewhere. 
Moreover, the French were struck by another aspect of 
this arbitrary exercise of supreme power. "President 
Wilson," wrote an eminent French publicist, "throws 
himself into the attitude of a man who can bind and 
loose the Turkish Empire at the very moment when the 
Senate appears opposed to accepting any mandate, 
European or Asiatic, at the moment when Mr. Lansing 
declares to the Congress that the government of which 
he is a member does not desire to accept any mandate. 
But is it not obvious that if Mr. Wilson sovereignly deter- 
mines the lot of Turkey he can be held in consequence to 

1 Cf. L'Echo de Paris, August 28, 1919. Article by Pertinax, 

181 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

the performance of certain duties ? We have often had to 
deplore the absence of policy common to the Allies. But 
has each one of them, considered separately, at least a 
policy of its own? Does it take action otherwise than at 
haphazard, yielding to the impulse of a general, a consul, 
or a missionary?" * 

It soon became manifest even to the most obtuse that 
whenever the Supreme Council, following its leaders 
and working on such lines as these, terminated its labors, 
the ties between the political communities of Europe 
would be just as flimsy as in the unregenerate days of 
secret diplomacy, secret alliances, and secret intrigues, 
unless in the meanwhile the peoples themselves inter- 
vened to render them stronger and more enduring. It 
would, however, be the height of unfairness to make 
Mr. Wilson alone answerable for this untoward ending 
to a far resonant beginning. He had been accused by the 
press of most countries of enwrapping personal ambition 
in the attractive covering of disinterestedness and altru- 
ism, just as many of his foreign colleagues were said to 
go in fear of the "malady of lost power." But charges of 
this nature overstep the bounds of legitimate criticism. 
Motive is hardly ever visible, nor is it often deducible 
from deliberate action. If, for example, one were to 
infer from the vast territorial readjustments and the still 
vaster demands of the various belligerents at the Con- 
ference, the motives that had determined them to enter 
the war, the conclusion — except in the case of the Ameri- 
can people, whose disinterestedness is beyond the reach of 
cavil — would indeed be distressing. The President of the 
United States merited well of all nations by holding up 
to them an ideal for realization, and the mere announce- 
ment of his resolve to work for it imparted an appreciable 
if inadequate incentive to men of good- will. The task, 

1 L'Echo de Paris, August 28, 1919. Article by Pertinax. 

1S2 



AIMS AND METHODS 

however, was so gigantic that he cannot have gaged its 
magnitude, discerned the defects of the instruments, 
nor estimated aright the force of the hindrances before 
taking the world to witness that he would achieve it. 
Even with the hearty co-operation of ardent colleagues 
and the adoption of a sound method he could hardly 
have hoped to do more than clear the ground — perhaps 
lay the foundation-stone — of the structure he dreamt of. 
But with the partners whom circumstance allotted him, 
and the gainsayers whom he had raised up and irritated 
in his own country, failure was a foregone conclusion 
from the first. The aims after which most of the Euro- 
pean governments strove were sheer incompatible with 
his own. Doubtless they all were solicitous about the 
general good, but their love for it was so general and so 
diluted with attachment to others' goods as to be hardly 
discernible. The reproach that can hardly be spared to 
Mr. Wilson, however, is that of pusillanimity. If his 
faith in the principles he had laid down for the guidance 
of nations were as intense as his eloquent words suggested, 
he would have spurned the offer of a sequence of high- 
sounding phrases in lieu of a resettlement of the world. 
And his appeal to the peoples would most probably have 
been heard. The beacon once lighted in Paris would 
have been answered in almost every capital of the world. 
One promise he kept religiously: he did not return to 
Washington without a paper covenant. Is it more? Is 
it merely a paradox to assert that as war was waged in 
order to make war impossible, so a peace was made that 
will render peace impossible? 



VI 



THE LESSER STATES 

BEFORE the Anglo-Saxon statesmen thus set them- 
selves to rearrange the complex of interests, forces. 
policies, nationalities, rights, and claims which con- 
stituted the politico-social world of 19 19, they were ex- 
pected to deal with all the Allied and Associated nations, 
without favor or prejudice, as members of one family. 
This expectation was not fulfilled. It may not have been 
warranted. From the various discussions and decisions 
of which we have knowledge, a number of delegates drew 
the inference that France was destined for obvious reasons 
to occupy the leading position in continental Europe, 
under the protection of Anglo-Saxondom ; and that a 
privileged status was to be conferred on the Jews in 
eastern Europe and in Palestine, while the other states 
were to be in the leading-strings of the Four. This view 
was not lightly expressed, however inadequately it may 
prove to have been then supported by facts. As to the 
desirability of forming this rude hierarchy of states, the 
principal plenipotentiaries were said to have been in 
general agreement, although responding to different mo- 
tives. There was but one discordant voices — that of 
France — who was opposed to the various limitations set 
to Poland's aggrandizement, and also to the clause placing 
the Jews under the direct protection of the League of 
Nations, and investing them with privileges in which the 
races among whom they reside are not allowed to par- 

1S4 



THE LESSER STATES 

ticipate. Bulgaria had a position unique in her class, 
for she was luckier than most of her peers in having 
enlisted on her side the American delegation and Mr. 
Wilson as leading counsel and special pleader for her 
claim to an outlet to the ^gean Sea. 

At the Conference each state was dealt with according 
to its class. Entirely above the new law, as we saw, 
stood its creators, the Anglo-Saxons. To all the others, 
including the French, the Wilsonian doctrine was applied 
as fully as was compatible with its author's main object, 
the elaboration of an instrument which he could take back 
with him to the United States as the great world settle- 
ment. Within these limits the President was evidently 
most anxious to apply his Fourteen Points, but he kept 
well within these. Thus he would, perhaps, have been 
quite ready to insist on the abandonment by Britain of 
her supremacy on the seas, on a radical change in the 
international status of Egypt and Ireland, and much 
else, had these innovations been compatible with his own 
special object. But they were not. He was apparently 
minded to test the matter by announcing his resolve to 
moot the problem of the freedom of the seas, but when 
admonished by the British government that it would 
not even brook its mention, he at once gave it up and, 
presumably drawing the obvious inference from this 
downright refusal, applied it to the Irish, Egyptian, and 
other issues, which were forthwith eliminated from the 
category of open or international problems. But France's 
insistent demand, on the other hand, for the Rhine 
frontier met with an emphatic refusal. 1 

The social reformer is disheartened by the one-sided 
and inexorable way in which maxims proclaimed to be of 
universal application were restricted to the second-class 
nations. 

1 In February, 19 19. 

I85 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Russia's case abounds in illustrations of this arbitrary, 
unjust, and impolitic pressure. The Russians had been 
our allies. They had fought heroically at the time when 
the people of the United States were, according to their 
President, "too proud to fight." They were essential 
factors in the Allies' victory, and consequently entitled 
to the advantages and immunities enjoyed by the Western 
Powers. In no case ought they to have been placed on 
the same level as our enemies, and in lieu of recompense 
condemned to punishment. And yet this latter con- 
ception of their deserts was not wholly new. Soon after 
their defection, and when the Allies were plunged in the 
depths of despondency, a current of opinion made itself 
felt among certain sections of the Allied peoples tending 
to the conclusion of peace on the basis of compensations 
to Germany, to be supplied by the cession of Russian 
territory. This expedient was advocated by more than 
one statesman, and was making headway when fresh 
factors arose which bade fair to render it needless. 

At the Paris Conference the spirit of this conception 
may still have survived and prompted much that was 
done and much that was left unattempted. Russia was 
under a cloud. If she was not classed as an enemy she 
was denied the consideration reserved for the Allies and 
the neutrals. Her integrity was a matter of indifference 
to her former friends; almost every people and nation- 
ality in the Russian state which asked for independence 
found a ready hearing at the Supreme Council. And 
some of them before they had lodged any such claim were 
encouraged to lose no time in asking for separation. In 
one case a large sum of money and a mission were sent 
to "create the independent state of the Ukraine," so 
impatient were peoples in the West to obtain a substitute 
for the Russian ally whom they had lost in the East, 
and great was their consternation when their proteges mis- 

186 



THE LESSER STATES 

spent the funds and made common cause with the 
Teutons. 

Disorganized Russia was in some ways a godsend to 
the world's administrators in Paris. To the advocate of 
alliances, territorial equilibrium, and the old order of 
things it offered a facile means of acquiring new help- 
mates in the East by emancipating its various peoples 
in the name of right and justice. It held out to the 
capitalists who deplored the loss of their milliards a 
potential source whence part of that loss might be made 
good. 1 To the zealots of the League of Nations it 
offered an unresisting body on which all the requisite 
operations from amputation to trepanning might be per- 
formed without the use of anesthetics. 

The various border states of Russia were thus quietly 
lopped off without even the foreknowledge, much less the 
assent, of the patient, and without any pretense at 
plebiscites. Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Georgia were 
severed from the chaotic Slav state offhandedly, and 
the warrant was the doctrine propounded by President 
Wilson — that every people shall be free to choose its own 
mode of living and working. Every people? Surely not, 
remarked unbiased onlookers. The Egyptians, the 
Irish, the Austrians, the Persians, to name but four 
among many, are disqualified for the exercise of these in- 
defeasible rights. Perhaps with good reason? Then 
modify the doctrine. Why this difference of treatment? 
they queried. Is it not because the supreme judge knows 
full well that Great Britain would not brook the discus- 
sion of the Egyptian or the Irish problem, and that 
France, in order to feel quite secure, must hinder the 
Austrian-Germans from coalescing with their brethren 



1 The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pichon, undertook to 
recognize in principle the independence of Esthonia, provided that Estho- 
nia would take over her part of the Russian debt, 

187 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of the Reich? But if Britain and France have the right 
to veto every self-denying measure that smacks of dis- 
ruption or may involve a sacrifice, why is Russia bereft 
of it? If the principle involved be of any value at all, 
its application must be universal. To an equal all- 
round distribution of sacrifice the only alternative is the 
supremacy of force in the service of arbitrary rule. And 
to this force, accordingly, the Supreme Council had 
recourse. The only cases in which it seriously vindicated 
the rights of oppressed or dissatisfied peoples to self- 
determination against the will of the ruling race or nation 
were those in which that race or nation was powerless to 
resist. Whenever Britain or France's interests were 
deemed to be imperiled by the putting in force of any 
of the Fourteen Points, Mr. Wilson desisted from its 
application. Thus it came about that Russia was put 
on the same plane with Germany and received similar, 
in some respects, indeed, sterner, treatment. The Ger- 
mans were at least permitted to file objections to the 
conditions imposed and to point out flaws in the arrange- 
ments drafted, and their representations sometimes 
achieved their end. It was otherwise with the Russians. 
They were never consulted. And when their representa- 
tives in Paris respectfully suggested that all such changes 
as might be decided upon by the Great Powers during their 
country's political disablement should be taken to be 
provisional and be referred for definite settlement to the 
future constituent assembly, the request was ignored. 

Of psychological rather than political interest was 
Mr. Wilson's conscientious hesitation as to whether the 
nationalities which he was preparing to liberate were 
sufficiently advanced to be intrusted with self-government. 
As stated elsewhere, his first impulse would seem to have 
been to appoint mandatories to administer the territories 
severed from Russia. The mandatory arrangement under 

188 



THE LESSER STATES 

the ubiquitous League is said to have been his own. 
Presumably he afterward acquired the belief that the 
system might be wisely dispensed with in the case of some 
of Russia's border states, for they soon afterward re- 
ceived promises of independence and implicitly of protec- 
tion against future encroachments by a resuscitated 
Russia. 

In this connection a scene is worth reproducing which 
was enacted at the Peace Table before the system of ad- 
ministering certain territories by proxy was fully elabo- 
rated. At one of the sittings the delegates set themselves 
to determine what countries should be thus governed, 1 
and it was understood that the mandatory system was to 
be reserved for the German colonies and certain provinces 
of the Turkish Empire. But in the course of the con- 
versation Mr. Wilson casually made use of the expression, 
"The German colonies, the territories of the Turkish 
Empire and other territories." One of the delegates 
promptly put the question, "What other territories?" 
to which the President replied, unhesitatingly, "Those 
of the late Russian Empire." Then he added by way of 
explanation : ' ' We are constantly receiving petitions from 
peoples who lived hitherto under the scepter of the 
Tsars — Caucasians, Central Asiatic peoples, and others — 
who refuse to be ruled any longer by the Russians and 
yet are incapable of organizing viable independent states 
of their own. It is meet that the desires of these nations 
should be considered." At this the Czech delegate, 
Doctor Kramarcz, flared up and exclaimed: "Russia? 
Cut up Russia? But what about her integrity? Is that 
to be sacrificed?" But his words died away without 
evoking a response. "Was there no one," a Russian 
afterward asked, "to remind those representatives of the 

1 In the first version of the Covenant, Article XIX deals with this sub- 
ject. In the revised version it is Article XXI. 

189 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Great Powers of their righteous wrath with Germany 
when the Brest-Litovsk treaty was promulgated?" 

Toward Italy, who, unlike Russia, was not treated as an 
enemy, but as relegated to the category of lesser states, 
the attitude of President Wilson was exceptionally firm 
and uncompromising. On the subject of Fiume and 
Dalmatia he refused to yield an inch. In vain the 
Italian delegation argued, appealed, and lowered its 
claims. Mr. Wilson was adamant. It is fair to admit 
that in no other way could he have contrived to get even 
a simulacrum of a League. Unless the weak states were 
awed into submitting to sacrifices for the great aim which 
he had made his own, he must return to Washington as 
the champion of a manifestly lost cause. On the other 
hand, it cannot be denied that his thesis was not destitute 
of arguments to support it. Accordingly the deadlock 
went on for months, until the Italian Cabinet fell and 
people wearied of the Adriatic problems. 

Poland was another of the communities which had to 
bend before Anglo-Saxon will, represented in her case 
mainly by Mr. Lloyd George, not, however, without the 
somewhat tardy backing of his colleague from Washing- 
ton. It is important for the historian and the political 
student to observe that as the British Premier was not 
credited with any profound or original ideas about the 
severing or soldering of east European territories, the 
authorship of the powerful and successful opposition 
to the allotting of Dantzig to Poland was rightly or 
wrongly ascribed not to him, but to what is euphemisti- 
cally termed "international finance" lurking in the back- 
ground, whose interest in Poland was obviously keen, 
and whose influence on the Supreme Council, although 
less obvious, was believed to be far-reaching. The same 
explanation was currently suggested for the fixed resolve 
of Mr. Lloyd George not to assign Upper Silesia to Poland 

190 



THE LESSER STATES 

without a plebiscite. His own account of the matter was 
that although the inhabitants were Polish — they are as two 
to one compared with the Germans — it was conceivable 
that they entertained leanings toward the Germans, and 
might therefore desire to throw in their lot with these. 
When one compares this scrupulous respect for the likes 
and dislikes of the inhabitants of that province with the 
curt refusal of the same men at first to give ear to the 
ardent desire of the Austrians to unite with the Germans, 
or to abide by a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Fiume or 
Teschen, one is bewildered. The British Premier's wish 
was opposed by the official body of experts appointed to 
report on the matter. Its members had no misgivings. 
The territory, they said, belonged of right to Poland, 
the great majority of its population was unquestionably 
Polish, and the practical conclusion was that it should 
be handed over to the Polish government as soon as 
feasible. Thereupon the staff of the commission was 
changed and new members were substituted for the old. 1 
But that was not enough. The British Premier still en- 
countered such opposition among his foreign colleagues 
that it was only by dint of wordy warfare and stubborn- 
ness that he finally won his point. 

The stipulation for which the first British delegate toiled 
thus laboriously was that within a fortnight after the 
ratification of the Treaty the German and Polish forces 
should evacuate the districts in which the plebiscite was 
to be held, that the Workmen's Councils there should be 
dissolved, and that the League of Nations should take 
over the government of the district so as to allow the 
population to give full expression to its will. But the 
League of Nations did not exist and could not be consti- 
tuted for a considerable time. It was therefore decided 2 



1 Cf. L'Echo de Paris, August 19, 1919. 

2 In July, 1919. 

191 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

that some temporary substitute for the League should be 
formed at once, and the Supreme Council decided that 
Inter-Allied troops should occupy the districts. That was 
the first instalment of the price to be paid for the British 
Premier's tenderness for plebiscites, which the expert com- 
missions deprecated as unnecessary, and which, as events 
proved in this case, were harmful. 

In the meanwhile Bolshevist — some said German — 
agents were stirring up the population by suasion and by 
terrorism until it finally began to ferment. Thousands 
of working-men responded to the goad, "turned down" 
their tools and ceased work. Thereupon the coal-fields 
of Upper Silesia, the production of which had already 
dropped by 50 per cent, since the preceding November, 
ceased to produce anything. This consummation grieved 
the Supreme Council, which turned for help to the Inter- 
Allied armies. For the Silesian coal-fields represented 
about one- third of Germany's production, and both France 
and Italy were looking to Germany for part of their fuel- 
supply. The French press pertinently asked whether it 
would not have been cheaper, safer, and more efficacious 
to have forgone the plebiscite and relied on the Polish 
troops from the outset. 1 For, however ideal the intentions 
of Mr. Lloyd George may have been, the net result of his 
insistence on a plebiscite was to enable an ex-newspaper 
vender named Hoersing, who had undertaken to prevent 
the detachment of Upper Silesia from Germany, to set 
his machinery for agitation in motion and cause general 
unrest in the Silesian and Dombrova coal-mining districts. 
When the strike was declared the workmen, who are Poles 
to a man, rejected all suggestions that they should refer 
their grievances to arbitration courts. For these tribunals 
were conducted by Germans. The consequence of Mr. 
Lloyd George's spirited intervention was, in the words of 

1 L'Echo de Paris, August 19, 1919. 

192 



'JUL LESSER STAT1 

an unbiased the specter rvation, 

freezing and Bolshevism in eastern Europe" during the 

t — a hea to pay for peek ad- 

ter of an i e, at a 

being al- 
lowed to 

Kumar.'- d and qualified in severer 

for adrr until hi 

quil 

policy, and i wed the Powers. Then 

( dl chai moment 

I abandoned the position which it had taken up 

.ting the armistice with Hungary, to revert to it 

afterward. 1 The ; h which the upshot of 

this revolt was hailed h>y all tl 

-j. For their an tip- ward th< .oil 

had lot ardened into i 

and ar :h to break the 

the planet. 
ering and CO 
only be a -■■ ture, built without any refer - 

al architecture. It was shaped 
her by the I I Points nor by the canons of the 

balance of power <v . It was hardly more than 

an abortive attempt to make a f the t 

Created by foro tld be perpetuated only by tot 

but if symptoms are to be trusted, it is more likely to be 
broken up by force. As an American pi ' "," 
marked in .'. "The Com hat 

.ridescend:. to recognize the League of Na- 
tions. Even the small na e buying war material, 

Hungary iras grossly violated by the Hun- 
-naniam, when oca;: 

rweot 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

quite oblivious of the fact that there are to be no more 
wars, now that the League is there to prevent them. 
vSweden is buying large supplies from Germany, and Spain 
is sending a commission to Paris to negotiate for some of 
France's war equipment." ! 

Belgium, too, was treated with scant consideration. 
The praise lavished on her courageous people during the 
war was apparently deemed an adequate recompense for 
the sacrifices she had made and the losses she endured. 
For the revision of the treaties of 1839, indispensable to 
the economic development of the country, no diplomatic 
preparation was made down to May, and among the 
Treaty clauses then drafted Belgium's share of justice was 
so slight and insufficient that the unbiased press pub- 
lished sharp strictures on the forgetfulness or egotism of 
the Supreme Council. "The little that has leaked out of 
the decisions taken regarding the conditions which affect 
Belgium," wrote one journal, "has caused not only bitter 
disappointment in Belgium, but also indignation every- 
where. . . . The Allies having decided not to accord moral 
satisfaction to Belgium (they chose Geneva as the capital 
of the League of Nations), it was perhaps to be expected 
that they would not accord her material satisfaction. 
And such expectations are being fulfilled. The Limburg 
province, annexed to Holland in 1839, the province which 
gave the retreating enemy unlawful refuge in 191 8, a rank 
violation of Dutch neutrality, is apparently not to be 
restored to Belgium. Even the right, vital to the safety 
and welfare of Belgium, the right of unimpeded naviga- 
tion of the Scheldt between Antwerp and the sea, has not 
yet been conceded. And the raw material that is indis- 
pensable if Belgian industry is to be revived is withheld; 
the Allies, however, are quite willing to flood the country 
with manufactured articles." 2 

1 The New York Herald, (Paris cd.). August 20, 1919. 2 Ibid., May 4, 1919. 

194 



THE LESSER STATES 

And yet Belgium's demands were extremely modest. 1 
They were formulated, not as the guerdon for her heroic 
defense of civilization, but as a plain corollary flowing 
direct from each and every principle officially recognized 
by the heads of the Conference — right, nationality, legiti- 
mate guarantees, and economic requirements. Tested 
by any or all of these accepted touchstones, everything 
asked for was reasonable and fair in itself, and seemingly 
indispensable to the durability of the new world-structure 
which the statesmen were endeavoring to raise on the 
ruins of the old. Belgium's forlorn political and territorial 
plight embodied all the worst vices of the old balance 
of power stigmatized by President Wilson: the mutila- 
tion of the country; the forcible separation of sections 
of its population from each other; the distribution of 
these lopped, ethnic fragments among alien states and 
dynasties; the control of her waterways handed over to 
commercial rivals; the transformation of cities and dis- 
tricts that were obviously destined to figure among her 
sources of national well-being and centers of culture 
into dead towns that paralyze her effort and hinder her 
progress. In a word, Belgium had had no political 
existence for her own behoof. She was not an organic 
unit in the sodality of nations, but a mere cog in the 
mechanism of European equilibrium. 

Ruined by the war, Belgium was sorely tried by the 
Peace Conference. She complained of two open wounds 
which poisoned her existence, stunted her economic 
growth, and rendered her self-defense an impossibility: 
the vast gap of Limburg on the east and the blocking 
of the Scheldt on the west. The great national rtduit, 
Antwerp, cut off from the sea, inaccessible to succor in 



1 I discussed Belgium's demands in a series of special articles published 
in The London Daily Telegraph and The Philadelphia Public Ledger in the 
months of January, February, and March, 1919. 

14 I9S 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

case of war, on the one side, and Limburg opening to 
Germany's armies the road through central Belgium, 
on the other — these were the two standing dangers which 
it was hoped would be removed. How dangerous they 
are events had demonstrated. In ( )cl.< >1 ><t, [914, Antwer] > 
fell because Holland had dosed the Scheldt and forbidden 
the entrance to warships and transports, and in Novem- 
ber, 1918, a German army of over seventy thousand men 
eluded pursuit by the Allies by passing through Dutch 
Limburg, carrying with them vast war materials and 
booty. Militarily Belgium is exposed to mortal perils 
so long as the treaties which ordained this preposterous 
division of territories are maintained in vigor. 

Economically, too, the consequences, especially of the 
status of the Scheldt, are admittedly baleful. To Holland 
the river is practically useless — indeed, the only advantage 
it could confer would be the power of impeding the growth 
and prosperity of Antwerp for the benefit of its rival, 
Rotterdam. All that the Belgians desired there was the 
complete control of their national river, with the right 
of carrying out the works necessary to keep it navigable. 
A like demand was put forward for the canal of Terncuzen, 
which links the city of Ghent with the Scheldt; and the 
suppression of the checks and hindrances to Belgium's 
free communications with her hinterland — i.e., the basins 
of the Meuse and the Rhine. From every point of 
view, including that of international law, the claims 
made were at once modest and grounded. But the 
Supreme Council had no time to devote to such sub- 
sidiary matters, and. like more momentous issues, they 
were adjourned. 

The Belgian delegation did not ask that Holland's 
territory should be curtailed. On the contrary, they 
would have welcomed its increase by the addition of 
territory inhabited by people of her own idiom, under 

196 



'WW: LESSEE STAT1 

Gennai rred, aa Denmark 

me :n the matter of the Schleswig zone, for 

e Supreme Council 
acq aL Aga were ton 

ion that the Rhine country ; 

scted Belgian in e i were nevei eoii- 

1 bey ttematically ignored by the Con 

ference V. o.l of the League of Nationi 

•/.:;.. to be cho en lef that I 

/ oi the sd by Pre .: r i f ;r.-. 

.or. him .of. One of the A::.*.:: can delegate! informed 
! "that the capital of the Le 
be ntuate in a tranquil comi bave a 

uatiof] • ' "A go 

climate!'" a&ked a oontine atesmaa. "Then n 

. .'; Monte Carlo!'" 
But the decuooi] m favor of Oer. /oner 

from Switzerland ready made to P . The 

chid grotto it coloi to t si that religion . 

i a larger part in the Conference ..ons 

thar. the fo] 

pirit of reHgiou! and politi 
h to be is I among the variou . 

on! oi the world. It u to John Calvin, rather than 
to Martin Luther, that the birth of the Scotch Covenantee i 

and of E Hence r ;';r:eva 

too, it wa (Rous teau — 

a true child of Calvin — who v uthot of Americ 

Declarator, of Ir. ace Again, or.'; o: the first 

pad . international arbitrate 

bom m Geneva John Knox sat :' the feet 

of Calvin. Consequently the Puritan Revolution, the 
French Revolution, and the American Revolution all 
a Geneva. 

1 In Praia and Gbdffada 

197 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

These were the considerations which weighed with 
President Wilson when he refused to fix bis choice on 
Brussels, [n vain the Belgians argued and pleaded, 
urging thai it' the Conference were to vote for London, 
Washington, or Paris, they would receive the announce 
tnent with respectful acquiescence, but that among the 
lessor states they conceived that their country's claims 
were the best grounded. To the Americans who objected 
that Switzerland's mountains and lakes, being free from 
hateful war memories, offer more fitting surroundings 
for the capital o\ the League of Peace than Brussels, where 
vestiges of the odious struggle will long survive, they 
answered that they could only regret that, Belgium's 
resistance to the Lawless invaders should he taken i«> 

disqualify her for the honor. 

It is worth while pursuing this matter a step farther. 
The Federal (\>uneil in Heme having soon afterward 
officially recommended ' the nation to enter the League 

which guarantees it neutrality, 8 an illuminating discussion 

ensued. And it was elicited that as (here is an obligation 

imposed on all member-states to execute the decrees of 
the League for the coercion of rebellious fellow members, 
it follows that in such cases Switzerland, too, would be 
obliged to take an active part in the struggle between the 
League and the recalcitrant country. From military 
operations, however, Switzerland is dispensed, but it 
would certainly be bound to adopt economic measures of 

pressure, and to this extent abandon its neutrality. Now 
not only would that attitude be construed by the dis- 
obedient nation as unfriendly, and the usual consequences 
drawn from it, but as Switzerland is [reed from military 
co-operation, it follows that the League could not fix the 



1 In August, 1010. 

2 By Article XXI of the Covenant and Article CCCCXXXV of the 
Treaty. 

i(>8 



THE i.k. 

headqiu military command in its o tai, 

Gent . ■• , as that would constitute a violation oi 
neutrality. Am], if it did, Switzerland would in self- 
defense be bound to oppo ion ' 

The Belgians were discouraged b inful de- 

meanor and grudging di on of the Supreme Council, 

and irritated by the arbitrariness of its decrees and the 
indefensible way in which it applied principle* -ere 

propounded as sacred. Before restoring the diminuti 
cantons of Bupen and Malmedy to Belgium, fi pie, 

Mr. Wilson insisted on ascertain ir.; ill of the popu- 

lation by plebiscite. In itself the measure i on- 

able, but the position of these little districi tan- 

tially on all-fs which was re- 

red to Prance without any such test. In Piume, also, 
will of the inhabit-- nt for nothing, Mr. Will 

refusing to consult them. Further, Austria, wl ople 

were known to favor union with Germany, temati- 

cally jockeyed into ruinous isolation. " hat, in 

the light of these conflicting judge ed the B 

gians, "is the true meaning of the principle of self-deter- 
mination?" The only reply they received was that Mr. 
Wilson was right when he told hi-; fellow-countrymen that 
hi-: principles stood in need of info r ion, and that, as 

he was the iithorized into was 

required in Europe. 

In money matters, too, the chief plenipotentiaries can 
hardly be acquitted of something akin to niggardlir. 
toward the country which had saved theirs from a catas- 
trophe. Down to the month of May, 1021, two and a 
half milliard francs was the maximum sum allotted to 
Belgium by the Supreme Council. And for the work of 
restoring the devav suntry, which the Great Powers 

had spontaneously promised to accomplish, it was alleged 
by experts to be wholly inadequate. Other financial 

199 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

grievances were ignored — for a time. Further, it was de- 
cided that Germany should surrender her African colonies 
to the Great Powers; yet Belgium, who contributed mate- 
rially to their conquest, was not to be associated with them. 

Irritated by this illiberality, the Belgian delegation, hav- 
ing consulted with M. Renkin, to whose judgment in these 
matters special weight attached, resolved to make a firm 
stand, and refused to sign the Treaty unless at least cer- 
tain modest financial, economic, and colonial claims, 
which ought to have been settled spontaneously, were 
accorded under pressure. And the Supreme Council, 
rather than be arraigned before the world on the charge 
of behaving unjustly as well as ungenerously toward 
Belgium, ultimately gave way, leaving, however, an im- 
pression behind which seemed as indelible as it was pro- 
found. . . . 

The domination which is now being exercised by the 
principal Powers over the remaining states of the world is 
fraught with consequences which were not foreseen, and 
have not yet been realized by those who established it. 
Among the least momentous, but none the less real, is one 
to which Belgium is exposed. Hitherto there was a lan- 
guage problem in that heroic country which, being an 
internal controversy, could be settled without noteworthy 
perturbations by the good-will of the Walloons and the 
Flemings. The danger, which one fervently hopes will 
be warded off, consists in the possible transformation of 
that dispute into an international question, in consequence 
of possible accords of a military or economic nature. The 
subject is too delicate to be handled by a foreigner, and 
the Belgian people are too practical and law-loving not 
to avoid unwary steps that might turn a linguistic prob- 
lem into a racial issue. 

The Supreme Council soon came to be looked upon as 
the prototype of the future League, and in that light its 

200 



THE LESSER STATES 

action was sharply scrutinized by all whom the League 
concerned. Foremost among these were the representa- 
tives of the lesser states, or, as they were termed, "states 
with limited interests." This band of patriots had pil- 
grimaged to Paris full of hope for their respective coun- 
tries, having drunk in avidly the unstinted praise and 
promises which had served as pabulum for their attach- 
ment to the Allied cause during the war. But their illu- 
sions were short-lived. At one of their first meetings with 
the delegates of the Great Powers a storm burst which 
scattered their expectations to the winds. When the sky 
cleared it was discovered that from indispensable fellow- 
workers they had shrunk to dwarfish protegees, mere 
units of an inferior category, who were to be told what to 
do and would be constrained to do it thoroughly if not 
unmurmuringly. 

At the historic sitting of January 26th, the delegates of 
the lesser states protested energetically against the purely 
decorative part assigned to them at a Conference in the 
decisions of which their peoples were so intensely inter- 
ested. The Canadian Minister, having spoken of the 
"proposal" of the Great Powers, was immediately cor- 
rected by M. Clemenceau, who brusquely said that it was 
not a proposal, but a decision, which was therefore de- 
finitive and final. Thereupon the Belgian delegate, M. 
Hymans, delivered a masterly speech, pleading for genu- 
ine discussion in order to elucidate matters that so closely 
concerned them all, and he requested the Conference to 
allow the smaller belligerent Allies more than two dele- 
gates. Their demand was curtly rejected by the French 
Premier, who informed his hearers that the Conference 
was the creation of the Great Powers, who intended to 
keep the direction of its labors in their own hands. He 
added significantly that the smaller nations' representa- 
tives would probably not have been invited at all if the 

201 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

special problem of the League of Nations had not been 
mooted. Nor should it be forgotten, he added, that the 
five Great Powers represented no less than twelve million 
fighting-men. ... In conclusion, he told them that they 
had better get on with their work in lieu of wasting pre- 
cious time in speechmaking. These words produced a 
profound and lasting effect, which, however, was hardly 
the kind intended by the French statesman. 

" Conf erential Tsarism" was the term applied to this 
magisterial method by one of the offended delegates. 
He said to me on the morrow: "My reply to M. Clemen- 
ceau was ready, but fear of impairing the prestige of the 
Conference prevented me from uttering it. I could have 
emphasized the need for unanimity in the presence of 
vigilant enemies, ready to introduce a wedge into every 
fissure of the edifice we are constructing. I could have 
pointed out that, this being an assembly of nations 
which had waged war conjointly, there is no sound reason 
why its membership should be diluted with states which 
never drew the sword at all. I might have asked what 
has become of the doctrine preached when victory was 
still undecided, that a league of nations must repose 
upon a free consent of all sovereign states. And above 
all things else I could have inquired how it came to pass 
that the architect-in-chief of the society of nations which 
is to bestow a stable peace on mankind should invoke 
the argument of force, of militarism, against the pacific 
peoples who voluntarily made the supreme sacrifice for 
the cause of humanity and now only ask for a hearing. 
Twelve million fighting-men is an argument to be employed 
against the Teutons, not against the peace-loving, law- 
abiding peoples of Europe. 

"Premier Clemenceau seemed to lay the blame for the 
waste of time on our shoulders, but the truth is that we 
were never admitted to the deliberations until yesterday; 

202 



THE LESSER STATES 

although two and one-half months have elapsed since the 
armistice was concluded, and although the progress 
made by these leading statesmen is manifestly limited, 
he grudged us forty-five minutes to give vent to our views 
and wishes. 

"The French Tiger was admirable when crushing the 
enemies of civilization with his twelve million fighting- 
men; but gestures and actions which were appropriate to 
the battlefield become sources of jarring and discord when 
imported into a concert of peoples." 

Much bitterness was generated by those high-handed 
tactics, whereupon certain slight concessions were made 
in order to placate the offended delegates; but, being doled 
out with a bad grace, they failed of the effect intended. 
Belgium received three delegates instead of two, and 
Jugoslavia three; but Rumania, whose population was 
estimated at fourteen millions, was allowed but two. This 
inexplicable decision caused a fresh wound, which was 
kept continuously open by friction, although it might 
readily have been avoided. Its consequences may be 
traced in Rumania's singular relations to the Supreme 
Council before and after the fall of Kuhn in Hungary. 

But even those drastic methods might be deemed war- 
ranted if the policy enforced were, in truth, conducive to 
the welfare of the nations on whom it was imposed. But 
hastily improvised by one or two men, who had no claim 
to superior or even average knowledge of the problems 
involved, and who were constantly falling into egregious 
and costly errors, it was inevitable that their intervention 
should be resented as arbitrary and mischievous by the 
leaders of the interested nations whose acquaintanceship 
with those questions and with the interdependent issues 
was extensive and precise. This resentment, however, 
might have been not, indeed, neutralized, but somewhat 
mitigated, if the temper and spirit in which the Duumvir- 

203 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

ate discharged its self-set functions had been free from 
hauteur and softened by modesty. But the magisterial 
wording in which its decisions were couched, the abrupt- 
ness with which they were notified, and the threats that 
accompanied their imposition would have been repellent 
even were the authors endowed with infallibility. 

One of the delegates who unbosomed himself to me on 
the subject soon after the Germans had signed the 
Treaty remarked: "The Big Three are superlatively un- 
sympathetic to most of the envoys from the lesser belliger- 
ent states. And it would be a wonder if it were other- 
wise, for they make no effort to hide their disdain for us. 
In fact, it is downright contempt. They never consult 
us. When we approach them they shove us aside as 
importunate intruders. They x come to decisions unknown 
to us, and cany them out in secrecy, as though we were 
enemies or spies. If we protest or remonstrate, we are 
imperialists and ungrateful. 

"Often we learn only from the newspapers the burdens 
or the restrictions that have been imposed on us." 

A couple of days previously M. Clemenceau, in an un- 
official reply to a question put by the Rumanian delega- 
tion, directed them to consult the financial terms of the 
Treaty with Austria, forgetting that the delegates of the 
lesser states had not been allowed to receive or read those 
terms. Although communicated to the Austrians, they 
were carefully concealed from the Rumanians, whom they 
also concerned. At the same time, the Rumanian govern- 
ment was called upon to take and announce a decision 
which presupposed acquaintanceship with those condi- 
tions, whereupon the Rumanian Premier telegraphed from 
Bucharest to Paris to have them sent. But his locum tenens 
did not possess a copy and had no right to demand one. 1 
Incongruities of this character were frequent. 

1 1 was in possession of a complete copy. 

204 



THE LESSER STATES 

One statesman in Paris, who enjoys a world-wide 
reputation, dissented from those who sided with the lesser 
states. He looked at their protests and tactics from an 
angle of vision which the unbiased historian, however 
emphatically he may dissent from it, cannot ignore. He 
said: "All the smaller communities are greedy and in- 
satiable. If the chiefs of the World Powers had under- 
stood their temper and ascertained their aspirations in 
191 4, much that has passed into history since then would 
never have taken place. During the war these miniature 
countries were courted, flattered, and promised the sun 
and the moon, earth and heaven, and all the glories therein. 
And now that these promises cannot be redeemed, they 
are wroth, and peevishly threaten the great states with 
disobedience and revolt. This, it is true, they could not 
do if the latter had not forfeited their authority and 
prestige by allowing their internal differences, hesitations, 
contradictions, and repentances to become manifest to 
all. To-day it is common knowledge that the Great 
Powers are amenable to very primitive incentives and 
deterrents. If in the beginning they had been united and 
said to their minor brethren: 'These are your frontiers. 
These your obligations,' the minor brethren would have 
bowed and acquiesced gratefully. In this way the 
boundary problems might have been settled to the satis- 
faction of all, for each new or enlarged state would have 
been treated as the recipient of a free gift from the World 
Powers. But the plenipotentiaries went about their task 
in a different and unpractical fashion. They began by 
recognizing the new communities, and then they gave 
them representatives at the Conference. This they did 
on the ground that the League of Nations must first be 
founded, and that all well-behaved belligerents on the 
Allied side have a right to be consulted upon that. And, 
finally, instead of keeping to their program and liquidating 

205 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

the war, they mingled the issues of peace with the clauses 
of the League and debated them simultaneously. In 
these debates they revealed their own internal differences, 

t.lk-ir hesitancy, and the weakness of their will. And the 
lesser states have taken advantage of that. The general 
results have been the postponement of peace, the physical 
exhaustion of the Central Empires, and the spread of 
Bolshevism." 

It should not be forgotten that this mixture of the 
general and the particular of the old order and the new 
was objected to on other grounds. The Italians, for 
example, urged that it changed the status of a large 
number of their adversaries into that of highly privileged 
Allies. During the war they were enemies, before the 
peace discussions opened they had obtained forgiveness, 
after which they entered the Conference as cherished 
friends. The Italians had waged their war heroically 
against the Anst Hans, who inflicted heavy losses on them. 
Who were these Austrians? They were composed of the 
various nationalities which made up the Hapsburg 
monarchy, and in especial of men of Slav speech. These 
soldiers, with notable exceptions, discharged their duty 
to the Austrian Emperor and state conscientiously, ac- 
cording to the terms of their oath. Their disposition 
toward the Italians was not a whit less hostile than was 
that of the common German man against the French and 
the English. Why, then, argued the Italians, accord 
them privileges over the ally who bore the brunt of the 
fight against them? Why even treat the two as equals? 
It may be replied that the bulk of the people were indif- 
ferent and merely carried out orders. Well, the same 
holds good of the average German, } r et he is not being 
spoiled by the victorious World Powers. But the Croats 
and others suddenly became the favorite children of the 
Conference, while the Germans and Teuton-Austrians, 

206 



THE LESSER STATES 

who in the meanwhile had accepted and fulfilled President 
Wilson's conditions for entry into the fellowship of na- 
tions, were n'jt only punished heavily — which was per- 
fectly just — but also disqualified for admission into the 
League, which was inconsistent. 

The root of all the incoherences complained of lay in 
the circumstance that the chiefs of the Great Powere 
had no program, no method; Mr. Wilson's pristine scheme 
would have enabled him to treat the gallant Serbs and 
their Croatian brethren as he desired. But he had failed 
to maintain it against opposition. On the other hand, the 
traditional method of the balnace of power would have 
given Italy all that she could reasonably ask for, but 
Mr. Wilson had partially destroyed it. Nothing re- 
mained then but to have recourse to a tertium quid which 
profoundly dissatisfied both parties and imperiled the 
peace of the world in days to come. And even this make- 
shift the eminent plenipotentiaries were unable to contrive 
single-handed. Their notion of getting the work done 
was to transfer it to missions, commissions, and sub- 
commissions, and then to take action which, as often as 
not, ran counter to the recommendations of these selected 
agents. Oddly enough, none of these bodies received 
adequate directions. To take a concrete example: a 
central commission was appointed to deal with the Polish 
frontier problems, a second commission under M. Jules 
Cambon had to study the report on the Polish Delimita- 
tion question, but although often consulted, it was seldom 
listened to. Then there was a third commission, which 
also did excellent work to very little purpose. Now all 
the questions which formed the subjects of their in- 
quiries might be approached from various sides. There 
were historical frontiers, ethnographical frontiers, political 
and strategical and linguistic frontiers. And this does not 
exhaust the list. Among all these, then, the commis- 

207 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

sioners had to choose their field of investigation as the 
spirit moved them, without any guidance from the 
Supreme Council, which presumably did not know what 
it wanted. 

As an example of the Council's unmethodical procedure, 
and of its slipshod way of taclding important work, the 
following brief sketch of a discussion which was intended 
to be decisive and final, but ended in mere waste of time, 
may be worth recording. The topic mooted was dis- 
armament. The Anglo-Saxon plenipotentiaries, feeling 
that they owed it to their doctrines and their peoples to 
ease the military burdens of the latter and lessen tempta- 
tions to acts of violence, favored a measure by which 
armaments should be reduced forthwith. The Italian 
delegates had put forward the thesis, which was finally ac- 
cepted, that if Austria, for instance, was to be forbidden 
to keep more than a certain number of troops under arms, 
the prohibition should be extended to all the states of 
which Austria had been composed, and that in all these 
cases the ratio between the population and the army 
should be identical. Accordingly, the spokesmen of the 
various countries interested were summoned to take 
cognizance of the decision and intimate their readiness 
to conform to it. 

M. Paderewski listened respectfully to the decree, and 
then remarked: "According to the accounts received 
from the French military authorities, Germany still has 
three hundred and fifty thousand soldiers in Silesia." 
"No," corrected M. Clemenceau, "only three hundred 
thousand." "I accept the correction," replied the Polish 
Premier. "The difference, however, is of no importance 
to my contention, which is that according to the symptoms 
reported we Poles may have to fight the Germans and to 
wage the conflict single-handed. As you know, we have 
other military work on hand. I need only mention our 

208 



THE LESSER STATES 

strife with the Bolsheviki. If we are deprived of effective 
means of self-defense, on the one hand, and told to expect 
no help from the Allies, on the other hand, the consequence 
will be what every intelligent observer foresees. Now 
three hundred thousand Germans is no trifle to cope with. 
If we confront them with an inadequate force and are 
beaten, what then?" "Undoubtedly," exclaimed M. 
Clemenceau, "if the Germans were victorious in the east 
of Europe the Allies would have lost the war. And that 
is a perspective not to be faced." 

M. Bratiano spoke next. "We too," he said, "have to 
fight the Bolsheviki on more than one front. This strug- 
gle is one of life and death to us. But it concerns, if only 
in a lesser degree, all Europe, and we are rendering ser- 
vices to the Great Powers by the sacrifices we thus offer 
up. Is it desirable, is it politic, to limit our forces without 
reference to these redoubtable tasks which await them? 
Is it not incumbent on the Powers to allow these states 
to grow to the dimensions required for the discharge of 
their functions?" "What you advance is true enough 
for the moment," objected M. Clemenceau; "but you 
forget that our limitations are not to be applied at once. 
We fix a term after the expiry of which the strength of the 
armies will be reduced. We have taken all the circum- 
stances into account." "Are you prepared to affirm," 
queried the Rumanian Minister, "that you can estimate 
the time with sufficient precision to warrant our risking 
the existence of our country on your forecast?" "The 
danger will have completely disappeared," insisted the 
French Premier, "by January, 1921." "I am truly 
glad to have this assurance," answered M. Bratiano, 
"for I doubt not that you are quite certain of what you 
advance, else you would not stake the fate of your eastern 
allies on its correctness. But as we who have not been 
told the grounds on which you base this calculation are 

209 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

asked to manifest our faith in it by incurring the heaviest 
conceivable risks, would it be too much to suggest that 
the Great Powers should show their confidence in their 
own forecast by guaranteeing that if by the insurgence 
of unexpected events they proved to be mistaken and 
Rumania were attacked, they would give us prompt and 
adequate military assistance?" To this appeal there 
was no affirmative response; whereupon M. Bratiano 
concluded: "The limitation of armaments is highly 
desirable. No people is more eager for it than ours. 
But it has one limitation which must, I venture to think, 
be respected. So long as you have a restive or dubious 
neighbor, whose military forces are subjected neither to 
limitation nor control, you cannot divest yourself of your 
own means of self-defense. That is our view of the matter. " 
Months later the same difficulty cropped up anew, this 
time in a concrete form, and was dealt with by the 
Supreme Council in its characteristic manner. Toward 
the end of August Rumania's doings in Hungary and her 
alleged designs on the Banat alarmed and angered the 
delegates, whose authority was being flouted with impun- 
ity; and by way of summarily terminating the scandal 
and preventing unpleasant surprises M. Clemenceau 
proposed that all further consignments of arms to 
Rumania should cease. Thereupon Italy's chief repre- 
sentative, Signor Tittoni, offered an amendment. He 
deprecated, he said, any measure leveled specially against 
Rumania, all the more that there existed already an 
enactment of the old Council of Four limiting the arma- 
ments of all the lesser states. The Military Council of 
Versailles, having been charged with the study of this 
matter, had reached the conclusion that the Great Powers 
should not supply any of the governments with war ma- 
terial. Signor Tittoni was of the opinion, therefore, that 
those conclusions should now be enforced. 

2IO 



THE LESSER STATES 

The Council thereupon agreed with the Italian delegate, 
and passed a resolution to supply none of the lesser 
countries with war material. And a few minutes later 
it passed another resolution authorizing Germany to 
cede part of her munitions and war material to Czecho- 
slovakia and some more to General Yudenitch! x 

When the commissions to which all the complex 
problems had to be referred were being first created, 2 
the lesser states were allowed only five representatives 
on the Financial and Economic commissions, and were 
bidden to elect them. The nineteen delegates of these 
states protested on the ground that this arrangement 
would not give them sufficient weight in the councils by 
which their interests would be discussed. These mal- 
contents were headed by Senhor Epistacio Pessoa, the 
President-elect of the United States of Brazil. The 
Polish delegate, M. Dmowski, addressing the meeting, 
suggested that they should not proceed to an election, 
the results of which might stand in no relation to the 
interests which the states represented had in matters of 
European finance, but that they should ask the Great 
Powers to appoint the delegates. To this the President- 
elect of Brazil demurred, taking the ground that it would 
be undignified for the lesser states to submit to have their 
spokesman nominated by the greater. Thereupon they 
elected five delegates, all of them from South American 
countries, to deal with European finance, leaving the 
Europeans to choose five from among themselves. This 
would have given ten in all to the communities whose 
interests were described as limited, and was an affront 
to the Great Powers. 

This comedy was severely judged and its authors 
reprimanded by the heads of the Conference, who, while 

1 Cf. Corriere delta Sera, August 24, 1919. 

2 In February. 

15 211 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

quashing the elections, relented to the extent of promising 
that extra delegates might be appointed for the lesser 
nations later on. As a matter of fact, the number of 
commissions was of no real consequence, because on all 
momentous issues their findings, unless they harmonized 
with the decisions of the chief plenipotentiaries, were 
simply ignored. 

The curious attitude of the Supreme Council toward 
Rumania may be contemplated from various angles of 
vision. But the safest coign of vantage from which to 
look at it is that formed by the facts. 

Rumania's grievances were many, and they began at 
the opening of the Conference, when she was refused more 
than two delegates as against the five attributed to each 
of the Great Powers and three each for Serbia and Bel- 
gium, whose populations are numerically inferior to hers. 
Then her treaty with Great Britain, France, and Russia, 
on the strength of which she entered the war, was upset 
by its more powerful signatories as soon as the frontier 
question was mooted at the Conference. Further, the 
existence of the Rumanian delegation was generally 
ignored by the Supreme Council. Thus, when the treaty 
with Germany was presented to Count von Brockdorff- 
Rantzau, a mere journalist 1 at the Conference possessed 
a complete copy, whereas the Rumanian delegation, 
headed by the Prime Minister Bratiano, had cognizance 
only of an incomplete summary. When the fragmentary 
treaty was drafted for Austria, the Rumanian delegation 
saw the text only on the evening before the presentation, 
and, noticing inacceptable clauses, formulated reserva- 
tions. These reservations were apparently acquiesced in 
by the members of the Supreme Council. That, at any 
rate, was the impression of MM. Bratiano and Misu. 

J Cf. Chapter, "Censorship and Secrecy." The writer of these pages 
was the journalist. 

212 



THE LESSER STATES 

But on the following day, catching a glimpse of the draft, 
they discovered that the obnoxious provisions had been 
left intact. Then they lodged their reserves in writing, 
but to no purpose. One of the obligations imposed on 
Rumania by the Powers was a promise to accept in ad- 
vance any and every measure that the Supreme Council 
might frame for the protection of minorities in the coun- 
try, and for further restricting the sovereignty of the state 
in matters connected with the transit of Allied goods. 
And, lastly, the Rumanians complained that the action of 
the Supreme Council was creating a dangerous ferment in 
the Dobrudja, and even in Transylvania, where the Saxon 
minority, which had willingly accepted Rumanian sway, 
was beginning to agitate against it. In Bessarabia the 
non-Rumanian elements of the population were fiercely 
opposing the Rumanians and invoking the support of the 
Peace Conference. The cardinal fact which, in the judg- 
ment of the Rumanians, dominated the situation was the 
quasi ultimatum presented to them in the spring, when 
they were summoned unofficially and privately to grant 
industrial concessions to a pushing body of financiers, or 
else to abide by the consequences, one of which, they were 
told, would be the loss of America's active assistance. 
They had elected to incur the threatened penalty after 
having carefully weighed the advantages and disadvan- 
tages of laying the matter before President Wilson him- 
self, and inquiring officially whether the action in question 
was — as they felt sure it must be — in contradiction with 
the President's east European policy. For it would be 
sad to think that abundant petroleum might have washed 
away many of the tribulations which the Rumanians had 
afterward to endure, and that loans accepted on onerous 
conditions would, as was hinted, have softened the hearts 
of those who had it in their power to render the existence 
of the nation sour or sweet. 1 "Look out," exclaimed a 

213 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Rumanian to me. ' ' You will see that we shall be spurned 
as Laodiceans, or worse, before the Conference is over." 
Rumania's external situation was even more perilous than 
her domestic plight. Situated between Russia and Hun- 
gary, she came more and more to resemble the iron be- 
tween the hammer and the anvil. A well-combined move 
of the two anarchist states might have pulverized her. 
Alive to the danger, her spokesmen in Paris were anxious 
to guard against it, but the only hope they had at the 
moment was centered in the Great Powers, whose delegates 
at the Conference were discharging the functions which 
the League of Nations would be called on to fulfil when- 
ever it became a real institution. And their past experi- 
ence of the Great Powers' mode of action was not calcu- 
lated to command their confidence. It was the Great 
Powers which, for their own behoof and without the 
slightest consideration for the interests of Rumania, had 
constrained that country to declare war against the Cen- 
tral Empires, 2 and had made promises of effective support 
in the shape of Russian troops, war material of every kind, 
officers, and heavy artillery. But neither the promises of 
help nor the assurances that Germany's army of invasion 
would be immobilized were redeemed, and so far as one 
can now judge they ought never to have been made. For 
what actually came to pass — the invasion of the country 
by first-class German armies under Mackensen — might 
easily have been foreseen, and was actually foretold. 3 
The entire country was put to sack, and everything of 
value that could be removed was carried off to Hungary, 
Germany, or Austria. The Allies lavished their verbal 
sympathies on the immolated nation, but did little else 



1 Le Temps, July 8, 191 9. 3 At the close of August, 1916. 

3 1 was one of those who at the time maintained that even in the Allies' 
interests Rumania ought not to enter the war at that conjuncture, and an. 
ticipation of that invasion was one of the reasons I adduced. 

214 



THE LESSER STATES 

to succor it, and want and misery and disease played havoc 
with the people. 

After the armistice things became worse instead of 
better. The Hungarians were permitted to violate the 
conditions and keep a powerful army out of all proportion 
to the area which they were destined to retain, and as the 
Allies disposed of no countering force in eastern Europe, 
their commands were scoffed at by the Budapest Cabinet. 
In the spring of 1919 the Bolshevists of Hungary waxed 
militant and threatened the peace of Rumania, whose 
statesmen respectfully sued for permission to occupy cer- 
tain commanding positions which would have enabled 
their armies to protect the land from invasion. But the 
Duumviri in Paris negatived the request. They fancied 
that they understood the situation better than the people 
on the spot. Thereupon the Bolshevists, ever ready for 
an opportunity, seized upon the opening afforded them by 
the Supreme Council, attacked the Rumanians, and in- 
vaded their territory. Nothing abashed, the two Anglo- 
Saxon statesmen comforted M. Bratiano and his colleagues 
with the expression of their regret and the promise that 
tranquillity would not again be disturbed. The Supreme 
Council would see to that. But this promise, like those 
that preceded it, was broken. 

The Rumanians went so far as to believe that the 
Supreme Council either had Bolshevist leanings or under- 
went secret influences — perhaps unwittingly — the nature 
of which it was not easy to ascertain. In support of these 
theories they urged that when the Rumanians were on 
the very point of annihilating the Red troops of Kuhn, 
it was the Supreme Council which interposed its authority 
to save them, and did save them effectually, when noth- 
ing else could have done it. That Kuhn was on the point 
of collapsing was a matter of common knowledge. A 
radio-telegram flashed from Budapest by one of his 

215 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

lieutenants contained this significant avowal: "He 
[Kuhn] has announced that the Hungarian forces are in 
flight. The troops which occupied a good position at the 
bridgehead of Gomi have abandoned it, carrying with 
them the men who were doing their duty. In Budapest 
preparations are going forward for equipping fifteen 
workmen's battalions." In other words, the downfall 
of Bolshevism had begun. The Rumanians were on the 
point of achieving it. Their troops on the bank of the 
river Tisza l were preparing to march on Budapest. 
And it was at that critical moment that the world-arbiters 
at the Conference who had anathematized the Bolshevists 
as the curse of civilization interposed their authority 
and called a halt. If they had solid grounds for interven- 
ing they were not avowed. M. Clemenceau sent for 
M. Bratiano and vetoed the march in peremptory terms 
which did scant justice to the services rendered and the 
sacrifices made by the Rumanian state. Secret arrange- 
ments, it was whispered, had been come to between agents 
of the Powers and Kuhn. At the time nobody quite 
understood the motive of the sudden change of disposition 
evinced by the Allies toward the Magyar Bolshevists. 
For it was assumed that they still regarded the Bolshevist 
leaders as outlaws. One explanation was that they ob- 
jected to allow the Rumanian army alone to occupy the 
Hungarian capital. But that would not account for their 
neglect to despatch an Inter- Allied contingent to restore 
order in the city and country. For they remained abso- 
lutely inactive while Kuhn's supporters were rallying 
and consolidating their scattered and demoralized forces, 
and they kept the Rumanians from balking the Bolshevist 
work of preparing another attack. As one of their 
French critics 2 remarked, they dealt exclusively in nega- 

1 Also known by the German name of Theiss. 

2 Cf. Le Temps, July 28, 1919. 

216 



THE LESSER STATES 

tives — some of them pernicious enough, whereas a posi- 
tive policy was imperatively called for. To reconstruct a 
nation, not to say a ruined world, a series of contradictory 
vetoes is hardly sufficient. But another explanation of 
their attitude was offered which gained widespread ac- 
ceptance. It will be unfolded presently. 

The dispersed Bolshevist army, thus shielded, soon re- 
covered its nerve, and, feeling secure on the Rumanian 
front, where the Allies held the invading troops immobil- 
ized, attacked the Slovaks and overran their country. 
For Bolshevism is by nature proselytizing. The Prague 
Cabinet was dismayed. The new-born Czechoslovak 
state was shaken. A catastrophe might, as it seemed, 
ensue at any moment. Rumania's troops were on the 
watch for the signal to resume their march, but it came 
not. The Czechoslovaks were soliciting it prayerfully. 
But the weak-kneed plenipotentiaries in Paris were 
minded to fight, if at all, with weapons taken from a dif- 
ferent arsenal. In lieu of ordering the Rumanian troops 
to march on Budapest, they addressed themselves to the 
Bolshevist leader, Kuhn, summoned him to evacuate the 
Slovak country, and volunteered the promise that they 
would compel the Rumanians to withdraw. This amaz- 
ing line of action was decided on by the secret Council of 
Three without the assent or foreknowledge of the nation 
to whose interests it ran counter and the head of whose 
government was rubbing shoulders with the plenipoten- 
tiaries every day. But M. Bratiano's existence and that 
of his fellow-delegate was systematically ignored. It is 
not easy to fathom the motives that inspired this super- 
cilious treatment of the spokesman of a nation which was 
sacrificing its sons in the service of the Allies as well as 
its own. Personal antipathy, however real, cannot be 
assumed without convincing grounds to have been the 
mainspring. 

217 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

But there was worse than the contemptuous treatment 
of a colleague who was also the chief Minister of a 
friendly state. If an order was to be given to the Ru- 
manian government to recall its forces from the front 
which they occupied, elementary courtesy and political 
tact as well as plain common sense would have suggested 
its being communicated, in the first instance, to the 
chief of that government — who was then resident in 
Paris — -as head of his country's delegation to the Con- 
ference. But that was not the course taken. The states- 
men of the Secret Council had recourse to the radio, and, 
without consulting M. Bratiano, despatched a message 
"to the government in Bucharest" enjoining on it the 
withdrawal of the Rumanian army. For they were 
minded scrupulously to redeem their promise to the Bol- 
shevists. One need not be a diplomatist to realize the 
amazement of "the Rumanian government" on receiving 
this abrupt behest. The feelings of the Premier, 
when informed of these underhand doings, can readily 
be imagined. And it is no secret that the temper of a 
large section of the Rumanian people was attuned by these 
petty freaks to sentiments which boded no good to the 
cause for which the Allies professed to be working. In 
September M. Bratiano was reported as having stig- 
matized the policy adopted by the Conference toward 
Rumania as being of a "malicious and dangerous 
character." 1 

The frontier to which the troops were ordered to with- 
draw had, as we saw, just been assigned to Rumania 2 
without the assent of her government, and with a degree 
of secrecy and arbitrariness that gave deep offense, not 
only to her official representatives, but also to those 
parliamentarians and politicians who from genuine at- 

1 Cf. The Daily Mail (Paris edition), September 5, 1919. 

2 On June 13, 1919. 

2iS 



THE LESSER STATES 

tachment or for peace' sake were willing to go hand in 
hand with the Entente. "If one may classify the tree 
by its fruits," exclaimed a Rumanian statesman in my 
hearing, "the great Three are unconscious Bolshevists. 
They are undermining respect for authority, tradition, 
plain, straightforward dealing, and, in the case of Ru- 
mania, are behaving as though their staple aim were to 
detach our nation from France and the Entente. And 
this aim is not unattainable. The Rumanian people 
were heart and soul with the French, but the bonds which 
were strong a short while ago are being weakened among 
an influential section of the people, to the regret of all 
Rumanian patriots." 

The answer given by the "Rumanian government in 
Bucharest " to the peremptory order of the Secret Council 
was a reasoned refusal to comply. Rumania, taught by 
terrible experience, declined to be led once more into 
deadly peril against her own better judgment. Her 
statesmen, more intimately acquainted with the Hun- 
garians than were Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Wilson, and M. 
Clemenceau, required guaranties which could be supplied 
only by armed forces — Rumanian or Allied. Unless and 
until Hungary received a government chosen by the 
free will of the people and capable of offering guaranties 
of good conduct, the troops must remain where they were. 
For the line which they occupied at the moment could be 
defended with four divisions, whereas the new one could 
not be held by less than seven or eight. The Council 
was therefore about to commit another fateful mistake, 
the consequences of which it was certain to shift to the 
shoulders of the pliant people. It was then that Rumania's 
leaders kicked against the pricks. 

To return to the dispute between Bucharest and Paris : 
the Rumanian government would have been willing to 
conform to the desire of the Supreme Council and with- 

219 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

draw its troops if the Supreme Council would only make 
good its assurance and guarantee Rumania effectually 
from future attacks by the Hungarians. The proviso 
was reasonable, and as a measure of self-defense impera- 
tive. The safeguard asked for was a contingent of Allied 
force. But the two supreme councilors in Paris dealt 
only in counters. All they had to offer to M. Bratiano 
were verbal exhortations before the combat and lip- 
sympathy after defeat, and these the Premier rejected. 
But here, as in the case of the Poles, the representatives 
of the "Allied and Associated" Powers insisted. They 
were profuse of promises, exhortations, and entreaties 
before passing to threats — of guaranties they said nothing 
—but the Rumanian Premier, turning a deaf car to 
cajolery and intimidation, remained inflexible. For he 
was convinced that their advice was often vitiated by 
gross ignorance and not always inspired by disinterested- 
ness, while the orders they issued were hardly more than 
the vclleities of well-meaning gropers in the dark who 
lacked the means of executing them. 

The eminent plenipotentiaries, thus set at naught by a 
little state, ruminated on the embarrassing situation. 
In all such cases their practice had been to resign them- 
selves to circumstances if they proved unable to bend 
circumstances to their schemes. It was thus that Presi- 
dent Wilson had behaved when British statesmen declined 
even to hear him on the subject of the freedom of the 
seas, when M. Clcmenceau refused to accept a peace 
that denied the Saar Valley and a pledge of military 
assistance to France, and when Japan insisted on the 
retrocession of Shantung. Toward Italy an attitude of 
firmness had been assumed, because owing to her economic 
dependence on Britain and the United States she could 
not indulge in the luxury of nonconformity. Hence the 
plenipotentiaries, and in particular Mr. Wilson, asserted 

220 



THE LESSER STATES 

their will inexorably and were painfully surprised that 
one of the lesser states had the audacity to defy it. 

The circumstance that after their triumph over Italy 
the world's trustees were thus publicly flouted by a little 
state of eastern Europe was gall and wormwood to them. 
It was also a menace to the cause with which they were 
identified. None the less, they accepted the inevitable 
for the moment, pitched their voices in a lower key, and 
decided to approve the Rumanian thesis that Neo-Bol- 
shevism in Hungary must be no longer bolstered up, 1 
but be squashed vicariously. They accordingly invited 
the representatives of the three little countries on which 
the honor of waging these humanitarian wars in the 
anarchist east of Europe was to be conferred, and sounded 
them as to their willingness to put their soldiers in the 
field, and how many as to the numbers available. M. 
Bratiano offered eight divisions. The Czechoslovaks did 
not relish the project, but after some delay and fencing 
around agreed to furnish a contingent, whereas the Jugo- 
slavs met the demand with a plain negative, which was 
afterward changed to acquiescence when the Council 
promised to keep the Italians from attacking them. As 
things turned out, none but the Rumanians actually 
fought the Hungarian Reds. Meanwhile the members 
of the American, British, and Italian missions in Hungary 
endeavored to reach a friendly agreement with the 
criminal gang in Budapest. 

The plan of campaign decided on had Marshal Foch 
for its author. It was, therefore, business-like. He de- 
manded a quarter of a million men, 2 to which it was 
decided that Rumania should contribute 120,000, Jugo- 
slavia 50,000, and Czechoslovakia as many as she could 



1 On July 11, 19 19, some days later, the decision was suspended, owing to 
the opinion of General Bliss, who disagreed with Foch. 

2 On July 17, 1919. 

221 



THE. INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

conveniently afford. But the day before the preparations 
were to have begun, 1 Bela Kuhn flung his troops 2 against 
the Rumanians with initial success, drove them across the 
Tisza with considerable loss, took up commanding posi- 
tions, and struck dismay into the members of the Su- 
preme Council. 1 he Semitic Dictator, with grim humor, 
explained to the crestfallen lawgivers, who were once 
more at fault, that a wanton breach of the peace was alien 
to his thoughts; that, on the contrary, his motive for 
action deseived high praise — it was to compel the rebel- 
lious Rumanians to obey the behest of the Conference 
and withdraw to their frontiers. The plenipotentiaries 
bore this gibe with dignity, and decided to have recourse 
once more to their favorite, and, indeed, only method — 
the despatch of exhortative telegrams. Of more effica- 
cious means they were destitute. This time their message, 
which lacked a definite address, was presumably intended 
for the anti-Bolshevist population of Hungary, whom it 
indirectly urged to overthrow the Kuhn Cabinet and 
receive the promised reward — namely, the privilege of en- 
tering into formal relations with the Entente and sign- 
ing the death-warrant of the Magyar state. It is not 
easy to see how this solution alone could have enabled the 
Supreme Council to establish normal conditions and tran- 
quillity in the land. But the Duumvirate seemed utterly 
incapable of devising a coherent policy for central or 
eastern Europe. Even when Hungary had a government 
friendly to the Entente they never obtained any advantage 
from it. They had had no use for Count Karolyi. They 
had allowed things to slip and slide, and permitted — nay, 
helped — Bolshevism to thrive, although they had brand- 
marked it as a virulent epidemic to be drastically stamped 
out. Temper, education, and training disqualified them 

1 On July 20th. 

2 Estimated at 85,000. 

222 



THE LESSER STATES 

for seizing oppoitunity and pressing the levers that stood 
ready to their hand. 

In consequence of the vacillation of the two chiefs, who 
seldom stood firm in the face of difficulties, the members 
of the predatory gang which concealed its alien origin 
under Magyar nationality and its criminal propensities * 
under a political mask had been enabled to go on playing 
an odious comedy, to the disgust of sensible people and 
the detriment of the new and enlarged states of Europe. 
For the cost of the Supreme Council's weakness had to 
be paid in blood and substance, little though the two dele- 
gates appeared to realize this. The extent to which the 
ruinous process was carried out would be incredible were 
it not established by historic facts and documents. 

The permanent agents of the Powers in Hungary, 2 pre- 
ferring conciliation to force, now exhorted the Hunga- 
rians to rid themselves of Kuhn and promised in return 
to expel the Rumanians from Hungarian territory once 
more and to have the blockade raised. At the close of 
July some Magyars from Austria met Kuhn at a frontier 
station 3 and strove to persuade him to withdraw quietly 
into obscurity, but he, confiding in the policy of the Allies 
and his star, scouted the suggestion. It was at this junc- 
ture that the Rumanians, pushing on to Budapest, re- 
solved, come what might, to put an end to the intolerable 
situation and to make a clean job of it once for all. And 
they succeeded. 

For Rumania's initial military reverse 4 was the result 



1 Moritz Kuhn, who altered his name to Bela Kuhn, was a vulgar crimi- 
nal. Expelled from school for larceny, he underwent several terms of 
imprisonment, and is alleged to have pilfered from a fellow-prisoner. Even 
among some thieves there is no honor. 

2 Italy was represented by Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli, who resided in 
Budapest; Britain, by Col. Sir Thomas Cunningham, who was in Vienna, 
as was also Prince Livio Borghese. Later on the Powers delegated generals 
to he members of a military mission to the Hungarian capital. 

3 At Bruck. * On July 20th. 

223 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of a surprise attack by some eighty thousand men. But 
her troops rapidly regained their warlike spirit, recrossed 
the river Tisza, shattered the Neo-Bolshevist regime, and 
reached the environs of Budapest . 

By the ist of August the lawless band that was ruining 
the country relinquished the reins of power, which were 
taken over at first by a Socialist Cabinet of which an in- 
fluential French press organ wrote: "The names of the 
new . . . commissaries of the people tell us nothing, because 
their bearers are unknown. But the endings' of their 
names tell us that most of them are, like those of the pre- 
ceding government, of Jewish origin. Never since the 
inauguration of official communism did Budapest better 
deserve the appellation of Judapest, which was assigned 
to it by the late M. Lueger, chief of the Christian Socialists 
of Vienna. That is an additional trait in common with 
the Russian Soviets." ' 

The Rumanians presented a stiff ultimatum to the new 
Hungarian Cabinet. They were determined to safeguard 
their country and its neighbors from a repetition of the 
danger and of the sacrifices it entailed ; in other words, to 
dictate the terms of a new armistice. The Powers de- 
murred and ordered them to content themselves with the 
old one concluded by the Serbian Voyevod Mishitch and 
General Henrys in November of the preceding year and 
violated subsequently by the Magyars. But the objec- 
tions to this course were many and unanswerable. In 
fact they were largely identical with the objections which 
the Supreme Council itself had offered to the Polish- 
Ukrainian armistice. And besides these there were others. 
For example, the Rumanians had had no hand or part in 
drafting the old armistice. Moreover it was clearly in- 
applicable to the fresh campaign which was waged and 
terminated nine months after it had been drawn up. 

1 Le Journal des Debate, August 4, 1919. 

224 



THE LESSER STATES 

Experience had shown that it was inadequate to guarantee 
public tranquillity, for it had not hindered Magyar attacks 
on the Rumanians and Czechoslovaks. The Rumanians, 
therefore, now that they had worsted their adversaries, 
were resolved to disarm them and secure a real peace. 
They decided to leave fifteen thousand troops for the 
maintenance of internal order. 1 Rumania's insistence on 
the delivery of live-stock, corn, agricultural machinery, 
and rolling-stock for railways was, it was argued, necessi- 
tated by want and justified by equity. For it was no 
more than partial reparation for the immense losses wan- 
tonly inflicted on the nation by the Magyars and their 
allies. Until then no other amends had been made or 
even offered. The Austrians, Hungarians, and Germans, 
during their two years' occupation of Rumania, had seized 
and carried off from the latter country two million five 
hundred thousand tons of wheat and hundreds of thou- 
sands of head of cattle, besides vast quantities of clothing, 
wool, skins, and raw material, while thousands of Ru- 
manian homes were gutted and their contents taken away 
and sold in the Central Empires. Factories were stripped 
of their machinery and the railways of their engines and 
wagons. When Mackensen left there remained in Ru- 
mania only fifty locomotives out of the twelve hundred 
which she possessed before the war. The material, there- 
fore, that Rumania removed from Hungary during the 
first weeks of the occupation represented but a small 
part of the quantities of which she had been despoiled 
during the war. 

It was further urged that at the beginning the Ru- 
manian delegates would have contented themselves with 
reparation for losses wantonly inflicted and for the 
restitution of the property wrongfully taken from them 

^This is a larger proportion than was left to the Germans by the Treaty 
of Versailles. 

225 



THE INSIDE STORY OF YUV PEACE CONFERENCE 

by their enemies, on the lines on which France had ob- 
tained this offset. They had asked for this, but wi 
informed that their request could not be complied with. 

They were not even permitted to send a representative 
to Germany to point out to the Inter-Allied authorities 
the objects of which their nation had been robbed, as 
though the plunderers would voluntarily give up their 

ill-gotten stores! It was partly because of these re- 
gions that the Rumanian authorities resolved to take 
what belonged to thetu without more ado. And they 
could not. they said, afford to wait, because they were 
expecting an attack by the Russian Polsheviki and it 
behooved them to have done with one foe before taking 
on another. These explanations irritated in lieu of ealm- 

, the Supreme Council. 

"Possibly." wrote the well-informed Temps, "Rumania 
would have been better treated if she had elosed with 
certain proposals of loans on crushing terms or com- 
plied with certain demands for oil concessions." ' Pos- 
sibly. But surely problems of justice, equity, and right 
ought never to have been mixed up with commercial and 
industrial interests, whether with the connivance or by 
the carelessness of the holders of a vast trust who needed 
and should have merited unlimited confidence. It is 
neither easy nor edifying to calculate the harm which 
transactions of this nature, whether completed or merely 
inchoate, are capable of inflicting on the gre.it community 
for whose moral as well as material welfare the Supreme 
Council was laboring in darkness against so many ob- 
stacles of its own creation. Is it surprising that the 
tes which suffered most from these weaknesses of the 
potent delegates should have resented their misdirection 
and endeavored to help themselves as best they could? 
It may be blameworthy and anti-social, but it is un- 

1 L( r«mfiS t July S, ion.). 



THE LESSER STATES 

happily natural and almost unavoidable. It : 

to b tted that the art of stimulating the nations — 

about which the delegates were so solicitous — to enthusi- 
astic readines - <r > accept the Council as the "moral guide 
of the v/orld " should have been exercised in such bungling 

fashion. 

The Supreme Council then feeling impel! ssert 

nity against the wilfulness of a small nation de- 
cided on ignoring alike the service and the disservice 
rendered by Rumania's action. Accordingly, it pro 
without reference to any of the recent events except the 
disappearance of the Bolshevist gang. Four generals were 
accordingly told off to take the conduct of Hungarian 
affairs into their hands despite their ignorance of the 
iitions of the problem. 1 They were ordered to 
disarm the Magyars, to deliver up Hungary's war material 
to the Allies, of whom only the Rumanians and the 
Czechoslovaks had taken the field against the enemy 
since the conclusion of the armistice the year before, and 
they were also to exercise their authority over the Ru- 
manian victors and the Serbs, both of whom occupied 
Hungarian territory. The Temps significantly remarked 
that the Supreme Council, while not wishing to deal with 
any Hungarian government but one qualified to repre- 
sent the country, "seems particularly eager to see re- 
sumed the importation of foreign wares into Hungary. 
Certain persons appear to fear that Rumania, by retaking 
from the Magyars wagons and engines, might check the 
resumption of this traffic." 2 

What it all came to was that the Great Powers, who had 
left Rumania to her fate when she was attacked by the 
Magyars, intervened the moment the assailed nation, 



1 It was the habitual practice of the Conference to intrust missions abroad 
to generals who knew nothing whatever about the countries to which they 
were sent. 2 Le Tempi, August 8, 1919. 

1C 22 7 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

helping itself, got the better of its enemy, and then they 
resolved to balk it of the fruits of victory and of the 
safeguards it would fain have created for the future. 
It was to rely upon the Supreme Council once more, to 
take the broken reed for a solid staff. That the Powers 
had something to urge in support of their interposition 
will not be denied. They rightly set forth that Rumania 
was not Hungary's only creditor. Her neighbors also 
possessed claims that must be satisfied as far as feasible, 
and equity prompted the pooling of all available assets. 
This plea could not be refuted. But the credit which the 
pleaders ought to have enjoyed in the eyes of the Ru- 
manian nation was so completely sapped by their ante- 
cedents that no heed was paid to their reasoning, suasion, 
or promises. 

Rumania, therefore, in requisitioning Hungarian prop- 
erty was formally in the wrong. On the other hand, it 
should be borne in mind that she, like other nations, 
was exasperated by the high-handed action of the Great 
Powers, who proceeded as though her good-will and loy- 
alty were of no consequence to the pacification of east- 
ern Europe. 

After due deliberation the Supreme Council agreed upon 
the wording of a conciliatory message, not to the Ru- 
manians, but to the Magyars, to be despatched to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Romanelli. The gist of it was the old 
refrain, "to carry out the terms of the armistice * and 
respect the frontiers traced by the Supreme Council 2 
and we will protect you from the Rumanians, who have 
no authority from us. We are sending forthwith an In- 
ter-Allied military commission 3 to superintend the dis- 
armament and see that the Rumanian troops withdraw." 

1 Armistice of November 13, 1918, which had become void. 

2 On June 13, 1919. 

3 Composed of four members, one each for Britain, the United States, 
France, and Italy. 

22S 



THE LESSER STATES 

It cannot be denied that the Rumanian conditions were 
drastic. But it should be remembered that the provoca- 
tion amounted almost to justification. And as for the 
crime of disobedience, it will not be gainsaid that a large 
part of the responsibility fell on the shoulders of the law- 
givers in Paris, whose decrees, coming oracularly from 
Olympian heights without reference to local or other 
concrete circumstances, inflicted heavy losses in blood 
and substance on the ill-starred people of Rumania. And 
to make matters worse, Rumania's official representatives 
at the Conference had been not merely ignored, but repri- 
manded like naughty school-children by a harsh dominie 
and occasionally humiliated by men whose only excuse was 
nervous tenseness in consequence of overwork combined 
with morbid impatience at being contradicted in matters 
which they did not understand. Other states had con- 
templated open rebellion against the big ferrule of the 
"bosses," and more than once the resolution was taken 
to go on strike unless certain concessions were accorded 
them. Alone the Rumanians executed their resolve. 

Naturally the destiny-weavers of peoples and nations 
in Paris were dismayed at the prospect and apprehensive 
lest the Rumanians should end the war in their own way. 
They despatched three notes in quick succession to the 
Bucharest government, one of which reads like a peevish 
indictment hastily drafted before the evidence had been 
sifted or even carefully read. It raked up many of the 
old accusations that had been leveled against the Ruma- 
nians, tacked them on to the crime of insubordination, and 
without waiting for an answer — assuming, in fact, that 
there could be no satisfactory answer — summoned them 
to prove publicly by their acts that they accepted and 
were ready to execute in good faith the policy decided 
upon by the Conference. 1 

1 On July 20th. 

229 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

That note seemed unnecessarily offensive and acted 
on the Rumanians as a powerful irritant, 1 besides exposing 
the active members of the Supreme Council to scathing 

criticism. The Rumanians asked their Entente friends 
in private to outline the policy which they were accused 
of countering, and were told in reply that it was beyond 
the power of the most ingenious hair-splitting casuist 
to define or describe. "As for us," wrote one of the 
Stanchest supporters of the Entente in French journal- 
ism, "who have followed with attention the labors and 
the utterances, written and oral, of the Four, the Five, 
the Ten, of the Supreme and Superior Councils, we have 
not yet succeeded in discovering what was the 'policy 
decided by the Conference.' We have indeed heard or 
read countless discourses pronounced by the choir-masters. 
They abound in noble thought, in eloquent expositions. 
in protests, and in promises. Rut of aught that could 
be termed a policy we have not found a trace."- This 
verdict will be indorsed by the historian. 

The Rumanians seemed in no hurry 10 reply to the 
Council's three notes. They were said to be too busy 
dealing out what they considered rough and ready justice 
to their enemies, and were impatient of the intervention 
of their "friends." They seized rolling-stock, cattle, 
agricultural implements, and other property of the kind 
that had been stolen from their own people and sent 
the booty home without much ado. Work of this kind 
was certain to be accompanied by excesses and the Con- 
ference received numerous protests from the aggrieved 
inhabitants. But on the whole Rumania, at any rate 
during the first few weeks of the occupation, had the 
substantial sympathy of the largest and most influential 



1 Paris journals ascribed it to Mr. Balfour, although it does not bear the 
hall-mark of a diplomatist. 
- Lc Journal des DSbats, August 13, 1019. 

»3° 



THE LESSER STATES 

section of the world's press. People declared that they 
were glad to see the haze of self righteousness and cant at 
last dispelled by a whiff of wholesome egotism. Prom the 
outspoken comments of the most widely circulating 
journals in Prance and Britain the dictators in Paris, 
who were indignant that the counsels of the strong should 
carry so little weight i t i eastern Europe, could acquaint 
themselves with the impression which their efforts at 
cosmic legislation wen; producing among the saner ele- 
ments of mankind. 

In almost every language one could read words of 
encouragement to the recalcitrant Rumanians for having 
boldly hurst the irksome bonds in which the peoples of 
the world were being pinioned. "It is our view," wrote 
one firm adherent of the Entente, "that having proved 
incapable of protecting the Rumanians in their hour of 
danger, our alliance cannot to-day challenge the safe- 
guards which they have won for themselves." 1 

"If liberty had her old influence," one read in another 
popular journal,- "the Great Powers would not be bring- 
ing pressure to bear on Rumania with the object of saving 
Hungary from richly deserved punishment." "Instead 
of nagging the Rumanians," wrote an eminent French 
publicist, "they would do much better to keep the Turks 
in hand. If the Turks in despair, in order to win Ameri- 
can sympathies, proclaim themselves socialists, syndi- 
calists, or laborists, will President Wilson permit them to 
renovate Armenia and other places after the manner of 
Jinghiz Khan?" '■'- 

But what may have weighed with the Supreme Council 
far more than the disapproval of publicists were its own 
impotence, the undignified figure it was cutting, and the 



1 IVrtinax in L' Echo de Paris, August 10, 1919. 

3 The Nr.w York Herald (Paris edition), August 10, 1919. 
3 Lc Journal des Utbats, August 13, 1919. Article by Auguste Gauvain. 

231 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

injury that was being done to the future League of Nations 
by the impunity with which one of the lesser states 
could thus set at naught the decisions of its creators and 
treat them with almost the same disrespect which they 
themselves had displayed toward the Rumanian delegates 
in Paris. They saw that once their energetic representa- 
tions were ignored by the Bucharest government they 
were at the end of their means of influencing it. To 
compel obedience by force was for the time being out 
of the question. In these circumstances the only issue 
left them was to make a virtue of necessity and veer round 
to the Rumanian point of view as unobtrusively as might 
be, so as to tide over the transient crisis. And that was 
the course which they finally struck out. 

Matters soon came to the culminating point. The 
members of the Allied Military Mission had received full 
powers to force the commanders of the troops of occupa- 
tion to obey the decisions of the Conference, and when 
they were confronted with M. Diamandi, the ex-Minister 
to Petrograd. they issued their orders in the name of the 
Supreme Council. "We take orders here only from our 
own government, which is in Bucharest." was the answer 
they received. The Rumanians have a proverb which 
runs: "Even a donkey will not fall twice into the same 
quicksand," and they may have quoted it to General 
Gorton when refusing to follow the Allies after their 
previous painful experience. Then the mission tele- 
graphed to Paris for further instructions. 1 In the mean- 
while the Rumanian government had sent its answer to 
the three notes of the Council. And its tenor was firm 
and unyielding. Undeterred by menaces. M. Bratiano 
maintained that he had done the right thing in sending 
troops to Budapest, imposing terms on Hungary and 
re-establishing order. As a matter of fact he had rendered 

1 General Gorton is the one who is said to have despatched the telegram. 



THE LESSER STATES 

a sterling service to all Europe, including France and 
Britain. For if Kuhn and his confederates bad contrived 
to overrun Rumania, the Great Powers would have been 
morally hound to hasten to the assistance of their defeated 
ally. The press was permitted to announce that the 
Council of Five wa:; preparing to accept the Rumanian 
position. The members of the Allied Military Mission were 
informed that they were not empowered to give orders 
to the Rumanians, ?jut only to consult and negotiate 
with them, whereby all their tact and consideration were 
earnestly solicited. 

Bat the palliatives devised by the delegates were un- 
availing to heal the breach. After a while the Council, 
having had no answer to its urgent notes, decided to send 
an ultimatum to Rumania, calling on her to restore the 
rolling-stock which she had seized and to evacuate the 
Hungarian capital. The terms of this document were 
described as harsh. 1 Happily, before it was despatched 
the Council learned that the Rumanian government had 
never received the communications nor seventy others 
forwarded by wireless during the same period. Once 
more it had taken a decision without acquainting itself 
of the facts. Thereupon a special messenger 2 was sent 
to Bucharest with a note "couched in stern terms," 
which, however, was "milder in tone" than the ultimatum. 

To go back for a moment to the elusive question of 
motive, which was not without influence on Rumania's 
conduct. Were the action and inaction of the plenipo- 
tentiaries merely the result of a lack of cohesion among 
their ideas? Or was it that they were thinking mainly 
of the fleeting interests of the moment and unwilling to 
precipitate their concerjtions of the future in the form 



1 In the beginning of September, 1919. 

2 The French government having prudently refused to furnish an envoy, 
the British chose Sir George Clark. 

233 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEAC1 CONFKRFNCE 

of a constructive policy]' The historian will do well to 
leave their motives to another tribunal arid confine him- 
self to facts, which even when carefully sifted are nu- 
merous and significant enough. 

During the progress of the events just sketched there 
were launched certain interesting accounts of what was 
going on below the surface, which had such impartial and 
well-informed vouchers that the chronicler of the Con- 
ference cannot pass them over in silence. It true, as they 
appear to be. they warrant the belief that two distinct 
elements lay at the root ot the Secret Council's dealings 
with Rumania. One of them was their repugnance to 
her whole system of government, with its survivals of 
feudalism, anti-Semitism, and conservatism. Associated 
with this was, people alleged, a wish to provoke a radical 
and, as they thought, beneficent change in the entire re- 
gime by getting rid of its chiefs. This plan had been suc- 
cessfully tried against MM. Orlando and Sonnino in 
Italy. Their solicitude for this latter aim may have 
been whetted by a personal lack of sympathy for the 
Rumanian delegates, with whom the Anglo-Saxon chiefs 
hardly ever conversed. It was no secret that the Ru- 
manian Premier found it exceedingly difficult to obtain 
an audience of his colleague President Wilson, from whom 
he finally parted almost as much a stranger as when he 
Brst arrived in Paris. 

It may not be amiss to record an instance oi the methods 
of the Supreme Council, tor by putting himself in the place 
of the Rumanian Premier the reader may the more clearly 
understand his frame of mind toward that body. In 
June the troops of Merit:: (or Bela) Kuhn had inflicted a 
severe defeat on the Czechoslavs. Thereupon the Secret 
Council of Four or Five, whose shortsighted action was 
answerable for the reverse, decided to remonstrate with 
him. Accordingly they requested him to desist from the 

?34 



THE LESSER STATES 

offensive. Only then di 1 it occur to them that if he was 
to withdraw hi:; armies behind the frontiers, he must be 
informed where these frontier:; were. They had already 
been determined in secret by the three great State .men, 
who carefully concealed thern not merely from an in- 
quisitive public, but also from the states concerned The 
Rumanian, Jugoslav and Czechoslovak delegates were, 
therefore, as much in the dark on the subject as were rank 
outsiders and enemies. But as soon as circumstances 
forced the hand of all the plenipotentiaries the secret had 
to be confided to them all. 1 The Hungarian Dictator 
pleaded that if his troops had gone out of bounds it was 
because the frontiers were unknown to him. The 
Czechoslovaks respectfully demurred to one of the 
boundaries along the river Ipol which it was difficult to 
justify and easy to rectify. But the Rumanian delega- 
tion, confronted with the map, met the decision with a 
frank protest. For it amounted to the abandonment of 
one of their three vital irreducible claims which they were 
not empowered to renounce. Consequently they felt 
unable to acquiesce in it. But the Supreme Council 
insisted. The second delegate, M. Misu, was in con- 
sequence obliged to start at once for Bucharest to consult 
with the King and the Cabinet and consider what action 
the circumstances called for. In the meantime, the en- 
tire question, and together with it some of the practical 
consequences involved by the tentative solution, remained 
in suspense. 

When certain clauses of the Peace Treaty, which, al- 
though they materially affected Rumania, had been 
drafted without the knowledge of her plenipotentiaries, 
were quite ready, the Rumanian Premier was summoned to 
take cognizance of them. Their tenor surprised and 
irritated him. As he felt unable to assent to them, and 

1 On June io, 1919. 

235 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

as the document was to be presented to the enemy in a 
day or two, he deemed it his duty to mention his objec- 
tions at once. But hardly had he begun when M. 
Clemenceau arose and exclaimed, "M. Bratiano, you are 
here to listen, not to comment." Stringent measures may 
have been considered useful and dictatorial methods in- 
dispensable in default of reasoning or suasion, but it was 
surely incumbent on those who employed them to choose 
a form which would deprive them of their sting or make 
them less personally painful. 

For whatever one may think of the wisdom of the 
policy adopted by the Supreme Council toward the un- 
privileged states, it would be difficult to justify the man- 
ner in which they imposed it. Patience, tact, and suasion 
are indispensable requisites in men who assume the func- 
tions of leaders and guides, yet know that military force 
alone is inadequate to shape the future after their concep- 
tion. The delegates could look only to moral power for 
the execution of their far-reaching plans, yet they spurned 
the means of acquiring it. The best construction one 
can put upon their action will represent it as the wrecking 
of the substance by the form. By establishing a situation 
of force throughout Europe the Council created and sanc- 
tioned the principle that it must be maintained by force. 

But the affronted nations did not stop at this mild criti- 
cism. They assailed the policy itself, cast suspicion on 
the disinterestedness of the motives that inspired it, and 
contributed thereby to generate an atmosphere of dis- 
trust in which the frail organism that was shortly to be 
called into being could not thrive. Contemplated through 
this distorting medium, one set of delegates was taunted 
with aiming at a monopoly of imperialism and the other 
with rank hypocrisy. It is superfluous to remark that 
the idealism and lofty aims of the President of the United 
States were never questioned by the most reckless Ther- 

236 



THE LESSER STATES 

sites. The heaviest charges brought against him were 
weakness of will, exaggerated self-esteem, impatience of 
contradiction, and a naive yearning for something con- 
crete to take home with him, in the shape of a covenant 
of peoples. 

The reports circulating in the French capital respecting 
vast commercial enterprises about to be inaugurated by 
English-speaking peoples and about proposals that the 
governments of the countries interested should facilitate 
them, were destructive of the respect due to statesmen 
whose attachment to lofty ideals should have absorbed 
every other motive in their ethi co-political activity. Thus 
it was affirmed by responsible politicians that an official 
representative of an English-speaking country gave ex- 
pression to the view, which he also attributed to his gov- 
ernment, that henceforth his country should play a much 
larger part in the economic life of eastern Europe than 
any other nation. This, he added, was a conscious aim 
which would be steadily pursued, and to the attainment 
of which he hoped the politicians and their people would 
contribute. So far this, it may be contended, was per- 
fectly legitimate. 

But it was further affirmed, and not by idle quidnuncs, 
that one of Rumania's prominent men had been informed 
that Rumania could count on the good-will and financial 
assistance of the United States only if her Premier gave 
an assurance that, besides the special privileges to be 
conferred on the Jewish minority in his country, he would 
also grant industrial and commercial concessions to cer- 
tain Jewish groups and firms who reside and do business 
in the United States. And by way of taking time by the 
forelock one or more of these firms had already despatched 
representatives to Rumania to study and, if possible, ear- 
mark the resources which they proposed to exploit. 

Now, to expand the trade of one's country is a legiti- 

237 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

mate ambition, and to hold that Jewish firms arc the best 
qualified to develop the resources of Rumania is a tenable 
position. But to mix up any commercial scheme with the 

ethical regeneration of Europe is, to put it mildly, im- 
politic. However unimpeachable the motives of the pro- 
moter of such a project, it is certain to damage both 
causes which he has at heart. But the report does not 
leave the matter here, k goes on to state that a very- 
definite proposal, smacking of an ultimatum, was finally 
presented, which set before the Rumanians two alterna- 
tives from which they were to choose — either the conces- 
sions asked for, which would earn for them the financial 
assistance of the United States, or else no concessions and 
no help. 

At a Conference, the object of which was the uplifting 
of the life of nations from the squalor of sordid ambitions 
backed by brutal force, to ideal aims and moral relation- 
ship, haggling and chaffering such as this seemed wholly 
out of place. It reminded one of "those that sold oxen 
and sheep and doves, and the changers of money sitting" 
in the temple of Jerusalem who were one day driven out 
with "a scourge of small cords." The Rumanians hoped 
that the hucksters in the latter-day temple of peace might 
be got rid of in a similar way; one of them suggested 
boldly asking President Wilson himself to say what he 
thought of the policy underlying the disconcerting pro- 
posal. . . . 

The other alleged element of the Supreme Council's 
attitude needs no qualification. The mystery that en- 
wrapped the orders from the Conference which suddenly 
arrested the march of the Rumanian and Allied troops, 
when they were Hearing Budapest for the purpose of over- 
throwing Bela Kuhn, never perplexed those who claimed 
to possess trustworthy information about the goings-on 
between certain enterprising officers belonging some to 

238 



THE LESSER STATES 

the Allied Army of Occupation and others to the Hun- 
garian forces. One of these transactions is alleged to have 
taken place between Kuhn himself, who is naturally a 
shrewd observer and hard bargain-driver, and a certain 
financial group which for obvious reasons remained name- 
less. The object of the compact was the bestowal on the 
group of concessions in the Banat in return for an under- 
taking that the Bolshevist Dictator would be left in power 
and subsequently honored by an invitation to the Con- 
ference. The plenipotentiaries' command arresting the 
march against Kuhn and their conditional promise to 
summon him to the Conference, dovetail with this con- 
tract. These undeniable coincidences are humiliating. 
The nexus between them was discovered and announced 
before the stipulations were carried out. 

The Banat had been an apple of discord ever since the 
close of hostilities. The country, inhabited chiefly by 
Rumanians, but with a considerable admixture of Magyar 
and Saxon elements, is one of the richest unexploited 
regions in Europe. Its mines of gold, zinc, lead, coal, 
and iron offer an irresistible temptation to pushing capi- 
talists and their governments, who feel further attracted 
by the credible announcement that it also possesses oil 
in quantities large enough to warrant exploitation. It 
was partly in order to possess herself of these abundant 
resources and create an accomplished fact that Serbia, 
who also founded her claim on higher ground, laid hands 
on the administration of the Banat. But the experiment 
was disappointing. The Jugoslavs having failed to main- 
tain themselves there, the bargain just sketched was en- 
tered into by officers of the Hungarian and Allied armies. 
For concession-hunters are not fastidious about the 
nationality or character of those who can bestow what 
they happen to be seeking. 

This stroke of jobbery had political consequences. 

239 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

That was inevitable. For so long as the Banat remained 
in Rumania or Serbian hands it could, not be alienated 
in favor of any foreign group. Therefore secession from 
both those states was a preliminary condition to economic 
alienation. The task was bravely tackled. An "inde- 
pendent republic" was suddenly added to the states of 
Europe. This amazing creation, which fitted in with the 
Balkanizing craze of the moment, was the work of a 
few wire-pullers in which the easy-going inhabitants had 
neither hand nor part. Indeed, they were hardly aware 
that the Republic of the Banat had been proclaimed. 
The amateur state-builders were obliging officers of the 
two armies, and behind them were speculators and 
concession-hunters. It was obvious that the new com- 
munity, as it contained a very small population for an 
independent state, would require a protector. Its spon- 
sors, who had foreseen this, provided for it by promising 
to assign the humanitarian r61e of protectress of the 
Banat Republic to democratic France. And French 
agents were on the spot to approve the arrangement. 
Thus far the story, of which I have given but the merest 
outline. 1 

In this compromising fashion then Bela Kuhn was left 
for the time being in undisturbed power, and none of his 
friends had any fear that he would be driven out by the 
Allies so long as he contrived to hit it off with the Hun- 
garians. Should these turn away from him, however, 
the cosmopolitan financiers, whose cardinal virtues are 
suppleness and adaptability, would readily work with his 
successor, whoever he might be. The few who knew of 
this quickening of high ideals with low intrigue were 
shocked by the light-hearted way in which under the aegis 
of the Conference a discreditable pact was made with the 

1 The actors in this episode were not all officers and civil servants. They 
included some men in responsible positions. 

240 



THE LESSER STATES 

"enemy of the human race," a grotesque regime foisted 
on a simple-minded people without consideration for the 
principle of self-determination, and the very existence of 
the Czechoslovak Republic imperiled. Indeed, for a 
brief while it looked as though the Bolshevist forces of 
the Ukraine and Russia would effect a junction with the 
troops of Bela Kuhn and shatter eastern Europe to shreds. 
To such dangerous extent did the Supreme Council in- 
directly abet the Bolshevist peace-breakers against the 
Rumanians and Czechoslovak allies. 

It was at this conjuncture that a Rumanian friend re- 
marked to me: "The apprehension which our people 
expressed to you some months ago when they rejected 
the demand for concessions has been verified by events. 
Please remember that when striking the balance of 
accounts." 

The fact could not be blinked that in the camp of the 
Allies there was a serious schism. The partizans of the 
Supreme Council accused the Bucharest government of 
secession, and were accused in turn of having misled their 
Rumanian partners, of having planned to exploit them 
economically, of having favored their Bolshevist in- 
vaders, and pursued a policy of blackmail. The rights 
and wrongs of this quarrel had best be left to another 
tribunal. What can hardly be gainsaid is that in a 
general way the Rumanians — and not these alone — were 
implicitly classed as people of a secondary category, who 
stood to gain by every measure for their good which the 
culture-bearers in Paris might devise. These inferior 
nations were all incarnate anachronisms, relics of dark 
ages which had survived into an epoch of democracy and 
liberty, and it now behooved them to readjust themselves 
to that. Their institutions must be modernized, their 
Old World conceptions abandoned, and their people 
taught to imitate the progressive nations of the West. 

241 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

What the populations thought and felt on the subject 
was irrelevant, they being less qualified bo judge what was 
good for them than their self-constituted guides and 
guardians. To the angry voices which their spokesmen 
uplifted no heed need be paid, and passive resistance 
could be overcome by coercion. This modified version 
of Carlyle's doctrine would seem to be at the root of the 
Supreme Council's action toward the lesser nations 
generally and in especial toward Rumania. 

POLAND AND THE SUPREME COUNCIL 

This frequent misdirection by the Supreme Council, 
however one may explain it, created an electric state of 
the political atmosphere among all nations whose interests 
were set down or treated as "limited," and more than 
one of them, as we saw. contemplated striking out a 
policy of passive resistance. As a matter of fact some 
of them timidly adopted it more than once, almost 
always with success and invariably with impunity. It 
was thus that the Czechoslovaks — the most docile of 
them all — disregarding the injunctions of the Conference, 
took possession of contentious territory, 1 and remained 
in possession of it for several months, and that the Jugo- 
slavs occupied a part of the district of Klagenfurt and for 
a long time paid not the slightest heed to the order issued 
by the Supreme Council to evacuate it in favor of the 
Austrians, and that the Poles applied the same tactics to 
eastern Galicia. The story of this last revolt is charac- 
teristic alike of the ignorance and of the weakness of the 
Powers which had assumed the functions of world- 
administrators. During the hostilities between the Ru- 
thenians of Galicia and the Poles the Council, taunted 
by the press with the numerous wars that were being 

1 In Teschen. 

-4- 



THE LESSER STATES 

waged while the world's peace-makers were chatting about 
cosmic politics in the twilight of the Paris conclave, 
issued an imperative order that an armistice must be 
concluded at once. But the Poles appealed to events, 
which swiftly settled the matter as they anticipated. 
Neither the Supreme Council nor the agents it employed 
had a real grasp of the east European situation, or of the 
r61e deliberately assigned to Poland by its French sponsors 
— that of superseding Russia as a bulwark against Ger- 
many in the East — or of the local conditions. Their 
action, as was natural in these circumstances, was a 
sequence of gropings in the dark, of incongruous behests, 
exhortations, and prohibitions which discredited them in 
the eyes of those on whose trust and docility the success 
of their mission depended. 

Consciousness of these disadvantages may have had 
much to do with the rigid secrecy which the delegates 
maintained before their desultory talks ripened into dis- 
cussions. In the case of Poland, as of Rumania, the veil 
was opaque, and was never voluntarily lifted. One day 1 
the members of the Polish delegation, eager to get an 
inkling of what had been arranged by the Council of Four 
about Dantzig, requested M. Clemenceau to apprize them 
at least of the upshot if not of the details. The French 
Premier, who has a quizzing way and a keen sense of 
humor, replied, "On the 26th inst. you will learn the pre- 
cise terms." But Poland's representative insisted and 
pleaded suasively for a hint of what had been settled. 
The Premier finally consented and said, "Tell the Gen- 
eral Secretary of the Conference, M. Dutasta, from me, 
that he may make the desired communication to you." 
The delegate accordingly repaired to M. Dutasta, pre- 
ferred his request, and received this reply: "M. Clemen- 
ceau may say what he likes. His words do not bind the 

^n Friday, April 18, 1919. 
17 243 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Conference. Before I consider myself released from 
secrecy I must have the consent of all his colleagues as 
well. If you would kindly bring me their express authori- 
zation I will communicate the information you demand." 
That closed the incident. 

When the Council finally agreed to a solution, the dele- 
gates were convoked to learn its nature and to make a 
vow of obedience to its decisions. During the first stage 
of the Conference the representatives of the lesser states 
had sometimes been permitted to put questions and pre- 
sent objections. But later on even this privilege was 
withdrawn. The following description of what went on 
may serve as an illustration of the Council's mode of pro- 
cedure. One day the Polish delegation was summoned 
before the Special Commission to discuss an armistice 
between the Ruthenians of Galicia and the Polish Repub- 
lic. The late General Botha, a shrewd observer, whose 
valuable experience of political affairs, having been con- 
fined to a country which had not much in common with 
eastern Europe, could be of little help to him in solving 
the complex problems with which he was confronted, was 
handicapped from the outset. Unacquainted with any 
languages but English and Dutch, the general had to sur- 
mount the additional difficulty of carrying on the con- 
versation through an interpreter. The form it took was 
somewhat as follows: 

"It is the wish of the Supreme Council," the chairman 
began, "that Poland should conclude an armistice with 
the Ruthenians, and under new conditions, the old ones 
having lost their force. 1 Are you prepared to submit your 
proposals ? " " This is a military matter, ' ' replied the Polish 
delegate, "and should be dealt with by experts. One of 
our most competent military authorities will arrive shortly 

1 The Rumanians, on the contrary, had been ordered to keep to the old 
conditions, although they, too, had lost their force. 

344 



THE LESSER STATES 

in Paris with full powers to treat with you on the subject. 
In the meantime, I agree that the old conditions are 
obsolete and must be changed. I can also mention three 
provisos without which no armistice is possible: (i) The 
Poles must be permitted to get into permanent contact 
with Rumania. That involves their occupation of eastern 
Galicia. The principal grounds for this demand are that 
our frontier includes that territory and that the Ruma- 
nians are a law-abiding, pacific people whose interests 
never clash with ours and whose main enemy — Bolshevism 
— is also ours. (2) The Allies shall purge the Ukrainian 
army of the Bolshevists, German and other dangerous 
elements that now pervade it and render peace impossible. 
(3) The Poles must have control of the oil-fields were it 
only because these are now being treated as military re- 
sources and the Germans are receiving from Galicia, which 
contains the only supplies now open to them, all the oil 
they require and are giving the Ruthenians munitions in 
return, thus perpetuating a continuous state of warfare. 
You can realize that we are unwilling to have our oil -fields 
employed to supply our enemies with war material against 
ourselves." General Botha asked, "Would you be satis- 
fied if, instead of occupying all eastern Galicia at once in 
order to get into touch with the Rumanians, the latter 
were to advance to meet you?" "Quite. That would 
satisfy us as a provisional measure." "But now suppose 
that the Supreme Council rejects your three conditions 
— a probable contingency — what course do you propose 
to take?" "In that case our action would be swayed by 
events, one of which is the hostility of the Ruthenians, 
which would necessitate measures of self-defense and the 
use of our army. And that would bring back the whole 
issue to the point where it stands to-day." 1 To the sug- 

1 That is exactly what happened in the end. But the delegates would 
not believe it until it. became an accomplished fact. 

»4S 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

gestions made by the Polish delegate that the question of 
the armistice be referred to Marshal Foch, the answer 
was returned that the Marshal's views carried no authority 
with the Supreme Council. 

General Botha, thereupon adopting an emotional tone, 
said: "I have one last appeal to make to you. It be- 
hooves Poland to lift the question from its present petty 
surroundings and set it in the larger frame of world issues. 
What we are aiming at is the overthrow of militarism and 
the cessation of bloodshed. As a civilized nation Poland 
must surely see eye to eye with the Supreme Council how 
incumbent it is on the Allies to put a stop to the misery 
that warfare has brought down on the world and is now 
inflicting on the populations of Poland and eastern Ga- 
licia." "Truly," replied the Polish delegate, "and so 
thoroughly does she realize it that it is repugnant to her 
to be satisfied with a sham peace, a mere pause during 
which a bloodier war may be organized. We want a 
settlement that really connotes peace, and our intimate 
knowledge of the circumstances enables us to distinguish 
between that and a mere truce. That is the ground of 
our insistence." 

"Bear well in mind," insisted the Boer general, "the 
friendly attitude of the great Allies toward your country 
at a critical period of its history. They restored it. 
They meant and mean to help it to preserve its status. 
It behooves the Poles to show their appreciation of this 
friendship in a practical way by deferring to their wishes. 
Everything they ordain is for your good. Realize that 
and carry out their schemes." "For their help we are 
and will remain grateful," was the answer, "and we 
will go as far toward meeting their wishes as is feasible 
without actually imperiling their contribution to the res- 
toration of our state. But we cannot blink the facts 
that their views are sometimes mistaken and their power 

246 



THE LESSER STATES 

to realize them generally imaginary. They have made 
numerous and costly mistakes already, which they now 
frankly avow. If they persisted in their present plan 
they would be adding another to the list. And as to 
their power to help us positively, it is nil. Their initial 
omission to send a formidable military force to Poland 
was an irreparable blunder, for it left them without an 
executive in eastern Europe, where they now can help 
none of their protegees against their respective enemies. 
Poles, Rumanians, Jugoslavs are all left to themselves. 
From the Allies they may expect inspiriting telegrams, 
but little else. In fact, the utmost they can do is to issue 
decrees that may or may not be obeyed. Examples are 
many. They obtained for us by the armistice the right 
of disembarking troops at Dantzig, and we were un- 
speakably grateful to them. But they failed to make the 
Germans respect that right and we had to resign ourselves 
to abandon it. They ordered the Ukrainians to cease 
their numerous attacks on us and we appreciated their 
thoughtfulness. But the order was disobeyed; we were 
assailed and had no one to look to for help but ourselves. 
Still we are most thankful for all that they could do. 
But if we concluded the armistice which you are pleading 
for, this is what would happen: we should have the 
Ruthenians arrayed against us on one side and the 
Germans on the other. Now if the Ruthenians have 
brains, their forces will attack us at the same time as those 
of the Germans do. That is sound tactics. But if their 
strength is only on paper, they will give admission to the 
Bolsheviki. That is the twofold danger which you, in the 
name of the Great Powers, are unwillingly endeavoring 
to conjure up against us. If you admit its reality you 
cannot blame our reluctance to incur it. On the other 
hand, if you regard the peril as imaginary, will you draw 
the obvious consequences and pledge the word of the 

247 



THE [NSIDE STORY OF nir PEACE CONFERENCE 
.:: Pow< . they will give us mik. 

gandstra ction had counted 

ivthing, the matter would have be< ed satis- 

torily then and there. But the Great Powers operated 

loss with argument than with more forcible stimuli. 

Holding the economic and financial resources of the 

world in their hands, they sometimes merely toyed with 

seeded to coerce where they were unable 

to convince or persuade One day the chief delegate of 

. of the states "with limited interests" said to me: 

unvarnished truth is that we are being coerced. 

Thv v the procedure. Thus 

we aro told unless we indorse the decrees of the 

Powers, whose interests are unlimited like their assurance, 

v will withhold from us the su] food, raw ma- 

..'.s. and money without which our national existence 

is inconceivable. Necessarily we must give way, at any 

a for the time being." Those words sum up the re- 

ns of the lesser to the greater Pow< 
In the case of Poland on ended thus — 

g the delegate, said: "If you 
disregard the u Big Pour, who cannot 

always lay before you the grounds of their policy, you 
run the risk of being left to your own devices. And you 
know what that means. Think well before you decide!" 
Just then, as it chanced, only a part of General Mailer's 
soldiers in France had been transported to their own 
country, 1 and the Poles were in mortal terror lest the 
work of conveying the remainder should be interrupted. 
This. then, was an implicit appeal to which they could 
not turn a wholly deaf ear. '"Well, what is it that the 
Big Pour ask of us?" inquired the delegate. '"The con- 
clusion of an armistice with the Ruthenians, also that 

1 About ;v. or.:y-nvo thousand had already left Fr.uiee 

I48 



THE LESSER STATES 

Poland — as one of the newly created states — should allow 
the free transit of all the Allied goods through her ter- 
ritory." The delegate expressed a wish to be told why 
this measure should be restricted to tin ly made 

states. The answer was because it was in the nature of 
an experiment and should, therefore, not be tried over too 
large an area. "There is also another little undertaking 
which you are requested to give — namely, that you will 
accept arid act upon the future decisions of the com- 
mission whatever they may be." "Without an inkling 
of their character?" "If you have confidence in us you 
need have no misgivings as to that." In spite of the de- 
terrents the Polish delegation at that interview met all 
these demands with a firm non possumus. It upheld the 
three conditions of the armistice, rejected the free transit 
proposal, and demurred to the demand for a promise 
to bow to all future decisions of a fallible commission. 
"When the Polish dispute with the Czechoslovaks was 
submitted to a commission we were not asked in advance 
to abide by its decision. Why should a new rule be 
introduced now?" argued the Polish delegates. And 
there the matter rested for a brief while. 

But the respite lasted only a few days, at the expiry of 
which an envoy called on the members of the Polish dele- 
gation and reopened the discussion on new lines. He 
stated that he spoke on l^ehalf of the Big Four, of whose 
views and intentions he was the authorized exponent. 
And doubtless he thought he was. But as a matter of 
fact the French government had no cognizance of his visit 
or mission or of the conversation to which it led. He pre- 
sented arguments before having recourse to deterrents. 
Poland's situation, he said, called for prudence. Her 
secular enemy was Germany, with whom it would be 
difficult, perhaps impossible, ever to cultivate such terms 
as would conciliate her permanently. All the more rea- 

249 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

son, therefore, to deserve and win the friendship of her 
other neighbors, in particular of the Ruthenians. The 
Polish plenipotentiary met the argument in the usual way, 
where upon the envoy exclaimed: "Well, to make a long 
story short, I am here to say that the line of action traced 
out for your country emanates from the inflexible will of 
the Great Powers. To this you must bend. If it should 
lead to hostilities on the part of your neighbors you could, 
of course, rely on the help of your protectors. Will this 
not satisfy you?" "If the protection were real it cer- 
tainly would. But where is it? Has it been vouchsafed 
at any moment since the armistice? Have the Allied gov- 
ernments an executive in eastern Europe ? Are they likely 
to order their troops thither to assist any of their protegees ? 
And if they issued such an order, would it be obeyed? 
They cannot protect us, as we know to our cost. That is 
why we are prepared, in our interests — also in theirs — to 
protect ourselves." 

This remarkable conversation was terminated by the 
announcement of the penalty of disobedience. "If you 
persist in refusing the proposals I have laid before you, I 
am to tell you that the Great Powers will withdraw their 
aid from your country and may even feel it to be their 
duty to modify the advantageous status which they had 
decided to confer upon it." To which this answer was 
returned: "For the assistance we are receiving we are 
and will ever be truly grateful. But in order to benefit 
by it the Polish people must be a living organism and your 
proposals tend to reduce us to a state of suspended vitality. 
They also place us at the mercy of our numerous enemies, 
the greatest of whom is Germany." 

But lucid intelligence, backed by unflagging will, was 
of no avail against the threat of famine. The Poles had 
to give way. M. Paderewski pledged his word to Messrs. 
Lloyd George and Wilson that he would have an armis- 

250 



THE LESSER STATES 

tice concluded with the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia, 
and the Duumvirs rightly placed implicit confidence in 
his word as in his moral rectitude. They also felt grateful 
to him for having facilitated their arduous task by accept- 
ing the inevitable. To my knowledge President Wilson 
himself addressed a letter to him toward the end of April, 
thanking him cordially for the broad-minded way in which 
he had co-operated with the Supreme Council in its efforts 
to reconstitute his country on a solid basis. Probably 
no other representative of a state "with limited interests" 
received such high mark of approval. 

M. Paderewski left Paris for Warsaw, there to win over 
the Cabinet. But in Poland, where the authorities were 
face to face with the concrete elements of the problem, the 
Premier found no support. Neither the Cabinet nor the 
Diet nor the head of the state found it possible to redeem 
the promise made in their name. Circumstance was 
stronger than the human will. M. Paderewski resigned. 
The Ruthenians delivered a timely attack on the Poles, 
who counter-attacked, captured the towns of Styra, Tar- 
nopol, Stanislau, and occupied the enemy country right 
up to Rumania, with which they desired to be in perma- 
nent contact. Part of the Ruthenian army crossed the 
Czech frontier and was disarmed, the remainder melted 
away, and there remained no enemy with whom to con- 
clude an armistice. 

For the "Big Four" this turn of events was a humilia- 
tion. The Ruthenian army, whose interests they had so 
taken to heart, had suddenly ceased to exist, and the future 
danger which it represented to Poland was seen to have 
been largely imaginary. Their judgment was at fault 
and their power ineffectual. Against M. Paderewski's 
impotence they blazed with indignation. He had given 
way to their decision and promptly gone to Warsaw to see 
it executed, yet the conditions were such that his words 

251 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

wore treated as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The 
Polish Premier, it is true, had tendered his resignation in 
sequence, but it was re and even had it boon 

sd, what was the retirement of a Minister as com- 
pared with the indignity put upon the world's lawgivers 
who represented power and interests which were alike 
unlimited? Angry telegrams were flashed over the wires 
from Paris to Warsaw and the Polish Premier was sum- 
moned to appear in Par.s without delay. He duly re- 
turned, but no now move was made. The die was oast. 

A noteworthy event in latter-day Polish history ensued 
upon that military victory over the Ruthenians of eastern 
Galicia, The Ukrainian ' Minister at Vienna was de- 

itched to request the Polos to sign a unilateral treaty 
with thorn after the model of that which was arranged by 
the two Anglo-Saxon states in favor of Prance. The 
proposal was that the Ukraine government would re- 
nounce all claims to eastern Galicia and place their troops 
under the supreme command of the Polish generalissimus, 
in rot urn for which the Polos should undertake to protect 
the Ukrainians against all their enemies. This draft 
agreement, while under consideration in Warsaw, was 
negatived by the Polish delegates in Paris, who saw no 
good reason why their people should bind themselves to 
tight Russia one day for the independence of the Ukraine. 
Another inchoate state which made an offer of alliance to 
Poland was Esthonia, but its advances wore declined on 
similar grounds. It is manifest, however, that in the new- 
state system alliances are more in vogue than in the old. 
although they were to have boon banished from it. 

Throughout all the negotiations that turned upon the 
future status and the territorial frontiers of Poland the 

1 The Ruthenians, Ukrainians, and Little Russians arc racially the same 

i rmany, Dutch 
in li. close kindred. The main 

as between the - of each branch are political. 



THE LESSER STATES 

British Premier unswervingly stood out against the 
Polish elaims, just as the President of the United States 
inflexibly countered those of Italy, and both united to 
negative those of the Rumanians. Whatever one may 
think of the merits of these controversies -and various 
opinions have been put forward with obvious sincerity — 
there can be but one judgment as to the spirit in which 
they were conducted. It was a dictatorial spirit, which 
was intolerant not merely of opposition, but of enlightened 
and constructive criticism. To the representatives of the 
countries concerned it seemed made up of bitter prejudice 
and fierce partizanship, imbibed, it was affirmed, from 
those unseen sources whence powerful and, it was thought, 
noxious currents flowed continuously toward the Confer- 
ence. For none of the affronted delegates credited with 
a knowledge of the subject either Mr. Lloyd George, who 
had never heard of Teschen, or Mr. Wilson, whose survey 
of Corsican politics was said to be so defective. And yet 
to the activity of men engaged like these in settling af- 
fairs of unprecedented magnitude it would be unfair to 
apply the ordinary tests of technical fastidiousness. Their 
position as trustees of the world's greatest states, even 
though they lacked political imagination, knowledge, and 
experience, entitled them to the high consideration which 
they generally received. But it could not be expected to 
dazzle to blindness the eyes of superior men — and the 
delegates of the lesser states, Venizelos, Dmowski, and 
Benes, were undoubtedly superior in most of the attributes 
of statesmanship. Yet they were frequently snubbed and 
each one made to feel that he was the fifth wheel in the 
chariot of the Conference. No sacred fame, says Goethe, 
requires us to submit to contempt, and they winced 
under it. The Big Three lacked the happy way of doing 
things which goes with diplomatic tact and engaging 
manners, and the consequence was that not only were 

253 



THE INSIDE STORY OF UW PEACE CONFERENCE 

• ev '•■... ." ,' ' ' 

doubt, " Bit 
we b . v\-'\ predicated of t ho 
- Anglo Sax* a rashly accu 

to deprive Prance of 
Sweeping recrimii 
. ve not ice only as ind 
to use . term rj 

vailing at -• Q . ch was - ieavor- 

peoples uaet in 

I l :y of gC - a ship. 

te Lesser states, to whom one should 
udgments, some queer 

Lavowed policy and re- 
vealed - i oo wise conducive to i 

he Oo ■ a ence 
ve do Longer the faintest Lcou 
Big Two' is the establish- 
of the Anglo Saxon peoples, which 
in ue may be tra into the 

Noi th Amei ica Bveo 

espectst tdmaid. Already she is 

ssolubly. She is admittedly unable bo 

dl her own ? protection. She will become 

s the years p ass and Germany, 
ha\ her house in order, regains her economic pre- 

ris decline is duo to the 

Law which diplomacy may retard 

cannot binder. Numbers will count in I are, 

and then Prance's role will be reduced. For this reason 

it is her interes new allies in eastern Europe 

aid be i i with all I ns of growing and 

keeping strong instead g held in the Leading strings 

of t - • perhaps this tutelage is reckoned 

one of those mea 

»54 



THE LESSER STATES 

Against Britain in especial the Poles, ai ire saw, wriefe 

oth. Tin • - • plained I 
a ' laim thi their pj 

their pi 

. | ish Premiei set bin him to I 

of thinking or voting- 'I bus it •• Mr. Lloyd 

George that the eastern Galician problem had had to be 
fought at every itage. At the outset the British P 
refused Galicia to Poland categorically and purposed 
making it an entirely separate state und 
<A Nations. This design, of which h< 
inspired the ini bich the arm rith the 

Ruthenians of Gali< pressed The Polish delegai 

one of them a man of incisive , left no un- 

turned to thwart that part of the English scheme, and they 
finally succeeded. But their opponents contrived to cb 
a spoonful of tar in Poland's pot of honey by ordering 
plebiscite to take place in eastern Galicia within ten or fif- 
teen years. Then came the question oi the Galician Consti- 
tution. The Poles proposed to confer on the R 
a restricted measure of home rule with authority to ar- 
range in their own way cd I and religious n 
local communications, and the i of encouraging 
industry and agricjlture, besides giving them a p 
portionate number of seats in the state leg e in 
War:,av/. But again the British delegates exj din 
problem', of bome rule — expressed their diss* and 
insisted on a parliament or diet for the Ukraine invested 
with considerable authority over the affair:, of the pr< 
inee. The Pole-, next announced their intention to have a 
governor of eastern Galicia appointed by the President 
of the Polish Republic, with a a e him. 

The British again amended the proposal and asked that 
the governor should be responsible to the Galieian parlia- 
ment, but to this the Poles demurred emphatically, and 

2« 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

finally it was settled that only the members of his council 
should be responsible to the provincial legislature. The 
Poles having suggested that military conscription should 
be applied to eastern Galicia on the same terms as to the 
rest of Poland, the British once more joined issue with 
them and demanded that no troops whatever should be 
levied in the province. The upshot of this dispute was 
that after much wrangling the British Commission gave 
way to the Poles, but made it a condition that the troops 
should not be employed outside the province. To this 
the Poles made answer that the massing of so many 
soldiers on the Rumanian frontier might reasonably be 
objected to by the Rumanians — and so the amcebean 
word-game went on in the subcommission. In a word, 
when dealing with the eastern Galician problem, Mr. 
Lloyd George played the part of an ardent champion 
of complete home rule. 

To sum up, the Conference linked eastern Galicia with 
Poland, but made the bonds extremely tenuous, so that 
they might be severed at any moment without involving 
profound changes in either country, and by this arrange- 
ment, which introduced the provisional into the definitive, 
a broad field of operations was allotted to political agita- 
tion and revolt was encouraged to rear its crest. 

The province of Upper Silesia was asked for on grounds 
which the Poles, at any rate, thought convincing. But 
Mr. Lloyd George, it was said, declared them insufficient. 
The subject was thrashed out one day in June when the 
Polish delegates were summoned before their all-powerful 
colleagues to be told of certain alterations that had been 
recently introduced into the Treaty which concerned them 
to know. They appeared before the Council of Five. 1 



^he Messrs. Wilson, George, Clemenceau, Barons Makino and Son- 
nino. M. Clemenceau was the nominal chairman, but in reality it was 
President Wilson who conducted the proceedings. 

256 



THE LESSER STATES 

President Wilson, addressing the two delegates, spoke 
approximately as follows: "You claim Silesia on the 
ground that its inhabitants are Poles and we have 
given your demand careful consideration. But the 
Germans tell us that the inhabitants, although Polish 
by race, wish to remain under German rule as heretofore. 
That is a strong objection if founded on fact. At present 
we are unable to answer it. In fact, nobody can answer 
it with finality but the inhabitants themselves. There- 
fore we must order a plebiscite among them." One of the 
Polish delegates remarked : "If you had put the question 
to the inhabitants fifty years ago they would have ex- 
pressed their wish to remain with the Germans because 
at that time they were profoundly ignorant and their 
national sentiment was dormant. Now it is otherwise. 
For since then many of them have been educated, and 
the majority are alive to the issue and will therefore 
declare for Poland. And if any section of the territory 
should still prefer German sway to Polish and their district 
in consequence of your plebiscite becomes German, the 
process of enlightenment which has already made such 
headway will none the less go on, and their children, 
conscious of their loss, will anathematize their fathers 
for having inflicted it. And then there will be trouble." 

Mr. Wilson retorted: "You are assuming more than 
is meet. The frontiers which we are tracing are provi- 
sional, not final. That is a consideration which ought 
to weigh with you. Besides, the League of Nations will 
intervene to improve what is imperfect." "O League 
of Nations, what blunders are committed in thy name!" 
the delegate may have muttered to himself as he listened 
to the words meant to comfort him and his countrymen. 

Much might have been urged against this proffered 
solace if the delegates had been in a captious mood. 
The League of Nations had as yet no existence. If its 

257 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

will, intelligence, and power could indeed be reckoned 
upon with such confidence, how had it come to pass | 
its creators, Britain and the United States, deemed them 
dubious enough to call for a reinforcement in the shape 
a formal alliance protection of Prance? If this 

precautionary measure, which shatters the whole Wil- 
sonian system, was tensable to one Ally it was at 

least equally indispensable to another. And in the case 
of Poland it was more urgent than in the ease of Prance, 
because if Germany wove again to scheme a war of eon- 
quest the probability is infinitesimal that she would invade 
Belgium or move forward on the western front. The 
line of least resist.tr.ee. which is Poland, would prove 

incomparably more attractive. And then? The absence 
of Allied troops in eastern Europe was one of the principal 
causes of the wars, tumults, and chaotic confusion that 

had made nervous people tremble for the Lite of civiliza- 
tion in the interval between the conclusion of the armistice 
and the ratification of the Treaty. In the future the 
abser.ee of strongly situated Allies there, if Germany were 
to begin a fresh war, would be more fatal si ill. and the 
Polish state might conceivably disappear before military 
aid from the Allied governments could reach it. Why 
should the safety of Poland and to some extent the 
security of Europe be made to depend upon what is at 
best a gambler's throw? 

But no counter-objections were offered. On the con- 
trary, M. Paderewski uttered the soft answer that turneth 
away wrath. He profoundly regretted the decision of 
the lawgivers, but. recognizing that it was immutable, 
bowed to it in the name of his country. He knew, he said, 
that the deleg.it es were animated by very friendly feelings 
toward his country and he thanked them for their help. 
M. Paderewski's colleague, the less malleable M. Dmow- 
ski, is reported to have said: "It is my desire to be quite 



THE LESSER STATES 

sincere with you, gentlemen. Therefore I venture to 
submit that while you profess to have settled the matter 
on principle, you have not carried out that principle 
thoroughly. Doubtless by inadvertence. Thus there 
are places inhabited by a large majority of Poles which 
you have allotted to Germany on the ground that they are 
inhabited by Germans. That is inconsistent." At this 
Mr. Lloyd George jumped up from his place and asked: 
"Can you name any such places?" M. Dmowski gave 
several names. "Point them out to me on the map," 
insisted the British Premier. They were pointed out 
on the map. Twice President Wilson asked the delegate 
to spell the name Bomst for him. 1 Mr. Lloyd George 
then said: "Well, those are oversights that can be 
rectified." "Oh yes," added Mr. Wilson, "we will see 
to that." 2 M. Dmowski also questioned the President 
about the plebiscite, and under whose auspices the voting 
would take place, and was told that there would be an 
Inter-Allied administration to superintend the arrange- 
ments and insure perfect freedom of voting. "Through 
what agency will that administration work ? Is it through 
the officials?'" "Evidently," Mr. Wilson answered. 
"You are doubtless aware that they are Germans?" 
"Yes. But the administration will possess the right to 
dismiss those who prove unworthy of their confidence." 
"Don't you think," insisted M. Dmowski, "that it would 
be fairer to withdraw one half of the German bureaucrats 
and give their places to Poles ? ' ' To which the President 
replied : ' ' The administration will be thoroughly impartial 
and will adopt all suitable measures to render the voting 
free." There the matter ended. 

The two potentates in council, tackling the future 



1 Bomst is a canton in the former Province (Regierungs-besirk) of Posen, 
with about sixty thousand inhabitants. 
"■ Minutes of this conversation exist. 
18 259 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

status of Lithuania, settled it in an offhand and singular 
fashion which at any rate bespoke their good intentions. 
The principle of self-determination, or what was tace- 
tiously termed the Balkanization of Europe, was at first 
applied to that territory and a semi-independent state 
created in petto which was to contain eight million inhabi- 
tants and be linked with Poland. Certain obstacles 
were soon afterward encountered which had not been 
foreseen. One was that all the Lithuanians number only 
two millions, or say at the most two millions and one 
hundred thousand. Out of these even the Supreme 
Council could not make eight millions. In Lithuania 
there are two and a half million Poles, one and a half 
million Jews, and the remainder arc White Russians. 1 
It was recognized that a community consisting of such 
disparate elements, situated where it now is, could hardly 
live and strive as an independent state. The Lithuanian 
Jews, however, were of a different way of thinking, and 
they opposed the Polish claims with a degree of stead- 
fastness and animation which wounded Poland's national 
pride and left rankling sores behind. 

It. is worth noting that the representatives of Russia, 
who are supposed to clutch convulsively at all the states 
which once formed part of the Tsardom, displayed a de- 
gree of political detachment in respect of Lithuania which 
came as a pleasant surprise to many. The Russian Am- 
bassador in Paris, M. Maklakoff, in a remarkable address 
before a learned assembly 2 in the French capital, an- 
nounced that Russia was henceforward disinterested in 
the status of Lithuania. 



1 An interesting Russian tribe, dwelling chiefly in the provinces of Minsk 
and Grodno (excepting the extreme south), a small part of Suvalki, Vilna 
(excepting the northwest corner), the entire provinces of Vitebsk and 
Moghileff, the west part of Smolensk, and a few districts of Tshernigoff. 

3 La Societc des fitudes Politiques. The discourse in question was 
printed and published. 

260 



THE LESSER STATES 

That the Poles were minded to deal very liberally with 
the Lithuanians became evident during the Conference. 
General Pilsudski, on his own initiative, visited Vilna and 
issued a proclamation to the Lithuanian:; announcing that 
elections would be held, and asking them to make known 
their desires, which would be realized by the Warsaw 
government. One of the many curious documents of the 
Conference is an official missive signed by the General 
Secretary, M. Dutasta, and addressed to the first Polish 
delegate, exhorting him to induce his government to come 
to terms with the Lithuanian government, a', behooi 
two neighboring states. Unluckily for the soundness of 
that counsel there was no recognized Lithuanian state or 
Lithuanian government to come to terms with. 

As has been often enough pointed out, the actions and 
utterances of the two world-menders were so infelicitous 
as to lend color to the belief — shared by the representa- 
tives of a number of humiliated nations — that greed of 
new markets was at the bottom of what purported to be 
a policy of pure humanitarianism. Some of the delegates 
were currently supposed to be the unwitting instruments 
of elusive capitalistic influences. Possibly they would 
have been astonished were they told this: Great Britain 
was suspected of working for complete control of the Bal- 
tic and its seaboard in order to oust the Germans from the 
markets of that territory and to have potent levers for 
action in Poland, Germany, and Russia. The achieve- 
ment of that end would mean command of the Baltic, 
which had theretofore been a German lake. 1 It would also 
entail, it was said, the separation of Dantzig from Poland, 
and the attraction of the Finns, Esthonians, Letts, and 
Lithuanians from Germany's orbit into that of Great 

1 In Germany and Russia the same view was generally taken of the 
motives that actuated the policy of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The most 
elaborate attempt to demonstrate its correctness was made by Cr. Bunke, 
in The Dantziger NeuesU Nachrichten, already mentioned in this book. 

§6z 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Britain. In vain the friends of the delegates declared that 
economic interests wore not the mainspring of their de- 
liberate act and that nothing was further from their 

bentton than to angle for a mandate for those countries. 
The conviction was deep rooted in the minds of many 
that each of t' : Towers was playing for its own 

hand. That there was some apparent foundation for this 
assumption cannot, as we saw. be gainsaid. Widely and 
unfavorably commented was the circumstance that in the 
heat of those discussions at the Conference a man of con- 
fidence of the Allies put this significant and impel- 
question to one of the plenipotentiaries: "How would 
you take it if England were to receive a mandate for 
Lithuania : ' ' 

"The Ore.-.: Powers."' observed the most outspoken of 

the delegates of the lesser states, "are bandits, but as 

.'.ior.s are on a Large scale they are entitled to 

another and more courteous name. Their gaze is fasei- 

ted by markets, concessions, monopolies. They are 

v making preparations for a great haul. At this 
politicians cannot affect to be scj ed. For it has 

never been otherwise since men came together in ordered 
communities. But what is irritating and repellent is . 

rfume of altruism and philanthropy which permeates 
this decomposition. We are told that already they are 
purchasing the wharves of Dantzig, making ready for 
'big deals' in Libau. Riga, and Reval, founding a bank in 
Klagenfurt and ting for oil-wells in Rumania. Al- 

though deeply immersed in the ethics of politics, they have 
ght of the worldly goods to be picked up and 
appropriated on the wearisome journey toward ideal goals. 
The atmosphere they have thus renewed is peculiarly 
favorable to the growth of .aid tends to aeeelerate 

the process of moral and soeial dissolution. And the 
effeets of this mephitie air may prove more durable than 

36a 



THE LESSER STATES 

the contribution of its creators to the political reorganiza- 
tion of Europe. If we compare the high functions which 
they might have fulfilled in relation to the vast needs and 
the unprecedented tendencies of the new age with those 
which they have unwittingly and deliberately performed 
as sophists of sentimental morality and destroyers of the 
wheat together with the tares, we shall have to deplore 
one of the rarest opportunities missed beyond retrieve." 

In this criticism there is a kernel of truth. The ethico- 
social currents to which the war gave rise had a profoundly 
moral aspect, and if rightly canalized might have fertilized 
many lands and have led to a new and healthy state- 
system. One indispensable condition, however, was that 
the peoples of the world should themselves be directly 
interested in the process, that they should be consulted 
and listened to, and helped or propelled into new grooves 
of thought and action. Instead of that the delegates con- 
tented themselves with giving new names to old institu- 
tions and tendencies which stood condemned, and with 
teaching lawless disrespect for every check and restraint 
except such as they chose to acknowledge. They were 
powerful advocates for right and justice, democracy and 
publicity, but their definitions of these abstract nouns 
made plain-speaking people gasp. Self -interest and mate- 
rial power were the idols which they set themselves to pull 
down, but the deities which they put in their places wore 
the same familiar looks as the idols, only they were differ- 
ently colored. 



VII 
Poland's outlook IN the future 

CASTING a parting glance at Poland as she looked 
when emerging from the Conference in the leading- 
strings of the Great Western Powers, after having es- 
caped from the Bolshevist dangers that compassed her 
round, we behold her about to begin her national existence 
as a semi-independent nation, beset with enemies domestic 
and foreign. For it would be an abuse of terms to affirm 
that Poland, or, indeed, any of the lesser states, is fully 
independent in the old sense of the word. The special 
treaty imposed on her by the Great Two obliges her to 
accord free transit to Allied goods and certain privileges 
to her Jewish and other minorities; to accept the super- 
vision and intervention of the League of Nations, which 
the Poles contend means in their case an Anglo-Saxon- 
Jewish association; and. at the outset, at any rate, to 
recognize the French generalissimus as the supreme com- 
mander of her troops. 

Poland's frontiers and general status ought, if the 
scheme of her French protectors had been executed, to 
have been accommodated to the peculiar functions 
which they destined her to fill in New Europe. France's 
plan was to make of Poland a wall between Germany 
and Russia. The marked tendency of the other two 
Conference leaders was to transform it into a bridge 
between those two countries. And the outcome of the 
compromise between them has been to construct some- 
thing which, without being either, combines all the dis- 

264 



POLAND'S OUTLOOK IN THE FUTURE 

advantages of both. It is a bridge for Germany and a 
wall for Bolshevist Russia. That is the verdict of a 
large number of Poles. Although the Europe of the 
future is to be a pacific and ethically constituted com- 
munity, Whose members will have their disputes and 
quarrels with one another settled by arbitration courts 
and other conciliatory tribunals, war and efficient prepa- 
ration for it were none the less uppermost in the minds of 
the circumspect lawgivers. Hence the Anglo-Saxon 
agreement to defend France against unprovoked aggres- 
sion. ] fence, too, the solicitude displayed by the French 
to have the Polish state, which is to be their mainstay in 
eastern Europe, equipped with every territorial and other 
guaranty necessary to qualify it for the duties. But 
what the French government contrived to obtain for 
itself it failed to secure for its new Slav ally. Nay, 
oddly enough it voted with the Anglo-Saxon delegates for 
keeping all the lesser states under the tutelage of the 
League. The Duumvirs, having made the requisite con- 
cessions to France, were resolved in Poland's case to avoid 
a further recoil toward the condemned forms of the old 
system of equilibrium. Hence the various plebiscites, 
home-rule charters, subdivisions of territory, and other 
evidences of a struggle for reform along the line of least 
resistance, as though in the unavoidable future conflict 
between timidly propounded theories and politico-social 
forces the former had any serious chance of surviving. In 
politics, as in coinage, it is the debased metal that ousts 
the gold from circulation. 

Poland's situation is difficult; some people would call 
it precarious. She is surrounded by potential enemies 
abroad and at home — Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, 
Magyars, and Jews. A considerable number of Teutons 
are incorporated in her republic to-day, and also a large 
number of people of Russian race. Now, Russia and 

265 



THE INSIDE STORY OF lHi: PEACE CONFERENCE 

Germany, even if they renounce all designs of reconquering 

the territory which they misruled for such a long span of 
time, may feel tempted one day to recover their own 
kindred, and what they consider to be their own territory. 
And irredentism is one of the worst political plagues for 
all the three parties who usually suffer from it. If then 
Germany and Russia were to combine and attack Poland. 
the consequences would be serious. That democratic Ger- 
many would risk such a wild adventure in the near future 
is inconceivable. But history operates with long periods 
of time, and it behooves statesmanship to do likewise. 

A Polish statesman would start from the assumption that, 
as Russia and Germany have for the time being ceased 
to be efficient members of the European state-system, 
a good understanding may be come to with both of them, 
and a close intimacy cultivated with one. Resourceful- 
ness and statecraft will be requisite to this consummation. 
For some Russians are still uncompromising, and would 
fain take back a part of what the revolutionary wave 
swept out of their country's grasp, but circumstance 
bids fair to set free a potent moderating force in the near 
future. Already it is incarnated in statesmen of the new- 
type. Iu this connection it is instructive to pass in review 
the secret maneuvers by which the recognition of Poland's 
independence was. so to say, extorted from a Russian 
Minister, who was reputed at the time to be a Democrat 
of the Democrats. As some governments have now 
become champions of publicity, I venture to hope that this 
disclosure will be as helpful to those whom it concerns 
as was the systematic suppression of my articles and 
telegrams during the space of four years. 1 

1 Most of my articles written during the last half of the war, and some 
during the armistice, were held back on grounds which were presumably 
patriotic, I share with those who were instrumental in keeping them 
from the public the moral portion of the reward which consists in the 
assumption that some high purpose was served bv the suppression. 

a66 



POLAND'S OUTLOOK IN THE FUTURE 

On the outbreak of the Russian revolution Poland's 
representatives in Britain, who had been ceasel 

working for the restoration of their country, approached 
the British government with a request that the oppor- 
tunity should be utilized at once, and the new democratic 
Cabinet in Petrograd requested to issue a proclamation 
recognizing the independence of Poland, The reasons 
for this move having been propounded in detail, orally 
and in writing, the Foreign Secretary despatched at once 
a telegram to the Ambassador in the Russian capital, 
instructing him to lay the matter before the Russian 
Foreign Minister and urge him to lose no time in establish- 
ing the claim of the Polish provisional government to the 
sympathies of the world, and the redress of its wrongs 
by Russia. Sir George Buchanan called on Professor 
Milyukoff, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and President 
of the Constitutional Democratic party, and propounded 
to him the views of the British government, which agreed 
with those of France and Italy, and hoped he would see 
his way to profit by the opportunity. The answer was 
prompt and definite, and within forty-eight hours of Mr. 
Balfour's despatch it reached the Foreign Office. The 
gist of it was that the Minister of Foreign Affairs re- 
gretted his inability to deal with the problem at that 
conjuncture, owing to its great complexity and various 
bearings, and also because of his apprehension that the 
Poles would demand the incorporation of Russian lands 
in their reconstituted state. From this answer many 
conclusions might fairly be drawn respecting persons, 
parties, and principles on the surface of revolutionary 
Russia. But to his credit, Mr. Balfour did not accept it 
as final. He again telegraphed to the British Ambassador, 
instructing him to insist upon the recognition of Poland, 
as the matter was urgent, and to exhort the provisional 
government to give in good time the desired proof of the 

267 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

democratic faith that is to save Russia. Sir George 
Buchanan accomplished the task expeditiously. M. Milyu- 
koff gave way. drafted and issued the proclamation. 
Mr. Bonar Law welcomed it in a felicitous speech is the 

House of Commons, 1 and the Entente press lauded to the 
skies the generous spirit of the new Russian government. 
The Russian people and their leaders have traveled far 
Since then, and have rid themselves of much useless 
ballast. 

As Slavs the Poles might have been naturally pre- 
disposed to live in amity with the Russians, were it not 
for the specter of the past that stands between them. 
But now that Russia is a democracy in faet as well as in 
name, this is much more feasible than it ever was before, 
and it is also indispensable to the Russians. In the 
first plaee. it is possible that Poland may have consolidated 
her forces before her mighty neighbor has recovered the 
status corresponding to her numbers and resources. If 

■ present estimates are correct, and the frontiers, when 
definitely traced, leave Poland a republic with some thirty- 
five million people, Such is her extraordinary birth-rate 
and the territorial scope it has for development, that 
in the not far distant future her population may exceed 
that of France. Assuming for the sake of argument that 
armies and other national defenses will count in politics 
as much as hitherto, Poland's specific weight will then be 
considerable. She will have become not indeed a world 
power (to-day there are only two such), but a European 
Great Power whose friendship will be well worth acquiring. 

In the meanwhile Polish statesmen — the Poles have 
one in Roman Dmowski — may strike up a friendly accord 
with Russia, abandoning definitely and formally all 
claims to so-called historic Poland, disinterest ing them- 
selves in all the Baltic problems which concern Russia so 

1 On April 26, 1917. 

268 



POLAND'S OUTLOOK IN THE FUTURE 

closely, and envisaging the Ukraine from a point of view 
that harmonizes with hers. And if the two peoples 
could thus find a common basis of friendly association, 
Poland would have solved at least one of her Sphinx 
questions. 

As for the internal development of the nation, it is 
seemingly hampered with as many hindrances as the 
international. It may be likened to the world after 
creation, bearing marks of the chaos of the eve. The 
German Poles differ considerably from the Austrian, while 
the Russian Poles are differentiated from both. The last- 
named still show traces of recent servitude in their every- 
day avocations. They lack the push and the energy 
of purpose so necessary nowadays in the struggle for life. 
The Austrian Poles in general are reputed to be likewise 
easy-going, lax, and more brilliant than solid, while their 
administrative qualities are said to be impaired by a 
leaning toward Oriental methods of transacting business. 
The Polish inhabitants of the provinces hitherto under 
Germany are people of a different temperament. They 
have assimilated some of the best qualities of the Teuton 
without sacrificing those which are inherent in men of 
their own race. A thorough grasp of detail and a gift 
for organization characterize their conceptions, and pre- 
cision, thoroughness, and conscientiousness are predicated 
of their methods. If it be true that the first reform per- 
emptorily called for in the new republic is an administra- 
tive purge, it follows that it can be most successfully 
accomplished with the whole-hearted co-operation of the 
German Poles, whose superior education fits them to con- 
form their schemes to the most urgent needs of the nation 
and the epoch. 

The next measure will be internal colonization. There 
are considerable tracts of land in what once was Russian 
Poland, the population of which, owing to the havoc of 

269 



THF INSIDE STOR* OF niF PEACE CONFERENCE 

Some d 
the Pi shes, whic at the best as had 

ais to the kilometer, ai ! 
For the Russi i army, when n the Ger- 

millions, who inhabited the territory to the east of 

Brest-Litovsk and northward between I id Minsk. 

Of these eight millions many perished on the way. A 

percentage of the survivors never returned. 1 Roughly 

ttg B COUple of millions (mostly Polos and Jews'* 

went back to their ruined homes. Now the Poles, who 

are one of the most races in Europe, might be 

jed to settle on these thinly populated lands, 

-. they could convert into ethnographically Polish 

cts within a relatively short span of time. These, 

however, are merely the ideas of a friendly observer, 

•• cann< n : lay claim bo an} weight. 

To-day Poland's hone is not, as it has been hitherto, the 

nobleman, the professor, and the public it the 

peasant. The members of this class are the nucleus of 

ion, h is from their midst that Poland's 

uresentatives in politics, arts, and science will be 

drawn. Already the peasants are having their sons 

educated in high-schools and universities, of which the 

blic has a fair num.' '. supplied with qualified 

and they are resolute a ries oi every 

mem tainted with Bolshevism. 



i Mainh Wi ! as. 

4 The Poles ':•- 

Liublin, and will s te in Posen, Q ssmao enter- 

i novel and \ sa which wil eUniversitj 

ol Posen Noticing wledge 

the less is the knowledge of ch is perhaps 

'■■ proposes b 
.; new type ms, one 

lot the study oi natural sc 

oen, which would include biology, psychology, ethnog 
sociology*, phi!. tory, etc. 



POLAND'S OUTLOOK IN THE FUTURE 

Thus the difficulties and dangers with which new 
Poland will have to contend are redoubtable. But she 
stands a good chance of overcoming them and reaching 
the goal where lies her one hope of playing a noteworthy 
part in reorganized Europe. The indispensable condition 
of success is that the current of opinion and sentiment in 
the country shall buoy up reforming statesmen. These 
must not only understand the requirements of the new 
epoch and be alive to the necessity of penetrating public 
opinion, but also possess the courage to place high social 
aims at the head of their life and career. Statesmen of 
this temper are rare to-day, but Poland possesses at least 
one of them. Her resources warrant the conviction which 
her chiefs firmly entertain that she may in a relatively 
near future acquire the economic leadership of eastern 
Europe, and in population, military strength, and area 
equal France. 

Parenthetically it may be observed that the enthusiasm 
of the Poles for British institutions and for intimate rela- 
tions with Great Britain has perceptibly cooled. 

In the limitations to which she is now subjected, her 
more optimistic leaders discern the temporarily unavoid- 
able condition of a beneficent process of working forward 
toward indefinite amelioration. Their people's faith, 
that may one day raise the country above the highest 
summit of its past historical development, if it does not 
reconcile them to the present, may nerve them to the 
effort which shall realize that high consummation in the 
future. 



Yin 
1 1 •.. j 

OF all v Conference, 

. >\ [tat] > demands ma} trulj 

easiest Whether placed in the 
or of the old >\ stem of the 
\-\ woo] 

teace criteria were 

rhey consisted of 
seven leous maxims which wore invoiced alter- 

. Mr Wilson deciding which was i ile to the 

discussion And from his judg 
. was :v 

i be able h 
ce on* el -,:\ in the sk 

id governments with which one 

• pre- 
sses a vi . was 

of ESurc example, 

ed to that 

of the A nist who once remarked to the 

'\\.:v "You Britishers are 

hand.. by having to build your railway lines through 

wns We .co to work diligently: we first 

e the cities afterwai 

And Mr. WUson happened jus: then to be in cues; of 

a mica i which to rest his idealistic lever. For he 

by egotistic governments 



[TALY 

■:] oi '■■■■■ CO were 

gibing 

foil for to 

/ to M r 

Vail' 

s<ed will, 

t.aink '.-saw that he 

would all 

■ v Chino Jap; 

were 
■ 

was truly unenviable, 
the fii able ex - 

ervingly. 1 
Italy and 
in the holloa 

The la' ;11 in tfc 

' 

backed by the i y ace. Ai 

tms backing Italy, i 

more powerful militarily than 

tmically depend 
Bngli initiea, who were as:-:ur*-yl b 

I 
for':, she could not be r< 

the injunctions oi the Supreme r could - 

malleable V ' case, 



1 'Jr.: -.resented 

- ■.-., provol* - 
out in the revivy] vwi 

2 73 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

fore. Mr. Wilson's ethical notions might be fearlessly 
applied. That this was the idea which underlay the 
President's policy is the obvious inference from the calm, 
unyielding way in which he treated the Italian delegation. 
In this connection it should be borne in mind that there 
is no more important distinction between all former peace 
settlements and that of the Paris Conference than the 
unavowed but indubitable fact that the latter rests upon 
the hegemony of the English-speaking communities of the 
world, whereas the former were based upon the balance 
oi power. So immense a change could not be effected 
without discreetly throwing out as useless ballast some of 
the highly prized dogmas of the accepted political creeds, 
even at the cost of impairing the solidarity of the Latin 
races. This was effected incidentally. As a matter of 
fact, the French arc not, properly speaking, a Latin race, 
nor has their solidarity with Italy or Spain ever been a 
moving political force iti recent times. Italy's refusal to 
light side by side with her Teuton allies against France 
and her backers may conceivably be the result o( racial 
affinities, but it has hardly ever been ascribed to that 
sentimental source. Sentiment in politics is a myth. In 
any case, M. Clemenceau discerned no pressing reason 
for making painful efforts to perpetuate the Latin union, 
while solicitude for national interests hindered him from 
making costly concessions to it. 

Naturally the cardinal innovation of which this was a 
corollary was never invoked as the ground for any of the 
exceptional measures adopted by the Conference. And 
yet it was the motive for several, for although no allusion 
was made to the hegemony of Anglo-Saxondom, it was 
ever operative in the subconsciousness of the two pleni- 
potentiaries. And in view of the omnipotence of these 
two nations, they temporarily sacrificed consistency to 
tactics, probably without conscientious qualms, and cer- 



ITALY 

tainly without political misgivings. That would seem 
to be a partial explanation of the lengths to which the 
Conference went in the direction of concessions to the 
Great Powers' imperialist demands. France asked to be 
recognized and treated as the personification of that 
civilization for which the Allied peoples had fought. And 
for many reasons, which it would be superfluous to discuss 
her',, a large part of her claim was allowed. This con- 
cession was attacked by many as connoting a departure 
from principle, but the deviation was more apparent than 
real, for under all the wrappings of idealistic catchwords 
lay the primeval doctrine of force. The only substantial 
difference between the old system and the new was to be 
found in the wielders of the force and the ends to which 
they intended to apply it. Force remains the granite 
foundation of the new ordering, as it had been of the old. 
But its employment, it was believed, would be different 
in the future from what it had been in the past. Con- 
centrated in the hands of the English-speaking peoples, 
it would become so formidable a weapon that it need 
never be actually wielded. Possession of overwhelmingly 
superior strength would suffice to enforce obedience to 
the decrees of its possessors, which always will, it is 
assumed, be inspired by equity. Aji actual trial of 
strength would be obviated, therefore, at least so long 
as the relative military and economic conditions of the 
world states underwent no sensible change. To this 
extent the war specter would be exorcised and trying 
abuses abolished. 

That those views were expressly formulated and thrown 
into the clauses of a secret program is unlikely. But it 
seems to be a fact that the general outlines of such a 
policy were conceived and tacitly adhered to. These 
outlines governed the action of the two world-arbiters, 
not only in the dictatorial decrees issued in the name of 
19 275 



THE [NSIDE STORY OF FHF PEACE CONFERENCE 

political idealism and its Fourteen Points, which were so 
.'•/'.>- resented as oppressive by Italy, Rumania. Jugo- 
slavia, Poland, and Greece, but likewise in those other 
Mas which SCandali vd the political puritans and 
Ldened the hearts of the French, the Japanese, the 
Jugoslavs, and the Jews. The dictatorial decrees were 
I by the delegates' fundamental aims, the con- 
cessions by their tactical needs— the former, therefore, 
wore meant to be permanent, the latter transient. 

All LOUS of the Italian crisis, however 

well they may lit a :" its phases, are. when applied 

•.lie pith of the matter, beside the mark. Even if it 
were true, as the dramatist. Sem Benelli, wrote, that 
' ' Pv. Wilson evidently considers our people as on the 

plane of an African colony, dominated by the will of a few 
ambitious men," that would not account for the tenacious 
determination with which the President held to his 
slighted theory. 

Italy's position in Europe was in many respects pecul- 
iar. Men still living remember the time when her name 
was scarcely more than a geographical expression which 
dually, during the last sixty years, came to connote a 
hard-working, sober, patriotic nation. Only little by 
little did she recover her finest provinces and her capital, 
and even then her unity was not fully achieved. Austria 
still held many of her sons, nol only in the Trent ino. but 
also on the other shore of the Adriatic. Put for thirty 
years her desire to recover these lost children was para- 
lyzed by international conditions. In her own interests. 
as well as in those of peace, she had become the third 
member of an alliance which constrained her to suppress 
her patriotic feelings and allowed her to bend all her ener- 
gies to the prevention of a European conflict. 

When hostilities broke out. the attitude of the Italian 
government was a matter of extreme moment to France 

-6 



ITALY 

and the Entente. Much, perhaps the fate of Europe, 
depended OH whether they would remain neutral or throw 
in their lot with the Teutons. They chose the former 
alternative and literally saved the situation. The ques- 
tion of motive is wholly irrelevant. Later on they were 
urged to move a step farther and take an active part 
against their former allies. But a powerful body of 
opinion and sentiment in the country was opposed to 
military co-operation, on the ground that the sum total 
of the results to be obtained by quiescence would exceed 
the guerdon of victory won by the side of the Entente. 
The correctness of this estimate depended upon many 
incalculable factors, among which was the duration of the 
struggle. The consensus of opinion was that it would 
be brief, in which case the terms dangled before Italy's 
eyes by the Entente would, it was believed by the Cabinet, 
greatly transcend those which the Central Powers were 
prepared to offer. Anyhow they were accepted and the 
compact was negotiated, signed, and ratified by men 
whose idealism marred their practical sense, and whose 
policy of sacred egotism, resolute in words and feeble 
in action, merely impaired the good name of the govern- 
ment without bringing any corresponding compensation 
to the country. The world struggle lasted much longer 
than the statesmen had dared to anticipate; Italy's 
obligations were greatly augmented by Russia's defection, 
she had to bear the brunt of all, instead of a part of 
Austria's forces, whereby the sacrifices demanded of her 
became proportionately heavier. Altogether it is fair 
to say that the difficulties to be overcome and the hard- 
ships to be endured before the Italian people reached their 
goal were and still are but imperfectly realized by their 
allies. For the obstacles were gigantic, the effort heroic; 
alone the results shrank to disappointing dimensions. 
The war over, Italian statesmen confidently believed 

277 



nil-: INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

that those supererogatory exertions would be appro; 
ately recognized by the Allies. And this expectation 

quickly crystallized into territorial demands. The press 
which voiced them ruffled the temper oi Anglo-Saxondom 
by clamoring for more than it was ever likely to eoneede, 
and buoyed up their own nation with illusory hopes, the 
non-fulfilment of which was certain to produce national 
discontent. Curiously enoogh, both the government and 
the press laid the main stress upon territorial expansion, 
leaving economic advantages almost wholly out of 
account. 

It was at this conjuncture that Mr. Wilson made his 
appearance and threw all the pieees on the political ehess- 
board into weird eonfusion. "You," he virtually said, 
"have been lighting for the dismemberment of your seen 
lar enemy, Austria. Well, she is now dismembered and 
you have full satisfaction. Your frontiers shall be ex- 
tended at her expense, but not at the expense ot the new 
states which have arisen on her ruins. On the contrary, 
their rights will circumscribe your claims and limit your 
territorial aggrandizement. Not only can you not have 
all the additional territory you covet, but I must refuse 
to allot even what has been guaranteed to you by your 
seeret treaty. I refuse to recognize that because the 
United States government was no party to it, was, in 
fact, wholly unaware of it until recently. New eireum- 
stanees have transformed it into a mere serap of paper." 

This language was not understood by the Italian people. 
For them the saeredness of treaties was a dogma not to 
be questioned, and least of all by the champion of right, 
justice, and good faith. They had welcomed the new- 
order preached by the American statesman, but were 
unable to reconcile it with the tearing up of existing con- 
ventions, the repudiation of legal rights, the dissolution 
of alliances. In particular their treaty with France, Brit- 

»78 



ITALY 

ain, and Russia had contributed materially to the victory 

over the common enemy, hai in fact saved the Allies. 
"It was Italy's intervention," said the chief of the Aus- 
trian General Staff, Conrad von IJoetzendorff, "that 
brought about the disaster. Without that the Central 
Empires would infallibly have won the war." ' And there 
is no reason to doubt his assertion. In truth Italy had 
done all she had promised to the Allies, and more. She 
had contributed materially to save France — wholly gra 
tuitously. It was also her neutrality, which she could have 
bartered, but did not, 2 that turned the scale at Bucharest 
against the military intervention of Rumania on the side 
of the Teutons." And without the neutrality of both these 
countries at the outset of hostilities the course of the 
Struggle and of European history would have been widely 
different from what they have been. And now that the 
Allies had achieved their aim they were to refuse to per- 
form their part of the compact in the name, too, of a moral 
principle from the operation of which three great Powers 
were dispensed. That was the light in which the matter 
appeared to the unsophisticated mind of the average 
Italian, and not to him. alone. Others accustomed to 
abstract reasoning asked whether the best preparation for 
the future regime of right and justice, and all that these 
imply, is to transgress existing rights and violate ordinary 
justice, and what difference there is between the demoral- 
izing influence of this procedure and that of professional 
Bolshevists. There was but one adequate answer to this 

1 In an interview given to the Correspondcnz Bureau of Vienna by Con- 
rad von Hoetzendorff. Cf. Le Temps, July 19, 19 19. 

2 The Prime Minister, Salandra, declared that to have made neutrality 
a matter of bargaining would have been to dishonor Italy. 

* King Carol was holding a crown council at the time. Bratiano had 
spoken against the King's proposal to throw in the country's lot with Ger- 
many. Carp was strongly for carrying out Rumania's treaty obligations. 
Some others hesitated, but before it could be put to the vote a telegram 
was brought in announcing Italy's resolve to maintain neutrality. The 
upshot was Rumania's refusal to follow her allies. 

279 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

objection, and it consisted in the whole-hearted and rigid 
application of the Wilsonian tenets to all nations without 
exception. But even the author of these tenets did not 
venture to make it. 

The essence of the territorial question la}?- in the disposal 
of the eastern shore of the Adriatic. 1 The Jugoslavs 
claimed all Istria and Dalmatia, and based their claim 
partly on the principle of nationalities and partly on the 
vital necessity of having outlets on that sea, and in par- 
ticular Fiume, the most important of them all. which they 
described as essentially Croatian and indispensable as a 
port. The Italian delegates, joining issue with the Jugo- 
slavs, and claiming a section of the seaboard and Fiume, 
argued that the greatest part of the East Adriatic shore 
would still remain Croatian, together with all the ports 
of the Croatian coast and others in southern Dalmatia — 
in a word, twelve ports, including Spalatoand Ragusa, and 
a thousand kilometers of seaboard. The Jugoslavs met 
this assertion with the objection that the outlets in ques- 
tion were inaccessible, all except Fiume and Metkovitch. 
As for Fiume, 2 the Italian delegates contended that 
although not promised to Italy by the Treaty of London, 
it was historically hers, because, having been for centuries 
an autonomous entity and having as such religiously pre- 
served its Italian character, its inhabitants had exercised 
their rights to manifest by plebiscite their desire to be 
united with the mother country. They further denied 
that it was indispensable to the Jugoslavs because these 
would receive a dozen other ports and also because the 
traffic between Croatia and Fiume was represented by 
only 7 per cent, of the whole, and even that of Croatia, 

1 On the eastern Adriatic, the Treaty of London allotted to Italy the 
peninsula of Istria, without Fiume, most of Dalmatia, exclusive of Spalato, 
the chief Dalmatian islands and the Dodeeannesus. 

2 The present population of Fiume is computed at 45,227 souls, of whom 
33,000 are Italians, 10,927 Slavs, and 1,300 Magyars. 

2 So 



ITALY 

Slavonia, and Dalmatia combined by only 13 per cent. 
Further, Italy would undertake to give all requisite 
export facilities in Fiume to the Jugoslavs. 

The latter traversed many of these statements, and in 
particular that which described Fiume as a separate 
autonomous entity and as an essentially Italian city. 
Archives were ransacked by both parties, ancient docu- 
ments produced, analyzed, condemned as forgeries or 
appealed to as authentic proofs, chance phrases were 
culled from various writers of bygone days and offered as 
evidence in support of each contention. Thus the con- 
test grew heated. It was further inflamed by the attitude 
of Italy's allies, who appeared to her as either covertly 
unfriendly or at best lukewarm. 

M. Clemenceau, who maintained during the peace 
negotiations the epithet "Tiger" which he had earned 
long before, was alleged to have said in the course of one 
of those conversations which were misnamed private, 
"For Italy to demand Fiume is to ask for the moon." 1 
Officially he took the side of Mr. Wilson, as did also the 
British Premier, and Italy's two allies signified but a cold 
assent to those other claims which were covered by their 
own treaty. But they made no secret of their desire to 
see that instrument wholly set aside. Fiume they would 
not bestow on their ally, at least not unless she was 
prepared to offer an equivalent to the Jugoslavs and to 
satisfy the President of the United vStates. 

This advocacy of the claims of the Jugoslavs was bit- 
terly resented by the Italians. For centuries the two 
peoples had been rivals or enemies, and during the war 
the Jugoslavs fought with fury against the Italians. For 
Italy the arch-enemy had ever been Austria and Austria 



1 Another delegate is reported to have answered: "As we need Italy's 
friendship, we should pay the moderate price asked and back her claim to 
have the moon." 

281 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

was largely Slav. "Austria," they say, "was the official 
name given to the cruel enemy against whom we fought, 
but it was generally the Croatians and other Slavs whom 
our gallant soldiers found facing them, and it was they 
who were guilty of the misdeeds from which our armies 
suffered." Official documents prove this. 1 Orders of 
the day issued by the Austrian Command eulogize "the 
Serbo-Croatian battalions who vied with the Austro- 
German and Hungarian soldiers in resisting the pitfalls 
dug by the enemy to cause them to swerve from their 
fidelity and take the road to treason. 2 In the last battle 
which ended the existence of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy a large contingent of excellent Croatian troops 
fought resolutely against the Italian armies." 

In Italy an impressive story is told which shows how 
this transformation of the enemy of yesterday into the 
ally of to-day sometimes worked out. The son of an 
Italian citizen who was fighting as an aviator was killed 
toward the end of the war, in a duel fought in the air, 
by an Austrian combatant. Soon after the armistice 
was signed the sorrowing father repaired to the place 
where his son had fallen. He there found an ex-Austrian 
officer, the lucky victor and slayer of his son, wearing in 
his buttonhole the Jugoslav cocarde, who, advancing 
toward him with extended hand, uttered the greeting, 
"You and I are now allies." 3 The historian may smile 
at the naivete of this anecdote, but the statesman will 
acknowledge that it characterized the relations between 
the inhabitants of the new state and the Italians. One 
can divine the feelings of these when they were exhorted 
to treat their ex-enemies as friends and allies. 



1 A number of orders of the day eulogizing individual Slav officers and 
collective military entities were quoted by the advocates of Italy's cause 
at the Conference. 

2 Official communique of June 17, 1918. 

3 Journal de Geneve, April 25, 1919. 



ITALY 

"Is it surprising, then," the Italians asked, "that we 
cannot suddenly conceive an ardent affection for the ruth- 
less 'Austrians' of whose cruelties we were bitterly com- 
plaining a few months back ? Is it strange that we cannot 
find it in our hearts to cut off a slice of Italian territory 
and make it over to them as one of the fruits of — our 
victory over them? If Italy had not first adopted 
neutrality and then joined the Allies in the war there 
would be no Jugoslavia to-day. Are we now to pay 
for our altruism by sacrificing Italian soil and Italian 
souls to the secular enemies of our race?" In a word, the 
armistice transformed Italy's enemy into a friend and 
ally for whose sake she was summoned to abandon some 
of the fruits of a hard-earned victory and a part of her 
.secular aspirations. What, asked the Italian delegates, 
would France answer if she were told that the Prussians 
whom her matchless armies defeated must henceforth be 
looked upon as friends and endowed with some new colo- 
nies which would otherwise be hers ? The Italian dram- 
atist Sem Benelli put the matter tersely: "The collapse 
of Austria transforms itself therefore into a play of words, 
so much so that our people, who are much more precise 
because they languished under the Austrian yoke and the 
Austrian scourge, never call the Austrians by this name; 
they call them always Croatians, knowing well that the 
Croatians and the Slavs who constituted Austria were our 
fiercest taskmasters and most cruel executioners. It is 
naive to think that the ineradicable characteristics and 
tendencies of peoples can be modified by a change of name 
and a new flag." 

But there was another way of looking at the matter, 
and the Allies, together with the Jugoslavs, made the 
most of it. The Slav character of the disputed territory 
was emphasized, the principle of nationality invoked, and 
the danger of incorporating an unfriendly foreign element 

283 



IHF tNSIDE STORY OF HlK PEACE CONFERENCE 

solemnly ■ out. 

son is generally im- 

an government, like 

governments, was frankly nationalistic; 

so statesman like maj weU be questioned 

indeed the i eadj been answered by some 

of i:..'\ - in the negative. 1 They 

i Cabinet afha\ ng deliberately Let loose popular 

afterward vainly sought to allay, and 

ch the] allege in su the charge have 

nevi ted, 

1: was . to Italy's best interests to strike up 

v . with the new state, if that were 

the men in whose hands her destinies 

rested, feeling their ibility, laudable at- 

I to come to a:: understanding, Signor Orlando, 

urcefulness, was one, 

In 1 I he had talked the subject over with the 

der, M. Trurj id favored the movement 

toward reconciliation ' which Barou S his col 

s resolutel} d A congress was ac- 

agrj held in Ron . ted, The 

came amicable. The Jugoslav 

comrj the ttalian capital congratulated Signor 

Orlando on the vict the Piave, But owing to 

various causes, especially to Baron Sonnino's opposition, 

these inchoate sentiments of neighborliness quickly lost 

warmth and finally vanished. No trace of them 

the Paris Conference, where the delegates 

v two states did not converse together nor even 

ite one another 

President Wilson's n:><: to Rome, where, to use an 

1 O s s M«3 ■"■'. -no. 

attitude on March ;. 1919 and a 

> 1:-. .V.~r.'.. Mio. 



ITALY 

Italian ex predion, he v/as welcomed by Delirium, ';ccrned 
to brighten Italy'-. r < ttlook on the future 

rward m§de by the President,';; enemies of th^ su i> 

:;o'|uent change toward Exbtl in the I 

[taliail people. This is commonly ascribed to his fail 

to fulfil the <■/;/' tatlO which hi-, 

aroused or warranted. Nothing could well fcx 

leading. Mr. Wilson's position on tin [taly's 

claims nevei changed, nor did he say or do 

would justify a doubt a i to what it was. In Re 

spoke to the Ministers in exactly the in 

Paris at the Conference \\<-. apprized them in ;'• 

of what he proposed to do in April and he ev( 

templated issuing a declaration of his Italian po 

once. But he was earnestly i d by the Minisfc 

to keep bis counsel to himself and to make no public 

allusion to it during his sojourn in [taly. 1 J\ 

fault, therefore, if the Italian people cherished illusory 

hopes. In Pari-; Signer Orlando had 

encountei w I 1 /) Mr. Wilson, 2 who told him plainly that 
the allotment of the northern frontiei d foi Italy 

by the London Treaty would be confirmed, while thai 
the territory on the eastern Adrial dd be <■ 

'\ he division of the spoils of Austria there must, he added, 
be made congruously with a map which he handed to the 
Italian Premier. It was proved on i i be 

identical with r >n': already published by the New Europe :: 
Signer Orlando glanced at the map and in 



1 Thi -.in'.': k'^i made public by Jv 

dsfcourie pronounced in the parliament at Roi 9, 1919) It wai 

Baron Sonni 
f.uhj'/.t. by President Wilson, Cf. /vz .'jUimpn, July jo, /'>r>. 

v Qn I--:.-, tai / to, 1919 

* It. gave eaetero Priuli to Jt.-j.ly, *P4**fnHiit Go - 
j,-»r t... ;ir;'] av.i^iw] 'I ri':'.t.c and Pola alao to Italy, but . terri- 

ld be expo 

of v/.'j r . 

285 



[HE INSIDE STORY OF [HE PEACE CONFERENCE 

aseology unfolded the tease is wh} : not enl 

tain the settlement proposed He added that 

'.ument would ratify it. Thereupon the President 

turned the diseussion t< out 

the harm which the annex; 

element could Inflict upon ttaly, the great advantages 
which cordial reli is with her Slav neighbor would 
confer on her. and the ease with w the 

markets of the new State, A young and small nation 
like the Jugoslavs would K .:! for an aet of gener- 

osity and would repay it by 1. p a return 

worth re than the contentious ies 

you don't know the Jugoslavs, Mr. President,*' exclaimed 
Signor Orlando. "If Italy were to cede to them Pal- 
mat ia. Fiume, and eastern [stria they would forthwith 
lay claim to Trieste and Tola and. after Trieste and IV 
to Friuli and Gorisia." 

After some further discussion Mr. Wilson said: "Well, 
1 am unable to reconcile with my principles the recogni 
tion of secret treaties, and as the two are incompatible 1 
uphold the principles." '"1. too." rejoined the Italian 
Premier, "condemn secret treaties in the future when the 
new principles will have begun to regulate international 
polities. As for those compacts whieh were concluded 

during the war they were all secret, not excluding those to 
whieh the United States was a party." The President 
demurred to this reservation. He conceived and put his 
ease briefly as follows Italy, like her allies, had had 

it in her power to accept the Fourteen Points, reject 
them, or make reserves. Britain and France had taken 

exception to those clauses whieh they were determined 
to reject, whereas Italy signified her adhesion to them all. 
Therefore she was bound by the principles underlying 
them and had forfeited the right to invoke a secret treaty. 
The settlement of the issues turning upon Palm.: 

186 



ITALY 

[stria, Piume, and the islands mast consequently be 
taken in hand without reference to the clauses of that 
instrument. Examined on their merit:, and in the light 
of the new arrangements, [taly's claims could not be 
upheld. It would be unfair to the Jugoslavs who inhabit 
whole country to cut them ofl from their own sea- 
board. Nor would such a measure he helpful to Italy 
herself, whose interest it was to form a homogeneous 
whole, consolidate her dominions, and prepare for the 
coming economic struggle for national well-being. The 
principle of nationality must, therefore, be allowed full 
play. 

A'; for Piume, even if the city were, as alleged, an 
independent entity and desirous of being incorporated in 
Italy, one would still have to set against these facts Jugo- 
slavia's imperative need of an outlet to the sea. Here 
Lh<: principle of economic necessity outweighs those of 
nationality and fr<-(- determination. A country must live, 
and therefon- be endowed with the wherewithal to sup- 
port life. On these grounds, judgment should be entered 
for the Jugoslavs. 

The Italian Premier's, answer was equally clear, but he 
could not unh»urden his mind of it all. His government 
had, it was true, adhered to the Fourteen Points without 
ration. But the assumptions on which it gave this 
undertaking were that it would not be used to upset past 
compacts, but would be reserved for future settlements; 
that even had it been otherwise the maxims in question 
should be deemed relevant in Italy's case only if applied 
impartially to all states, and that the entire work of 
reorganization should rest on this ethical foundation. A 
regime of exceptions, with privileged and unprivileged 
nations, would obviously render the scheme futile and 
inacceptable. Yet this was the system that was actually 
being introduced. If secret treaties were to be abrogated, 

287 



THE INSIDE STORY OF IHE PEACE CONFERENCE 

i d Japan and Ch '>- n 

out of oou3 rate between them adjudi- 

. 5, If the Fourteen Points are binding, 
iom of -.'■ dmed. If equal rights 

on all states, let the Monroe Doc 
ed. If disarmament is 1 oe a reality, 

ca cease to build warships. Sup- 
se for b that to-morrow Bran! or Chile were 

in of the conduct of the United States, the 
League of Nations, in whose name Mr. Wilson speaks, 
would be hi i Monroe Doctrine front inter- 

ring, whereas Bri ad the United States in analo- 

gous co: v intermeddle in the affairs of any of 

the ates. When Ireland or Egypt or India uplifts 

its voice against Britain, it is but b voice in the desert 
which awakens no echo. If Fiume were inhabited by 
Au\ ens who, with b like claim bo be considered 

B separate entity, asked to be allowed to live under the 
Stars and Stripes, What would President Wilson's attitude 
be then? Would he turn a deaf ear to their prayi 
Surely not. Why. in the case of Italy, does he not do 
.is he would be done by? What it all comes to is that 
the new ordering under the Bag of equality is to eonsist 
of superior and ; .ons. of which the former, who 

gak RngKsh, are to possess unlimited power over the 
ter, to deeide what is good for them and what is bad. 
what is lieit and what is forbidden. And against their 
I there is to be no appeal. In a word, it is to be the 
hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon race. 

It is worth noting that Signer Orlando's arguments 
were all derived from the merits of the ease, not from 
the terms or the force of the London Treaty. Fiume. 
he said, had besought Italy to incorporate it. and had 
made this request before the armistice, at a moment 
when it was riskv to proclaim attachments to the king- 

288 



ITALY 

dom. 1 The inhabitants had invoked Mr. Wilson's ■ ■■ 
words: "National aspirations must be respected. . . . Self- 
determination i - ; not, a mere phra " P^^^pl'-:'. and prov- 
Lncea are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to 
Sovereignty as if they were mere chattels arid, pawns in a 
game. Iwery territorial settlement involved in thi 
must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the 
populations concerned, and riot a-, a part of any adjust- 
ment for compromise oi claims among rival states." And 
in his address at Mount Vernon the President had advo 
catcd a doctrine which i-. peculiarly applicable to I ; iume — 
i.e.: 

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory, 
of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political 
relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that 
settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not 
upon the- basis of material inter':-, t or advantage of any 
other nation or people which may desire a different settle 
ment, for the sake of its own exterior influence or mas- 
tery." 2 These maxims laid down by Mr. Wilson irn- 
plicitly allot Piume to Italy. 

Finally as to the objection that Italy's elaims would 
entail the incorporation of a number of Slavs, the answer 
was that the percentage was negligible as compared with 
the number of foreign elements annexed by other state:;. 
The Pole,, it, v:;r. estimated, would have some 30 pel 
eent. of aliens, the Czeehs not less, Rumania 17 per 
cent., Jugoslavia 1 1 per cent., Franee 4 per eent., and 
Italy only 3 per cent. 

In February the Jugoslavs made a strategie mow 
which many admired as elever, and others blamed as 
unwise. They proposed that all differences between their 

1 The National Council of Piume issued its proclamation before it had 
b< come known that the battle of Vittorio Vow gun — i.e., 0< 

30, 1918. 

2 Speech delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4, 1918. 

289 



VHV INSIDE STOItt OF nit- PEACE CONFERENCE 

■ Mr V 

was 

. i 

■ whose ■■•• as k lown .> s incl 

As 

■ .. ould bt two could be es 

. lose ■ could hope >\ do 

\ at was 

B 

bO en -'■ ' ..-.'\ j as 

tive 
e consequences 
would be dutj As ex e - tion 

was five plei 

■ v ould seem be i sd than any om 

■ be ? ei e the w isesl 

\ of the C 
9 as exp »uch 

. i 
a s . a Supreme ( 

Sign knew that if he hi the sug 

gest de Mr WUsc f's hopes would 

extingu shed the 

Fou pie hold all the les 

as to *he President was, however, con 

vinced that the Iti - - It he 

I; is worth recording that ho 
was so sure of his own hold on tho Italian masses that, 
whs S Orland his demand 



ITALY 

he Daln 
vide bim with a - 

the I' 

out this document irj Parliament in o 
to the nation that tin tion bad 

by America, that it would most r 

Italy's best in I should fe 

with alacrity Signer Orlando, how 
tincate and things took t 

Jri Pai . the Italian delegation made little he 
Bv< / o - dmired, i d, and felt drawn toward the 

to, left to himfelf, wouA 
/ ■ ired • igeo . . - 

though he might be unable to ■■■■' ■ 
by the secret - reaty H ii he wa i noi h fl to himself. He 
had to reckon with hi* Minister of . : who 

war; a. mute a:, an <,-j:.<:r and al unsociable, 

i Sonninohad bis own policy, which wasimmut, 
almost unutterable. At the Co e he seemed un- 

willing to propound, much loss to f 
those foreign collcagu* approval 

its realization depended. He actually shunned deli 

v/ho would tain have talked over their a 

in a friendly, informal way, and whose busisu 

strike up an agreement. In fact, results which could be 

secured only by persuading indifferent or hostile people 
and capturing their good v/ill he expected to attain by 
holding aloof from all and leading the life of a hermit, one 

might almost say of a misanthrope. One can irr. 
the feelings, if one may not reproduce the utterances, of 
English speaking officials, whose legitimate desire for a 

free exchange of view:; with Italy':, official spokesmaj 
thwarted by the idiosyncrasies of her ov/n Minister of 

Foreign Affair.. In Allied Circles BarOfl Sonnino was dis- 
tinctly unpopular, and bis unpopularity produced a 
'jo 391 



rHE INSIDE STORY OF [HI PI V- CONFERENCE 

Ho t 
wh two 

i 

So - 

v\ 
... m n coin, 

■ Jugosli 
ng* .>.-.'. bo to Mr, Wife 

s . peace was with On 

gC4 w -.:■: 
8VW tO 

He nx. 5 to S«3 B would 

-. . . .-. \ it would ". fee the 

League— the g - 

v. ha eas sh< 

She would not un 
states n hich - create while 

. 
eras b Irinmvirate v. :he 

. bo Qe 

the 
econ hich 1 1 

settled oi even ba In the meanwhile the pie 

i Qitmcil, oi whom four or five i 
vo io :.. co a istons, had dis- 
Mr, Wilson was in- 
exorable in his refusal to hi city over bo Italy, and 

various compromises devised by as weavi 

of . try the Italian delegate-. 

5 Of the United Skates, F 



ITALY 

whose wtQfaei mmo. r V^. ! . 

[talian press , tine qua noti 

Italy'-, approval erf the Peace Treaty and by annoum 

that it WOtlld had r; 

practically imp* 

ce that by the govern- 

immaterial to the issue i y * r : who 

fcly told that d from I the 

peoples of E Id fire their ent . and carry 

--. whithei joevei he 9 ished 

governrj now purpose) this ur.: ires 

totentiarie , he would 

one this duri v;rn in Rome but was 

by Bai ation now was to 

tnpel the r ". to go home :n whether 

ible attitude corresponded with that of their 

and to draw the into the camp o: the 

"ide He virtually adm his con- 

■■■':- w Orlando. What he seems to have 

rlooked, however, is that th f ;r'; are time limit . to f ;very 

policy, and that only the same cause . r ,an be set in moti 

to produce the same re suits. In Ital ident's 

very different sound in April from the - 

are forth in January, and the secret of his 

popularity even then was the prevalent faith in his firm 

erminatioi] to bring about a peace of justice, irrespec- 

e of all separate interests, not merely a peace ".vith 

indulgence for the strong and rigor for the weak. The 

time when Mr. Wilson might have summoned the peoples 

of Europe to follow him had gone by :~r ; . It is 

worth noting that the American statesman's views about 

certain of Italy's claims, although originally laid down 

with the usual emphasis as immutable, underwent con- 

>le mod:':' which did not tend to reinforce 

his authority. Thus at the outset he had proclaimed the 

293 



THE INSIDE STORY OF IHE PEACE CONFERENCE 

necessity of dividing [stria between the two claimant 
nations, but, on further reflection, ho gave way in Italy's 
favor, thus enabling Signer Orlando to make the point 
that even the President's solutions needed corrections. 
It is also a fact that when the Italian Premier insisted 

on having the Adriatic problems definitely settled before 
the presentation of the Treaty to the Germans 1 his 
colleagues of France and Britain assured him that this 

reasonable request would be complied with. The eir- 
cumstance that this promise was disregarded did n 
tend to smooth matters in the Council of Five 

The decisive dud between Signer Orlando and Mr. 
Wilson was fought out in April, and the overt aets which 
aently marked their tense relations were but the 
practical consequences of that. On the historic day each 
one so; forth his program with a >.v .,:•:...<• attached, and 
the President of the United States gave utterance to an 
estimate of Italian public opinion which astonished and 
pained the Italian Premier, who. having contributed to 
form it. deemed himself a more competent judge of its 
trend than his distinguished interlocutor. Put Mr. Wil- 
son not only refused to alter his judgment, but announced 
his intention to act upon it and issue an appeal to the 
Italian nation. The gist of this document was known to 
M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George It has been 
alleged, and seems highly probable, that the British 
Premier was throughout most anxious to bring about a 
workable compromise. Proposals were therefore put for- 
ward respecting Fiume and Dalmatia, some of which were 
not inaeeeptable to the Italians, who lodged counter- 
proposals about the others. On the fate of these counter- 
proposals everything depended. 

On April 83d I was at the Hotel Bdouard VII. the head- 
quarters of the Italian delegation, discussing the outlook 

1 Between April 5th and 12th. 

994 



ITALY 

.;• to learn that -y,me agreement had b< 

u bed I rung rc< of the 

on were .: ce on the burning sub- 

infully aware that tirr c -. Dan ex '•- 

sword o bread over 

their heads, and that a spirit oi large cornpron 

indi >le. At three o'clock Mr- Lli George's 

'::■■..:•/ brought the reply oi the Council of Three to 
Jta' . xirnurn of oc -. Only one point re 

mained in dispute, I was told, but tl 
Piume, and, by a strange chan' not mentioned in 

the reply which the secret* 

Italian delegation ce telephoned to the Bril 

Premier asking him to receive the Marquis Imperii 
v/h o , cal ling - ard , 1 earn ed t ?. 

to be a free city and exempt from control. It was ••'•' 

marquis had ji rned that J took leave oi my 

hosts and received the i that I should be in- 

formed of the result. About half an hour later, on 

eipt of an urgent i ; tened back to the 

Italian headquarters, v. ernation prevailed, and 

J learned that hardly had the delegate-; begun to d:v 
the contentious clause when a copy of the Tempi -■ 
brought in, containing Mr. Wilson' s appeal v .o the Itali 
people "over the head-, of the Italian government," 

The publication fell like a powerful explosive. The 
public were a', a loss to fit in Mr. Wilson':-; unpi 
action with that of his British and French colleagues. 
Pot if in the morning he sent his appeal to the newspaper . 
it was asked, why did he allow his Italian colleagues 
to go on examining a proposal on which he mam'fe 

tuned that they were no longer competent to treat? 
Moreover a rational desire to settle Italy's Adriatic 
frontiers, it was observed, ought not to have lessened his 
concern about the larger issues which his unwor. 

29 S 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

procedure was bound to raise. And one of these was 
respect for authority, the loss of which was the taproot of 
Bolshevism. Signor Orlando replied to the appeal in a 
trenchant letter which was at bottom a reasoned protest 
against the assumed infallibility of any individual and, 
in particular, of one who had already committed several 
radical errors of judgment. What the Italian Premier 
failed to note was the consciousness of overwhelming 
power and the will to use it which imparted its specific 
mark to the whole proceeding. Had he realized this ele- 
ment, his subsequent tactics would perhaps have run 
on different lines. 

The suddenness with which the President carried out 
his purpose was afterward explained as the outcome of 
misinformation. In various Italian cities, it had been 
reported to him, posters were appearing on the walls an- 
nouncing that Fiume had been annexed. Moreover, it 
was added, there were excellent grounds for believing that 
at Rome the Italian Cabinet was about to issue a decree 
incorporating it officially, whereby things would become 
more tangled than ever. Some French journals gave 
credit to these allegations, and it may well be that Mr. 
Wilson, believing them, too, and wanting to be beforehand, 
took immediate action. This, however, is at most an 
explanation; it hardly justifies the precipitancy with 
which the Italian plenipotentiaries were held up to the 
world as men who were misrepresenting their people. 
As a matter of fact careful inquiry showed that all those 
reports which are said to have alarmed the President were 
groundless. Mr. Wilson's sources of information respect- 
ing the countries on which he was sitting in judgment were 
often as little to be depended on as presumably were the 
decisions of the special commissions which he and Mr. 
Lloyd George so unceremoniously brushed aside. 

On the following morning Signori Orlando and Sonnino 

296 



ITALY 

called on the British Premier in response to his urgent 

invitation. To their surprise they found Mr. Wil:,on and 
M. Clemenceau also awaiting thorn, ready, as it might 
geem, to begin the discussion anew, curious in any case 
to observe tlv- effect of the declaration, Put the Italian 
Premier burned hi:; boats without delay or hesitation. 
" You have challenged the authority of the Italian govern- 
ment," he said, "and appealed to the Italian people. Be 
it so. It is now become my duty to seek out the repre- 
sentatives of my people in Parliament and to call upon 
them to decide between Mr. Wilson and me." The Presi- 
dent returned the only answer possible, "Undoubtedly 
that is your duty." "I shall inform Parliament then that 
we have allies incapable of agreeing among themselves on 
matters that concern us vitally." Disquieted by the 
militant tone of the Minister, Mr. Lloyd George uttered 
a suasive appeal for moderation, and expressed the hope 
that, in his speech to the Italian Chamber, Signor Orlando 
would not forget to say that a satisfactory solution may 
yet be found. He would surely be incapable of jeopardiz- 
ing the chances of such a desirable consummation. "I 
will make the people arbiters of the whole situation," the 
Premier announced, "and in order to enable them to 
judge with full knowledge of the data, I herewith ask your 
permission to communicate my last memorandum to the 
Council of Four. It embodies the pith of the facts which 
it behooves the Parliament to have before it. In the mean- 
time, the Italian government withdraws from the Peace 
Conference." On this the painful meeting terminated and 
the principal Italian plenipotentiaries returned to Rome. 
In France a section of the press sympathized with the 
Italians, while the government, and in particular M. 
Clemenceau, joined Mr. Wilson, who had promised to 
restore the sacredness of treaties 1 in exhorting Signor 

1 In his address to the representatives of organized labor in January, 191 8. 

297 



THF INSIDE STORY OF THF PEACE CONFERENCE 

Orlando to give Up the Treaty of London. The clash 
between Mr. Wilson and Signer Orlando and the de- 
re of the kalian plenipotentiaries coincided with the 
arrival of the Germans in Versailles, so that the Allies 
were faced with the alternative of speeding up their des- 
ultory talks and improvising B definite solution or giving 
up all pretense at unanimity in the presence of the enemy. 
One important Paris journal found fault with Mr. Wilson 
and his "Encyclical," and protested emphatically against 
his way of filling every gap in his arrangements by wedg- 
ing into it his League of Wit ions. "Can we harbor any 
illusion as to the net worth of the League of Nations when 
the revised text of the Covenant reveals it shrunken to 
the merest shadow, incapable of thought, will, action, or 
justice? • • • Too often have we made sacrifices to the Wil- 
sonian doctrine." l . . . Another press organ compared 
Fiume to the Saar Valley and sympathized with Italy, 
who. relying on the solidarity of her allies, expected to 
secure the city. 8 

While those wearisome word-battles— in which the per- 
sona] element played an undue part — were being waged 
in the twilight of a secluded Valhalla, the Supreme Eco- 
nomic Council decided that the seized Austrian vessels 
must be pooled among all the Allies. When the untoward 
consequences of this decision were flashed upon the Italians 
and the Jugoslavs, the rupture between them was seen to 
be injurious to both and profitable to third parties. For 
if the Austrian vessels were distributed among all the 
Allied peoples, the share that would fall to those two 
would be of no account. Now for the first time the ad- 
versaries bestirred themselves. But it was not their dip- 
lomatists who took the initiative. Eager for their re- 
spective countries' share of the spoils of war, certain 

1 L'Eclw de Paris, April -?g, 1919. 
'- & Qauhis, April 39, 1919. 

3 9 3 



ITALY 

businessmen on both sides met, 1 deliberated, and worked 
out an equitable accord which gave four-fifths of the ton- 
nage to Italy and the remainder to the Jugoslavs, who 
otherwise would not have obtained a single ship. 2 They 

next set about getting the resolution of the Economic 
Council repealed, and went on with their conversations. 3 
The American delegation was friendly, promised to plead 
for the repeal, and added that "if the accord eould be 
extended to the Adriatic problem Mr. Wilson would be 
delighted and would take upon himself to ratify it even 
without the sanction oj the Conference* Encouraged by this 
promise, the delegates made the attempt, but as the 
Italian Premier had for some unavowed reason limited 
the intercourse of the negotiators to a single day, on the 
expiry of which he ordered the conversation to cease, B 
they failed. Two or three days later the delegates in 
question had quitted Paris. 

What this exchange of views seems to have demon- 
strated to open -minded Italians was that the Jugoslavs, 
whose reputation for obstinacy was a dogma among all 
their adversaries and some of their friends, have chinks 
in their panoply through which reason and suasion may 
penetrate. 

When the Italian withdrew from the Conference he 
had ample reason for believing that in his absence peace 
could not be signed, and many thought that, by departing, 
he was giving Mr. Wilson a Roland for his Oliver. But 
this supposed tactical effect formed no part of Orlando's 
deliberate plan. It was a coincidence to be utilized, 
nothing more. Mr. Wilson had left him no choice but 
to quit France and solicit the verdict of his countrymen. 

1 These meetings were held from March 28 till April 23, 1919. 

2 See Marco Borsa's article in // Secolo, June 18, 191 9; also Corriere 
delta Sera, June 19, 191 9. 

3 From May 5 to 16, 1919. 

4 // Secolo, )unc 19, 1919. 6 On April 23, 1919, 

299 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

But Mr. Wilson's colleagues were aghast at the thought 
that the Pact of London, by which none of the Allies 
might conclude a separate peace, rendered it indispensable 

that Italy's recalcitrant plenipotentiaries should be co- 
signatories, or at any rate consenting parties. About 
this interpretation of the Pact there was not the slightest 
doubt. Hence every one feared that the signing of the 
Peace Treaty would be postponed indefinitely because 
of the absence of the Italian plenipotentiaries from the 
Conference. That certainly was the belief of the remain- 
ing delegates. There was no doubt anywhere that the 
presence or the express assent of the Italians was a sine 
qua not of the legality of the Treaty. It certainly was 
the conviction of the French press, and was borne out by 
the most eminent jurists throughout the world. 1 That 
the Italian delegates might refuse to sign, as Signor 
Orlando had threatened, until Italy's affairs were arranged 
satisfactorily was taken for granted, and the remaining 
members of the inner Council set to work to check-mate 
this potential maneuver and dispense with her co-opera- 
tion. This aim was attained during the absence of the 
Italian delegation by the decree that the signature of any 
three of the Allied and Associated governments would be 
deemed adequate. The legality and even the morality 
of this provision were challenged by many. 



1 "Can and will our allies treat our absence as a matter of no moment? 
Can and will they violate the formal undertaking whieh forbids the bellig- 
erents to conclude a diplomatic peace? . . . The London Declaration pro- 
hibits categorically the conclusion of any separate peace with any enemy- 
state. France and England cannot sign peace with Germany if Italy does 
not sign it. . . . The situation is grave and abnormal, for our allies it is 
also grave and abnormal. Italy is isolated, and nations, especially those 
of continental Europe, which are not overrich, Bee solitude as nature 
abhors a vacuum." — Cor r it- re tlcihi Sera, April Jo, IQIQ, Again: The 
Treaty of London' restrains Prance and England from concluding peace 
without Italy. And Italy is minded not to conclude peace with Germany 
before she herself has received satisfaction." — Journal dt Getihe, April 25, 
1919. 

300 



ITALY 

But it may be maintained that the imperative nature 
of the task which confronted the Conference demanded 
a chart of ideas and principles different from that by 
which Old World diplomacy had been guided and that re- 
spect for the letter of a compact should not be allowed to 
destroy its spirit. There is much to be said for this 
contention, which was, however, rejected by Italian 
jurists as destructive of the sacredness of treaties. They 
also urged that even if it were permissible to dash formal 
obstacles aside in order to clear the path for the further- 
ance of a good cause 1 it is also indispensable that the 
result should be compassed with the smallest feasible 
sacrifice of principle. Hopes were accordingly enter- 
tained by the Italian delegates that, on their return to 
Paris, at least a formal declaration might be made that 
Italy's signature was indispensable to the validity of the 
Treaty. But they were not, perhaps could not, be ful- 
filled at that conjuncture. 

Advantage was taken in other ways of the withdrawal 
of Italy's representatives from the Conference. For 
example, a clause of the Treaty with Germany dealing 
with reparations was altered to Italy's detriment. An- 
other which turned upon Austro- German relations was 
likewise modified. Before the delegates left for Rome 
it had been settled that Germany should be bound over 
to respect Austria's independence. This obligation was 
either superfluous, every state being obliged to respect 
the independence of every other, or else it had a cryptic 
meaning which would only reveal itself in the application 
of the clause. As soon as the Conference was freed from 
the presence of the Italians the formula was modified, 
and Germany was plainly forbidden to unite with Austria, 
even though Austria should expressly desire amalgama- 
tion. As this enactment runs directly counter to the 
principle of self-determination, the Italian Minister Crespi 

301 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

raised his voice in energetic protest against this and the 
financial changes, 1 whereupon the Triumvirs, giving way 
on the latter point, consented to restore the primitive 
text of the financial condition. 2 Germany is obliged to 
supply France with seven million tons of coal every year 
by way of restitution for damage done during the war. 
At the price of fifty francs a ton, the money value of this 
tribute would be three hundred and fifty million francs, 
of which Italy would be entitled to receive 30 per cent. 
But during the absence of the Italian representatives a 
supplementary clause was inserted in the Treaty 3 con- 
ferring a special privilege on France which renders Italy's 
claim of little or no value. It provides that Germany 
shall deliver annually to France an amount of coal equal 
to the difference between the pre-war production of the 
mines of Pas de Calais and the Nord, destroyed by the 
enemy, and the production of the mines of the same 
area during each of the coming years, the maximum limit 
to be twenty million tons. As this contribution takes 
precedence of all others, and as Germany, owing to 
insufficiency of transports and other causes, will probably 
be unable to furnish it entirely, Italy's claim is considered 
practically valueless. 

The reception of the delegates in Rome was a triumph, 
their return to Paris a humiliation. For things had been 
moving fast in the meanwhile, and their trend, as we said, 
was away from Italy's goal. Public opinion in their own 
country likewise began to veer round, and people asked 
whether they had adopted the right tactics, whether, in 
fine, they were the right men to represent their country 
at that crisis of its history. There was no gainsaying 
the fact that Italy was completely isolated at the Con- 



1 On May 6, 1919, at Versailles. 

* Cf. Corners delta Sera, May 10, 1919. 

3 Annex W of the Revised Treaty. 

302 



ITALY 

ference. She had sacrificed much and had garnered in 
relatively little. The Jugoslavs had offered her an 
alliance — although this kind of partnership had originally 
been forbidden by the Wilsonian discipline; the offer 
was rejected and she was now certain of their lasting 
enmity. Venizelos had also made overtures to Baron 
Sonnino for an understanding, but they elicited no 
response, and Italy's relations with Greece lost whatever 
cordiality they might have had. Between France and 
Italy the threads of friendship which companionship in 
arms should have done much to strengthen were strained 
to the point of snapping. And worst, perhaps, of all, the 
Italian delegates had approved the clause forbidding 
Germany to unite with Austria. 

That the fault did not lie wholly in the attitude of 
the Allies is obvious. The Italian delegates' lack of 
method, one might say of unity, was unquestionably a 
contributory cause of their failure to make perceptible 
headway at the Conference. A curious and character- 
istic incident of the slipshod way in which the work 
was sometimes done occurred in connection with the 
disposal of the Palace Venezia, in Rome, which had 
belonged to Austria, but was expropriated by the Italian 
government soon after the opening of hostilities. The 
heirs of the Hapsburg Crown put forward a claim to 
proprietary rights which was traversed by the Italian 
government. As the dispute was to be laid before 
the Conference, the Roman Cabinet invited a juris 
consult versed in these matters to argue Italy's case. 
He duly appeared, unfolded his claim congruously with 
the views of his government, but suddenly stopped 
short on observing the looks of astonishment on the 
faces of the delegates. It appears that on the preced- 
ing day another delegate of the Economic Conference, 
also an Italian, had unfolded and defended the contrary 

3°3 



THE tNSIDE STORY OF IHE PFACF CONFFRFXCF 

thesis — namely, that Austria's heirs had inherited her 
ri^ht to the Palace of Venecia. 1 

Passing to more momentous matters, one may per- 
tinently ask whether too much stress was not laid by the 
first Italian delegation upon the national and sentimental 
sides of Italy's interests, and too little on the others. 
Among the Great Towers Italy is most in need of raw 
materials. She is destitute of eoal. iron, eouon. and 
naphtha. Most of them are to be had in Asia Minor, 
They are indispensable conditions of modern life and 
progress. To demand a fair share of them as guerdon 
for having saved Europe, and to put in her claim at a 

moment when Europe was being reconstituted, could not 

have been construed as imperialism. The other Allies 
had possessed most of those neeessaries in abundance long 
before the war. They were adding to them now as the 
fruits of a vietory which Italy's sacrifices had made 

possible. Why, then, should she be left unsatisfied? 

bitterly though the nation was disappointed by failure 
to have its territorial claims allowed, it became still 
more deeply grieved when it came to realize that much 
more important advantages might have been secured if 
these had been placed in the forefront of the nation's 
demands. Emigration ground for Italy's surplus popula- 
••.. which is rapidly increasing, eoal and iron for her 
industries might perhaps have been obtained if the 
Italian plan of campaign at the Conference had been 
rightly conceived and skilfully executed. Tut this realis- 
tic aspect of Italy's interests was almost wholly lost sight 
of during the waging of the heated and unfruitful contests 
for the possession of town and ports, which, although sacred 

symbols of Italianism, could not add anything to the 

1 This incident was revealed by Banco Ferri, in his remarkable speech 
in the ttalian Parliament on July 9, 1919, O". I .: Stampa, July 10, 1919, 
page ft. 

304 



ITALY 

economic resources which will play such a predominant 
part in the future struggle for material well-being a 
the new and old states. There was a marked propensity 
among Italy's leaders at home and in Paris to consider 
each oi the issues that concerned their country as though 
it stood alone, instead of envisaging Italy's economic, 
financial, and military position after the war as an in- 
divisible problem arid proving that it behooved the Allies 
m the Interests of a European peace to solve it satisfac- 
torily, and to provide compensation in one direction for 
inevitabb gaps in the other. Tin., to my thinking, was 
the fundamental error of the Italian and Allied stata 
for which Europe may have to suffer. That Italy's pol- 
icy cannot in the near future return to the lin< 
which it ran ever since the establishment of her national 
unity, whatever her allies may do or say, will hardly be 
gainsaid. Interests are decisive factors of foreign policy, 

and the action of the Great Power:, ha:, determined 
Italy's orientation, 

Italy undoubtedly gained a great deal by the war, into 
which she entered mainly for the purpose of achieving her 
unity and securing strong frontier,. But she signed the 
Treaty convinced that she had not succeeded in 
either purpose, and that her alii'-, were answerable for 
her failure. It was i < rtainly part of their pohey to build 

up a Strong State on her frontier out of a race vvhi':h she 

regards as her adversary and to give it command of some 

of her Strategic positions. And the overt bearing manner 
in which this policy was sometimes carried out left as 
much bitterness behind as the object it aimed at. It is 

alleged that the Italian delegates Were treated with an 
economy of consideration which bordered on something 
much Worse, while the argument-, officially invoked to 
n on -suit them appeared to them in the light of bitter 
sarcasms. President Wilson, they complained, ignored 

3<»5 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

his far-resonant principle of self-determination when 
tan presented her claim for Shantung, but refused to 

swerve from it when Italy relied on her treaty rights in 
Palmatia. And when the inhabitants oi Fiume voted for 
union with the mother country, the President abandoned 
that principle and gave judgment for Jugoslavia on other 
grounds. He was right, but disappointing, they ob- 
served, when he told Ins fellow-citizens that his presence 
in Europe was indispensable in order to interpret his con- 
ceptions, for no other rational being could have construed 
them thus. 

The withdrawal of the Italian delegates was construed 
.-> an act of insubordination, and punished as such. The 
Marquis de Viti de Yarche has since disclosed the fact 
that the Allied governments forthwith reduced the credits 
accorded to Italy during hostilities, whereupon hardships 
and distress were aggravated and the peasantry over a 
large area of the country suffered intensely. 1 For Italy 
is more dependent on her allies than ever, owing to the 
sacrifices which she offered up during the war, and she 
was made to feel her dependence painfully. The military 
assistance which they had received from her was fraught 
with financial and economic consequences which have not 
yet been realized by the unfortunate people who must 
endure them. Italy at the close of hostilities was bur- 
dened with a foreign debt of twenty milliards of lire, an 
internal debt of fifty millards. and a paper circulation four 
times more than what it was in pre-war days.- Raw 
materials were exhausted, t rathe and production were 
stagnant, navigation had almost ceased, and the ex- 

1 Cf. Tkt Mor>::-.£ ;V.v, July 0. 1010. 

- On July ioth the Italian Finance Minister, in his financial statement, an- 
nounced that the total cost of the war to Italy would amount to one hun- 
dred milliard lire, lie added, however, that her share oi the German in- 
demnity would wipe out her foreign debt, while a progressive tax on all 
but small fortunes would meet her internal obligations. Cf. Corricre dtlia 
Sfero, July II and [2, 1919. 

;o6 



ITALY 

penditure of the state had risen to eleven milliards a 
year. 1 

According to the figures published by tl i 
iety of Berne, the genera] rise in | - ttributed to 

the v/ar hit Italy much harder than any of her allies. 3 
The consequences of this and other perturbation 
sinister and immediate. The nation, bereft of what it 
had been taught to regard right, humiliated in the 

persons of its chiefs, subjected to foreign guidance, in- 
sufficiently clad, underfed, and with no tangible grounds 
for expecting speedy improvement, was seething with 
discontent. Frequent strik' 6 merely aggravated the gen- 
eral suffering, which finally led to riots, rising:-;, and the 
shedding of blood. The economic, political, and moral 
crisis was unprecedented. The men who drew Italy into 
the war were held up to public opprobrium because in 
the imagination of the people the victory had cost them 
more and brought them in less than neutrality would 
have done. One of the principal orators of the Opposi- 
tion, in a trenchant di in the Italian Parliament, 

d, "The Salandra-Sonnino Cabinet led Italy into the 
war blindfolded." a 

After the return of the Italian delegation to Paris vari- 
OUS fresh combinations were devised for the purpose of 
grappling with the Adriatic problem. One commended 
itself to th& Italians as a possible basis for discussion. In 
principle it was accepted. A declaration to this effect 
was made by Signer Orlando and taken cognizance of by 
M. Clemenceau, who undertook to lay the matter before 
Mr. Wilson, the sole arbitrator in Italian affairs. He 
played the part of Fate throughout. Days went by after 

x Cf. Avanti, July 19, 1919. 

2 Shown in percentages, the rise in the cost of living was: United States, 
220 per cent. ; England, 240 per cent.; Switzerland, 257 per cent.; France, 
368 per cent.; Italy, 481 per cent. 

' Enrico Ferri, on July 9, 1919. Cf. La Stampa, July 10, 1919. 

21 307 



[HE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

this without bringing any token that the Triumvir. 
was interested in the Adriatic. A: last the Italian Premier 
oinded his French colleague that the latest proposal 
had been accepted in principle, and the Italian plenipo- 
tentiaries were awaiting Mr. Wilson's pleasure in the 
matter. Accordingly, M, Qemenceau undertook to broach 
the matter to the American statesman without delay. 
The reply, which was promptly given, dismayed the Ital- 
ians. It was in the form of one of those interpretations 
which, becoming associated with Mr. Wilson's name. 
shook public confidence in certain of the statesman-like 
qualities with which he had at first been credited. The 
construction which he now put upon the mode of voting 
to be applied to Fiume. including this city — in a large dis- 
trict inhabited by a majority of Jugoslavs imparted 
the .is the Italians had understood it a wholly new 

ect. They accordingly declared it inacceptable. As 
after that there seemed to be nothing more for the Italian 
Premier to do in Paris, he left, was soon afterward de- 
ed in the Chamber, and resigned together with his 
Cabinet. The vote of the Italian Parliament, which ap- 
peared to the continental press in the light of a protest 
of the nation against the aims and the methods of the 
Conference, closed for the time being the chapter oi Italy's 
endeavor to complete her unity, secure strong frontiers, 
and perpetuate her political partnership with Prance and 
her intimate relations with the Entente. Thenceforward 
the English-speaking states might influence her overt acts. 
compel submission to their behests, arid generally exercise 
a sort of guardianship over her. because they are the dis- 
pensers of economic boons, but the union of hearts, the 
mutual trust, the cement supplied by common aims are 
lacking. 

One of the most telling arguments employed by Presi- 
dent Wilson to dissuade various states from claiming 

30$ 



ITALY 

strategic positions, and in particular Italy from insisting 
on the annexation of Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, 
was the effective protection which the League of Nations 

would confer en them. 1 Strategical considerations would, 
it was urged, lose all their value in the new era, and terri- 
torial guaranties become meaningless and cumbersome 
survivals of a dead epoch. That was the principal 
weapon with which he had striven to parry the thrusts 
of M. Clemenceau and the touchstone by which he V 
the sincerity of all professions of faith in his cherished 
project of compacting the nations of the world in a vast 
league of peace-loving, law-abiding communities. But 
the faith of France's leaders differed little from unbelief. 
Guaranties first and the protection of the League after- 
ward was the French formula, around which many fierce 
battles royal were fought. In the end Mr. Wilson, hav- 
ing obtained the withdrawal of the demand for the Rhine 
frontier, gave in, and the Covenant was reinforced by a 
compact which in the last analysis is a military under- 
taking, a unilateral Triple Alliance, Great Britain and the 
United States undertaking to hasten to France's assist- 
ance should her territory be wantonly invaded by Ger- 
many. The case thus provided for is extremely improb- 
able. The expansion of Germany, when the auspicious 
hour strikes, will presumably be inaugurated on wholly 
new lines, against which armies, even if they can be mo- 
bilized in time, will be of little avail. But if force were 
resorted to, it is almost certain to be used in the direction 
where the resistance is least — against France's ally, Po- 
land. This, however, is by the way. The point made 



1 At a later date the President reiterated the grounds of his decision. In 
his Columbus speech (September 4, 1919J he asserted that "Italy desired 
Fiume for strategic military reasons, which the League of Nations would 
make unnecessary." (The New York Herald (Paris edition;, September 6, 
1919.,) But the League did not render strategic precautions unnecessary 
to France. 

309 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

by the Italians was that the League of Nations being thus 
admittedly powerless to discharge the functions which 
alone could render strategic frontiers unnecessary, can 
consequently no longer be relied upon as an adequate 
protection against the dangers which the possession of 
the strongholds she claimed on the Adriatic would effec- 
tively displace. Either the League, it was argued, can. 
as asserted, protect the countries which give up command- 
ing positions to potential enemies, or it cannot. In the 
former hypothesis France's insistence on a military con- 
vention is mischievous and immoral — in the latter Italy 
stands in as much need of the precautions devised as her 
neighbor. But her spokesmen were still plied with the 
threadbare arguments and bereft of the - countervailing 
corrective. And faith in the efficacy of the League was 
sapped by the very men who were professedly seeking to 
spread it. 

The press of Rome. Turin, and Milan pointed to the 
loyalty of the Italian people, brought out, they said, in 
sharp relief by the discontent which the exclusive char- 
acter of that triple military accord engendered among 
them. As kinsmen of the French it was natural for 
Italians to expect that they would be invited to become 
a party to this league within the League. As loyal allies 
of Britain and France they felt desirous of being admitted 
to the alliance. But they were excluded. Nor was their 
exasperation allayed by the assurance of their press that 
this was no alliance, but a state of tutelage. An alliance, 
it was explained, is a compact by which two or more 
parties agree to render one another certain services under 
given conditions, whereas the convention in question is a 
one-sided undertaking on the part of Britain and the 
United States to protect France if wantonly attacked, 
because she is unable efficaciously to protect herself. 
It is a benefaction. But this casuistry fell upon deaf 

310 



ITALY 

ears. What the people felt was the disesteem — the term 
in vogue was stronger — in which they were held by the 
Allies, whom they had saved perhaps from ruin. 

By slow degrees the sentiments of the Italian nation 
underwent a disquieting change. All parties and cla ises 
united in stigmatizing the behavior of the Allies in terms 
which even the literary eminence of the poet d'Annunzio 
could not induce the censors to let pass. "The Peace 
Treaty," wrote Italy's most influential journal, "and 
its correlate forbode for the near future the Continental 
hegemony of France countersigned by the Anglo-Arncri- 
can alliance." l Another widely circulated and respected 
organ described the policy of the Entente as a solvent of 
the social fabric, constructive in words, corrosive in acts, 
"mischievous if ever there was a mischievous policy. 
For while raising hopes and whetting appetites, it does 
nothing to satisfy them; on the contrary, it does much to 
disappoint them. In words — a struggle for liberty, for 
nations, for the equality of peoples and classes, for the 
well-being of all; in acts — the suppression of the most 
elementary and constitutional liberty, the overlordship 
of certain nations based on the humiliation of others, the 
division of peoples into exploiters and exploited — the 
sharpening of social differences — the destruction of collec- 
tive wealth, and its accumulation in a few blood-stained 
hands, universal misery, and hunger." 2 

Although it is well understood that Italy's defeat at the 
Conference was largely the handiwork of President Wil- 
son, the resentment of the Italian nation chose for its 
immediate objects the representatives of France and 
Britain. The American "associates" were strangers, here 
to-day and gone to-morrow, but the Allies remain, and 
if their attitude toward Italy, it was argued, had been 

1 Corrierc delta Sera, May II, 1 919. 
1 La Stampa, July 16, 1919. 

3" 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
.' their loyalty had boon real, she would have 

tely as well as they, whatever the 
Am© - might have said or done 

The Italian press iery wrath against its 

French ally, who so t the Coi ce had met 

Italy's solicitations with the odious word "impossible." 

Even d s organs of public opinion gave tree vent 

as of Prance's policy and antb as of its 

lences w hich disturbed the equanimity of Europe 

state "It is impossible," one of these journals 

wrote, "tor France to become the absolute despot of 

Europe without Italy, much less against Italy. What 

I the powers of Richelieu, who was a lion and 

. combined, and was beyond the reaeh of Bonaparte, 

who was both an eagle and a serpent cann >t be achieved 

by "Tiger" Clemeneeau in circumstances so much less 

favorable than those of yore. We. it is true, are isolated. 

v is not preeisoly embarrassed by the choice 

of peace was described as "Franco-Slav 

domination with rs in Prague, and a 

inch office in Agram.*' M. CI snly 

charged v. fth striving a emony of the Continent 

mtry by many from Austria and 

sun tg her with a ring of Slav states Poland. 

Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and perhaps the non-Slav 

kingdom of K. All these states would bo in the 

lea.. ngs of the French K . and Austria would 

be linked to it in a d : goisa And in order to 

effect this resuscitation of the Hapsburg state under 

name of "Danubian federation." Mr. Wilson, it was 

.1. had authorized a deliberate \ ] of bis own 

principle of self de:r-.--aunation. and refused to Ausl 

jht of a/ the regime which she prt It 

was, in truth, an odd compromise, these critics c 
tinued. for ilist of the President's caliber, on whose 

3" 



ITALY 

every political action the scrutinizing gaze of the world 
was fixed. One could not account for it as a sacrifice 
made for a high ethical aim — one of those ends which,' 
according to the old maxim, hallows the means. It 
seemed an open response to a secret instigation or impulse 
which was unconnected with any recognized or avowable 
principle. Even the Socialist organs swelled the chorus 
of the accusers. Avanti wrote, "We are Socialists, yet 
we have never believed that the American President with 
his Fourteen Points entered into the war for the highest 
aims of humanity and for the rights of peoples, any more 
than we believe at present that his opposition to the 
aspirations of the Italian state on the Adriatic are in- 
spired by motives of idealism." 1 

The fate 01 the disputed territories on the Adriatic was 
to be the outcome of self-determination. Poland's claims 
were to be left to the self-determination of the Silesian 
and Ruthenian populations. Rumania was told that her 
suit must remain in abeyance until it could be tested by 
the same principle, which would be applied in the form 
of a plebiscite. For self-determination was the corner- 
stone of the League of Nations, the holiest boon for which 
the progressive peoples of the world had been pouring 
out their life-blood and substance for nearly five years. 
But when Italy invoked self-determination, she was 
promptly non-suited. When Austria appealed to it she 
was put out of court. And to crown all, the world was 
assured that the Fourteen Points had been triumphantly 
upheld. This depravation of principles by the triumph 
of the little prudences of the hour spurred some of the 
more impulsive critics to ascribe it to influences less 
respectable than those to which it may fairly be attributed. 

The directing Powers were hypersensitive to the oft- 
repeated charge of meddling in the internal affairs 

1 Avanti, April 27, 1919. Cf. Le Temps, April 28, 1919. 

313 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of other nations. They were never tired of protesting 
their abhorrence of anything that smacked of interference. 
Among the numerous facts, however, which they could 
neither deny nor reconcile with their professions, the fol- 
lowing was brought forward by the Italians, who had a 
special interest to draw public attention to it. It had to 
do with the abortive attempt to restore the Hapsburg 
monarchy in Hungary as the first step toward the for- 
mation of a Danubian federation. "It is certain," wrote 
the principal Italian journal, "that the Archduke Joseph's 
coup d'etat did not take place, indeed (given the conditions 
in Budapest) could not take place, without the Entente's 
connivance. The official communique's of Budapest and 
Vienna, dated August 9th, recount on this point precise 
details which no one has hitherto troubled to deny. The 
Peidl government was scarcely three days in power, and, 
therefore, was not in a position to deserve either trust or 
distrust, when the heads of the 'order-loving organiza- 
tions' put forward, to justify the need of a new crisis, the 
complaints of the heads of the Entente Missions as to the 
anarchy prevailing in Hungary and the urgency of finding 
'some one' who could save the country from the abyss. 
Then a commission repaired to Alscuth, where it easily 
persuaded the Archduke to come to Budapest. Here he 
at once visited all the heads of missions and spent the 
whole day in negotiations. 'As a result of negotiations 
with Entente representatives, the Archduke Joseph undertook 
a solution of the crisis.' He then called together the old 
state police and a volunteer army of eight thousand men. 
The Rumanian garrison was kept ready. The Peidl gov- 
ernment naturally did not resist at all. At 10 p.m. on 
August 7th all the Entente Missions held a meeting, to 
which the Archduke Joseph and the new Premier were in- 
vited. General Gorton presided. TJie Conference lasted 
two hours and reached an agreement on all questions. AH 

3*4 



ITALY 

the heads of Missions assured the new government of their 
warmest support." l 

Another case of unwarranted interference which stirred 
the Italians to bitter resentment turned upon the obliga- 
tion imposed on Austria to renounce her right to unite 
with Germany. "It is difficult to discern in the policy of 
the Entente toward Austria anything more respectable 
than obstinacy coupled with stupidity," wrote the same 
journal. "But there is something still worse. It is im- 
possible not to feel indignant with a coalition which, after 
having triumphed in the name of the loftiest ideas . . . 
treats German-Austria no better than the Holy Alliance 
treated the petty states of Italy. But the Congress of 
Vienna acted in harmony with the principle of legitimism 
which it avowed and professed, whereas the Paris Confer- 
ence violates without scruple the canons by which it 
claims to be guided. 

"Not a whit more decorous is the intervention of the 
Supreme Council in the internal affairs of Germany — a 
state which, according to the spirit and the letter of the 
Versailles Treaty, is sovereign and not a protectorate. 
The Conference was qualified to dictate peace terms to 
Germany, but it wanders beyond the bounds of its com- 
petency when it construes those terms and arrogates to 
itself — on the strength of forced and equivocal interpreta- 
tions — the right of imposing upon a nation which is neither 
militarily nor juridically an enemy a constitutional reform. 
Whether Germany violates the Treaty by her Constitution 
is a question which only a judicial finding of the League of 
Nations can fairly determine." 2 

It would be impolitic to overlook and insincere to be- 
little the effects of this incoherency upon the relations 
between France and Italy. Public opinion in the Penin- 

1 Corriere delta Sera, August 9, 1919. 

2 Corriere delta Sera, September 3, 19 19. 

315 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

sula characterized the attitude of France as deliberately 
hostile. The Italians at the Conference eagerly scruti- 
nized every act and word of their French colleagues, with 
a view to discovering grounds for dispelling this view. 
But the search is reported to have been worse than vain. 
It revealed data which, although susceptible of satisfac- 
tory explanations, would, if disclosed at that moment, have 
aggravated the feeling of bitterness against France, which 
was fast gathering. Signor Orlando had recourse to the 
censor to prevent indiscretions, but the intuition of the 
masses triumphed over repression, and the existing tense- 
ness merged into resentment. The way in which Italians 
accounted for M. Clemenceau's attitude was this. Al- 
though Italy has ceased to be the important political 
factor she once was when the Triple Alliance was in being, 
she is still a strong continental Power, capable of placing 
a more numerous army in the field than her republican 
sister, and her population continues to increase at a high 
rate. In a few years she will have outstripped her rival. 
France, too. has perhaps lost those elements of her power 
and prestige which she derived from her alliance with 
Russia. Again, the Slav ex-ally, Russia, may become the 
enemy of to-morrow. In view of these contingencies 
France must create a substitute for the Rumanian and 
Italian allies. And as these have been found in the new 
Slav states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, she 
can afford to dispense with making painful sacrifices to 
keep Italy in countenance. 

A trivial incident which affords a glimpse of the spirit 
prevailing between the two kindred peoples occurred 
at St.-Germain-en-Laye, where the Austrian delegates 
were staying. They had been made much of in Vienna 
by the Envoy of the French Republic there, M. Allize, 
whose mission it was to hinder Austria from uniting 
with the Reich. Italy's policy was, on the contrary, to 

316 



ITALY 

apply Mr. Wilson's principle of self-determination and 
allow the Austrians to do as they pleased in that respect. 
A fervent advocate of the French orthodox doctrine — a 
publicist — repaired to the Austrian headquarters at St.- 
Germain for the purpose, it is supposed, of discussing 
the subject. Now intercourse of any kind between pri- 
vate individuals and the enemy delegates was strictly 
forbidden, and when M. X. presented himself, the Italian 
officer on duty refused him admission. He insisted. 
The officer was inexorable. Then he produced a written 
permit signed by the Secretary of the Conference, M. 
Dutasta. How and why this exception was made in his 
favor when the rule was supposed to admit of no excep- 
tions was not disclosed. But the Italian officer, equal 
to the occasion, took the ground that a military prohibition 
cannot be canceled by a civilian, and excluded the 
would-be visitor. 

The general trend of France's European policy was 
repugnant to Italy. She looked on it as a well-laid 
scheme to assume a predominant r61e on the Continent. 
That, she believed, was the ultimate purpose of the veto 
on the union of Austria and Germany, of the military 
arrangements with Britain and the United States, and of 
much else that was obnoxious to Italy. Austria was to 
be reconstituted according to the federative plans of the 
late Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to be made stronger 
than before as a counterpoise to Italy, and to be at the 
beck and call of France. Thus the friend, ally, sister of 
yesterday became the potential enemy of to-morrow. 
That was the refrain of most of the Italian journals, and 
none intoned it more fervently than those which had been 
foremost in bringing their country into the war. One 
of these, a Conservative organ of Lombardy, wrote: 
"Until yesterday, we might have considered that two 
paths lay open before us, that of an alliance with France 

3i7 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

and that of an independent policy. But we can think 
so no longer. To offer our friendship to-day to the peo- 
ple who have already chosen their own road and estab- 
lished their solidarity with our enemies of yesterday and 
to-morrow would not be to strike out a policy, but to 
decide on an unseemly surrender. It would be tanta- 
mount to reproducing in an aggravated form the situation 
we occupied in the alliance with Germany. Once again 
we should be engaged in a partnership of which one of the 
partners was in reality our enemy. France taking the 
place of Germany, and Jugoslavia that of Austria, the 
situation of the old Triple Alliance would be not merely 
reproduced, but made worse in the reproduction, because 
the Triplicc at least guaranteed us against a conflict which 
we had grounds for apprehending, whereas the new alliance 
would tie our hands for the sake of a little Balkan state 
which, single-handed, we are well able to keep in its place. 

"We have had enough of a policy which has hitherto 
saddled us with all the burdens of the alliance without 
bestowing on us any advantage — which has constrained 
us to favor all the peoples whose expansion dovetailed 
with French schemes and to combat or neglect those 
others whose consolidation corresponded to our interests 
— which has led us to support a great Poland and a great 
Bohemia and to combat the Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Rumania, Spain, to whose destinies the French, but not 
we, were indifferent." l A press organ of Bologna de- 
nounced the atrocious and ignominious sacrifice "which 
her allies imposed on Italy by means of economic black- 
mailing and violence with a whip in one hand and a 
chunk of bread in the other." 2 

Sharp comments were provoked by the heavy tax on 
strangers in Tunisia imposed by the French government, 3 

1 Quoted in La Stampa of July 20, 1919. ' Ibidem. 

3 Corriere d' Italia, June 29, 191 9. 

318 



ITALY 

on strangers, mostly Italians, who theretofore had enjoyed 
the same rights as the French and Tunisians. "Sud- 
denly," writes the principal Italian journal, "and just 
when it was hoped that the common sacrifices they had 
made had strengthened the ties between the two nations, 
the governor of Tunisia issued certain orders which 
endangered the interests of foreigners and the effects of 
which will be felt mainly by Italians, of whom there are 
one hundred and twenty thousand in Tunisia. 1 First 
there came an order forbidding the use of any language 
but French in the schools. Now the tax referred to in 
the House of Lords gives the Tunisian government power 
to levy an impost on the buying and selling of property 
in Tunisia. The new tax, which is to be levied over and 
above pre-existing taxes, ranged from 59 per cent, of the 
value when it is not assessed at a higher sum than one 
hundred thousand lire to 80 per cent, when its estimated 
value is more than five hundred thousand lire." The 
article terminates with the remark that boycotting is 
hardly a suitable epilogue to a war waged for common 
ideals and interests. 

These manifestations irritated the French and were 
taken to indicate Italy's defection. It was to no purpose 
that a few level-headed men pointed out that the French 
government was largely answerable for the state of mind 
complained of. "Pertinax," in the Echo de Paris, wrote 
"that the alliance, in order to subsist and flourish, should 
have retained its character as an Anti-German League, 
whereas it fell into the error of masking itself as a Society 
of Nations and arrogated to itself the right of bringing 
before its tribunal all the quarrels of the planet." 2 Italy's 
allies undoubtedly did much to forfeit her sympathies 
and turn her from the alliance. It was pointed out that 

1 Cf. Modern /to/yjuly 12, 1919 (page 298). 

2 Echo de Paris, July 7, 1919. 

3 T 9 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

when the French troops arrived in Italy the Bulletin of 
the Italian command eulogized their efforts almost daily, 
but when the Italian troops went to France, the com- 
muniques of the French command were most chary of 
allusions to their exploits, yet the Italian army con- 
tributed more dead to the French front than did the 
French army to the Italian front. 1 At the Peace Con- 
ference, as we saw, when the terms with Germany were 
being drafted, Italy's problems were set aside on the 
grounds that there was no nexus between them. The 
Allies' interests, which were dealt with as a whole during 
the war, were divided after the armistice into essential 
and secondary interests, and those of Italy were relegated 
to the latter class. Subsequently France, Britain, and 
the United States, without the co-operation or fore- 
knowledge of their Italian friends, struck up an alliance 
from which they excluded Italy, thereby vitiating the 
only arguments that could be invoked in favor of such a 
coalition. When peace was about to be signed they one- 
sidedly revoked the treaty which they had concluded in 
London, rendering the consent of all Allies necessary to 
the validity of the document, and decreed that Italy's 
abstention would make no difference. When the instru- 
ment was finally signed, Mr. Wilson returned to the 
United States, Mr. Lloyd George to England, and the 
Marquis of Saionji to Japan, without having settled any 
of Italy's problems. Italy, her needs, her claims, and her 
policy thus appear as matters of little account to the 
Great Powers. Naturally, the Italian people were dis- 
appointed, and desirous of seeking new friends, the old 
ones having forsaken them. 

It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences 
which this attitude of the Allies toward Italy may have 
on European politics generally. Her most eminent 

1 Cf. "An Italian Expose," published by The Morning Post, July 5, 1919. 

330 



ITALY 

statesman, Signor Tittoni, who succeeded Baron Sonnino, 
transcending his country's mortifications, exerted him- 
self tactfully and not unsuccessfully to lubricate the 
mechanism of the alliance, to ease the dangerous friction 
and to restore the tone. And he seems to have accom- 
plished in these respects everything which a sagacious 
statesman could do. But to arrest the operation of 
psychological laws is beyond the power of any individual. 
In order to appreciate the Italian point of view, it is no- 
wise necessary to approve the exaggerated claims put 
forward by her press in the spring of 19 19. It is enough 
to admit that in the light of the Wilsonian doctrine they 
were not more incompatible with that doctrine than the 
claims made by other Powers and accorded by the 
vSupreme Council. 

To sum up, Italy acquired the impression that associa- 
tion with her recent allies means for her not only sacrifices 
in their hour of need, but also further sacrifices in their 
hour of triumph. She became reluctantly convinced 
that they regard interests which she deems vital to herself 
as unconnected with their own. And that was unfortu- 
nate. If at some fateful conjuncture in the future her 
allies on their part should gather the impression that 
she has adjusted her policy to those interests which are so 
far removed from theirs, they will have themselves to 
blame. 



IX 

JAPAN 

AMONG the solutions of the burning questions which 
jLJl exercised the ingenuity and tested the good faith of 
the leading Powers at the Peace Conference, none was 
more rapidly reached there, or more bitterly assailed out- 
side, than those in which Japan was specially interested. 
The storm that began to rage as soon as the Supreme 
Council's decision on the Shantung issue became known 
did not soon subside. Far from that, it threatened for 
a time to swell into a veritable hurricane. This problem, 
like most of those which were submitted to the forum of 
the Conference, may be envisaged from either of two 
opposite angles of survey; from that of the future society 
of justice-loving nations, whose members are to forswear 
territorial aggrandizement, special economic privileges, 
and political sway in, or at the expense of, other countries; 
or from the traditional point of view, which has always 
..lied in international politics and which cannot be 
better described than by Signer Salandra's well-known 
phrase "sacred egotism." Viewed in the former light. 
Japan's demand for Shantung was undoubtedly as much 
a stride backward as were those of the United States and 
France for the Monroe Doctrine and the Saar Valley re- 
spectively. But as the three Great Powers had set the 
example, Japan was resolved from the out-set to rebel 
against any decree relegating her to the second- or third- 
class nations. The position of equality occupied by her 

3 — 



JAPAN 

government among the governments of other Great 
Powers did not extend to the Japanese nation among the 
other nations. But her statesmen refused to admit this 
artificial inferiority as a reason for descending another 
step in the international hierarchy and they invoked the 
principle of which Britain, France, and America had 
already taken advantage. 

The Supreme Council, like Janus of old, possessed two 
faces, one altruistic and the other egotistic, and, also like 
that son of Apollo, held a key in its right hand and a rod 
in its left. It applied to the various states, according to 
its own interest or convenience, the principles of the old 
or the new Covenant, and would fain have dispossessed 
Japan of the fruits of the campaign, and allotted to her 
the r61e of working without reward in the vineyard of 
the millennium, were it not that this policy was excluded 
by reasons of present expediency and previous commit- 
ments. The expediency was represented by President 
Wilson's determination to obtain, before returning to 
Washington, some kind of a compact that might be de- 
scribed as the constitution of the future society of nations, 
and by his belief that this instrument could not be ob- 
tained without Japan's adherence, which was dependent 
on her demand for Shantung being allowed. And the pre- 
vious commitments were the secret compacts concluded 
by Japan with Britain, France, Russia, and Italy before 
the United States entered the war. 

Nippon's role in the war and the circumstances that 
shaped it are scarcely realized by the general public. They 
have been purposely thrust in the background. And yet 
a knowledge of them is essential to those who wish to 
understand the significance of the dispute about Shan- 
tung, which at bottom was the problem of Japan's inter- 
national status. Before attempting to analyze them, 
however, it may not be amiss to remark that during the 
22 3 2 3 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

French pre^s campaign conducted in the years 1915—16, 

with the object of determining the Tokio Cabinet to take 
pan in the military operations in Europe, the question 
of motive was discussed with a degree of tactlessness which 
it is difficult to account tor. It was affirmed, tor exam- 
ple, that the Mikado's people would be overjoyed if the 
Allied governments vouchsafed them the honor oi par- 
ticipating in the great civilizing crusade against the Cen- 
tral Empires. That was proclaimed to be such an envi- 
able privilege that to pay for it no sacrifice of men or 
money would be exorbitant. Again, the degree to which 
Germany is a menace to Japan was another of the texts 
on which Entente publicists relied to scare Nippon into 
drastic action, as though she needed to be told by Euro- 
peans where her vital interests lav, from what quarters 
they were jeopardized, and how they might be safe- 
guarded most successfully. So much for the question of 
tact and form. Japan has never accepted the doctrine 
of altruism in politics which her Western allies have so 
zealously preached. Until means have been devised and 
adopted for substituting moral for military force in the 
relations of state with state, the only reconstruction of 
the world in which the Japanese can believe is that which 
is based upon treaties and the pledged word. That is 
the principle which underlies the general policy and the 
present strivings of our Far Eastern ally. 

One of the characteristic traits of all Nippon's dealings 
with her neighbors is loyalty and trustworthiness. Her 
intercourse with Russia before and after the Manehurian 
campaign offers a shining example of all the qualities 
which one would postulate in a true-hearted neighbor 
and a stanch and chivalrous ally. I had an opportunity 
of watching the development of the relations between the 
two governments for many years before they quarreled, 
and subsequently down to 1914, and I can state that the 

324 



JAPAN 

praise lavished by the Tsar's Ministers on their Japanese 
colleagues was well deserved. And for that reason it 
may be taken as an axiom that whatever developments 
the present situation may bring forth, the Empire of Nip- 
pon will carry out all its engagements with scrupulous 
exactitude, in the spirit as well as the letter. 

To be quite frank, then, the Japanese are what we should 
term realists. Consequently their foreign policy is in- 
spired by the maxims which actuated all nations down 
to the year 19 14, and still move nearly all of them to-day. 
In fact, the only Powers that have fully and authorita- 
tively repudiated them as yet are Bolshevist Russia, and 
to a large extent the United States. Holding thus to the 
old dispensation, Japan entered the war in response to a 
definite demand made by the British government. The 
day before Britain declared war against Germany the 
British Ambassador at Tokio officially inquired whether 
his government could count upon the active co-operation 
of the Mikado's forces in the campaign about to begin. 
On August 4th Baron Kato, having in the meanwhile 
consulted his colleagues, answered in the affirmative. 
Three days later another communication reached Tokio 
from London, requesting the immediate co-operation of 
Japan, and on the following day it was promised. The 
motive for this haste was credibly asserted to be Britain's 
apprehension lest Germany should transfer Kiaochow to 
China, and reserve to herself, in virtue of Article V of 
the Convention of 1898, the right of securing after the 
war "a more suitable territory" in the Middle Empire 
or Republic. Thereupon they began operations which 
were at first restricted to the China seas, but were 
afterward extended to the Pacific and Indian Oceans, 
and finally to the Mediterranean. The only task that 
fell to their lot on land was that of capturing Kiaochow. 
But whatever they set their hands to they carried out 

32S 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

thoroughly, and to the complete satisfaction of their 
European allies. 

For many years the people of Nippon have been wend- 
ing slowly, but with tireless perseverance and unerring 
instinct, toward their far-off goal, which to the unbiased 
historian will seem not merely legitimate but praise- 
worthy. Their intercourse with Russia was the story of 
one long laborious endeavor to found a common concern 
which should enable Japan to make headway on her mis- 
sion. Russia was just the kind of partner whose co- 
operation was especially welcome, seeing that it could 
be had without the hitches and set-backs attached to 
that of most other Great Powers. The Russians were 
never really intolerant in racial matters, nor dangerous 
in commercial rivalry. They intermarried freely with all 
the so-called inferior races and tribes in the Tsardom, and 
put all on an equal footing before the law. Twenty-three 
years ago I paid a visit to my friend General Tomitch, 
the military governor of Kars, and I found myself sitting 
at his table beside the Prefect of the city, who was a 
Mohammedan. The individual Russian is generally free 
from racial prejudices; he has no sense of the "yellow 
peril," and no objection to receive the Japanese as a com- 
rade, a colleague, or a son-in-law. 

And the advances made by Ito and others would have 
been reciprocated by Witte and Lamsdorff were it not 
that the Tsar, interested in BezobrazofT's Yalu venture, 
subordinated his policy to those vested interests, and com- 
pelled Japan to fight. The master-idea of the policy of 
Ito, with whom I had two interesting conversations on 
the subject, was to strike up a close friendship with the 
Tsardom, based on community of durable interests, and 
to bespeak Russia's help for the hour of storm and stress 
which one day might strike. The Tsar's government was 
inspired by analogous motives. Before the war was ter- 

326 



JAPAN 

minated I repaired to London on behalf of Russia, in 
order to propose to the Japanese government, in addition 
to the treaty of peace which was about to be discussed at 
Portsmouth, an offensive and defensive alliance, and to 
ask that Prince Ito be sent as first plenipotentiary, in- 
vested with full powers to conclude such a treaty. 

M. Izvolsky's policy toward Japan, frank and states- 
man-like, had an offensive and a defensive alliance for 
its intended culmination, and the treaties and conven- 
tions which he actually concluded with Viscount Motono, 
in drafting which I played a modest part, amounted 
almost to this. The Tsar's opposition to the concessions 
which represented Russia's share of the compromise 
was a tremendous obstacle, which only the threat of the 
Minister's resignation finally overcame. And Izvolsky's 
energy and insistence hastened the conclusion of a treaty 
between them to maintain and respect the status quo in 
Manchuria, and, in case it was menaced, to concert 
with each other the measures they might deem necessary 
for the maintenance of the status quo. And it was no 
longer stipulated, as it had been before, that these meas- 
ures must have a pacific character. They were pre- 
pared to go farther. And I may now reveal the fact 
that the treaty had a secret clause, providing for the 
action which Russia afterward took in Mongolia. 

These transactions one might term the first act of the 
international drama which is still proceeding. They 
indicate, if they did not shape, the mold in which the 
bronze of Japan's political program was cast. It neces- 
sarily differed from other politics, although the maxims 
underlying it were the same. Japan, having become a 
Great Power after her war with China, was slowly develop- 
ing into a world Power, and hoped to establish her claim 
to that position one day. It was against that day that 
she would fain have acquired a puissant and trustworthy 

327 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

ally, and she left nothing undone to deserve the whole- 
hearted support of Russia. In the historic year of 1914, 
many months before the storm-cloud broke, the War 
Minister Sukhomlinoff transferred nearly all the garrisons 
from Siberia to Europe, because he had had assurances 
from Japan which warranted him in thus denuding the 
eastern border of troops. During the campaign, when 
the Russian offensive broke down and the armies of the 
enemy were driving the Tsar's troops like sheep before 
them, Japan hastened to the assistance of her neighbor, 
to whom she threw open her military arsenals, and many 
private establishments as well. And when the Petrograd 
Cabinet was no longer able to meet the financial liabilities 
incurred, the Mikado's advisers devised a generous 
arrangement on lines which brought both countries into 
still closer and more friendly relations. 

The most influential daily press organ in the Tsardom, 
the Novoye Vretnya, wrote: "The war with Germany 
has supplied our Asiatic neighbor with an opportunity 
of proving the sincerity of her friendly assurances. She 
behaves not merely like a good friend, but like a stanch 
military ally. ... In the interests of the future tranquil 
development of Japan a more active participation of the 
Japanese is requisite in the war of the nations against 
the world-beast of prey. An alliance with Russia for 
the attainment of this object would be an act of immense 
historic significance." 1 

Ever since her entry into the community of progressive 
nations, Japan's main aspiration and striving has been to 
play a leading and a civilizing part in the Far East, and 
in especial to determine China by advice and organization 
to move into line with herself, adopt Western methods 
and apply them to Far-Eastern aims. And this might 
well seem a legitimate as well as a profitable policy, 

1 Novove Vretnya, June 13-26, 1915. 

3*8 



JAPAN 

and a task as noble as most 01 those to which the world 
is wont to pay a tribute of high praise. It appeared all 
the more licit that the Powers of Europe, with the excep- 
tion of Russia, had denied full political rights to the 
colored alien. He was placed in a category apart — 
an inferior class member of humanity. 

"In Japan, and as yet in Japan alone, do we find the 
Asiatic welcoming European culture, in which, if a tree 
may fairly be judged by its fruit, is to be found the best 
prospect for the human personal liberty, in due combina- 
tion with restraints of law sufficient to, but not in excess 
of, the requirements of the general welfare. In this partic- 
ular distinctiveness of characteristic, which has thus dif- 
ferentiated the receptivity of the Japanese from that of 
the continental Asiatic, we may perhaps see the influence 
of the insular environment that has permitted and favored 
the evolution of a strong national personality ; and in the 
same condition we may not err in finding a promise of 
power to preserve and to propagate, by example and by 
influence, among those akin to her, the new policy which 
she has adopted, and by which she has profited, affording 
to them the example which she herself has found in the 
development of Eastern peoples." l 

Now that is exactly what the Japanese aimed at accom- 
plishing. They were desirous of contributing to the intel- 
lectual and moral advance of the Chinese and other back- 
ward peoples of the Far East, in the same way as France 
is laudably desirous of aiding the Syrians, or Great Britain 
the Persians. And what is more, Japan undertook to 
uphold the principle of the open door, and generally to 
respect the legitimate interests of European peoples in 
the Far East. 

But the white races had economic designs of their own 
on China, and one of the preliminary conditions of their 
1 Cf. The Problem of Asia (Capt. A. T. Mahan), pp. 150-151. 

329 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

execution was that Japan's aspirations should be foiled. 
Witte opened the campaign by inaugurating the process 
of peaceful penetration, but his remarkable efforts were 
neutralized and defeated by his own sovereign. The 
Japanese, after the Manehurian campaign, which they 
had done everything possible to avoid, contrived wholly 
to eliminate Russian aggression from the Far East. The 
feat was arduous and the masterly way in which it was 
tackled and achieved sheds a luster on Japanese states- 
manship as personified by Viscount Motono. The Tsar- 
dom, in lieu of a potential enemy, was transformed into a 
stanch and powerful friend and ally, on whom Nippon 
could, as she believed, rely against future aggressors. 
Russia came to stand toward her in the same political 
relationship as toward Prance. Japanese statesmen took 
the alliance with the Tsardom as a solid and durable 
postulate of their foreign policy 

All at once the Tsardom fell to pieces like a house of 
cards, and the fragments that emerged from the ruins 
possessed neither the will nor the power to stand by their 
Far Eastern neighbors. The fruits of twelve years' 
statesmanship and heavy sacrifices were swept away 
by the Russian revolution, and Japan's diplomatic po- 
sition was therefore worse beyond compare than that 
of the French Republic in July, iqi;, because the latter 
was forthwith sustained by Great Britain and the United 
States, with such abundance of military and economic 
resources as made up in the long run for that of Russia. 
Japan, on the other hand, has as yet no substitute for 
her prostrate ally. She is still alone among Powers some 
of whom decline to recognize her equality, while others 
are ready to thwart her policy and disable her for the 
coming race. 

The Japanese are firm believers in the law of causality. 
Where they desire to reap, there they first sow. They 

33° 



JAPAN 

invariably strive to deal with a situation while there is 
still time to modify it, and they take pains to render the 
means adequate to the end. Unlike the peoples of 
western Europe and the United States, the Japanese 
show a profound respect for the principles of authority 
and inequality, and reserve the higher functions in the 
community for men of the greatest ability and attain- 
ments. It is a fact, however, that individual liberty 
has made perceptible progress in the population, and is 
still growing, owing to the increase of economic well- 
being and the spread of general and technical education. 
But although socialism is likewise spreading fast, I feel 
inclined to think that in Japan a high grade of instruction 
and of social development on latter-day lines will be 
found compatible with that extraordinary cohesiveness 
to which the race owes the position which it occupies 
among the communities of the world. The soul of the 
individual Japanese may be said to float in an atmosphere 
of collectivity, which, while leaving his intellect intact, 
sways his sentiments and modifies his character by ren- 
dering him impressible to motives of an order which has 
the weal of the race for its object. 

Japan has borrowed what seemed to her leaders to 
be the best of everything in foreign countries. They 
analyzed the military, political, and industrial successes 
of their friends and enemies, satisfactorily explained and 
duly fructified them. They use the school as the seed- 
plot of the state, and inculcate conceptions there which the 
entire community endeavors later on to embody in acts 
and institutions. And what the elementary school has 
begun, the intermediate, the technical, and the high 
schools develop and perfect, aided by the press, which is 
encouraged by the state. 

Japan's ideal cannot be offhandedly condemned as 
immoral, pernicious, or illegitimate. Its partizans per- 

33i 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

tinently invoke every principle which their Allies applied 
to their own aims and strivings. And men of deeper 
insight than those who preside over the fortunes of the 
Entente to-day recognize that Europeans of high prin- 
ciples and discerning minds, who perceive the central 
issues, would, were they in the position of the Japanese 
statesmen, likewise bend their energies to the achievement 
of the same aims. 

The Japanese argue their case somewhat as follows: 
"We are determined to help China to put herself in 
line with ourselves, and to keep her from falling into 
anarchy. And no one can honestly deny our qualifica- 
tions. We and they have very much in common, and 
we understand them as no Anglo-Saxon or other foreign 
people can. On the one hand our own past experience 
resembles that of the Middle Kingdom, and on the 
other our method of adapting ourselves to the new inter- 
national conditions challenged and received the ungrudg- 
ing admiration of a world disposed to be critical. The 
Peking treaties of May, 191 5, between China and Japan, 
and the pristine drafts of them which were modified 
before signature, enable the outsider to form a fairly 
accurate opinion of Japan's economic and political pro- 
gram, which amounts to the application of a Far Eastern 
Monroe Doctrine. 

"What we seek to obtain in the Far East is what the 
Western Powers have secured throughout the remainder 
of the globe: the right to contribute to the moral and 
intellectual progress of our backward neighbors, and to 
profit by our exertions. China needs the help which we 
are admittedly able to bestow. To our mission no 
cogent objection has ever been offered. No Cabinet in 
Tokio has ever looked upon the Middle Realm as a 
possible colony for the Japanese. The notion is pre- 
posterous, seeing that China is already over-populated. 

332 



JAPAN 

What Japan sorely needs are sources whence to draw 
coal and iron for industrial enterprise. She also needs 
cotton and leather." 

In truth, the ever-ready command of these raw ma- 
terials at their sources, which must be neither remote nor 
subject to potential enemies, is indispensable to the 
success of Japan's development. But for the moment the 
English-speaking nations have a veto upon them, in virtue 
of possession, and the embargo put by the United States 
government upon the export of steel during the war 
caused a profound emotion in Nippon. For the ship- 
building works there had increased in number from nine 
before the war to twelve in 191 7, and to twenty-eight at 
the beginning of 19 18, with one hundred slips capable 
of producing six hundred thousand tons of net register. 
The effect of that embargo was to shut down between 
70 and 80 per cent, of the shipbuilding works of the 
country, and to menace with extinction an industry which 
was bringing in immense profits. 

It was with these antecedents and aims that Japan 
appeared before the Conference in Paris and asked, not 
for something which she lacked before, but merely for 
the confirmation of what she already possessed by treaty. 
It must be admitted that she had damaged her cause by 
the manner in which that treaty had been obtained. To 
say that she had intimidated the Chinese, instead of 
coaxing them or bargaining with them, would be a 
truism. The fall of Tsingtao gave her a favorable oppor- 
tunity, and she used and misused it unjustifiably. The 
demands in themselves were open to discussion and, if 
one weighs all the circumstances, would not deserve a 
classification different from some of those — the protection 
of minorities or the transit proviso, for example — imposed 
by the greater on the lesser nations at the Conference. 
But the mode in which they were pressed irritated the 

333 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

susceptible Chinese and belied the professions made 
by the Mikado's Ministers. The secrecy, too, with which 
the Tokio Cabinet endeavored to surround them war- 
ranted the worst construction. Yuan Shi Kai 1 regarded 
the procedure as a deadly insult to himself and his country. 
And the circumstance that the Japanese government 
failed either to foresee or to avoid this amazing psycho- 
logical blunder lent color to the objections of those who 
questioned Japan's qualifications for the mission she had 
set herself. The wound inflicted on China by that ex- 
hibition of insolence will not soon heal. How it reacted 
may be inferred from the strenuous and well-calculat 
opposition of the Chinese delegation at the Conference 

Nor was that all. In the summer of iqiO a free right 
occurred between Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Cheng- 
cha-tun, the rights and wrongs of which were, as is 
usual in such cases, obscure. But the Okuma Cabinet, 
assuming that the Chinese were to blame, pounced upon 
the incident and made it the base of fresh demands to 
China, 2 two of which were manifestly excessive. That 
China would be better off than she is or is otherwise 
likely to become under Japanese guidance is in the highest 
degree probable. But in order that that guidance should 
be effective it must be accepted, and this can only be the 
consequence of such a policy of cordiality, patience, and 
magnanimity as was outlined by my friend, the late 
Viscount Motono. 3 

At the Conference the policy of the Japanese dek\c 
was clear-cut and coherent. It may be summarized as 
follows: the Japanese delegation decided to give its 



1 The late President of the Chinese Republic. 

2 These demands were (,i) an apology from the Chinese authority 

an indemnity for the killed and wounded; M the policing of certain dis- 
tricts of Manchuria by the Japanese; and (4) the employment of Japanese 
officers to train Chinese troops in Manchuria. 

• : Minister of Foreign Affairs. He repudiated his predecessor's policy. 

334 



JAPAN 

entire support to the Allies in all matters concerning the 
future relations of Germany and Russia, western Europe, 
the Balkans, the African colonies, as well as financial 
indemnities and reparations. The fate of the Samoan 
Archipelago must be determined in accord with Britain 
and the United States. New Guinea should be allotted to 
Australia. As the Marshall, Caroline, and Ladrone 
Islands, although of no intrinsic value, would constitute a 
danger in Germany's hands, they should be taken over by 
Japan. Tsingtao and the port of Kiaochow should belong 
to Japan, as well as the Tainan railway. Japan would 
co-operate with the Allies in maintaining order in Siberia, 
but no Power should arrogate to itself a preponderant 
voice in the matter of obtaining concessions or other 
interests there. Lastly, the principle of the open door was 
to be upheld in China, Japan being admittedly the Power 
which is the most interested in the establishment and 
maintenance of peace in the Far East. 

At the Conference, when the Kiaochow dispute came 
up for discussion, the Japanese attitude, according to their 
Anglo-Saxon and French colleagues, was calm and dig- 
nified, their language courteous, their arguments were put 
with studied moderation, and their resolve to have their 
treaty rights recognized was inflexible. Their case was 
simple enough, and under the old ordering unanswerable. 
The only question was whether it would be invalidated by 
the new dispensation. But as the United States had 
obtained recognition for its Monroe Doctrine, Britain 
for the supremacy of the sea, and France for the occupa- 
tion of the Saar Valley and the suspension of the right 
of self-determination in the case of Austria, it was obvious 
that Japan had abundant and cogent arguments for her 
demands, which were that the Chinese territory once 
held by Germany, and since wrested from that Power 
by Japan, be formally retroceded to Japan, whose claim 

335 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

uest and also upon 
iduded with China. 
A: the same I osly d-.<- 

a1 territory for herself. 

ig to one na 
of the country acquiring it to 
expl advantage is not conducive to amity 

or good-will." Ja] hough by : tune ol war 

German] *s h« tr be trposereta 

ase; she had, in fact, 
She DC \ed. 

i i r, that the as of retrocessk 

of .-. genera] settle] etween Tok 

Qg 
The C linesc . a, which worked vigorous'. \ 

• over . ierable number ol 

gued that K g to 

Germany on a China declared war on that 

stafe 

ol K w, wore abrogated by that d< a, and 

the ownership of every rood of C ritory held 

by G< everted in law to China louldthei 

over U aot to Japan. To this 

at with I 

m in 1014 ! the whole im- 

bs of Shantung issed to 

. Power, China being still a neutral Consequently the 

. .' C not a feet the 

which al 

by right of st. As ict, this 

ture of I i ates by the Japanese had been 

.a by the British ent, in order to 

prevent Germany from ceding it to China 1: that move 

1 N >:h. 



JAPAN 

meant anything, therefore, it meant that neither China 
nor Germany had or could have any hold on the territory 
once it was captured by Japan. Further, this conquest 
was effected at the cost of vast sums of money and two 
thousand Japanese lives. 

Nor was that all. In the year 191 5 x China signed an 
agreement with Japan, undertaking "to recognize all mat- 
ters that may be agreed upon between the Japanese gov- 
ernment and the German government respecting the dis- 
position of all the rights, interests, and concessions which, 
in virtue of treaties or otherwise, Germany possesses 
vis-d-vis China, in relation to the province of Shantung." 
This treaty, the Chinese delegates answered, was extorted 
by force. Japan, having vainly sought to obtain it by 
negotiations that lasted nearly four months, finally pre- 
sented an ultimatum, 2 giving China forty-eight hours in 
which to accept it. She had no alternative. But at least 
she made it known to the world that she was being 
coerced. It was on the day on which that document 
was signed that the Japanese representative in Peking 
sent a spontaneous declaration to the Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, promising to return the leased territory 
to China on condition that all Kiaochow be opened as a 
commercial port, that a Japanese settlement be estab- 
lished, and also an international settlement, if the Powers 
desired it, and that an arrangement be made beforehand 
between the Chinese and Japanese governments with 
regard to "the disposal of German public establishments 
and populations, and with regard to other conditions and 
procedures." 

The Japanese further invoked another and later agree- 
ment, which was, they alleged, signed by the Chinese 
without demur. 3 This accord, coming after the entry of 

1 May 25, 1915. 2 On May 6, 191 5. 

8 On September 24, 191 8. 

337 



IE INSIE STORY < ." THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

b war, was bantam* 

g ts .- • C . 'v. ed she wg 

sess 

boty 
■ . 
which Japan met ■ ■ >. ■ . ■ . . . 

which was invalidated by C as 

i .--. 4 V.-..S latter . i - . 

teseasse 
to declare v\ .:■; ■ : outset, but I 

ion was . isi i id sub- 

- an Phis aD we 

Bagerness exhil . . . Barn- 
an should los* . g ■ith 
as, the represent* • ad* : ish Am- 
bassador be Baron Kato on the - alleged 

: .-. e bo prevent then af Shantung to ( 

i G 

i ts < 
put in the folk by a delega . . .... 

"Yes w do, does \ . . i 91 m is 

exclusively a Ch tese 

state \ Yes en no, • as K by 

the Kaiser in . 

detriment e .'. 

rid? Yes oar do, did Ja 1 
the agg r es si ve impt 

for the purpose a asting 

Yes or d - as EGaoch gEsh 

and Japanese troops in 1914 ' . do- 

se ' Yes oar do, •■ is China's 
do-4 . ermany, which was 

offered by President Yuan Shi Kb d August . re- 

I at the 
1 . • . - 

xx8 



JAPAN 

The Japanese catechism ran thus: "Yes or no, was 
Kiaochow a German possession in the yen- 1914? Yes 
or no, was the: world, including the United States, a con- 
senting party to the occupation of that province by the 
Germans? Why did China., who to-day insists that that 
port is indispensable to her, cede it to Germany? Why 
in m;i.j did she make no effort to recover it, but leave this 
task to the Japanese army? Further, who can maintain 
that juridically the last war abolished ipso facto all the 
cessions of territory previously effected? Turkey for- 
merly ceded Cyprus to Great Britain. Will it be argued 
that this cession is abrogated and that Cyprus must re- 
turn to Turkey directly and unconditionally? The Con- 
ference announced repeatedly that it took its stand on 
justice and the welfare of the peoples. It is in the name 
of the welfare of the peoples, as well as in the name of 
justice, that we assert our right to take over Kiaochow. 
The harvest to him whose hands soweth the seed." ' 

If we add to all these conflicting data the circumstance 
that Great Britain, France, and Russia had undertaken 2 
to support Japan's demands at the Conference, and that 
Italy had promised to raise no objection, we shall have a 
tolerable notion of the various factors of the Chino- 
Japanese dispute, and of its bearings on the Peace Treaty 
and on the principles of the Covenant. It was one of the 
many illustrations of the incompatibility of the Treaty 
and the Covenant, the respective scopes of which were 

1 Le Matin, April 23, 1919. 

3 " His Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the requests of the 
Japanese Government for assurances that they will support Japan's claims 
jn regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung, and possessions 
in islands north of the Equator, on the occasion of a Peace Gonference, it 
being understood that the Japanese Government will, in the event of a 
peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to German 
islands south of the Equator." (Signed) Conyngham Greene, British 
Ambassador, Tokio, February 16, 1917. France gave a similar assurance 
in writing on March 1, 1917, and the Russian government had made a like 
declaration on February 20, 191 7. 

23 339 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

radically and irreconcilably different. The Supreme 
Council had to adjudicate upon the matter from the 
point of view either of the Treaty or of the Covenant; 
as part of a vulgar bargain of the old, unregenerate days, 
or as an example of the self-renunciation of the new ethical 
system. The majority of the Council was pledged to the 
former way of contemplating it, and, having already pro- 
mulgated a number of decrees running counter to the 
Covenant doctrine in favor of their own peoples, could 
not logically nor politically make an exception to the 
detriment of Japan. 

What actually happened at the Peace Table is still a 
secret, and President Wilson, who knows its nature, holds 
that it is in the best interests of humanity that it should 
so remain ! The little that has as yet been disclosed comes 
mainly from State-Secretary Lansing's answers to the 
questions put by the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee. America's second delegate, in answer to the ques- 
tions with which he was there plied, affirmed that "Presi- 
dent Wilson alone approved the Shantung decision, that 
the other members of the American delegation made no 
protest against it, and that President Wilson alone knows 
whether Japan has guaranteed to return Shantung to 
China." x Another eminent American, who claims to have 
been present when President Wilson's act was officially 
explained to the Chinese delegates, states that the Presi- 
dent, disclosing to them his motives, pleaded that political 
exigencies, the menace that Japan would abandon the 
Conference, and the rumor that England herself might 
withdraw, had constrained him to accept the Shantung 



1 As a matter of fact, the entire world knew and knows that she had guar- 
anteed the retrocession. Baron Makino declared it at the Conference. 
Cf. The (London) Times, February 13, 1919; also on May 5, 1919; and 
Viscount Uchida confirmed it on May 17, 1919. It had also been stated 
in the Japanese ultimatum to Germany, August 15, 191 4, and repeated by 
Viscount Uchida at the beginning of August, 191 9. 

340 



JAPAN 

settlement in order to save the League. 1 Rumors appear 
to have played an undue part in the Conference, influenc- 
ing the judgment or the decisions of the Supreme Council. 
The reader will remember that it was a rumor to the effect 
that the Italian government had already published a 
decree annexing Fiume that is alleged to have precipitated 
the quarrel between Mr. Wilson and the first Italian dele- 
gation. It is worth noting that the alleged menace that 
Japan would quit the Conference if her demands were 
rejected was not regarded by Secretary Lansing as serious. 
"Could Japan's signature to the League have been ob- 
tained without the Shantung decision?" he was asked. 
"1 think so," he answered. 

The decision caused tremendous excitement among the 
Chinese and their numerous friends. At first they pro- 
fessed skepticism and maintained that there must be some 
misunderstanding, and finally they protested and refused 
to sign the Treaty. One of the American journals pub- 
lished in Paris wrote: "Shantung was at least a moral 
explosion. It blew down the front of the temple, and now 
everybody can see that behind the front there was a very 
busy market. The morals were the morals of a horse 
trade. If the muezzin were loud and constant in his calls 
to prayer, it probably was to drown the sound of the 
dickering in the market. There is no longer any obliga- 
tion upon this nation to accept the Covenant as a moral 
document. It is not." 2 

All that may be perfectly true, but it sounds odd that 
the discovery should not have been made until Japan's 
claim was admitted formally to take over Shantung, after 
she had solemnly promised to restore it to China. The 
Covenant was certainly transgressed long before this, 



1 Mr. Thomas Millard, some of whose letters were published by The New 
York Times. Cf. Le Temps, July 29, 1919. 

2 Tlie Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 20, 1919. 

341 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

and much more flagrantly than by President Wilson's 
indorsement of Japan's demand for the formal retroces- 
sion of Shantung. But by those infractions nobody 
seemed scandalized. Quod licet Jovi non licet bovi. Debts 
of gratitude had to be paid at the expense of the Covenant, 
and people closed their eyes or their lips. It was not 
until the Japanese asked for something which all her 
European allies considered to be her right that an outcry 
was raised and moral principles were invoked. 

The Japanese press was nowise jubilant over the finding 
of the Supreme Council. The journals of all parties 
argued that their country was receiving no more than had 
already been guaranteed to it by China, and ratified by 
the Allies before the Peace Conference met, and to have 
obtained what was already hers by rights of conquest and 
of treaties was anything but a triumph. What Japan 
desired was to have herself recognized practically, not 
merely in theory, as the nation which is the most nearly 
interested in China, and therefore deserving of a special 
status there. In other words, she aimed at the proclama- 
tion of something in the nature of a Far Eastern doctrine 
analogous to that of Monroe. As priority of interest had 
been conceded to her by the Ishii-Lansing Agreement with 
the United States, it was in this sense that her press 
was fain to construe the clause respecting non-inter- 
ference with "regional understandings." 

That policy is open. The principles underlying it, al- 
ways tenable, were never more so than since the Peace 
Conference set the Great Powers to direct the lesser 
states. Moreover, Japan, it is argued, knows by expe- 
rience that China has always been a temptation to the 
Western peoples. They sent expeditions to fight her and 
divided her territory into zones of influence, although 
China was never guilty of an aggressive attitude toward 
them, as she was toward Japan. They were actuated by 

342 



JAPAN 

land greed and all that that implies, and if China were 
abandoned to her own resources to-morrow she would 
surely fall a prey to her Western protectors. In this con- 
nection they point to an incident which took place during 
the Conference, when Signor Tittoni demanded that 
Italy should receive the Austrian concession in Tientsin, 
which adjoins the Italian concession. But Viscount 
Chinda protested and the demand was ruled out. To 
sum up, the broad maxim underlying Japan's policy as 
defined by her own representatives is that in the resettle- 
ment of the world the principle adopted, whether the 
old or the new, shall be applied fairly and impartially 
at least to all the Great Powers. 

Every world conflict has marked the close of one epoch 
and the opening of another. Into the melting-pot on 
the fire kindled by the war many momentous problems 
have been flung, any one of which would have sufficed 
to bring about a new political, economic, and social con- 
stellation. Japan's advance along the road of progress 
is one of these far-ranging innovations. She became a 
Great Power in the wars against China and Russia, and is 
qualifying for the part of a World Power to-day. And 
her statesmen affirm that in order to achieve her purpose 
she will recoil from no sacrifice except those of honor and 
of truth. 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

IN their dealings with Russia the principal plenipotenti- 
aries consistently displayed the qualities and employed 
the standards, maxims, and methods which had stood 
them in good stead as parliamentary politicians. The 
betterment of the world was an idea which took a separate 
position in their minds, quite apart from the other political 
ideas with which they usually operated. Overflowing 
with verbal altruism, they first made sure of the political 
and economic interests of their own countries, safeguard- 
ing or extending these sources of power, after which they 
proceeded to try their novel experiment on communities 
which they could coerce into obedience. Hence the 
aversion and opposition which they encountered among 
all the nations which had to submit to the yoke, and more 
especially among the Russians. 

Russia's opposition, widespread and deep-rooted, is 
natural, and history will probably add that it was justified. 
It starts from the assumption, which there is no gainsaying, 
that the Conference was convoked to make peace between 
the belligerents and that whatever territorial changes 
it might introduce must be restricted to the countries 
of the defeated peoples. From all " disannexations " not 
only the Allies' territories, but those of neutrals, were to 
be exempted. Repudiate this principle and the demands 
of Ireland, Egypt, India to the benefits of self-determina- 
tion became unanswerable. Belgium's claim to Dutch 

344 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

Limburg and other territorial oddments must likewise 
be allowed. Indeed, the plea actually put forward 
against these was that the Conference was incompetent 
to touch any territory actually possessed by either neu- 
tral or Allied states. Ireland, Egypt, and Dutch Limburg 
were all domestic matters with which the Conference 
had no concern. 

Despite this fundamental principle Russia, the whilom 
Ally, without whose superhuman efforts and heroic sacri- 
fices her partners would have been pulverized, was tacitly 
relegated to the category of hostile and defeated peoples, 
and many of her provinces lopped off arbitrarily and 
without appeal. None of her representatives was con- 
voked or consulted on the subject, although all of them, 
Bolshevist and anti-Bolshevist, were at one in their re- 
sistance to foreign dictation. 

The Conference repeatedly disclaimed any intention 
of meddling in the internal affairs of any other state, 
and the Irish, the Egyptian, and several other analogous 
problems were for the purposes of the Conference included 
in this category. On what intelligible grounds, then, 
were the Finnish, the Lettish, the Esthonian, the Georgian, 
the Ukrainian problems excluded from it? One cannot 
conceive a more flagrant violation of the sovereignty of a 
state than the severance and disposal of its territorial 
possessions against its will. It is a frankly hostile act, 
and as such was rightly limited by the Conference to 
enemy countries. Why, then, was it extended to the 
ex-Ally ? Is it not clear that if reconstituted Russia should 
regard the Allied states as enemies and choose the poten- 
tial enemies of these as its friends, it will be legitimately 
applying the principles laid down by the Allies themselves ? 
No expert in international law and no person of average 
common sense will seriously maintain that any of the 
decisions reached in Paris are binding on the Russia of the 

345 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

future. No problem which concerns two equal parties 
can be rightfully decided by only one of them. The 
Conference which declared itself incompetent to impose 
on Holland the cession to Belgium even of a small strip 
of territory on one of the banks of the Belgian river 
Scheldt cannot be deemed authorized to sign away vast 
provinces that belonged to Russia. Here the plea of 
the self-determination of peoples possesses just as much 
or as little cogency as in the case of Ireland and Egypt. 

President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George had inaugu- 
rated their East European policy by publicly proclaiming 
that Russia was the key to the world situation, and that 
the peace would be no peace so long as her hundred and 
fifty million inhabitants were left floundering in chaotic 
confusion, under the upas shade of Bolshevism. They 
had also held out hopes to their great ex-ally of efficient 
help and practical counsel. And there ended what may 
be termed the constructive side of their conceptions. 

It was followed by no coherent action. Discourses, 
promises, maneuvers, and counter-maneuvers were con- 
tinuous and bewildering, but of systematic policy there 
was none. Statesmanship in the higher sense of the word 
was absent from every decision the delegates took and 
from every suggestion they proffered. Nor was it only 
by omission that they sinned. Their invincible turn 
for circuitous methods, to which severer critics give a 
less sonorous name, was manifested ad nauseam. They 
worked out cunning little schemes which it was hard to 
distinguish from intrigues, and which, if they had not 
been foiled in time, would have made matters even worse 
than they are. From the outset the British government 
was for summoning Bolshevist delegates to the Conference. 
A note to this effect was sent by the London Foreign 
Office to the Allied governments about a fortnight before 
the delegates began their work of making peace. But 

346 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

the suggestion was withdrawn at the instance of the 
French, who doubted whether the services of systematic 
lawbreakers would materially conduce to the establish- 
ment of a new society of law-abiding states. Soon after- 
ward another scheme cropped up, this time for the appoint- 
ment of an Inter- Allied committee to watch over Russia's 
destinies and serve as a sort of board of Providence. 
The representatives of the anti- Bolshevist governments 
resented this notion bitterly. They remarked that they 
could not be fairly asked to respect decisions imposed on 
them exactly as though they were vanquished enemies 
like the Germans. The British and American delegates 
were swayed in their views mainly by the assumptions 
that all central Russia was in the power of Lenin; that 
his army was well disciplined and powerful; that he 
might contrive to hold the reins of government and main- 
tain anarchism indefinitely, and that the so-called con- 
structive elements were inclined toward reaction. 

In other words, the delegates accepted two sets of prem- 
ises, from which they drew two wholly different sets of 
conclusions. Now they felt impelled to act on the one, 
now on the other, but they could never make up their 
minds to carry out either. They agreed that Bolshevism 
is a potent solvent of society, fraught with peril to all 
organized communities, yet they could not resolve to use 
joint action to extirpate it. 1 They recognized that so 
long as it lasted there was no hope of establishing a com- 
munity of nations, but they discarded military interven- 
tion on grounds of their own internal policy, and because 
it ran counter to the principle of self-determination. Over 
against that principle, however, one had to set the cir- 
cumstance that they were already intei meddling in Rus- 

1 " From whatever angle this Russian business is viewed, the policy of the 
Allies, if it can be dignified with that name, seems to be a compound of 
weakness, ineptitude, and shilly-shally." — Cf. The Westminster Gazette, 
July 5, 1919. 

347 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

sian affairs in Archangel, Murmansk, Odessa, and else- 
where, and that they ended by creating a new state and 
government in northwestern Russia, against which Kol- 
chaJk and IVnikin vehemently protested. 

In mitigation of judgment it is only fair to take into 
account the tremendous difficulties that faced them; their 
unfamiliarity with the Russian problem; the want of a 
touchstone by which to test the overwhelming mass of 
conflicting information which poured in upon them; their 
constitutional lack of moral courage, and the circum- 
stance that they were striving to reconcile contradictories. 
Without chart or compass they drifted into strange and 
sterile courses, beginning with the Prinkipo incident and 
ending with the written examination to which they 
naively subjected Kolehak in order to legalize inter- 
national relations, which could not truly be described as 
either war or peace. Neither the causes of Bolshevism 
in its morbid manifestations nor the unformulated ideas 
underlying whatever positive aspect it may be supposed 
to possess, nor the conditions governing its slow but per- 
ceptible evolution, were so much as glanced at, much less 
studied, by the statesmen who blithely set about dealing 
with it now by military force, now by economic pressure, 
and fitfully by tentative forbearance and hints to its 
leaders of forthcoming recognition. 

One cannot thus play fast and loose with the destinies 
of a community composed of one hundred and fifty million 
people whose members are but slackly linked together by 
a few tenuous social bonds, without forfeiting the right to 
offer them real guidance. And a blind man is a poor 
guide to those who can see. Alone the Americans were 
equipped with carefully tabulated statistics and huge 
masses of facts which they poured out as lavishly as coal- 
heavers hurl the contents of their sacks into the cellar. 
But they put them to no pract ical use. Losing themselves 

348 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

in a labyrinth of details, they failed to get a comprehen- 
sive view of the whole. The other delegations lacked 
both data and general ideas. And all the Allies were 
destitute of a powerful army in the East, and therefore 
of the means of asserting the authority which they 
assumed. 

They one and all dealt in vague theories and deceptive 
analogies, paying little heed to the ever-shifting necessi- 
ties of time, place, and peoples, and indeed to the only 
conditions under which any new maxims could be fruitfully 
applied. And even such rules as they laid down were 
restricted and modified in accordance with their own 
countries' interests or their unavowed aims, without spe- 
cific warrant or explanation. No account was taken of 
the historical needs or aspirations of the people for whom 
they were legislating, as though all nations were of the 
same age, capable of the same degree of culture, and im- 
pressible to identical motives. It never seemed to have 
crossed their minds that races and peoples, like individ- 
uals, have a soul, or that what is meat to one may be 
poison to another. 

One of the most Ententophil and moderate press organs 
in France put the matter forcibly and plainly as follows: 
"The governments of Washington and of London are 
aware that we are immutably attached to the alliance 
with them. But we owe them the truth. Far too often 
they make a bad choice of the agents whose business it 
is to keep them informed, and they affect too much dis- 
dain for friendly suggestions which emanate from any 
other source. American agents, in particular, civil as 
well as military, explore Europe much as their forebears 
'prospected' the Far West, and they look upon the most 
ancient nations of Europe as Iroquois, Comanches, or 
Aztecs. They are astounded at not finding everything 
on the old Continent as in New York or Chicago, and they 

349 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

set to work to reform Europe according to the rules in 
force in Oklahoma or Colorado. Now we venture re- 
spectfully to point out to them that methods differ with 
countries. In the United States the Colonists were wont 
to set fire to the forests in order to clear and fertilize the 
land. Certain American agents recommend the employ- 
ment in Europe of an analogous procedure in political 
matters. They rejoice to behold the Russian and Hun- 
garian forests burst into flame. In Lenin, Trotzky, Bela 
Kuhn, they appreciate useful pioneers of the new civiliza- 
tion. We crave their permission to view these things 
from another side. In old Europe one cannot set fire to 
the forests without at the same time burning villages and 
cities." * 

Before and during the armistice I was in almost con- 
stant touch with all Russian parties within the country 
and without, and received detailed accounts of the chang- 
ing conditions of the people, which, although conflicting 
in many details, enabled me to form a tolerably correct 
picture of the trend of things and to forecast what was 
coming. 

Among other communications I received proposals from 
Moscow with the request that I should present them to 
one of the British delegates, who was supposed to be then 
taking an active interest, or at any rate playing a promi- 
nent part, in the reconstruction of Russia, less for her 
own sake than for that of the general peace. But as it 
chanced, the eminent statesman lacked the leisure to take 
cognizance of the proposal, the object of which was to hit 
upon such a modus vivendi with Russia as would enable 
her united peoples to enter upon a normal course of 
national existence without further delay. Incidentally 
it would have put an end to certain conversations then 

1 Cf. Journal des DSbats, August 13, 1919. Article by M. Auguste Gau- 
vain. 

350 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

going forward with a view to a friendly understanding 
between Russia and Germany. It would also, I had 
reason to believe, have divided the speculative Bolshevist 
group from the extreme bloodthirsty faction, produced a 
complete schism in the party, and secured an armistice 
which would have prevented the Allies' subsequent de- 
feats at Murmansk, Archangel, and Odessa. Truth 
prompts me to add that these desirable by-results, al- 
though held out as inducements and characterized as 
readily attainable, were guaranteed only by the unofficial 
pledge of men whose good faith was notoriously doubtful. 

The document submitted to me is worth summarizing. 
It contained a lucid, many-sided, and plausible account of 
the Russian situation. Among other things, it was a 
confession of the enormity of the crimes perpetrated, on 
both sides, it said, which it ascribed largely to the brutaliz- 
ing effects of the World War, waged under disastrous con- 
ditions unknown in other lands. Myriads of practically 
unarmed men had been exposed during the campaign to 
wholesale slaughter, or left to die in slow agonies where 
they fell, or were killed off by famine and disease, for the 
triumph of a cause which they never understood, but had 
recently been told was that of foreign capitalists. In the 
demoralization that ensued all restraints fell away. The 
entire social fabric, from groundwork to summit, was rent, 
and society, convulsed with bestial passions, tore its own 
members to pieces. Russia ran amuck among the nations. 
That was the height of war frenzy. Since then, the 
document went on, passion had abated sensibly and a 
number of well-intentioned men who had been swept 
onward by the current were fast coming to their senses, 
while others were already sane, eager to stem it and 
anxious for moral sympathy from outside. 

From out of the revolutionary welter, the exposS con- 
tinued, certain hopeful phenomena had emerged sympto- 

35i 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

matic of a new spirit. Conditions conducive to equality 
existed, although real equality was still a somewhat re- 
mote ideal. But the tendencies over the whole sphere 
of Russian social, moral, and political life had undergone 
remarkable and invigorating changes in the direction of 
"reasonable democracy." Many wholesome reforms had 
been attempted, and some were partially realized, es- 
pecially in elementary instruction, which was being spread 
clumsily, no doubt, as yet, but extensively and equally, 
being absolutely gratuitous. 1 

Various other so-called ameliorations were enumerated 
in this obviously partial expos£, which was followed by an 
apology for certain prominent individuals, who, having 
been swept off their feet by the revolutionary floods, 
would gladly get back to firm land and help to extricate the 
nation from the Serbonian bog in which it was sinking. 
They admitted a share of the responsibility for having 
set in motion a vast juggernaut chariot, which, however, 
they had arrested, but hoped to expiate past errors by 
future zeal. At the same time they urged that it was not 
they who had demoralized the army or abolished the 
death penalty or thrown open the sluice-gates to anarchist 
floods. On the contrary, they claimed to have reorganized 
the national forces, reintroduced the severest discipline 
ever known, appointed experienced officers, and restored 
capital punishment. Nor was it they, but their pred- 
ecessors, they added, who had ruined the transport ser- 
vice of the country and caused the food scarcity. 

These individuals would, it was said, welcome peace 
and friendship with the Entente, and give particularly 
favorable consideration to any proposal coming from the 

1 There can be no doubt that the Bolshevist government under Luna- 
tcharsky has made a point of furthering the arts, sciences, and elementary 
instruction. All reports from foreign travelers and from eminent Russians 
— one of these my university fellow-student, now perpetual secretary of 
the Academy — agree about this silver lining to a dark cloud. 

352 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

English-speaking peoples, in whom they were disposed 
to place confidence under certain simple conditions. The 
need for these conditions would not be gainsaid by the 
British and American governments if they recalled to 
mind the treatment which they had theretofore meted 
out to the Russian people. At that moment no Russian 
of any party regarded or could regard the Allies without 
grounded suspicions, for while repudiating interference 
in domestic affairs, the French, Americans, and British 
were striving hard to influence every party in Russia, 
and were even believed to harbor designs on certain 
provinces, such as the Caucasus and Siberia. Color was 
imparted to these misgivings by the circumstance that the 
Allied governments were openly countenancing the dis- 
memberment of the country by detaching non-Russian 
and even Russian elements from the main body. It 
behooved the Allies to dissipate this mistrust by issuing 
a statement of their policy in unmistakable terms, re- 
pudiating schemes for territorial gains, renouncing inter- 
ference in domestic affairs and complicity in the work of 
disintegrating the country. Russia and her affairs must 
be left to Russians, who would not grudge economic con- 
cessions as a reasonable quid pro quo. 

The proposal further insisted that the declaration of 
policy should be at once followed by the despatch of two 
or three well-known persons acquainted with Russia and 
Russian affairs, and enjoying the confidence of European 
peoples, to inquire into the conditions of the country and 
make an exhaustive report. This mission, it was added, 
need not be official, it might be intrusted to individuals 
unattached to any government. 

If a satisfactory answer to this proposal were returned 
within a fortnight, an armistice and suspension of the 
secret pourparlers with Germany would, I was told, have 
followed. That this compact would have led to a 

353 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

settlement of the Russian problems is more than any 
one, however well informed, could vouch for. but I had 
some grounds for believing the move to be genuine and 
the promises overdone. No reasonable motive suggested 
itself for a vulgar hoax. Moreover, the overture dis- 
closed two important facts, one of which was known at the 
time only to the Bolshevist government — namely, that 
secret pourparlers were going forward between Berlin and 
Moscow for the purpose of arriving at a workable under- 
standing between the two governments, and that the 
Allied troops at Odessa. Archangel, and Murmansk were 
in a wretched plight and in direr need of an armistice than 
the Bolsheviki. 1 

I mentioned the matter summarily to one of the del- 
egates, who evinced a certain interest in it and prom- 
ised to discuss it at length later on with a view to action. 
Another to whom I unfolded it later thought it would be 
well if I myself started, together with two or three others, 
for Moscow, Petrograd. Ekaterinodar, and other places, 
and reported on the situation. But weeks went by and 
nothing was done. 2 

I had interesting talks with some influential delegates 
on the eve of the invitation issued to all de facto govern- 
ments of Russia to forgather at Prinkipo for a symposium. 
They admitted frankly at the time that they had no poliey 
and were groping in the dark, and one of them held to the 
dogma that no light from outside was to be expected. 
They gave me the impression that underlying the impend- 
ing summons was the conviction that Bolshevism, divest- 
ed of its frenzied manifestations, was a rough and ready 
government calumniously blackened by unscrupulous en- 
emies, criminal perhaps in its outbursts, but suited in its 

1 This latter fact was doubtless known to the British government, which 
decided as early as March to recall the British troops from northern Russia. 

• 1 published the facts in Ti:e Daily Telegraph, April 21, and The Public 
Ledger of Philadelphia, April io, 1919. 

354 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

feasible aims to the peculiar needs of a peculiar people, 
and therefore as worthy of being recognized as any of the 
others. It was urged that it had already lasted a con- 
siderable time without provoking a counter-movement 
worthy of the name; that the stories circulating about the 
horrors of which it was guilty were demonstrably exag- 
gerated; that many of the bloody atrocities were to be 
ascribed to crazy individuals on both sides; that the 
witnesses against Lenin were partial and untrustworthy; 
that something should be done without delay to solve a 
pressing problem, and that the Conference could think 
of nothing better, nor, in fact, of any alternative. 

To me the principal scheme seemed a sinister mistake, 
both in form and in substance. In form, because it nullified 
the motives which determined the help given to the 
Greeks, Poles, and Serbs, who were being urged to crush 
the Bolshevists, and left the Allies without good grounds 
for keeping their own troops in Archangel, Odessa, and 
northern Russia to stop the onward march of Bolshevism. 
vSome governments had publicly stigmatized the Bol- 
shevists as cutthroats; one had pledged itself never to 
have relations with them, but the Prinkipo invitation 
bespoke a resolve to cancel these judgments and declara- 
tions and change their tack as an improvement on doing 
nothing at all. The scheme was also an error in sub- 
stance, because the sole motive that could warrant it 
was the hope of reconciling the warring parties. And 
that hope was doomed to disappointment from the outset. 

According to the Prinkipo project, which was attributed 
to President Wilson, 1 an invitation was to be issued to all 
organized groups exercising or attempting to exercise 
political authority or military control in Siberia and 
northern Russia, to send representatives to confer with 

1 Colonel House is said to have dissociated himself from the President on 
this occasion. 

24 355 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

the delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers on 
Prince's Islands. It is difficult to discuss the expedient 
seriously. One feels like a member of the little people 
of yore, who are reported to have consulted an oracle 
to ascertain what they must do to keep from laughing 
during certain debates on public affairs. It exposed its 
ingenuous authors to the ridicule of the world and made 
it clear to the dullest apprehension that from that quarter, 
at any rate, the Russian people, as a whole, must expect 
neither light nor leading, nor intelligent appreciation 
of their terrible plight. There is a sphere of influence 
in the human intellect between the reason and the imag- 
ination, the boundary line of which is shadowy. That 
sphere would seem to be the source whence some of the 
most extraordinary notions creep into the minds of men 
who have suddenly come into a position of power which 
they are not qualified to wield — the - wissants 

of the world of polities. 

To the credit of the Supreme Council it never let 
offended dignity stand between itself and the triumph 
of any of the various causes which it successively took in 
hand. Time and again it had been addressed by the 
Russian Bolshevist government in the most opprobrious 
terms, and accused not merely of clothing political expedi- 
ency in the garb of spurious idealism, but of giving the 
fore place in political lite to sordid interests, over which 
a cloak of humanitarianism had been deftly thrown. 
One official missive from the Bolshevist government to 
President Wilson is worth quoting from: 1 "We should 
like to learn with more precision how you conceive the 
Societ y of Nations ? When you insist on the independence 
of Belgium, of Serbia, of Poland, you surely mean that 
the masses of the people are everywhere to take over the 

1 It was sent at the end of October, 1918, and to niy\ knowledge was not 
published in full. 

356 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

administration of the country. But it is odd that you 
did not also require the emancipation of Ireland, of 
Egypt, of India, and of the Philippines. . . , 

"As we concluded peace with the German Kaiser, for 
whom you have no more consideration than we have for 
you, so we are minded to make peace with you. We 
propose, therefore, the discussion, in concert with our 
allies, of the following questions: (i) Are the French and 
English governments ready to give up exacting the blood 
of the Russian people if this people consent to pay them 
ransom and to compensate them in that way? (2) If 
the answer is in the affirmative, what ransom would the 
Allies want (railway concessions, gold mines, or territories) ? 

"We also look forward to your telling us exactly 
whether the future Society of Nations will be a joint 
stock enterprise for the exploitation of Russia, and in 
particular — as your French allies require — for forcing 
Russia to refund the milliards which their bankers fur- 
nished to the Tsarist government, or whether the Society 
of Nations will be something different. ..." 

As soon as the Prinkipo motion was passed by the 
delegates I was informed by telephone, and I lost no time 
in communicating the tidings to Russia's official repre- 
sentatives in Paris. The plan astounded them. They 
could hardly believe that, while hopefully negotiating 
with the anti-Bolshevists, the Conference was desirous 
at the same time of opening pourparlers with the Leninists, 
between whom and them antagonism was not merely 
political, but personal and vindictive, like that of two 
Albanians in a blood feud. I suggested that the scheme 
should be thwarted at its inception, and that for this pur- 
pose I should be authorized by the representatives of the 
four l constructive governments in Russia to make known 

1 Omsk, Ekaterinodar, Archangel, and the Crimea. The last-named dis- 
appeared soon afterward. 

357 



THE INSIDE STOR1 M CONFERENCE 

. askm. I v. . . . . . 

. . -. . - . k assass is . . 

..v. :.::.-.: 
.er no dreams 

lg recei' - bded 

to the United S 

sold come t< \ .'.'■'■ 

gre* i . i i ■ - . 

v.:— fc's . ■ . - 

ild s . tg lea the I - . st movemen 
smercDessI . -. 

I s.ugue of 
I 

cause 
as lost By v.. - . they unofficially 

...-■ i Russ -. M sters i Pai - ■ horn I 

I not deig ed be consult 
the prangt and i sd them g ve at least i 

assi it 

at loss of 
book :. N - the 

roao. to the est ability. Hms 

necessary :he> c\\ ars of the < 

st active governments or theii su ate 

i slayers < would 

occupy : wings of the hotel at Prink 

.. their adversaries Hm .. egates would see to :'■ 
"T ; should we go there al all if discuss 

Bfflnous? - Russians Because the A 

governments desire be ascertain the conditio]] i Russia 

i your conception of . - thai would i 

nehorate it,*' was the reply. 

is d ace to study the Russian situation, doc 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

U it reasonable to expert us to journey thither in order to 

tell subordinates, who have no knowledge of our country, 
what we can tell them and their principals in Pari:, in 
greater detail and with corifirmatory documents. More- 
over, the delegates you have appointed have no qualifica 
tion to judge of Russia's plight and potentialities. They 
know neither the country nor its language nor its people 

nor its politics, yet you want US to travel all the way to 
Turkey t<> fell them what we think, in order that they 
Should return from Turkey to Paris and report to your 
Ministers what we said and what we could have unfolded 
directly to the Mini: iters themselves long ago and are 
ready to propound to them to-day or to-morrow. 

"The project is puerile and your tactics are baleful. 
Your Ministers branded the Bolshevists as criminals, and 
the French government publicly announced that it would 
enter into no relations with them. In spite of that, all 
the Allied governments have now offered to enter into 
relations with them. Now you admit that you made a 
slip, and you promise to correct it if only we consent to 
save your face and go on a wild-goose chase to Prinkipo. 
But for us that journey would be a recantation of our 
principles. That is why we are unable to make it." 

The Prinkipo incident, which began in the region of high 
politics, ended in comedy. A number of more or less 
witty epigrams were coined at the expense of the pleni- 
potentiaries, the scheme, set in a stronger light than it was 
meant to endure, assumed a grotesque shape, and its pro- 
moters strove to consign it as best they could to oblivion. 
But the Sphinx question of Russia's future remained, and 
the penalties for failure to solve it aright waxed more and 
more deterrent. The supreme arbiters had cognizance of 
them, had, in fact, enumerated them when proclaiming the 
impossibility of establishing a durable peace or a solid 
League of Nations as long as Russia continued to be a 

359 



THF INSIDE STORY OF THF PEACE CONFERENCE 

• 

S 

B of 

;\ag 

grees, they hardened the Slav nation agab 

Russians at ting I . n the West* 

g . . docansts in 

E&very . could percei v e 

ercussk 

t>m Siberia >pu- 

'.. For 

as. Th* governme 

ighout knew its own nd pur- 

consistei v\ tov 

was kh making 

is a 1 ac convert to tho 

ini •■-. - ke Westea . back- 

ler and a poten She is charged with 
arest the 
ooutsi The charge is true Only a 

Can .... would expect to - ed by altruism . 

self-denial, in a dices these virtues. 

C unit] if interests is k that binds Ji 

Britain, A like bond bad - between ber . 

Tsarist Russia. I he/ Her S tat eSBO 

i have no ts did not think 

. to give it a more fashionable name. This did 

eat the Japanese from being chivalrously loyal bo 

i mptations, I 
er ol their engagements, But 
alt'- ae no pretense to k i pose, ' 

soo 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

political maxims differ nowise from those of the great 
European States, whose territorial, economic, and military 
interests have been religiously safeguarded by the Treaty 
of Versailles. True, the statesmen of Tokio shrink from 
the hybrid combination Of two contradictions linked to- 
gether by a sentimental fallacy. Their unpopularity 
among Anglo-Saxons is the result of speculations about 
their future intentions; in other words, they are being 
punished, as certain of the delegates at the Conference 
have been eulogized, not for what they actually did, but 
for what it is assumed they are desirous of achieving. 
Toward Russia they played the same game that their allies 
Were playing there and in Europe, only more frankly and 
systematically. They applied the two principal maxims 
which lie at the root of international politics to-day — do 
ut des, and the nation that is capable of leading others 
has I he right and the duty to lead them. And they estab- 
lished a valuable reputation for fulfilling their compacts 
conscientiously. Nippon, then, would have helped her 
Russian neighbors, and she expected to be helped by them 
in return. Have not the Allies, she asked, compelled 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia to pay them in 
cash for their emancipation ? 

Russians, who have no color prejudices, hit it off with 
the Japanese, by whom they are liked in return. That 
the two peoples should feel drawn to each other politically 
is, therefore, natural, and that they will strike up economic 
agreements in the future seems to many inevitable and 
legitimate. One such agreement was on the point of 
being signed between them and the anti-Bolshevists of 
Omsk immediately after, and in consequence of, the 
Allies' ill-considered invitation to Lenin and Trotzky to 
delegate representatives to Prinkipo. This convention, 
I have reason to believe, was actually drafted, and was 
about to be signed. And the adverse influence that sud- 

361 



[HE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

denly made itself felt and hindered the compact came 
not from Russia, but from western Europe. It would be 
unfruitful to dwell further on this matter here, beyond 

recording the belief of many Russians that the seal of the 
English-speaking peoples for the well-being of Siberia. 
where they intend to maintain troops after having with- 
drawn them from Europe, is the counter-move to Japan's 
capacity and wish to co-operate with the population of 
that rich country. This assumption may be groundless, 
bat it will surprise only those who fail to note how often 
the flag of principle is unfurled over economic interests. 

The delegates were not all discouraged by their dis- 
comfiture over the Prinkipo project. Some of them still 
hankered .liter ail agreement with the Bolshevists which 
would warrant them in including the Russian problem 
among the tasks provisionally achieved. President Wil- 
son despatched secret envoys to Moscow to strike up an 
accord with Lenin. 1 but although the terms which Mr. 
Bullitt obtained were those which had in advance been 
declared satisfactory, he drew back as soon as they were 
.-.greed to. And he assigned no reason for this change of 
attitude. Whether the brightening of t lie prospects of Kol- 
chak and Denikin had modified his judgment on the ques- 
. of expediency must remain a matter of conjecture. 
It is hardly necessary, however, to point out once more 
that this sudden improvisation of schemes which were 

..ndoned again at the last moment tended to lower the 
not particularly high estimate set by the ethnic wards of 
the Anglo-Saxon peoples on the moral guidance of their 
self -constituted guardians. 

An ardent champion of the Allied nations in France 
wrote: "We have never had a Russian policy which was 
all of one piece. We have never synthetized any but 

atradictory conceptions. This is so true that one may 

. Chapter IV "C-:-.<. •>':•. ip and Secrecy," p. i v ;r. 

$6$ 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

safely affirm that if Russian patriotism has been sustained 
by our velleities of action, Russian destruetiveness has 
been encouraged by our velleities of desertion. We 
joined, so to say, both camps, and our velleities of de- 
sertion occasionally getting the upper hand of our velleities 
of action ... we carry out nothing." ' 

Toward Kolchak and Denikin the attitude of the Su- 
preme Council varied considerably. It was currently re- 
ported in Paris that the Admiral had had the misfortune 
to arouse the displeasure of the two Conference chiefs 
by some casual manifestation of a frame of mind which 
was resented, jx±rhaps a movement of independence, to 
which distance or the medium of transmission imparted a 
flavor of disrespect. Anyhow, the Russian leader was for 
some time under a cloud, which darkened the prospects of 
his cause. And as for Denikin, he appeared to the other 
great delegate as a self -advertising braggart. 

These mental portraits were retouched as the fortune of 
war favored the pair. And their cause benefited corre- 
spondingly. To this improvement influences at work in 
London contributed materially. For the anti-Bolshevist 
currents which made themselves felt in certain state de- 
partments in that capital, where there were several ir- 
reconcilable policies, were powerful and constant. By 
the month of May the Conference had turned half- 
heartedly from Lenin and Trotzky to Kolchak and 
Denikin, but its mode of negotiating bore the mark pecul- 
iar to the diplomacy of the new era of "open covenants 
openly arrived at." The delegates in Paris communicated 
with the two leaders in Russia "over the heads" and 
without the knowledge of their authorized representatives 
in Paris, just as they had issued peremptory orders to 
"the Rumanian government at Bucharest" over the heads 
of its chiefs, who were actually in the French capital, 

1 Pertinax in V Echo de Paris, July 5, 191 9. 

3 6 3 



Till- INSIDE STORY OF TUK PEACE CONFERENCE 

The proximate motives that determined several im- 
portant decisions of the Secret Council, although of no 
political moment, are of sufficient psychological interest bo 
warrant mention. They shod a light on the concreteness, 
directness, and simplicity oi the workings of the states- 
men's minds when engaged in transacting international 
business. For example, the particular moment for the 
recognition of new communities as states was fixed by 

wholly extrinsical circumstances. A food-distributer, for 
instance, or the Secretary of a Treasury, wanted a receipt 
for expenditure abroad from the people that benefited by 
it. As a document of this character presupposes the e\ 
istence of a state and a government, the official dispenser 
of food or money was loath to go to the aid of any nation 
which was not a state or which lacked a properly con- 
stituted government. Hence, in some eases the Con- 
ference had to create both on the spur oi the moment. 
Thus the reason why Finland's independence received 
the hall-mark of the Powers when it did was because 
the United States government was generously preparing 
to give aid to the Finns and had to get in return proper 
receipts signed by competent authorities representing the 
state. 1 Had it not been for this immediate need oi valid 
receipts, the act of recognition might have been post - 
poned in the same way as was the marking off oi the 
frontiers. And like considerations led to like results in 
other cases. Czechoslovakia's independence was formally 
recognized for the same reason, as one of its leading men 
frankly admitted. 

One of the serious worries of the Conference chiefs in 
their dealings with Russia was the lack of a recognized 
government there, qualified to sign receipts for advances 
of money and munitions. And as they could not resolve 



1 This admission was made to a distinguished member of the Diplomatic 
Corps. 

3 6 4 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

to accord recognition to any of the existing administra- 
tions, they hit upon the middle course, that of promoting 
the anti-Bolshevists to the rank of a community, not, 
indeed, sovereign or independent, but deserving of every 
kind of assistance except the despatch of Allied troops. 
Assistance was already being given liberally, but the 
necessity was felt for justifying it formally. And the two 
delegates went to work as though they were hatching 
some dark and criminal plot. Secretly despatching a 
message to Admiral Kolchak, they put a number of 
questions to him which he was not qualified to answer 
without first consulting his official advisers in Paris. 
Yet the v/ere not apprised by the Secret Coun- 

cil of what was being done. Nay, more, the French 
Foreign Office was not notified. By the merest chance I 
got wind of the matter and published the official mes- 
sage. 1 It summoned the Admiral to bind himself to 
convene a Constituent Assembly as soon as he arrived in 
Moscow; to hold fn:(s elections; to repudiate definitely 
the old regime and all that it implied; to recognize the 
independence of Poland and Finland, whose frontiers 
would be determined by the League of Nations; to 
avail himself of the advice and co-operation of the 
League in coming to an understanding with the border 
states, and to acquiesce in the decision of the Peace 
Conference respecting the future status of Bessarabia. 
Kolchak's answer was described as clear when "de- 
cipherable," and to his credit, he frankly declined to 
forestall the will of the Constituent Assembly respect- 
ing those border states which owed their separate ex- 
istence to the initiative of the victorious governments. 
But the Secret Council of the Conference accepted his 
answer, and relied upon it as an adequate reason for 

1 In The Daily Telegraph, June 1 9, 19 19, and in The Public Ledger of 
Philadelphia. 

365 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

continuing the assistance which they had been giving 
him theretofore. 

About the person of Kolchak it ought to be superfluous 
to say more than that he is an upright citizen of energy 
and resolution, as patriotic as Fabricius, as disinterested 
and unambitious as Cincinnatus. To his credit account, 
which is considerable, stands his wonder-working faith 
in the recuperative forces of his country when its fortunes 
were at their lowest ebb. With buoyancy and confidence 
he set himself the task of rescuing his fellow-countrymen 
when it looked as hopeless as that of Xenophon at 
Cunaxa. He created an army out of nothing, induced 
his men by argument, suasion, and example to shake off 
the virus of indiscipline and sacrifice their individual 
judgment and will to the well-being of their fellows. He 
enjoined nothing upon others that he himself was not 
ready to undertake, and he exposed himself time and 
again to risks greater far than any general should de- 
liberately incur. Whether he succeeds or fails in his 
arduous enterprise, Kolchak, b}' his preterhuman patience 
and sustained energy and courage, has deserved excep- 
tionally well of his country, and could afford to ignore the 
current legends that depict him in the crying colors of a 
reactionary, even though they were accepted for the time 
by the most exalted among the Great Unversed in Russian 
affairs. One may dissent from his policy and object to 
some of his lieutenants and to many of his partizans, but 
from the single-minded, patriotic soldier one cannot with- 
hold a large meed of praise. Kolchak's defects are mostly 
exaggerations of his qualities. His remarkable versatility 
is purchased at the price of fitfulness, his energy displays 
itself in spurts, and his impulsiveness impairs at times the 
successful execution of a plan which requires unflagging 
constancy. His judgment of men is sometimes at fault, 
but he would never hesitate to confer a high post upon 

366 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

any man who deserved it. He is democratic in the current 
sense of the word, but neither a doctrinaire nor a faddist. 
A disciplinarian and a magnetic personality withal, he 
charms as effectually as he commands his soldiers. He is 
enlightened enough, like the great Western world- 
menders in their moments of theorizing, to discountenance 
secrecy and hole-and-corner agreements, and, what is still 
more praiseworthy, he is courageous enough to practise 
the doctrine. 

When the revolution broke out Kolchak was at 
Sebastopol. The telegram conveying the sensational 
tidings of the outbreak was kept secret by all military 
commanders — except himself. He unhesitatingly sum- 
moned the soldiers and sailors, apprised them of what 
had taken place, gave them an insight into the true 
meaning of the violent upheaval, and asked them to join 
with him in a heroic endeavor to influence the course of 
things, in the direction of order and consolidation. He 
gaged aright the significance of the revolution and the 
impossibility of confining it within any bounds, political, 
moral, or geographical. But he reasoned that a band of 
resolute patriots might contrive to wrest something for 
the country from the hands of Fate. It was with this 
faith and hope that he set to work, and soon his valiant 
army, the reclaimed provinces, and the improved Russian 
outlook were eloquent witnesses to his worth, whose 
testimony no legendary reports, however well received in 
the West, could weaken. 

How ingrained in the plenipotentiaries was their prone- 
ness for what, for want of a better word, may be termed 
conspirative and circuitous action may be inferred from 
the record of their official and unofficial conversations and 
acts. When holding converse with Kolchak's authorized 
agents in Paris they would lay down hard conditions, 
which were described as immutable; and yet when com- 

367 



THE INSIDE STORY OV THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

municating with the Admiral direct they would submit 
to him terms considerably loss irksome, unknown to his 
Paris advisors, thus mystifying both and occasioning 
friction between them En many cases the contrast be- 
tween the two sots of demands was disconcerting, and in 
all it tended to cause misunderstandings arid complicate 
the relations between Kblchak and his Paris agents. But 
he continued to give his confidence to his representatives, 
although they wore denied that of the delegates. It 
would, of course, be grossly unfair to impute anything 
like disingenuousness to plenipotentiaries engaged upon 
issues of this magnitude, but it was an unfortunate co- 
incidence that they were known to regard some of the 
members of the Russian Council in Paris with disfavor, 
and would have been glad to see them superseded. When 
Nansen's project to feed the starving population of Russia 
was first mooted. Kolchak's Ministers in Paris were ap- 
proached on the subject, and the Allies' plan was pro- 
pounded to them so defectively or vaguely as to give them 
the impression that the co-operation of the Bolshevist 
government was part of the program. They were also 
allowed to think that during the work of feeding the 
people the despatch of munitions and other military 
necessaries to Kolchak and his army would be discon- 
tinued. Naturally, the scheme, weighted with these two 
accompaniments, was unacceptable to Kolchak's repre- 
sentatives in Paris. But, strange to say, in the official 
notification which the plenipotentiaries telegraphed at the 
same time to the Admiral direct, neither of these ob- 
noxious riders was included, so that the proposal assumed 
a different aspect. 

Another example of these singular tactics is supplied by 
their pourparlers with the Admiral's delegates about the 
future international status of Finland, whose help was 
then being solicited to free Petrograd from the Bolshevist 

368 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

yoke. The Finns insisted on the preliminary recognition 
of their complete independence by the Russians. Kol- 
ehak's representatives shrank from bartering any terri- 
tories which had belonged to the state on their own sole 
responsibility. None the less, as the subject was being 
theoretically threshed out in all its bearings, the members 
of the Russian Council in Paris inquired of the Allies 
whether the Finns had at least renounced their preten- 
sions to the province of Karelia. "But the spokesmen of 
the Conference replied elusively, giving them no assurance 
that the elaim had been relinquished. Thereupon they 
naturally concluded that the Finns either still maintained 
their demand or else had not yet modified their former 
decision on the matter, and they deemed it their duty to 
report in this sense to their chief. Yet the plenipoten- 
tiaries, in their message on the subject to Kolchak, which 
was sent about the same time, assured him that the an- 
nexation of Karelia was no longer insisted upon, and that 
the Finns would not again put forward the claim! One 
hardly knows what to think of tactics like these. In their 
talks with the spokesmen of certain border states of Rus- 
sia the official representatives of the three European 
Powers at the Conference employed language that gave 
rise to misunderstandings which may have untoward con- 
sequences in the future. One would like to believe that 
these misunderstandings were caused by mere slips of the 
tongue, which should not have been taken literally by 
those to whom they were addressed; but in the mean- 
while they have become not only the source of high, pos- 
sibly delusive, hopes, but the basis of elaborate policies. 
For example, Esthonian and Lettish Ministers were given 
to understand that they would be permitted to send dip- 
lomatic legations to Petrograd as soon as Russia was re- 
constituted, a mode of intercourse which presupposes the 
full independence of all the countries concerned. A con- 

369 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

stitution was also drawn up for Esthonia by one of the 
Great Powers, which started with the postulate that each 
people was to be its own master. Consequently, the two 
nations in question were warranted in looking forward to 
receiving that complete independence. And if such was, 
indeed, the intention of the Great Powers, there is nothing 
further to be said on the score of straightforwardness or 
precision. But neither in the terms submitted to Kolchak 
nor in those to which his Paris agents were asked to give 
their assent was the independence of either country as 
much as hinted at. 1 

These may perhaps seem trivial details, but they enable 
us to estimate the methods and the organizing arts of the 
statesmen upon whose skill in resource and tact in dealing 
with their fellows depended the new synthesis of inter- 
national life and ethics which they were engaged in real- 
izing. It would be superfluous to investigate the effect 
upon the Russians, or, indeed, upon any of the peoples 
represented in Paris, of the Secret Council's conspirative 
deliberations and circuitous procedure, which were in 
such strong contrast to the "open covenants openly 
arrived at" to which in their public speeches they paid 
such high tribute. 

The main danger, which the Allies redoubted from fail- 
ure to restore tranquillity in Russia, was that Germany 
might accomplish it and, owing to her many advantages, 
might secure a privileged position in the country and use 
it as a stepping-stone to material prosperity, military 
strength, and political ascendancy. This feat she could 
accomplish against considerable odds. She would achieve 
it easily if the Allies unwittingly helped her, as they were 
doing. 



1 In July M. Pichon told the Esthonian delegates that France recognized 
the independence of their country in principle. But this declaration was 
not taken seriously, either by the Russians or by the French. 

37° 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

Unfortunately the Allied governments had not much 
hope of succeeding. If they had been capable of elaborat- 
ing a comprehensive plan, they no longer possessed the 
means of executing it. But they devised none. "The 
fact is," one of the Conference leaders exclaimed, "we 
have no policy toward Russia. Neither do we possess 
adequate data for one." 

They strove to make good this capital omission by 
erecting a paper wall between Germany and her great 
Slav neighbor. The plan was simple. The Teutons were 
to be compelled to disinterest themselves in the affairs of 
Russia, with whose destinies their own are so closely bound 
up. But they soon realized that such a partition is use- 
less as a breakwater against the tidal wave of Teutondom, 
and Germany is still destined to play the part of Russia's 
steward and majordomo. 

How could it be otherwise? Germany and Russia are 
near neighbors. Their economic relations have been con- 
tinuous for ages, and the Allies have made them indispen- 
sable in the future; Russia is ear-marked as Germany's 
best colony. The two peoples are become interdependent. 
The Teuton will recognize the Slav as an ally in economics, 
and will pay himself politically. Who will now thwart or 
check this process? Russia must live, and therefore buy 
and sell, barter and negotiate. Can a parchment treaty 
hinder or invalidate her dealings? Can it prevent an 
admixture of politics in commercial arrangements, seeing 
that they are but two aspects of one and the same trans- 
action ? It is worthy of note that a question which goes 
to the quick of the matter was never mooted. It is this : 
Is it an essential element of the future ordering of the world 
that Germany shall play no part whatever in its progress? 
Is it to be assumed that she will always content herself 
with being treated as the incorrigible enemy of civilization ? 
And, if not, what do all these checks and barriers amount to ? 

25 371 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

In Russia there arc millions of Germans conversant 
with the language, laws, and customs of the people. Many 
of them have been settled there for generations. They 
are passionately attached to their race, and neither un- 
friendly nor useless to the country of their adoption. The 
trade, commerce, and industry of the European provinces 
are largely in their hands and in those of their forerunners 
and helpers, the Jews. The Russo-German and Jewish 
middlemen in the country have their faces ever turned 
toward the Fatherland. They are wont to buy and sell 
1 1 icro. They always obtained their credit in Berlin, Dres- 
den, or Frankfurt. They acted as commercial travelers, 
agents, brokers, bankers, for Russians and Germans. They 
are constantly going and coming between the two coun- 
tries. How are these myriads to be fettered permanently 
and kept from eking out a livelihood in the future on the 
lines traced by necessity or interest in the past? The 
Russians, on their side, must live, and therefore buy and 
sell. Has the Conference or the League the right or power 
to dictate to them the persons or the people with whom 
alone they may have dealings? Can it narrow the field 
of Russia's political activities? Some people flatter them- 
selves that it can. In this case the League of Nations 
must transform itself into an alliance for the suppression 
of the German race. 

Burning indignation and moral reprobation were the 
sentiments aroused among the high-minded Allies by the 
infamous Treaty of Brest- Li to vsk. For that mockery of a 
peace, even coming from an enemy, transcended the 
bounds of human vengeance. It was justly anathematized 
by all Entente peoples as the loathsome creation of a 
frenzied people. But shortly afterward the Entente 
governments themselves, their turn having come, wrought 
what Russians of all parties regard as a political patch- 
work of variegated injustice more odious far, because 

372 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

its authors claimed to be considered as the devoted friends 
of their victims and the champions of right. Whereas 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty provided for a federative Slav 
state, with provincial diets and a federal parliament, the 
system substituted by the Allies consisted in carving up 
Russia into an ever-increasing number of separate states, 
some of which cannot live by themselves, in debarring 
the inhabitants from a voice in the matter, in creating a 
permanent agency for foreign intervention, and ignoring 
Russia's right to reparation from the common enemy. 
The Russians were not asked even informally to say 
what they thought or felt about what was being done. 
This province and that were successively lopped off in a 
lordly way by statesmen who aimed at being classed as 
impartial dispensers of justice and sowers of the seeds 
of peace, but were unacquainted with the conditions and 
eschewed investigation. Here, at all events, the usual 
symptoms of hesitancy and procrastination were absent. 
Swift resolve and thoroughness marked the disintegrating 
action by which they unwittingly prepared the battle- 
fields of the future. 

Nobody acquainted with Russian psychology imagines 
that the feelings of a high-souled people can be transformed 
by gifts of food, money, or munitions made to some of 
their fellow-countrymen. How little likely Russians are 
to barter ideal boons for material advantages may be 
gathered from an incident worth noting that occurred in 
the months of April and May, when the fall of the capital 
into the hands of the anti-Bolshevists was confidently 
expected. 

At that time, as it chanced, the one thing necessary 
for their success against Bolshevism was the capture of 
Petrograd. If that city, which, despite its cosmopolitan 
character, still retained its importance as the center of 
political Russia, could be wrested from the tenacious 

373 



THE tNSIDE STORV OF YUY. PEACE CONFERENCE 

[Yotsky, the fall of the anarchist 

a conclusion. The 

cx&rdingfy pressed every Lever to sot 

city. And as, of all helpers. th< s and Bsthonians 

Imittedly the most efficacious, conversations 
;un with their Leaders, They were ready to 
drive tin, but it must be a hard and lucrative one. 

rhey would march on Petrograd for a price. The prin- 
cipal condition which they laid down was the express 
and definite recognition of their complete independence 

ears which it would be unfruitful here to dis- 
cuss. The EColchak government was ready to 
with the Finnish Cabinet, as the d$ government, 

and to recognise Finland's presenl status for what it is 
in internationa] Law; but as they could not give what 
they did not possess, their recognition must, they ex- 
plained, be like their own authority, provisional. A 
similar reply was made to the Bsthonians; to this t] 

urred. The Russians stood firm and the 
negotiations fell through, It is to be supposed that when 
they have recovered their former status they will prove 
more amenable to the blandishments of the Allies than 
they were to the powerful bribe dangled before their eyes 
by th E and the Finns? 

But if the improvised a nents entailing dismem- 

berment which the Great Powers imposed on Russia 
during her cataleptic trance are revised, as they may be. 
whenever she recovers consciousness and strength, what 
course will events then follow : If she seeks to regather 
under her wing some of the peoples whose complete 
et.dence the League of Nations was so eager to 
guarantee, will thi nd to the appeal of these 

and fly to their assistance : Russia, who has not been 
consulted, will not be as bound by the canons of the 

oT4 



ATTITUDE TOWARD RUSSIA 

League, and one need not be a prophet to 

reluctance of ".'' - - i \ i 

order to prevent b 

potentiaries may have he- -. • 'c as of T< 

becoming again integral part-, of tl 

may then see its political axis once n - 

outlook obscured. Thus the system of equilibrium, 

which was theoretic olished by the Fourteen Poii 

may be ablished by the hundred and one economico- 

political changes whicl -; reeovery will contribute 

to bring about. 

A decade is but a twinkling in the history of a nal 
Within a few years Russia may ore be united. 

The army that v.'ill I \ v.;]] con- 

fute a form: pen in the | of the state 

that wields it. .'. everything, even military strength, 
is relative, and i armies of the rest of Europe will 

be impatient to fight in the . and will therefore count 
for c Tnsiderably less than their nui 'here v.-ill be no 

real danger of an in vasion . R ■ .• country easy to get 

into, but hard to gd c il of and military against 

its armies there would in verity I cry, 

annexation, indemnities, or other appreciable gains. 
It is hard to believe that the di tatesmen 

of the Conference took these eventualities fully into 
account before attempting to reshape amorphous Russia 
after their own vague ideal. But whether we ■ heir 

v/ork by the standards of political science or of interna- 
tional ethic, or explain it as a scries of well-meant 
expedients begotten by the practical logic of momentary 
convenience, we must confess that its gifted authors 
lacked a direct eye for the wayward tides of national 
and international movements; were, in fact, smitten by 
political blindness, and did the best they could in these 
distressing circumstan// 

375 



XI 

BOLSHEVISM 

WHAT is Bolshevism? A generic term that stands 
for a number of things which have little in common. 
It varies with the countries where it appears. In Russia 
it is the despotism of an organized and unscrupulous 
group of men in a disorganized community. It might also 
be termed the frenzy of a few epileptics running amuck 
among a multitude of paralytics. It is not so much a 
political doctrine or a socialist theory as a psychic disease 
of a section of the community which cannot be cured 
without leaving permanent traces and perhaps modifying 
certain organic functions of the society affected. For 
some students at a distance who make abstraction from 
its methods — as a critic appreciating the performance of 
"Hamlet" might make abstraction from the part of the 
Prince of Denmark — it is a modification of the theory of 
Karl Marx, the newest contribution to latter-day social 
science. In Russia, at any rate, the general condition of 
society from which it sprang was characterized not by 
the advance of social science, but by a psychic disorder the 
germs of which, after a century of incubation, were brought 
to the final phase of development by the war. In its 
origins it is a pathological phenomenon. 

Four and a half years of an unprecedented campaign 
which drained to exhaustion the financial and economic 
resources of the European belligerents upset the psychical 
equilibrium of large sections of their populations. Goaded 

376 



BOLSHEVISM 

by hunger and disease to lawless action, and no longer 
held back by legal deterrents or moral checks, they fol- 
lowed the instinct of self-preservation to the extent of 
criminal lawlessness. Familiarity with death and suf- 
fering dispelled the fear of human punishment, while 
numbness of the moral sense made them insensible to the 
less immediate restraints of a religious character. These 
phenomena are not unusual concomitants of protracted 
wars. History records numerous examples of the home- 
coming soldiery turning the weapons destined for the 
foreign foe against political parties or social classes in their 
own country. In other European communities for some 
time previously a tendency toward root-reaching and 
violent change was perceptible, but as the state retained 
its hold on the army it remained a tendency. In the 
case of Russia — the country where the state, more than 
ordinarily artificial and ill-balanced, was correspondingly 
weak — Fate had interpolated a blood-stained page of 
red and white terror in the years 1906-08. Although 
fitful, unorganized, and abortive, that wild splutter was 
one of the foretokens of the impending cataclysm, and 
was recognized as such by the writer of these pages. 
During the foregoing quarter of a century he had watched 
with interest the sowing of the dragon's teeth from which 
was one day to spring up a race of armed and frenzied 
men. Few observers, however, even in the Tsardom, 
gaged the strength or foresaw the effects of the anarchist 
propaganda which was being carried on suasively and 
perseveringly, oftentimes unwittingly, in the nursery, the 
school, the church, the university, and with eminent 
success in the army and the navy. Hence the widespread 
error that the Russian revolution was preceded by no 
such era of preparation as that of the encylopedists in 
France. 

Recently, however, publicists have gone to the other 

377 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

extreme and asserted that Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Gorky, 
and a host of other Russian writers were apostles of the 
tenets which have since received the name of Bolshevism, 
and that it was they who prepared the Russian upheaval 
just as it was the authors of the "Encyclopedia" who 
prepared the French Revolution. In this sweeping form 
the statement is misleading. Russian literature during 
the reigns of the last three Tsars — with few exceptions, 
like the writings of Leskoff — was unquestionably a 
vehicle for the spread of revolutionary ideas. But it 
would be a gross exaggeration to assert that the end 
deliberately pursued was that form of anarchy which is 
known to-day as Bolshevism, or, indeed, genuine anarchy 
in any form. Tolstoy and Gorky may be counted among 
the forerunners of Bolshevism, but Dostoyevsky, whom I 
was privileged to know, was one of its keenest antagonists. 
Nor was it only anarchism that he combated. Like 
Leskoff, he was an inveterate enemy of political radicalism, 
and we university students bore him a grudge in con- 
sequence. In his masterly delineation * of a group of 
"reformers," in particular of Verkhovensky — whom 
psychic tendency, intellectual anarchy, and political 
crime bring under the category of Bolshevists — he fore- 
shadowed the logical conclusion, and likewise the political 
consummation, of the corrosive doctrines which in those 
days were associated with the name of Bakunin. In the 
year 1905-06, when the upshot of the conflict between 
Tsarism and the revolution was still doubtful, Count 
Witte and I often admired the marvelous intuition of the 
great novelist, whose gallery of portraits in the "Devils" 
seemed to have become suddenly endowed with life, and 
to be conspiring, shooting, and bomb-throwing in the 
streets of Moscow, Petersburg, Odessa, and Tiflis. The 
seeds of social revolution sown by the novelists, essayists, 

1 In the Biessy (Devils). 

378 



BOLSHEVISM 

and professional guides of the nation were forced by the 
wars of 1904 and 19 14 into rapid germination. 

As far back as the year 1892, in a work published over 
a pseudonym, the present writer described the rotten 
condition of the Tsardom, and ventured to foretell its 
speedy collapse. 1 The French historian Michelet wrote 
with intuition marred by exaggeration and acerbity: 
"A barbarous force, a law-hating world, Russia sucks 
and absorbs all the poison of Europe and then gives it 
off in greater quantity and deadlier intensity. When 
we admit Russia, we admit the cholera, dissolution, 
death. That is the meaning of Russian propaganda. 
Yesterday she said to us, ' f am Christianity.' To- 
morrow she will say, 'I am socialism.' It is the revolting 
idea of a demagogy without an idea, a principle, a senti- 
ment, of a people which would march toward the west 
with the gait of a blind man, having lost its soul and its 
will and killing at random, of a terrible automaton like a 
dead body which can still reach and slay. 

"It might commove Europe and bespatter it with blood, 
but that would not hinder it from plunging itself into 
nothingness in the abysmal ooze of definite dissolution." 

Russia, then, led by domiciled aliens without a father- 
land, may be truly said to have been wending steadily 
toward the revolutionary vortex long before the outbreak 
of hostilities. Her progress was continuous and percep- 
tible. As far back as the year 1906 the late Count Witte 
and myself made a guess at the time-distance which the 
nation still had to traverse, assuming the rate of progress 
to be constant, before reaching the abyss. This, however, 
was mere guesswork, which one of the many possibilities 
— and in especial change in the speed-rate — might belie. 
In effect, events moved somewhat more quickly than we 

1 Rttssian Characteristics, by E. B. Lanin (Eblanin. a Russian word 
which means native of Dublin, Eblana). 

379 



THE INSIDE STORY OF HIE PEACE CONFERENCE 

anticipated, and it was the World War and its appalling 
concomitants that precipitated the catastrophe. 

As circumstances willed it, certain layers of the people 
of central Europe were also possessed by the revolutionary 
spirit at the close of the World War. In their case hunger, 
hardship, disease, and moral shock were the avenues along 
which it moved and reached them. This coincidence was 
fraught with results more impressive than serious. The 
governments of both these great peoples had long been 
the mainstays of monarchic tradition, military discipline, 
and the principle of authority. The Teutons, steadily 
pursuing an ideal which lay at the opposite pole to anar- 
chy, had risked every worldly and well-nigh every spirit- 
ual possession to realize it. It was the hegemony of the 
world. This aspiration transfigured, possessed, fanati- 
cized them. Teutondom became to them what Islam is 
to Mohammedans of every race, even when they shake 
off religion. They eschewed no means, however iniqui- 
tous, that seemed to lead to the goal. They ceased to be 
human in order to force Europe to become German. 
Offering up the elementary principles of morality on the 
altar of patriotism, they staked their all upon the single 
venture of the w r ar. It was as the throw of a gambler 
playing for his soul with the Evil One. Yet the faith of 
these materialists waxed heroic withal, like their self- 
sacrifice. And in the fiery ardor of their enthusiasm, hard 
concrete facts were dissolved and set floating as illusions 
in the ambient mist. Their wishes became thoughts and 
their fears were dispelled as fancies. They beheld only 
what they yearned for, and when at last they dropped 
from the dizzy height of their castles in cloudland their 
whole world, era, and ideal was shattered. Unavailing 
remorse, impotent rage, spiritual and intense physical ex- 
haustion completed their demoralization. The more har- 
ried and reckless among them became frenzied. Turning 

380 



BOLSHEVISM 

first against their rulers, then against one another, they 
finally started upon a work of wanton destruction relieved 
by no creative idea. It was at this time-point that they 
endeavored to join hands with their tumultuous Eastern 
neighbors, and that the one word "Bolshevism " connoted 
the revolutionary wave that swept over some of the Slav 
and German lands. But only for a moment. One may 
safely assert, as a general proposition, that the same 
undertaking, if the Germans and the Russians set their 
hands to it, becomes forthwith two separate enterprises, 
SO different are the conceptions and methods of these two 
peoples. Bolshevism was almost emptied of its contents 
by the Germans, and little left of it but the empty shell. 

Comparisons between the orgasms of collective madness 
which accompanied the Russian welter, on the one hand, 
and the French Revolution, on the other, are unfruitful 
and often misleading. It is true that at the outset those 
spasms of delirium were in both cases violent reactions 
against abuses grown well-nigh unbearable. It is also a 
fact that the revolutionists derived their preterhuman 
force from historic events which had either denuded those 
abuses of their secular protection or inspired their victims 
with wonder-working faith in their power to sweep them 
away. But after this initial stage the likeness vanishes. 
The French Revolution, which extinguished feudalism as 
a system and the nobility as a privileged class, speedily 
ceased to be a mere dissolvent. In its latter phases it 
assumed a constructive character. Incidentally it created 
much that was helpful in substance if not beautiful in 
form, and from the beginning it adopted a positive doc- 
trine as old as Christianity, but new in its application to 
the political sphere. Thus, although it uprooted quanti- 
ties of wheat together with the tares, its general effect was 
to prepare the ground for a new harvest. It had a dis- 
tinctly social purpose, which it partially realized. Nor 

381 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

should it be forgotten that in the psychological sphere it 
kindled a transient outburst of quasi-religious enthusiasm 
among its partizans, imbued them with apostolic zeal, in- 
spired them with a marvelous spirit of self-abnegation, 
and nerved their arms to far-resonant exploits. And the 
forces which the revolution thus set free changed many of 
the forms of the European world, but without reshaping 
it after the image of the ideal. 

Has the withering blight known as Bolshevism any such 
redeeming traits to its credit account? The consensus of 
opinion down to the present moment gives an emphatic, 
if summary, answer in the negative. Every region over 
which it swept is blocked with heaps of unsightly ruins. 
It has depreciated all moral values. It passed like a tor- 
nado, spending its energies in demolition. Of construc- 
tion hardly a trace has been discerned, even by indulgent 
explorers. 1 One might liken it to a so-called possession 
by the spirit of evil, wont of yore to use the human organs 
as his own for words of folly and deeds of iniquity. Bol- 
shevism has operated uniformly as a quick solvent of the 
social organism. Doubtless European society in 191 7 
sorely needed purging by drastic means, but only a fanatic 
would say that it deserved annihilation. 

It has been variously affirmed that the political leaven 
of these destructive ferments in eastern and central Eu- 
rope was wholesome. Slavs and Germans, it is argued, 
stung by the bankruptcy of their political systems, re- 
solved to alter them on the lines of universal suffrage and 
its corollaries, but were carried farther than they meant 
to go. This mild judgment is based on a very partial 



1 Educational reforms have been mentioned among its achievements and 
attributed to Lunatcharsky. That he exerted himself to spread elementary 
instruction must be admitted. But this progress and the effective protec- 
tion and encouragement which he has undoubtedly extended to arts and 
sciences would seem to exhaust the list of items in the credit account of the 
Bolshevist regime. 

.182 



BOLSHEVISM 

survey of the phenomena. The improvement in question 
was the work, not of the Bolshevists, but of their adver- 
saries, the moderate reformers. And the political striv- 
ings of these had no organic nexus with the doctrine which 
emanated from the nethermost depths in which vengeful 
pariahs, outlaws, and benighted nihilists were floundering 
before suffocating in the ooze of anarchism. Neither can 
one discern any degree of kinship between Spartacists like 
Eichhorn or Lenin and moderate reformers as represented, 
say, by Theodor Wolff and Boris Savinkoff. The two 
pairs are sundered from each other by the distance that 
separates the social and the anti-social instinct. Those 
are vulgar iconoclasts, these are would-be world-builders. 
That the Russian, or, indeed, the German constitu- 
tional reformers should have hugged the delusion that 
while thrones were being hurled to the ground, and an 
epoch was passing away in violent convulsions, a few 
alterations in the electoral law would restore order and 
bring back normal conditions to the agonizing nations, is 
an instructive illustration of the blurred vision which char- 
acterizes contemporary statesmen. The Anglo-Saxon del- 
egates at the Conference were under a similar delusion 
when they undertook to regenerate the world by a series 
of merely political changes. 

No one who has followed attentively the work of the 
constitution-makers in Weimar can have overlooked 
their readiness to adopt and assimilate the positive ele- 
ments of a movement which was essentially destructive. 
In this respect they displayed a remarkable degree of open- 
mindedness and receptivity. They showed themselves 
avid of every contribution which they could glean from 
any source to the work of national reorganization, and 
even in Teutonized Bolshevism they apparently found 
helpful hints of timely innovations. One may safely 
hazard the prediction that these adaptations, however 

383 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

little they may be relished, are certain to spread to 
the Western peoples, who will be constrained to accept 
them in the long run, and Germany may end by becoming 
the economic leader of democratic Europe. The law ot 
politico-social interchange and assimilation underlying 
this phenomenon, had it been understood by the states- 
men of the Entente, might have rendered them less 
desirous of seeing the German organism tainted with the 
germs of dissolution. For what Germany borrows from 
Bolshevism to-day western Europe will borrow from 
Germany to-morrow. And foremost among the new 
institutions which the revolution will impose upon 
Europe is that of the Soviets, considerably modified in 
form and limited in functions. 

"In the conception of the Soviet system," writes the 
most influential Jewish-German organ in Europe, "there 
is assuredly something serviceable, and it behooves us to 
familiarize ourselves therewith. Psychologically, it rests 
upon the need felt by the working-man to be something 
more than a mere cog in the industrial mechanism. The 
first step would consist in conferring upon labor com- 
mittees juridical functions consonant with latter-day 
requirements. These functions would extend beyond 
those exercised by the labor committees hitherto. How 
far they could go without rendering the industrial enter- 
prise impossible is a matter for investigation. . . . This 
is not merely a wish of the extremists; it is a psychologi- 
cal requirement, and therefore it necessitates the estab- 
lishment of a closer nexus between legislation and practi- 
cal life which unhappily is become so complicated. And 
this need is not confined to the laboring class. It is 
universal. Therefore, what is good for the one is meet 
for the other." * 

The Soviet system adapted to modern existence is one 

1 Frankfurter Zeitung, February 28, I9*9- 

oS4 



BOLSHEVISM 

and probably the sole — legacy of Bolshevism to the 
new age. 

During the Peace Conference Bolshevism played a 
large part in the world's affairs. By some of the eminent 
lawgivers there it was feared as a scourge; by others it 
was wielded as a weapon, and by a third set it was em- 
ployed as a threat. Whenever a delegate of one of the 
lesser states felt that he was losing ground at the Peace 
Table, and that his country's demands were about to be 
whittled down as extravagant, he would point significantly 
to certain "foretokens" of an outbreak of Bolshevism 
in his country and class them as an inevitable consequence 
of the nation's disappointment. Thus the representative 
of nearly every state which had a territorial program 
declared that that program must be carried out if Bol- 
shevism was to be averted there. "This or else Bol- 
shevism" was the peroration of many a delegate's expose. 
More redoubtable than political discontent was the prose- 
lytizing activity of the leaders of the movement in Russia. 

Of the two pillars of Bolshevism one is a Russian, the 
other a Jew, the former, Ulianoff (better known as Lenin), 
the brain; the other, Braunstein (called Trotzky), the 
arm of the sect. Trotzky is an unscrupulous despot, in 
whose veins flows the poison of malignity. His element 
is cruelty, his special gift is organizing capacity. Lenin 
is a Utopian, whose fanaticism, although extensive, has 
well-defined limits. In certain things he disagrees pro- 
foundly with Trotzky. He resembles a religious preacher 
in this, that he created a body of veritable disciples around 
himself. He might be likened to a pope with a college 
of international cardinals. Thus he has French, British, 
German, Austrian, Czech, Italian, Danish, Swedish, 
Japanese, Hindu, Chinese, Buryat, and many other fol- 
| lowers, who are chiefs of proselytizing sections charged 
with the work of spreading the Bolshevik evangel through- 

385 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

out :''- 

duties. Lenin, however, dissatisfied with the measures 
of suecess already attained, is constantly stimulat 
his disciples to more strenuous exertions. He shai 

h other sectarian chiefs who have played a prominent 

part in the world's history that indefinable quality which 
stirs en .'. susceptibility and renders those who 

approach him more easily accessible bo ideas tow. 
which they began by manifesting n ice, Lenin 

is credibly reported to have made several converts among 
his West . i -.Us. 

The plenipotentiaries, during the first four months, 
approached Bolshevism from b single direction, unvaried 
by the events which it generated or the modifications 
which i: underwent. They tested it solely by its aeei- 
dent s on the one aim which they were intent 

tiring — a formal and provisional resettlement of Europe 
capable of being presented to their respective parliaments 
as .-. fair achievement. With its real character, its mani- 
fold corollaries, its innovating tendeneies over the social. 
political, and ethnical domain, they were for the time 
being unconcerned. Without the slightest reference to 
any of these cons os they were ready to rind a 

plaee for it in the new state system with which they 
hoped to endow the world. More than once they were on 
the point of giving it official recognition. There was no 
preliminary testing, sifting, or examining by these empiri- 
cists, who. rinding Bolshevism on their way. and dis- 
cerning no faeile means of dislodging or transforming it. 
signified their willingness under easy conditions to hall- 
mark and incorporate it as one of the elements of the new 
ordering. From the crimes laid to its eharge they were 
prepared to make abstraetion. The barbarous methods 
to which it owed its very existenee they were willing to 
consign to oblivion. And it was onlv a freak of circum- 

i$o 



BOLSHEVISM 

stance that hindered this embodiment of despotism from 
beginning one of their accepted means of rendering the 
world safe for democracy. 

Political students outside the Conference, going farther 
into the matter, inquired whether there was any kernel 
of truth in the doctrines of Lenin, any social or political 
advantage in the practices of Braunstein (Trotzky), and 
the conclusions which they reached were negative. 1 But 
inquiries of this theoretical nature awakened no interest 
among the empiricists of the Supreme Council. For 
them Bolshevism meant nothing more than a group of 
politicians, who directed, or misdirected, but certainly 
represented the bulk of the Russian people, and who, if 
won over and gathered under the cloak of the Conference, 
would facilitate its task and bear witness to its triumph. 
This inference, drawn by keen observers from many 
countries and parties, is borne out by the curious admis- 
sions and abortive acts of the principal plenipotentiaries 
themselves. 

In its milder manifestations on the social side Russian 
Bolshevism resembles communism, and may be described 
as a social revolution effected by depriving one set of 
people — the ruling and intelligent class — of power, prop- 
erty, and civil rights, putting another and less qualified 
section in their place, and maintaining the top-heavy 
structure by force ruthlessly employed. Far-reaching 
though this change undoubtedly is, it has no nexus with 
Marxism or kindred theories. Its proximate causes were 
many: such, for example, as the breakdown of a tyran- 
nical system of government, state indebtedness so vast 
that it swallowed up private capital, the depreciation of 
money, and the corresponding appreciation of labor. It 



1 A succinct but interesting study of this question appeared in the Han- 
dels-Zeitung of the Berliner Tageblatt, over the signature of Dr. Felix 
Pinner, July 20, 1918. 

26 387 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

is fair, therefore, to say that a rise in the cost of produc- 
tion and the temporary substitution of one class for 
another mark the extent to which political forces revolu- 
tionized the social fabric. Beyond these limits they did 
not go. The notion had been widespread in most coun- 
tries, and deep-rooted in Russia, that a political upheaval 
.would effect a root-reaching and lasting alteration in the 
forces of social development. It was adopted by Lenin, 
a fanatic of the Robespierre type, but far superior to 
Robespierre in will-power, insight, resourcefulness, and 
sincerity, who, having seized the reins of power, made the 
experiment. 

It is no easy matter to analyze Lenin's economic policy, 
because of the veil of mist that conceals so much of Rus- 
sian contemporary history. Our sources are confined to 
the untrustworthy statements of a censored press and 
travelers' tales. 

But it is common knowledge that the Bolshevist dic- 
tator requisitioned and "nationalized" 'the banks, took 
factories, workshops, and plants from their owners and 
handed them over to the workmen, deprived landed pro- 
prietors of their estates, and allowed peasants to appro- 
priate them. It is in the matter of industry, however, 
that his experiment is most interesting as showing the 
practical value of Marxism as a policy and the ability 
of the Bolsheviki to deal with delicate social problems. 
The historic decree issued by the Moscow government on 
the nationalization of industry after the opening experi- 
ment had broken down contains data enough to enable 
one to affirm that Lenin himself judged Marxism inap- 
plicable even to Russia, and left it where he had found it 
— among the ideals of a millennial future. That ukase 
ordered the gradual nationalization of all private indus- 
tries with a capital of not less than one million rubles, 
but allowed the owners to enjoy the gratuitous usufruct 

388 



BOLSHEVISM 

of the concern, provided that they financed and carried 
it on as before. Consequently, although in theory the 
business was transferred to the state, in reality the 
capitalist retained his place and his profits as under the 
old system. Consequently, the principal aims of so- 
cialism, which are the distribution of the proceeds of 
industry among the community and the retention of a 
certain surplus by the state, were missed. In the Bolshe- 
vist procedure the state is wholly eliminated except for 
the purpose of upholding a fiction. It receives nothing 
from the capitalist, not even a royalty. 

The Slav is a dreamer whose sense of the real is 
often defective. He loses himself in vague general- 
ities and pithless abstractions. Thus, before opening 
a school he will spin out a theory of universal edu- 
cation, and then bemoan his lack of resources to real- 
ize it. True, many of the chiefs of the sect — for it 
is undoubtedly a sect when it is not a criminal con- 
spiracy, and very often it is both — were not Slavs, 
but Jews, who, for the behoof of their kindred, dropped 
their Semitic names and adopted sonorous Slav substi- 
tutes. But they were most unscrupulous peculators, in- 
capable of taking an interest in the scientific aspect of 
such matters, and hypnotized by the dreams of lucre which 
the opportunity evoked. One has only to call to mind 
some of the shabby transactions in which the Semitic 
Dictator of Hungary, Kuhn, or Cohen, and Braunstein 
(Trotzky) of Petrograd, took an active part. The former 
is said to have offered for sale the historic crown of 
St. Stephen of Hungary — which to him was but a plain 
gold headgear adorned with precious stones and a jeweled 
cross — to an old curiosity dealer of Munich, 1 and when 
solemnly protesting that he was living only for the Soviet 

1 Cf. Bonsoir, July 29, 1919. The price was not fixed, but the minimum 
was specified, It was one hundred thousand kronen. 

389 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Republic and was ready to die far it, he was actively en- 
gaged in smuggling out of Hungary into Switzerland fifty 
million kronen bonds, thirty -live kilograms of gold, and 
thirty chests rilled with objects of value. 1 His colleague 
SzamueUy's plunder is a matter of history. 

To such adventurers as those science is a drug. They 
are primitive beings impressible mainly to concrete mo- 
tives of the barest kind. The dupes of Lenin were people 
of a different type. Many of them fancied that the great 
political clash must inevitably result in an equally great 
and salutary soeial upheaval. This assumption has not 
been borne out by events. 

Those fanatics fell into another error; they were in a 
hurry, and would fain have effected their great transforma- 
tion as by the waving of a magician's wand. Impatient 
of gradation, they scorned to traverse the distance be- 
tween the point of departure and that of the goal, and by 
way of setting up the new social structure without delay, 
they rolled away all hindrances regardless of consequences. 
In this spirit of absolutism they abolished the services 
of the national debt, struck out the claims of Russia's 
creditors to their capital or interest, and turned the shops 
and factories over to labor boards. That was the initial 
blunder which the ukase alluded to was subsequently 
issued to rectify. But it was too late. The equilibrium 
of the forces of production had been definitely upset and 
could no longer be righted. 

One of the basic postulates of profitable production is 
the equilibrium of all its essential factors — such as the 
laborer's wages, the cost of the machinery and the mate- 
rial, the administration. Bring discord into the harmony 
and the entire mechanism is out of gear. 

The Russian workman, who is at bottom an illiterate 
peasant with the old roots of serfdom still clinging to him, 

1 Ci. Der Tag, Vienna, August 13, 1919. L'Echo de Paris, August 15, 1919. 

390 



BOLSHEVISM 

has seldom any bowels for his neighbor and none at all for 
his employer. "God Himself commands us to despoil 
such gentry," is one of his sayings. He is in a hurry to 
enrich himself, and he cares about nothing else. Nor can 
he realize that to beggar his neighbors is to impoverish 
himself. Hence he always takes and never gives; as a 
peasant he destroys the forests, hewing trees and planting 
none, and robs the soil of its fertility. On analogous lines 
he would fain deal with the factories, exacting exorbitant 
wages that eat up all profit, and naively expecting the 
owner to go on paying them as though he were the trustee 
of a fund for enriching the greedy. The only people to 
profit by the system, and even they only transiently, were 
the manual laborers. The bulk of the skilled, intelligent, 
and educated artisans were held up to contempt and ostra- 
cized, or killed as an odious aristocracy. That, it has 
been aptly pointed out, 1 is far removed from Marxism. 
The Marxist doctrine postulates the adhesion of intelli- 
gent workers to the social revolution, whereas the Russian 
experimenters placed them in the same category as the 
capitalists, the aristocrats, and treated them accordingly. 
Another Marxist postulate not realized in Russia was that 
before the state could profitably proceed to nationaliza- 
tion the country must have been in possession of a well- 
organized, smooth-running industrial mechanism. And 
this was possible only in those lands in which capitalism 
had had a long and successful innings, not in the great 
Slav country of husbandmen. 

By way of glozing over these incongruities Lenin's ukase 
proclaimed that the measures enacted were only provi- 
sional, and aimed at enabling Russia to realize the great 
transformation by degrees. But the impression conveyed 
by the history of the social side of Lenin's activity is that 
Marxism, whether as understood by its author or as inter- 

1 By Dr. F. Pinner, H. Vorst, and others. 

391 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

preted and twisted by it? Russian adherents, has boon 
tried and found impracticable. One is further warranted 
in saying that neither the visionary workers who are moved 
by misdirected seal for social improvement nor the theo- 
rists who are constantly on the lookout for new and 
stimulating ideas are likely to discover in Russian Bolshe- 
vism any aspeet but the one alluded to above worthy 
of their serious consideration. 

A much deeper mark was made on the history of the 
century by its methods. 

Compared with the soul-searing horrors let loose during 
the Bolshevist fit of frenzy, the worst atrocities reeorded 
of Deputy Carrier and his noyades during the French 
Revolution were but the freaks of compassionate human 
beings. In Bolshevist Russia brutality assumed tonus 
so monstrous that the modem man of the West shrinks 
from conjuring up a faint picture of them in imagination. 
Tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands were done to death 
in hellish ways by the orders of men and of women. 
Eyes were gouged out, ears hacked off, amis and legs torn 
from the body in presence of the victims' children or wives, 
whose agony was thus begun before their own turn came. 
Men and women and infants were burned alive. Chinese 
executioners were specially hired to indict the awful tort- 
ure of the "thousand slices." l Officers had their limbs 
broken and were left for hours in agonies. Many victims 
arc credibly reported to have been buried alive. History, 
from its earliest dawn down to the present day. has re- 
corded nothing so profoundly revolting as the nameless 



1 The condemned man is tied I ■■ a cross, his mouth gas^ovl. and 

the execution is made to last several hours. It usually begins with a slit 
on the forehead and the putting down of the skin toward the chin. After 
the lapse of a certain time the nose is severed from the face. An interval 

follows, then an ear is lopped off, and so the devilish work goes on with 
long pauses. The skill of the executioner is displayed in the length of time 
during which the victim remains conscious. 

39« 



BOLSHEVISM 

cruelties in which these human fiends reveled. One grue- 
some picture of the less loathsome scenes enacted will live 
in history on a level with the noyades of Nantes. I have 
seen several moving descriptions of it in Russian journals. 
The following account is from the pen of a French marine 
officer : 

"We have two armed cruisers outside Odessa. A few 
weeks ago one of them, having an investigation to make, 
sent a diver down to the bottom. A few minutes passed 
and the alarm signal was heard. He was hauled up and 
quickly relieved of his accoutrements. He had fainted 
away. When he came to, his teeth were chattering and 
the only articulate sounds that could be got from him were 
the words: 'It is horrible! It is awful!' A second diver 
was then lowered, with the same procedure and a like re- 
sult. Finally a third was chosen, this time a sturdy lad 
of iron nerves, and sent down to the bottom of the sea. 
After the lapse of a few minutes the same thing happened 
as before, and the man was brought up. This time, how- 
ever, there was no fainting fit to record. On the contrary, 
although pale with terror, he was able to state that he 
had beheld the sea-bed peopled with human bodies stand- 
ing upright, which the swaying of the water, still sensible 
at this shallow depth, softly rocked as though they were 
monstrous algae, their hair on end bristling vertically, and 
their arms raised toward the surface. ... All these corpses, 
anchored to the bottom by the weight of stones, took on 
an appearance of eerie life resembling, one might say, a 
forest of trees moved from side to side by the wind and 
eager to welcome the diver come down among them. . . . 
There were, he added, old men, children numerous be- 
yond count, so that one could but compare them to the 
trees of a forest." l 

From published records it is known that the Bolshevist 

1 Cf. Le Figaro, February 18, 1919. 

393 



THE INSIDE STOR\ CE CONFERENCE 

js 

S 
was 

seek 

... 

•'..■.'. 
socad Embi k and est tg •• sg - 

so Dolstoj 9c 

Th Society rests a 

. . . 
. . . 

.. is •.- i;\s i 

A: mm \ ed I 

. N . •• v\ ho - : \ 

e muttitado 01 ftgreft- 



i 



BOLSHEVISM 

able presence, he war. resourceful and unscrupulous, soon 
became popular, and even captivated the Emperor, 

Shcn T:;iiiik, who appointed him Minister. He then set 
about applying his fen*'!:, ;md realizing his dreams. 
Wang Ngan Shen began by making commerce and trade 

a state monopoly, just as Lenin had done, "in order," 
he explained, "to keep the poor from being devoured by 
the rieh." The state was proclaimed the sole owner of 
all the wealth of the soil; agricultural overseers were 
despatched to each district to distribute the land among 
the peasants, each of these receiving as much as he and 
his family could cultivate. The peasant obtained also 
the seed, but this he was obliged to return to the state 
after the ingathering of the harvest. The power of the 
overseer went farther; it was he who determined what 
crops the husbandman might sow and who fixed day by 
day the price of every salable commodity in the district. 
As the state reserved to itself the right to buy all agri- 
cultural produce, it was bound in return to save up a 
part of the profits to be used for the benefit of the people 
in years of scarcity, ;m<l also at other times to be employed 
in works needed by the community. Wang Ngan Shen 
also ordained that only the wealthy should pay taxes, 
the proceeds of which were to be employed in relieving 
the wants of the poor, the old, and the unemployed. 
The theory was smooth and attractive. 

For over thirty years those laws are said to have 
remained in force, at any rate on paper. To what extent 
they were carried out is problematical. Probably a be- 
ginning was actually made, for during Wang's tenure of 
office confusion was worse confounded than before, and 
misery more intense and widespread. The opposition 
to his regime increased, spread, and finally got the upper 
hand. Wang Ngan Shen was banished, together with 
those of his partizans who refused to accept the return to 

395 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

would appear to have boon the 
ihevism n I in history. 

Anc bo the Bolshevist 

. the country which it rufru 

ma> i the Chinese a organised in the year 

850 by a ' who, having become a Christian, 

by God bo regenerate his people. 

He ngly gc \ ether b band of stout-hearted 

fellows who:- h< sd, disciplined, and transformed 

a the nu as . ny to which brigands, 

- -t every social layer afterward 

. Yangts Va h y, invaded 

twelve of the richest provinces, seised six hundred cities 

and towns, and put an end to twenty million people in 

werve years by tire, sword, and famine. - 

To tion Hung Sew Tseuen, a master 

he name of Crusade of the 

For twelve years this "Crusade" lasted. 

and ht have endured much longer had it not been 

.0 given by outsiders. It was there t 
"C • won h Is and . lished a 

re were the Conference who argued 

gOUS to that of 
China in 1854, ought, like her. to be helped by the Gn 
Powers, tl was, they held, quite as much in the intere st s 
of Eun n hers. But however forcible their argu- 

ments, they encountered an insurmountable obstacle in 
the fear entertained by the chiefs of the leading ^overti- 
me- the extreme onal parties in their 
ve c rantries should make capital out of the move 
and turn them out of office. Thev invoked the interests 



1 Hung Sow T<; . lasted Erom 1850 bo 1864. 

- and porcelain towers, was 



BOLSHEVISM 

of the cause of which they were the champions for declin- 
ing to expose themselves to any such risk. It has been 
contended with warmth, and possibly with truth, that if 
at the outset the Great Powers had intervened they might 
with a comparatively small army have crushed Bolshevism 
and re-established order in Russia. On the other hand, 
it was objected that even heavy guns will not destroy 
ideas, and that the main ideas which supplied the revo- 
lutionary movement with vital force were too deeply 
rooted to have been extirpated by the most formidable 
foreign army. That is true. But these ideas were not 
especially characteristic of Bolshevism. Far from that, 
they were incompatible with it: the bestowal of land 
on the peasants, an equitable reform of the relations 
between workmen and employers, and the abolition of 
the hereditary principle in the distribution of everything 
that confers an unfair advantage on the individual or 
the class are certainly not postulates of Lenin's party. 
It is a tenable proposition that timely military assistance 
would have enabled the constructive elements of Russia 
to restore conditions of normal life, but the worth of 
timeliness was never realized by the heads of the govern- 
ments who undertook to make laws for the world. They 
ignored the maxim that a statesman, when applying 
measures, must keep his eye on the clock, inasmuch as the 
remedy which would save a nation at one moment may 
hasten its ruin at another. 

The expedients and counter-expedients to which the 
Conference had recourse in their fitful struggles with 
Bolshevism were so many surprises to every one con- 
cerned, and were at times redolent of comedy. But 
what was levity and ignorance on the part of the delegates 
meant death, and worse than death, to tens of thousands of 
their prot6g6es. In Russia their agents zealously egged 
on the order-loving population to rise up against the 

397 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Bolsheviki and attack their strong positions, promising 
them immediate military help if they succeeded. But 
when, these exploits having been duly achieved, the agents 
were asked how soon the foreign reinforcements might 
be expected, they replied, calling for patience. After 
a time the Bolsheviki assailed the temporary victors, 
generally defeated them, and then put a multitude of 
defenseless people to the sword. Deplorable incidents 
of this nature, which are said to have occurred several 
times during the spring of 1010. shook the credit of the 
Allies, and kindled a feeling of just resentment among 
all classes of Russians. 



XII 

HOW BOLSHEVISM WAS FOSTERED 

THE Allies, then, might have solved the Bolshevist 
problem by making up their minds which of the two 
alternative politics — war against, or tolerance of, Bolshe- 
vism — they preferred, and by taking suitable action in 
good time. If they had handled the Russian tangle with 
skill and repaid a great sacrifice with a small one before 
it was yet too late, they might have hoped to harvest in 
abundant fruits in the fullness of time. But they belonged 
to the class of the undecided, whose members continually 
suffer from the absence of a middle word between yes and 
no, connoting what is neither positive nor negative. 
They let the opportunity slip. Not only did they with- 
hold timely succor to either side, but they visited some of 
the most loyal Russians in western Europe with the utmost 
rigor of coercion laws. They hounded them down as 
enemies. They cooped them up in cages as though they 
were Teuton enemies. They encircled them with barbed 
wire. They kept many of them hungry and thirsty, 
deprived them of life's necessaries for days, and in some 
cases reduced the discontented — and who in their place 
would not be discontented? — to pick their food in dust- 
bins among garbage and refuse. I have seen officers and 
men in France who had shed their blood joyfully for the 
Entente cause gradually converted to Bolshevism by the 
misdeeds of the Allied authorities. In whose interests? 
With what helpful results? 

399 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

I \Y. 

erest, and in favorable 

.1 1 sa) without hesitation 

> as vehemently and 

levists .is among their i 

versaries. "My country as a whole is bitterly hostile 

to ; k es," exclaimed an eminent Russu 

i qq inestimable st 
vices at the cost ( cal existence, they tun 

acks upon hi i agon] were no affi 

theirs Do day the nation is divided on man] issues 
Diss* tve riven and shatt i mto 

eds, But in one respect Russia is still united in the 
veh< >ward the Allies, who 6 

Loned he i ate 

astsofprey Some i fcred engen 

i d rrugh tresentatives of the 

Russian government had been admitted to 

the Conference. A statesman would have insisted upon 

-: this ety valve. It would have 

med the Allies It would 

e bound the Russians to them. For Russia's 6V 

sent o yered by Kolchak and his 

colleagues to represent them, would have boon the ex 
ess community hovering between lite 
ath. They could and would have gone tar tow* 
conciliating the world dictators, to wk able 

s they might have hesitated to offer unbend 
And . aiescence, however provisional, 

would have tended to relieve the Allies of a sensible part 
of ; ad of responsibility. It would also have linl 

Loosely, s, but perceptibly, to the 

Western Powers. It would have imparted a settled 
Bnl ection to Kolchak's policy, and com- 

municated it to the nation. In short, it might have dis- 

400 



HOW BOLSHEVISM WAS FOSTERED 

pel led some of the storm-clouds that are gathering in the 
east of Europe." 

But the Allies, true to their wont of drifting, put off 
all decisive action, and let things slip and slide, for the 
Germans to put in order. There were no Russians, 
therefore, at the Conference, and there lies no obligation 
on any political group or party in the anarchist Slav state 
to hold to the Allies. But it would be an error to imagine 
that they have a white sheet of paper on which to trace 
their line of action and write the names of France and 
Britain as their future friends. They are filled with 
angry disgust against these two ex-Allies, and of the two 
the feeling against France is especially intense. 1 

It is a truism to repeat in a different form what Messrs. 
Lloyd George and Wilson repeatedly affirmed, but ap- 
parently without realizing what they said : that the peace 
which they regard as the crowning work of their lives 
deserves such value as it may possess from the assumption 
that Russia, when .she recovers from her cataleptic fit, 
will be the ally of the Powers that have dismembered her. 
If this postulate should prove erroneous, Germany may 
form an anti-Allied league of a large number of nations 
which it would be invidious to enumerate here. But it is 
manifest that this consummation would imperil Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Jugoslavia, and sweep away the last 
vestiges of the peace settlement. And although it would 
be rash to make a forecast of the policy which new Russia 
will strike out, it would be impolitic to blink the conclu- 
sions toward which recent events significantly point. 

In April a Russian statesman said to me: "The Allied 
delegates are unconsciously thrusting from them the only 
means by which they can still render peace durable and a 

1 It is right to say that during the summer months a considerable section 
of the an ti- Bolshevists modified their view of Britain's policy, and expressed 
gratitude for the aid bestowed on Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch, with- 
out which their armies would have collapsed. 

401 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

fellowship of the nations possible Unwittingly they are 

augmenting the forces of Bolshevism and raising political 
enemies against themselves. Consider how they are be- 
having toward us. Recently a number of Russian pris- 
oners escaped from Germany to Holland, whereu] 
A1E. atives packed them off by force and against 

their will to Dantirig, to be conveyed thence to Libau, 
where they have become recruits of the si Red 

Guards. Those men -.night have beer, usefully employed 
in the Allied countries, to whose cause they were devoted, 
but so exas- were they at their forcible removal to 

Libau that many of them declared that they would join 
the Bolshevist forces. 

"Even our official representatives are seemingly in- 
eluded in the category of suspects. Our Minister in 
Peking was refused the right of sending ciphered telegrams 
and our charge* d'affaires in a European capital suffered 
the same deprivation, while the Bolshevist envoy enjoyed 
this diplomat ie privilege. A councilor of embassy in one 
Allied country was refused a passport visa for another 
until he deelared that if the refusal were upheld he would 
return a high order which for extraordinary services 
he had reeeived from the government whose embassy 
was vetoing his visa. On the national festival of a certain 
Allied country the charge* d'affaires of Russia was the 
only member of the diplomatic corps who received no 
official invitation." 

One day in January, when a erowd had gathered on the 
Quai d'Orsay. watching the delegates from the various 
countries — British. American, Italian. Japanese. Ru- 
manian, ete. — enter the stately palaee to safeguard the 
interests of their respective countries and legislate for 
the human raee, a Russian officer passed, accompanied 
by an illiterate soldier who had seen hard service first 
under the Grand Duke Nicholas, and then in a Russian 

40: 



HOW BOLSHEVISM WAS FOSTERED 

brigade in France. The soldier gazed wistfully at the 
palace, then, turning to the officer, asked, "Are they 
letting any of our people in there ?" The officer answered, 
evasively: "They are thinking it over. Perhaps they 
will." Whereupon his attendant blurted out: "Thinking 
it over! What thinking is wanted? Did we not fight 
for them till we were mowed down like grass? Did not 
millions of Russian bodies cover the fields, the roads, and 
the camps? Did we not face the German great guns with 
only bayonets and sticks? Have we done too little for 
them? What more could we have done to be allowed in 
there with the others? I fought since the war began, and 
was twice wounded. My five brothers were called up at 
the same time as myself, and all five have been killed, and 
now the Russians are not wanted! The door is shut in 
our faces. . . ." 

Sooner or later Russian anarchy, like that of China, 
will come to an end, and the leaders charged with the 
reconstitution of the country, if men of knowledge, pa- 
triotism, and character, will adopt a program conducive 
to the well-being of the nation. To what extent, one 
may ask, is its welfare compatible with the status quo 
in eastern Europe, which the Allies, distracted by con- 
flicting principles and fitful impulse, left or created 
and hope to perpetuate by means of a parchment in- 
strument? 

The zeal with which the French authorities went to 
work to prevent the growth of Bolshevism in their coun- 
try, especially among the Russians there, is beyond dis- 
pute. Unhappily it proved inefficacious. Indeed, it is 
no exaggeration to say that it defeated its object and 
produced the contrary effect. For attention was so com- 
pletely absorbed by the aim that no consideration re- 
mained over for the means of attaining it. A few con- 
crete examples will bring this home to the reader. The 
27 403 



THE INSIDE STORY OE THE H { CONFERENCE 

:rom an er/ .an, 

GSMUQ I 

Mos an Eougl 

> fight a .-." 
is the F 

■ and 

•$h. 

as ew 

of . 

Their ficers 

■ 

standing Slavs 

ivates, a 

- -. irtuatty i i 

- 
ardingly. line, 

tst ol •■■■ horn v . sou] 

'•. they had fondly 

3 

■-. Ives reins 

excess 

ol lerwenl a n ige 

they 
nurtured for die Fren 

■ ■ . 
The s 
wlv 
threw* all di every tu 

tinst 
These were the tx tgsof th* SB of 

' * bo 

404 



MOW BOLSHEVISM WAS FOSTERED 

This anti Russian spirit grew iatenser as time lapsed. 
Thousands of Russian soldiers were sent out to work for 
private employers, not by the War Ministry, but by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, under whom they were 
placed. They wen- fed and paid a wage which under 
normal circumstances should have contented them, for 
1 1 was more than they used to receive in pre-war days in 
their own country. But the circumstances were not 
normal. Side by side with them worked Frenchmen, 
many of whom were unable physically to compete with 

the Sturdy peasants Iron) IVrm and Vyatka.. And when 
propagandists pointed out to them that the French worker 
was paid 100 per cent, more, they brooded over the 
inequality and Labeled it as they were told. For over- 
work, too, the rate of pay was still more unequal. One 
result of this dilTerential treatment was the estrangement 
of the two races as represented by the two classes of work- 
men, and the growth of mutual dislike. But there was 
another. When they learned, as they did in time, that 
the employer was selling the produce of their labor at a 
profit of 400 and 500 per cent., they had no hesitation 
about repeating the formulas suggested to them by 
socialist propagandists: "We are working for blood- 
suckers. The bourgeois must be exterminated." In 
this way bitterness against the Allies and hatred of the 
capitalists were inculcated in tens of thousands of Rus- 
sians who a few mor.ths before were honest, simple- 
minded peasants and well-disciplined soldiers. Many of 
these men, when they returned to their country, joined 
the Red Guards of Bolshevism with spontaneous ardor. 
They needed no pressing. 

There was one young officer of the Guards, in particular, 

named G , who belonged to a very good family and 

was an exceptionally cultured gentleman. Music was his 
recreation, and he was a virtuoso on the violin. In the 

405 



THE INSIDE STOW Of THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

. .• ■ "... s bes 

s g . . - . 

. 

■• the F . . goi - 

sssed* 
. . . ( v g G . 

. . b Ta 

And Bn King George was to vis *t - 

B3K . 3» . . - . . 

ssnei .. . ops to oomc 

bs along . ' i 

-.-..-.:. b best places 

. ■.• '. . ces G 

- s . - ... Etas 

s ... but 

.>.-. ... ■ .'.. . . . te pat the ques 

khed Ross 
tass - With (eats 

in h - . as G— — recoo - . - adding; "We 

who Bought . - - . . 

be >••'• .. s b Poles and Cw 

.... in their 
- and had at i 

DOS i - ^c.::\: \< . 

ase bz ■.- ... 

■ 
I g George V s 



XIII 



SIDELIGHTS on THE TREATY 

FROM the opening of Liu- Conference fundamental 
differences sprang up which split the delegates into 

two main parties, of which one was solicitous mainly 
about the resettlement of the world and its future main 
stay, the League o{ Nations, and the other about the 

furtherance of national interests, which, it maintained, 
was equally indispensable to an enduring peace. The 
latter were ready to welcome the League on condition 
that it was utilized in the service of their national pur- 
poses, but not if it countered them. To bridge the chasm 
between the two was the task to which President Wilson 
courageously set his hand. Unluckily, by way of qualify- 
ing for the experiment, he receded from his own strong 
position, and having cut his moorings from one shove, 
failed to reach the other. His pristine idea was worthy 
of a world-leader; had, in fact, been entertained and ad- 
vocated by some of the foremost spirits of modern times. 
He purposed bringing about conditions under which the 
pacific progress of the world might be safeguarded in a 
very large measure and for an indefinite time. But being 
very imperfectly acquainted with the concrete conditions 
of European and Asiatic peoples — he had never before 
felt the pulsation of international life — his ideas about the 
ways and means were hazy, and his calculations bore no 
real reference to the elements of the problem. Conse- 
quently, with what seemed a wide horizon and a generous 

407 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

ambition, his grasp was neither firm nor comprehensive 
enough for such a revolutionary undertaking. In no case 
could he make headway without the voluntary co-opera- 
tion of the nations themselves, who in their own best 
interests might have submitted to heavy sacrifices, to 
which their leaders, whom he treated as true exponents 
of their will, refused their consent. But he scouted the 
notion of a world-parliament. Whenever, therefore, con- 
templating a particular issue, not as an independent ques- 
tion in itself, but as an integral part of a larger problem, 
he made a suggestion seemingly tending toward the ulti- 
mate goal, his motion encountered resolute opposition in 
the face of which he frequently retreated. 

At the outset, on which so much depended, the peoples 
as distinguished from the governments appeared to be 
in general sympathy with his principal aim, and it seemed 
at the time that if appealed to on a clear issue they would 
have given him their whole-hearted support, provided 
always that, true to his own principles, he pressed these 
to the fullest extent and admitted no such invidious dis- 
tinctions as privileged and unprivileged nations. This 
belief was confirmed by what I heard from men of mark, 
leaders of the labor people, and three Prime Ministers. 
They assured me that such an appeal would have evoked 
an enthusiastic response in their respective countries. 
Convinced that the principles laid down by the President 
during the last phases of the war would go far to meet the 
exigencies of the conjuncture, I ventured to write on one 
of the occasions, when neither party would yield to the 
other: "The very least that Mr. Wilson might now do, 
if the deadlock continues, is to publish to the world the 
desirable objects which the United States are disinter- 
estedly, if not always wisely, striving for, and leave the 
judgment to the peoples concerned." l 

1 The Daily Telegraph, March 28, 1919. 

408 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

But he recoiled from the venture. Perhaps it was 
already too late. In the judgment of many, his assent to 
the suppression of the problem of the freedom of the seas, 
however unavoidable as a tactical expedient, knelled the 
political world back to the unregenerate days of strategical 
frontiers, secret alliances, military preparations, financial 
burdens, and the balance of power. On that day, his 
grasp on the banner relaxing, it fell, to be raised, it may be, 
at some future time by the peoples whom he had aspired 
to lead. The contests which he waged after that first 
defeat had little prospect of success, and soon the pith 
and marrow of the issue completely disappeared. The 
utmost he could still hope for was a paper covenant — 
which is a different thing from a genuine accord — to take 
home with him to Washington. And this his colleagues 
did not grudge him. They were operating with a different 
cast of mind upon a wholly different set of ideas. Their 
aims, which they pursued with no less energy and with 
greater perseverance than Mr. Wilson displayed, were 
national. Some of them implicitly took the ground that 
Germany, having plunged the world in war, would persist 
indefinitely in her nefarious machinations, and must, 
therefore, in the interests of general peace, be crippled 
militarily, financially, economically, and politically, for 
as long a time as possible, while her potential enemies 
must for the same reason be strengthened to the utmost 
at her expense, and that this condition of things must be 
upheld through the beneficent instrumentality of the 
League of Nations. 

On these conflicting issues ceaseless contention went 
on from the start, yet for lack of a strong personality of 
sound, over-ruling judgment the contest dragged on 
without result. For months the demon of procrastina- 
tion seemed to have possessed the souls of the principal 
delegates, and frustrated their professed intentions to 

409 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

through the work ev -'v. Even unforeseen 

kkcits led to dangerorcs delay. Every pass 
became a ground Go ig the vital tssu* ugh 

each day lost increased the i sol achieving the 

bject, which was the conclusion of peace. Pot 
example, the committee h the question of 

reparations would reach a iet ston, say, that Germany 
most pay a certain sum, w3 old entail a century of 

strenuous effort accompanied with s. thrift and 

tomic Committt i sd that 

e restricted within 
such narrow limits as to put such payment wholly out 
of her power. And this difference of viea necessil 
ant of the whole issue. Mr. Hughes, 
Australia, commenting on this shilly-shally] 
th truths "The minds of the people are grievously 
The long delay, coupled with tears lest that 
the Peace Treaty, when it does come, should prove to be ■ 
peace un wor th y, unsatisfactory, unenduring, has made 
arts of the people sick, We were told that the 
aty would ho ready in the coming week, but 
wo look round and see half a world engaged in war, or 
d far war. Bolshevism is spreading with 
y of a prairie Bre The Allies have been fan 
to retreat from some of the most fertile parts of southern 
Russia, and Allied tn tish, at Murmansk 

and Archangel are in grave danger of destruction. Yet 
wo woro told that peace was at hand, and that the world 
was safe tor hherty and racy. It IS not 

ice, liberty, and m^lrfr>£ the world safe for 
democracy that the world wants The | i 

pies of the Allied countries justifiably desire to be rt 
suxed by plain, comprehensible statements instead of 

. . . . \ - . . . . ■ 

410 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

long-drawn-out negotiations and the thick veil of secrecy 
in which these were shrouded." 

It requires an effort to believe that procrastination 
was raised to the level of a theory by men whose experience 
of political affairs was regarded as a guarantee of the 
soundness of their judgment. Yet it is an incontro- 
vertible fact thai dilatory tactics were seriously suggested 
as a policy at the Conference. It was maintained that, 
far from running risks by postponing a settlement, the 
Entente nations went 1 , on the contrary, certain to find 
the ground better prepared the longer the day of reckon- 
ing was put off. Germany, they contended, had recov- 
ered temporarily from the Bolshevik fever, but the im- 
provement was fleeting. The process of decomposition 
was becoming intenser day by day, although the symp- 
toms were not always manifest. Lack of industrial pro- 
duction, of foreign trade and sound finances, was gnawing 
at the vitals of the Teuton Republic. The army of 
unemployed and discontented was swelling. Soon the 
sinister consequences of this stagnation would take the 
form of rebellions and revolts, followed by disintegration. 
And this conjunction would be the opportunity of the 
Entente Powers, who could then step in, present their 
bills, impose their restrictions, and knead the Teuton 
dough into any shape they relished. Then it would 
be feasible to prohibit the Austrian-Germans from ever 
entering the Republic as a federated state. In a word, 
the Allied governments need only command, and the 
Teutons would hasten to obey. It is hardly credible 
that men of experience in foreign politics should build 
uipon such insecure foundations as these. It is but fair 
to say the Conference rejected this singular program 
in theory while unintentionally carrying it out. 

Although everybody admitted that the liquidation 

4H 



THE INSIDE >".Vx\ OF V: CE CONFERENCE 

to nore 
fat settk 

! 

essing - '. is 

tA I iger 

. - c . . - 
Ufies tk 

. I sue ; to be 

is ■■ takes nod her, in espectfr e of its 
• 
g the a 

redistrj . it safely hai 

And hardly less nportant was 
an army bo eas 
ken in s i ADm s on 1 nts, 

d the :v '■...-. g said nay 

■\>. But this 

. exist It ass tme ' 

tvance, • 
.v es - t i eut dm ing 

in a k way, 

As bJ disarmament, 

SB 

whi< I it would ha 

e only if the wiB I oe it procei 

cumstances. In no case 
could at the knowledge i 

oserves, nor within 
time-lir. its fixed the k the C 

the a of a new ord er in g, 

like human progress, is .1 long process. It admits of a 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE I REATY 

variety of beginnings, but one can never be sure of the 
end, seeing that it presupposes a radical change in the 
temper of the people:., one might almost say a remodeling 
of human nature. It. can only \><- the effect of a variety 
of causes, mainly moral, operating over a long period oi 
time. Peace with Germany was a matter for the govern 
ments concerned; the elimination of war could only be 
accomplished by the peoples. The one was in the main 

a political problem, the oilier social, economical, and 

el liieal. 

Mr. Balfour asserted optimi:.! i< .illy' that the work 

of concluding peace with Germany was a very simple 
matter. None the less it took the Conference over five 
months to arrange it. So desperately slow was the 
progress of the Supreme Council that on the 213th day 
of the Peace Conference, 8 two months after the Germans 
had signed the conditions, not one additional treaty had 
been concluded, nay, none was even ready for signature. 
The [talian plenipotentiary, Signor Tittoni, thereupon 
addressed his colleagues frankly on the subject and asked 
thein whether they were not neglecting their primary 
duty, which was to conclude treaties with the various 
enemies who had ceased to fight in November of the 
previous year and were already waiting for over nine 
months tO resume normal life, and whether the delegates 
were justified in seeking to discharge the functions of a 
supreme board for the government of all Europe. He 
pointed out that nobody could hope to profit by the state 
of disorder and paralysis for which this procrastination 
was answerable, the economic effects making themselves 
felt sooner or later in every country. lie added that the 
cost of the war had been calculated for every month, 
every week, every day, and that the total impressed every 
one profoundly; but that nobody had thought it worth 

l In March, 1919. 'August 19, '9>9. 

413 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

his while to count up the atrocious cost of this incredibly 
slow peace and of the waste of wealth cause : . et ery week 
and month that it dragged on. Italy, he lamented, felt 
this loss more keenly than her partners because her pea 
had not yet been concluded. He felt moved, therefore, 
he said, to tell them that the business . governing 
Europe to which the Conference had been attending all 
those months was not precisely the work for which it v 
convoked. 1 

This sharp and timely admonition was the preamble 
motion. The Conferer.ce was just then al\ 
for a "well-earned holiday," during which its memtx 
might renew their spent energies and return in October 
to resume their labors, the v. les in the meanwhile 
bearing the cost in blood and substance. The Italian 
delegate objected to any such break and adjured them to 
remain at their posts. Why, he asked, should ill-starred 
Italy, which had already sustained so many and such pain- 
ful losses, be condemned to sacrifice further enormous 
sums in order that the delegates who had been frittering 
.-.way their time tackling irrelevant issues, and endeavor- 
ing to rule all Europe, might have a rest \ Why should 
they interrupt the sessions before making peace with 
Austria, with Hungary, with Bulgaria, with Turkey, and 
enabling Italy to return to normal life? Why should 
time and opportunity be given to the Turks and Kurds 
for the massacre of Armenian men, women, and children? 
This candid reminder is said to have had a sobering 
effect on the versatile delegates yearning for a holiday. 
The situation that evoked it will a: use the passing won- 
der of level-headed men. 

It is worth recording that such was the atmosphere of 
suspicion among the delegates that the motives for this 
holiday were believed by some to be less the need of 

1 Ci. Corrirre dtlla Sera, August 20, 1919. 

414 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

repose than an unavowable desire to give time to the 
ll.ipshurgs to recover the Crown of St. Stephen as the 
first step toward seizing that of Austria. 1 The Austrians 
desired exemption from the obligation to make repara- 
tions and pay crushing taxes, and one of the delegates, 
with a leaning for that country, was not averse to the idea. 
As the states that arose on the ruins of the Hapsburg 
monarchy were not considered enemies by the Conference, 
it was suggested that Austria herself should enjoy the 
same distinction. But the Italian plenipotentiaries ob- 
jected and Signor Tittoni asked, "Will it perhaps be 
asserted that there was no enemy against whom we 
Italians fought for three years and a half, losing half a 
million slain and incurring a debt of eighty thousand 
millions?" 

A French journal, touching on this Austrian problem, 
wrote :- "Austria-Hungary has been killed and now France 
is striving to raise it to life again. But Italy is furiously 
opposed to everything that might lead to an understand- 
ing among the new states formed out of the old possessions 
of the Hapsburgs. That, in fact, is why our transalpine 
allies were so favorable to the union of Austria with 
Germany. France on her side, whose one overruling 
thought is to red nee her vanquished enemy to the most 
complete impotence, France who is afraid of being 
afraid, will not tolerate an Austria joined to the German 
Federation." Here the principle of self-determination 
went for nothing. 

Before the Conference had sat for a month it was 
angrily assailed by the peoples who had hoped so much 
from its love of justice — Egyptians, Koreans, Irishmen 
from Ireland and from America, Albanians, Frenchmen 
from Mauritius and Syria, Moslems from Aderbeidjan, 

1 Ibidem (Corriere della Sera, August 20, 1919). 

2 L'Humaniti, May 21, 1919- 

415 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE GONFEREN< 

Persians, Tartars, Xw. and a h others, i 

q the halt and d 
the :he diplomatic Pool ol Siloam 

the mi:. the moving of the ver 

beard that a great and potent world- 

'ormer had arisen ■■•■ hose m i ssion it was to redress 

secular aces and confer liberty upon oppre s sed 

they sent their envoys 
re him. And these wandered about the 
streets of Paris seeking the intercess 
Ministers, and journalists wh d for them 

B of the new Messiah or his 
bs. But all to them. One of 

hose as vernacular English, 

- to shake the dust of Paris from his boots, 
quoting Sydney Smith, remarked: "They, too, are 
Pharise e s They would do the Good Samaritan, but with- 
out the oil and twopence. How has K come to | ass that 
e Jews without an official del ammanded the 

pport — the militant — of the Supreme Council, 

aid not hesitate to tyrannize eastern Europe 

Involuntarily the student of politics called to mind the 

Baron Hager - by one of his 
ents during the Congress of Vienna: "Public i 
conttnu 3 .Me to the Congress On all 

- i I said that there is no harmony, that they 
as about the re-establishment of 
ore. but are bent only on forcing one 

another's hands, es grabbing as much as he ear. 

. . . T. e Congress will end because it mu 

but that it will leave things more entangled than it 



.\;. i oio. 

Congress in the years i$ 14-15. 
416 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

found them. . . . The peoples, who in consequence of 
the success, the sincerity, and the noble-mindedness of this 
superb coalition had conceived such esteem for their 
leaders and such attachment to them, and now perceive 
how they have forgotten what they solemnly promised — 
justice, order, peace founded on the equilibrium and 
legitimacy of their possessions — will end by losing their 
affection and withdrawing their confidence in their 
principles and their promises." 

Those words, written a hundred and five years ago, 
might have been penned any day since the month of 
February, 1919. 

The leading motive of the policy pursued by the 
Supreme Council and embodied in the Treaty was aptly 
described at the time as the systematic protection of 
France against Germany. Hence the creation of the 
powerful barrier states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugo- 
slavia, Greater Rumania, and Greater Greece. French 
nationalists pleaded for further precautions more com- 
prehensive still. Their contention was that France's 
economic, strategic, financial, and territorial welfare 
being the cornerstone of the future European edifice, 
every measure proposed at the Conference, whether 
national or general, should be considered and shaped in 
accordance with that, and consequently that no possi- 
bility should be accorded to Germany of rising again to 
a commanding position because, if she once recovered her 
ascendancy in any domain whatsoever, Europe would 
inevitably be thrust anew into the horrors of war. Ter- 
ritorially, therefore, the dismemberment of Germany was 
obligatory; the annexation of the Saar Valley, together 
with its six hundred thousand Teuton inhabitants, was 
necessary to France, and either the annexation of the left 
bank of the Rhine or its transformation into a detached 
state to be occupied and administered by the French until 

4i7 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Germany pays the last farthing of the indemnity. Further, 
Austria must be deprived of the right of determining her 
own mode of existence and constrained to abandon the 
idea of becoming one of the federated states of the Ger- 
man Republic, and, if possible, northern Germany should 
be kept entirely separate from southern. The Allies 
should divide the Teutons in order to sway them. All 
Germany's other frontiers should be delimitated in a like 
spirit. And at the same time the work of knitting to- 
gether the peoples and nations of Europe and forming 
them into a friendly sodality was to go forward without 
interruption. 

''How to promote our interests in the Rhineland," 
wrote M. Maurice Barres, 1 "is a life-and-death question 
for us. We are going to carry to the Rhine our military 
and, I hope, our economic frontier. The rest will follow 
in its own good time. The future will not fail to secure 
for us the acquiescence of the population of the Rhine- 
land, who will live freely under the protection of our arms, 
their faces turned toward Paris." 

Financially it was proposed that the Teutons should be 
forced to indemnify France, Belgium, and the other coun- 
tries for all the damage the) 7 had inflicted upon them; 
to pay the entire cost of the war, as well as the pensions 
to widows, orphans, and the mutilated. And the military 
occupation of their country should be maintained until 
this huge debt is wholly wiped out. 

A Nationalist organ, 2 in a leading article, stated with 
brevity and clearness the prevailing view of Germany's 
obligations. Here is a characteristic passage: "She is 
rich, has reserves derived from many years of former 
prosperity; she can work to produce and repair all the 
evil she has done, rebuild all the ruins she has accumu- 

1 In L'Echo de Paris, March 2, 1919. Cf . The DaSy Telegraph, March 4th. 
' Le Gaulois, March S, 1919. Cf. The Daily Telegraph, March 10th. 

41S 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

latcd, and restore all the fortunes she has destroyed, how- 
ever irksome the burden." After analyzing Doctor 
Helfferich's report published six years ago, the article 
concluded, "Germany must pay; she disposes of the 
means because she is rich; if she refuses we must com- 
pel her without hesitation and without ruth." 

As France, whose cities and towns and very soil were 
ruined, could not be asked to restore these places at her 
own expense and tax herself drastically like her allies, 
the Americans and British, the prior and privileged right 
to receive payment on her share of the indemnity should 
manifestly appertain to her. Her allies and associates 
should, it was argued, accordingly waive their money 
claims until hers were satisfied in full. Moreover, as 
France's future expenditure on her army of occupation, 
on the administration of her colonies and of the annexed 
territories, must necessarily absorb huge sums for years 
to come, which her citizens feel they ought not to be asked 
to contribute, and as her internal debt was already over- 
whelming, it is only meet and just that her wealthier 
partners should pool their war debts with hers and share 
their financial resources with her and all their other allies. 
This, it was argued, was an obvious corollary of the war 
alliance. Economically, too, the Germans, while per- 
mitted to resume their industrial occupations on a suffi- 
ciently large scale to enable them to earn the wherewithal 
to live and discharge their financial obligations, should be 
denied free scope to outstrip France, whose material pros- 
perity is admittedly essential to the maintenance of gen- 
eral peace and the permanence of the new ordering. In 
this condition, it is further contended, our chivalrous ally 
was entitled to special consideration because of her low 
birth-rate, which is one of the mainsprings of her difficul- 
ties. This may permanently keep her population from 
rising above the level of forty million, whereas Germany, 
28 419 



THE INSIDE STORY OF rHE PEACE CONFKRKXCF 

by the mid< century, will have reached the f< 

midable total of eighty million, so that competition be- 
tween them would not be on a :> s i' equality. Hence 
the chances should be evenly balanced by the action oi 
the Conference, to be continued by the League. Ois- 
g treatment was therefore a necessity. And 
it should be so introduced that France should be tree to 
maintain a protective tariff, of which she had sore need 
her foreign trade, without causing umbrage to her 
allies. For they could tun gainsay that her position de- 
served speeial treatment. 

Some of the Anglo-Saxon delegates took other ground, 
feeling unable to countenance the postulate underlying 
those demands, namely, that the Teuton race was to be 
forever anathema. They looked far enough ahead to 
make due allowance for a future when conditions in Europe 
will be very different from what they are to daw The 
German race, they felt, being numerous and virile, will 
not die out and cannot be suppressed. And as it is also 
enterprising and resoureeful it would be a mistake to 
render it permanently hostile by the Allies overstepping 
the bounds of justice, because in this ease neither national 
nor general interests would be furthered. You may hin- 
der Germany, they argued, from acquiring the hegemony 
of the world, but not from becoming the principal factor 
in European evolution. If thirty years hence the tVr 
man population totals eighty million or more, will not 
their attitude and their sentiment toward their neighbors 
Constitute an all important element o\ European tran 
quillity and will not the trend o\ these be to a large extent 
the outcome of the Allies' policy oi to day ? The present . 
therefore, is the time for the delegates to deprive that 
sentiment of its venomous, ant i- Allied Sting, not by re 
nouneing any of their countries' rights, but by respeeting 

those of others. 

4^0 



SIDELIGHTS ON 'J UK TREATY 

That was the reasoning of those who believed that 
national striving should be subordinated to the general 
good, and that the present time and its aspirations should 
be ' onsidered in strict relation to the future of the whole 
community of nation:;. They further contended that 
while Germany deserved to suffer eondignly for the 
heinous crimes of unchaining the war and waging it 
ruthlessly, as many of her own people confessed, she 
should not be wholly crippled or enthralled in the hope 
that she would be rendered thereby impotent forever. 
Such hope / as train. With her waxing strength her desire 
of vengeance would grow, and together with it the means 
of wreaking it. She might yet knead Russia into such 
a shape as would make that Slav people a serviceable 
instrument of revenge, and her endeavors might con 
ceivably extend farther than Russia. The one-sided re- 
settlement of Europe charged with explosives of such in- 
calculable force would frustrate the most elaborate at- 
tempts to create not only a real league of nations, but 
even sueh a rough approximation toward one as might 
in time and under favorable circumstances develop into 
a trustworthy war preventive. They concluded that a 
league of nations would be worse than usele IS if trans- 
formed into a weapon to be wielded by one group of 
nations against another, or as an artificial makeshift for 
dispensing peoples from the observance of natural laws. 

At the same time all the governments of the Allies 
were sincere and unanimous in their desire to do every- 
thing possible to show their appreciation of France's 
heroism, to recognize the vastness of her sacrifices, and 
to pay their debt of gratitude for her services to humanity. 
All were actuated by a resolve to contribute in the measure 
of the possible to compensate her for such losses as were 
still reparable and to safeguard her against the recurrence 
of the ordeal from which she had escaped terribly scathed. 

421 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The only limits they admitted to this work of reparation 
were furnished by the aim itself and by the means of 
attaining it. Thus .Messrs. Wilson and Lloyd George 
held that to incorporate In renovated France millions or 
even hundreds of thousands of Germans would be to 
introduce into the political organism the germs of fell 
disease, and on this ground they firmly refused to sanction 
the Rhine frontier, which the French were thus obliged 
to relinquish. The French delegates themselves admitted 
that if granted it could not be held without a powerful 
body of international troops ever at the beck and call of 
the Republic, vigilantly keeping watch and ward on the 
banks of the Rhine and with no reasonable prospect of 
a term to this servitude. For the real ground of this de- 
pendence upon foreign forces is the disproportion between 
the populations of Germany and France and between 
the resources of the two nations. The ratio of the former 
is at present about six to four and it is growing perceptibly 
toward seven to four. The organizing capacity in com- 
merce and industry is said to be even greater. If, there- 
fore, France cannot stand alone to-day, still less could 
she stand alone in ten or fifteen years, and the necessity 
of protecting her against aggression, assuming that the 
German people does not become reconciled to its status 
of forced inferiority, would be more urgent and less prac- 
ticable with the lapse of time. For, as we saw, it is largely 
a question of the birth-rate. And as neither the British 
nor the American people, deeply though they are attached 
to their gallant comrades in arms, would consent to this 
arrangement, which to them would be a burden and to 
the Germans a standing provocation, their representatives 
were forced to the conclusion that it would be the height 
of folly to do aught that would give the Teutons a con- 
venient handle for a war of revenge. Let there be no 
annexation of territory, they said, no incorporation of 

4:2 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

unwilling German citizens. The Americans further argued 
that an indefinite occupation of German territory by a 
large body of international troops would be a direct en- 
couragement to militarism. 

The indemnities for which the French yearned, and on 
which their responsible financiers counted, were large. 
The figures employed were astronomical. Hundreds of 
milliards of francs were operated with by eminent pub- 
licists in an offhand manner that astonished the survivor 
of the expiring budgetary epoch and rejoiced the hearts 
of the Western taxpayers. For it was not only journalists 
who wrote as though a stream of wealth were to be 
turned into these countries to fertilize industry and com- 
merce there and enable them to keep well ahead of their 
pushing competitors. Responsible Ministers likewise hall- 
marked these forecasts with their approval. Before the 
fortune of war had decided for the Allies, the finances of 
France had sorely embarrassed the Minister, M. Klotz, of 
whom his chief, M. Clemenceau, is reported to have said: 
"He is the only Israelite I have ever known who is out of 
his element when dealing with money matters. ' ' Before the 
armistice, M. Klotz, when talking of the complex problem 
and sketching the outlook, exclaimed : " If we win the war, 
I undertake to make both ends meet, far though they now 
seem apart. For I will make the Germans pay the entire 
cost of the war." After the armistice he repeated his 
promise and undertook not to levy fresh taxation. 

Thus, despite fitful gleams of idealism, the atmosphere of 
the Paris Conclave grew heavy with interests, passions, 
and ambitions. Only people in blinkers could miss the 
fact that the elastic formulas launched and interpreted 
by President Wilson were being stretched to the snapping- 
point so as to cover two mutually incompatible policies. 
The chasm between his original prospects and those of 
his foreign associates they both conscientiously endeavored 

423 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

to ■'.. N they hit upon a 

erritorial equilibrium an erilized league 

. \ . ) and a military co 

tultant carried with it the coa ted 

is ol these systems and was deprived of its re- 
deeming features by the other. At a conjuncture in the 
world's 3 which p i nationalism of the 

creased and multiplied na- 
is and s bs which thej deprived of sovereignty and 

DCS, National ambitions took 

vial hatred, was raised 

to i st power. In a word, the world's state system 

was so oddly pieced together that only economic exhaus- 

D followed by a speedy return to militarism could insure 

for it a moderate duration. 

Territorial self-sufficiency, military strength, and ad- 
van - alliances were accordingly looked to as the 
mainstays of the new ordering, even by those who paid 
lip tribute to the "Wilsonian ideal. The ideal itself under- 
went a dis in the proeess of incarnation. 
The Italians asked how the Monroe Doctrine could be 
meiled with the charter of the League of Nations, 
seeing that the League would be authorized to intervene 
in the domestic affairs of other member-states, and if 
ary to despatch troops to keep Germany. Italy, 
and Poland in order; whereas if the United States were 
Ity of ;> agression . Brazil, the Argen- 
tine Republic, or Mexico, the League, paralyzed by that 
Doctrine, must look on inactive. The Germans, alleging 
defects in the Wilsonian Covenant, which was 
justed primarily to the Allies' designs, went to Paris 
vd with a substitute which, it must in fairness be 
admitted, was considerably superior to that of their 
adversaries, and incidentally fraught with greater pro: 
to themselves. 

4-4 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

It is superfluous to add that the continental view pre- 
vailed, but Mr. Wilson imagined that, while abandoning 
his principles in favor of Britain, Prance, and Bulgaria, 
he could readjust the balance by applying them with 
rigor to Italy and exaggerating them when dealing with 
Greece. He afterward communicated his reasons for this 
belief in a message published in Washington. 1 The 
alliance — he was understood to have been opposed to all 
partial alliances on principle- Which guarantees military 
sueeor to Prance, he had signed, he said, in gratitude to 
that eountry, for he seriously doubted whether the 
Ameriean Republic eould have won its freedom against 
Britain's opposition without the gallant and friendly 
aid of Prance. "We reeently had the privilege of assist- 
ing in driving enemies, who also were enemies of the 
world, from her soil, but that does not pay our debt to 
her. Nothing ean pay such a debt." His critics retorted 
that that is a sentimental reason which might with equal 
force have been urged by France and Britain in justifica- 
tion of their promises to Italy and Rumania, yet was 
rejected as irrelevant by Mr. Wilson in the name of a 
higher principle. 

The President of the United States, it was further urged, 
is a historian, and history tells him that the help given 
to his country against England neither came from the 
French people nor was actuated by sympathy for the 
American cause. It was the vindictive act of one of 
those kings whose functions Mr. Wilson is endeavoring 
to abolish. The monarch who helped the Americans 
was merely utilizing a favorable opportunity for depriv- 
ing with a minimum of effort his adversary of lucrative 
possessions. Moreover, the debt which nothing can pay 
was already due when in the years 1 914-16 France 
was i n imminent danger of being crushed by a ruthless 

1 Cf. The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 21, 1919. 

425 



• [NS] )I STOM Of CE CONFERENCE 

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case France's g 

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it 

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I Mr Wilsi 
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Supreme Counci] "We are com 

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en what he wanted was : e of the h 

Alliance. He got that assurance, wii c with 



SIDELIGHTS on THE TREATY 

French watch on the Rhine, the French in the Saar 
Valley and in Africa, with German money going into 
French coffers, makes him tolerably indulgent of the 
altruistic i tietoi icians. 

"The English, the intelligent English, we know have 
their tongues in their cheeks. The [talians are petulant 
imperialists, and Japan doesn't care what happens to the 
League so long as Japan says what shall happen in A sin." ' 

Peace was at last Bigned, no1 on the basis oi the Fourteen 
Points nor yet entirely on the lines of territorial equilib- 
rium! but «»n those of a compromise which, missing the 
advantages of each, combined many of the evils of both 
and of "i hers which were generated by their conjunct ion, 
and laid the foundations oi the new state fabric on quick- 
sands. That Was at bottom the view tO which Italy, 

Rumania, and Greece gave utterance when complaining 
that their claims were being dealt with on the principle 
of self-denial, whereas those of France had been settled 
on the traditional basis of territorial guaranties and 
military alliances. Further, the Treaty failed to lay an 
.'ix to the roots of war, did, in fact, increase their number 
while purporting to destroy them. Far from that: germs 
of future conflicts not only l >et ween the late belligerents, 

but also between the recent Allies,, were plentifully scat- 
tered and may sprout up in the fullness of time. 

The Paris press expressed its satisfaction with France's 
share of the fruits of victory. For the provisions of the 
Treaty went as far as any merely political arrangement 

could go tO Check the natural inequality, numerical, 

economical, industrial, and financial, between the 

Teuton and French peoples. To many this problem 
seemed wholly insoluble, because its solution involved 
a suspension or a corrective of a law of nature. Take 
the birth rate in France, for example. Before the war it 
1 Cf, TJu Cltiau'o Tribune (Paris edition), Augusl 23, 1919 

427 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

had long been declining at a rate which alarmed thought- 
ful French patriots. And, according to official statistics, 
it is falling off still more rapidly to-day, whereas the in- 
crease in other countries is greater than ever before. 1 
Thus, whereas in the year iqii there were 73,599 births 
in the Seine Department, there were only 47,480 in 191S. 
Wet nurses, too, are disappearing. Of these, in the year 
191 1, in the same territory there were 1,363, but in 10 iS 
only 65. The mortality among foundlings rose trom 5 
per cent, before the war to 40 per cent, in the year 191 8.- 
M. Bertillon calculates that for France to increase merely 
at the same rate as other nations — not to recover the 
place among them which she has already lost, but only 
to keep her present one — she needs five hundred thou- 
sand more births than are registered at present. A statis- 
tical table which he drew up of the birth-rate of four 
European nations during five decades, beginning with the 
year 1861, is unpleasant reading 3 for the friends of that 
heroic and artistic people. France, containing in round 
numbers 40,000,000 inhabitants, ought to increase an- 
nually by 500,000. Before the war the total number of 
births in Germany was computed at one million nine 
hundred and fifty thousand, but hardly more than one 
million of the children born were viable. 4 The gen- 
eral conclusion to be drawn from these figures and 
from the circumstances that the falling off in the French 
population still goes on unchecked, is disquieting for 

1 Report of Dr. Jacques Bertillon. Cf. L' Information, January 20, 1919. 
; Cf. Lc Matin, August 13, 1919. 

1 Excess of births over deaths (yearly average). — Cf. U Information, 
January 20, 191 9: 

Germany Great Britain Italy France 

1S61-70 408,333 365»499 183,100 93.515 

[871-80 5* I »034 43I.436 I9i.538 64,063 

1 881-9O 55i»3o8 442,112 307,089 66,982 

1S91-1900 730-265 430,000 339.409 -3.961 

1901-10 866,33s 484,82a 369,959 46,524 

* Professor L. Marchand. Cf. La D'rmocratie Nouvelle, April 26, 1919. 

428 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

chose who desire to see the French race continue to play 
the leading part in continental Europe. One of the 
shrewdest observers in contemporary Germany — him- 
self a distinguished Semite — commented on this decisive 
fact as follows: 1 "Within ten years Germany will con- 
tain seventy million inhabitants, and in the torrent of 
her fecundity will drown anemic and exhausted France. 
. . . The French nation is dying of exhaustion. There is 
no reason, however, for the world to get alarmed . . . 
for before the French will have vanished from the earth, 
other races, virile and healthy, will have come to their 
county to take their place." That is what is actually 
happening, and it is impressively borne in upon the visitor 
to various French cities by the vast number of exotic 
names over houses of business and in other ways. 

With this formidable obstacle, then, the three members 
of the Supreme Council strenuously coped by exercising 
to the fullest extent the power conferred on the victors 
over the vanquished. And the result of their combina- 
tions challenged and received the unstinted approval of 
all those numerous enemies of Teutondom who believe 
the Germans to be incapable of contributing materially 
to human progress, unless they are kept in leading- 
strings by one of the superior races. The Treaty repre- 
sents the potential realization of France's dream, achieved 
semi-miraculously by the very statesmen on whom the 
Teutons were relying to dispel it. Defeated, disarmed, 
incapable of military resistance, and devoid of friends, 
Germany thought she could discern her sheet-anchor of 
salvation in the Wilsonian gospel, and it was the preacher 
of this gospel himself who implicitly characterized her 
salvation as more difficult than the passage of a camel 

1 Dr. Walter Rathenau, in a book entitled The Death of France. I have 
not been able to procure a copy of this book. The extracts given above 
are taken from a statement published by M. Brudenne in the Matin of 
February 16, 1919. 

429 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

through the eye of a needle. The crimes perpetrated by 
the Teutons were unquestionably heinous beyond words, 
and no punishment permitted by the human conscience 
is too drastic to atone for them. How long this punish- 
ment should endure, whether it should be inflicted on 
the entire people as well as on their leaders, and what 
form should be given to it, were among the questions 
confronting the Secret Council, and they implicitly an- 
swered them in the way we have seen. 

People who consider the answer adequate and justified 
give as their reason that it presupposes and attains a 
single object — the efficacious protection of France as the 
sentinel of civilization against an incorrigible arch- 
enemy. And in this they may be right. But if you en- 
large the problem till it covers the moral fellowship of 
nations, and if you postulate that as a safeguard of future 
peace and neighborliness in the world, then the outcome 
of the Treaty takes on a different coloring. Between 
France and Germany it creates a sea of bitterness which 
no rapturous exultation over the new ethical ordering 
can sweeten. The latter nation is assumed to be smitten 
with a fell moral disease, to which, however, the physi- 
cians of the Conference have applied no moral remedy, 
but only measures of coercion, mostly powerful irritants. 
The reformed state of Europe is consequently a state of 
latent war between two groups of nations, of which one 
is temporarily prostrate and both are naively exhorted 
to join hands and play a helpful part in an idyllic society 
of nations. This expectation is the delight of cynics 
and the despair of those serious reformers who are not 
interested politicians. Heretofore the most inveterate 
optimists in politics were the revolutionaries. But they 
have since been outdone by the Paris world-reformers, 
who tempt Providence by calling on it to accomplish 
by a miracle an object which they have striven hard and 

43° 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

successfully to render impossible by the ordinary opera- 
tion of cause and effect. Thus the Covenant mars the 
Treaty, and the Treaty the Covenant. 

In Weimar and Berlin the Treaty was termed the death - 
sentence of Germany, not only as an empire, but as an 
independent political community. Henceforward her 
economic efforts, beyond a certain limit, will be struck with 
barrenness, her industry will be hindered from outstrip- 
ping or overtaking that of the neighboring countries, 
and her population will be indirectly kept within definite 
bounds. For, instead of exporting manufactures, she 
will be obliged to export human beings, whose intellect 
and skill will be utilized by such rivals of her own race 
as vouchsafe to admit them. Already before the Confer- 
ence was over they began to emigrate eastward. And 
those who remain at home will not be masters in their own 
house, for the doors will be open to various foreign 
commissions. 

The assumption upon which the Treaty-framers pro- 
ceeded is that the abominations committed by the Ger- 
man military and civil authorities were constructively 
the work of the entire nation, for whose reformation 
within a measurable period hope is vain. This view pre- 
dominated among the ruling classes of the Entente 
peoples with few exceptions. If it be correct, it seems 
superfluous to constrain the enemy to enter the league of 
law-abiding nations, which is to be cemented only by 
voluntary adherence and by genuine attachment to lib- 
erty, right, and justice. Hence the Covenant, by being 
inserted in the Peace Treaty, necessarily lost its value 
as an eirenicon, and became subsequent to that instru- 
ment, and seems likely to be used as an anti-German 
safeguard. But even then its efficacy is doubtful, and 
manifestly so; otherwise the reformers, who at the start 
set out to abolish alliances as recognized causes of war, 

43i 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

would not have ended by setting up B now Triple Alliance, 
which involves military, naval, and aer iblishments, 

and the correspt .ucial burdens inseparable from 

these. An alliance of this character, whatever one may 
think of its economic and financial aspects, runs counter 
to the spirit of the Covenant, but was an obvious corol- 
lary of the Allies' attitude as mirrored in the Treaty. 
And the spirit of the Treaty destroys the letter of the 
Covenant. For the world is there implicitly divided 
into two camps — the friends and the enemies of liberty. 
right, and justice; and the main functions of the League 
as narrowed by the Treaty will be to hinder or defeat the 
machinations of the enemies. Moreover, the deliberate 
concessions made by the Conference to such agencies of 
the old ordering as the grouping of two or three Powers 
into defensive alliances bids fair to be extended in time. 
Eor the stress of circumstance is stronger than the will of 
man. At this rate the last state may be worse than the first. 

The world situation, thus formally modified, remained 
essentially unchanged, and will so endure until other forces 
are released. The League of Nations forfeited its ideal 
character under the pressure of national interests, and 
became a coalition of victors against the vanquished. 
By the insertion of the Covenant in the Treaty the former 
became a means for the execution of the latter. Eor even 
Mr. Wilson, faced with realities and called to practical 
counsel, affectionately disnv'ssed the high-souled specula- 
tive projects in which he delighted during his hours oi 
contemplation. Although the German delegates signed 
the Treaty, no one can honestly say that he expects them 
to observe it longer than constraint presses, however 
solemn the obligations imposed. 

In the press organ of the most numerous and powerful 
political party in Germany one might read in an article 
on the Germans in Bohemia annexed by Chechoslovakia: 

433 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

"Assuredly their destiny will not be determined for all 
time by the Versailles peace of violence. It behooves 
the German nation to cherish its affection for its op- 
pressed brethren, even though it be powerless to succor 
them immediately. What then can it do ? Italy has given 
it a marvelous lesson in the policy of irredentism, which 
she pursued in respect of the Trentino and Trieste." l 

With the Treaty as it stands, nationalist France of this 
generation has reason to be satisfied. One of its framers, 
himself a shrewd business man and politician, publicly 
set forth the grounds for this satisfaction.- Alsace and 
Lorraine reunited to the metropolis, he explained, will 
assist France materially with an industrious population 
and enormous resources in the shape of mineral wealth 
and a fruitful soil. Germany's former colonies, Kamerun 
and Togoland, arc become French, and will doubtless 
offer a vast and attractive field for the expansion and 
prosperity of the French population. Morocco, freed 
from German enterprise, can henceforth be developed 
by the French population alone and without let or hin- 
drance, for the benefit of the natives and in the true sense 
of Mr. Wilson's humanitarian ordinances. The potash 
deposits, to which German agriculture largely owed its 
prosperity, will henceforward be utilized in the .service 
of French agriculture. "In iron ore the wealth of France 
is doubled, and her productive capacity as regards pig- 
iron and steel immensely increased. Her production of 
textiles is greater than before the war by about a third." 3 
In a word, a vast area of the planet inhabited by various 
peoples will look to the French people for everything 
that makes their collective life worth living. 

1 Germania, August 1 1, 1919. Cf. Le Temps, September 9, 1919. 

2 M. Andre Tardieu in a speech delivered on August 17, 1919. Cf. Paris 
newspapers of following two days, and in particular New York Herald, 
August 19th. 

3 Cf. speech delivered by M. Andre Tardieu on August 17, 1919. 

433 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The sole arrangement which for a time caused heart- 
burnings in France was that respecting the sums of money 
which Germany should have been made to pay to her 
victorious enemies. For the opinions on that subject 
held by the average man, and connived at or approved 
by the authorities, were wholly fantastic, just as were 
some of the expectations of other Allied states. The 
French people differ from their neighbors in many respects 
— and in a marked way in money matters. They will 
sacrifice their lives rather than their substance. They 
will leave a national debt for their children and their 
children's children, instead of making a resolute effort 
to wipe it out or lessen it by amortization. In this respect 
the British, the Americans, and also the Germans differ 
from them. These peoples tax themselves freely, create 
sinking funds, and make heavy sacrifices to pay off their 
money obligations. This habit is ingrained. The con- 
trary system is become second nature to the French, 
and one cannot change a nation's habits overnight. The 
education of the people might, however, have been 
undertaken during the war with considerable chances 
of satisfactory results. The government might have 
preached the necessity of relinquishing a percentage of 
the war gains to the state. It was done in Britain and 
Germany. The amount of money earned by individuals 
during the hostilities was enormous. A considerable per- 
centage of it should have been requisitioned by the 
state, in view of the peace requirements and of the huge 
indebtedness which victory or defeat must inevitably 
bring in its train. But no Minister had the courage nec- 
essary to brave the multitude and risk his share of popu- 
larity or tolerance. And so things were allowed to slide. 
The people were assured that victory would recompense 
their efforts, not only by positive territorial gains, but 
by relieving them of their new financial obligations. 

434 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

That was a sinister mistake. The truth is that the 
French nation, if defeated, would have paid any sum 
demanded. That was almost an axiom. It would and 
could have expected no ruth. But, victorious, it looked 
to the enemy for the means of refunding the cost of the 
war. The Finance Minister — M. Klotz — often declared 
to private individuals that if the Allies were victorious 
he would have all the new national debt wiped out by 
the enemy, and he assured the nation that milliards 
enough would be extracted from Germany to balance 
the credit and debit accounts of the Republic. And the 
people naturally believed its professional expert. Thus 
it became a dogma that the Teuton state was to provide 
all the cost of the war. In that illusion the nation lived 
and worked and spent money freely, nay, wasted it woe- 
fully. 

And yet M. Klotz should have known better. For he 
was supplied with definite data to go upon. In October, 
191 8, the French government, in doubt about the full 
significance of that one of Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points 
which dealt with reparations, asked officially for explana- 
tions, and received from Mr. Lansing the answer by 
telegraph that it involved the making good by the enemy 
of all losses inflicted directly and lawlessly upon civilians, 
but none other. That surely was a plain answer and a 
just principle. But, in accordance with the practice of 
secrecy in vogue among Allied European governments, 
the nation was not informed of these restrictive condi- 
tions, but was allowed to hug dangerous delusions. 

But the Ministers knew them, and M. Klotz was a 
Minister. Not only, however, did he not reveal what he 
knew, but he behaved as though his information was of 
a directly contrary tenor, and he also stated that Germany 
must also refund the war indemnities of 1870, capitalized 
down to November, 191 8, and he set down the sum at 
29 435 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

fifty milliards of francs. This procedure was not what 
ably might have been expected from the leader of 
a heroic nation stout-hearted enough I unpleasant 

facts. Some of the leading spirits in the country, despite 
the intensity of their feelings toward Germany, disap- 
proved this kind of bookkeeping, but M. Klot.t did not 
relinquish his method of keeping accounts. He drew up 
a bill against the Teutons for one thousand and eighty-six 
milliards of francs. 

The Germans at the Conference maintained that if the 
wealth of their nation were realized and liquid, it would 
amount at most to four hundred milliards, but that to 
realise it would involve the stripping of the population of 
everything — of its forests, its mines, its railways, its fac- 
tories, its cattle, its houses, its furniture, and its ready 
money. They further pleaded that the territorial clan 
of the Treaty deprived them of important resources, 
which would reduce their solvency to a greater degree 
than the Allies realized. These clauses dispossessed the 
nation of 21 per cent, of the total crops of cereals and 
potatoes. A further falling off in the quantities of food 
produced would result from the restrictions on the im- 
portation of raw materials for the manufacture of fertil- 
isers. Of her coal, Germany was forfeiting about one- 
third; three-fourths of her iron ore was also being taken 
away from her; her total zinc production would be cut 
down by over three-fifths. Add to this the enormous 
shortage of tonnage, machinery, and man-power, the total 
loss of her colonies, the shrinkage of available raw stuffs. 
and the depreciation of the mark. 

At the Conference the Americans maintained their 
ground. Invoking the principle laid down by Mr. Wil- 
son and clearly formulated by Mr. Lansing, they insisted 
that reparations should be claimed only for damage done 
to civilians directly and lawlessly. After a good deal of 

436 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

fencing, rendered necessary by the pledges given by 
European statesmen to their electors, it was decided 
that the criteria provided by that principle should be 
applied. But even with that limitation the sums claimed 
were huge. It was alleged by the Germans that some of 
the demands were for amounts that exceeded the total 
national wealth of the country filing the claim. And as 
no formula could be devised that would satisfy all the 
claimants, it was resolved in principle that, although 
Germany should be obliged to make good only certain 
classes of losses, the Conference would set no limits to 
the sums for which she would thus be liable. 

At this juncture M. Loucheur suggested that a minimum 
sum should be demanded of the enemy, leaving the de- 
tails to be settled by a commission. And this was the so- 
lution which was finally adopted. 1 It was received with 
protests and lamentations, which, however, soon made 
place for self-congratulations, official and private. 

The French Minister of Finances, for example, drew a 
bright picture in the Chamber of the financial side of the 
Treaty, so far as it affected his country: "Within two 
years," he announced, "independently of the railway 
rolling stock, of agricultural materials and restitutions, 
we receive a part, still to be fixed, of the payment of 
twenty milliards of marks in gold; another share, also to 
be determined, of an emission of bonds amounting to 
forty milliard gold marks, bearing interest at the rate of 
2 per cent. ; a third part, to be fixed, of German shipping 
and dyes ; seven million tons of coal annually for a period 
of ten years, followed by diminishing quantities during 
the following years; the repayment of the expenses of 
occupation; the right of taking over a part of Germany's 
interests in Russia, in particular that of obtaining the 

1 On this subject of reparations the Journal de Geneve published several 
interesting articles at various times, as, for example, on May 15, 1919. 

437 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

payment of pre-war debts at the pre-war rate of exchange, 
likewise the maintenance of such contracts as we may 
desire to maintain in force and the return of Alsace- 
Lorraine free from all incumbrances. Nor is that all. 
In Morocco we have the right to liquidate German prop- 
erty, to transfer the shares that represent Germany's 
interests in the Bank of Morocco, and finally the allot- 
ment under a French mandate of a portion of the German 
colonies free from incumbrances of any kind. . . . We shall 
receive four hundred and sixty-three milliard francs, 
payable in thirty-six years, without counting the resti- 
tutions which will have been effected. Nor should it be 
forgotten that already we have received eight milliards' 
worth of securities stolen from French bearers. So do not 
consider the Treaty as a misfortune for France." l 

Soon after the outburst of joy with which the ingather- 
ing of the fruits of France's victory was celebrated, clouds 
unexpectedly drifted athwart the cerulean blue of the 
political horizon, and dark shadows were flung across the 
Allied countries. The second- and third-class nations fell 
out with the first-class Powers. Italy, for example, whose 
population is almost equal to that of her French sister, 
demanded compensation for the vast additions that were 
being made to France's extensive possessions. The 
grounds alleged were many. Compensation had been 
promised by the secret treaty. The need for it was re- 
inforced by the rejection of Italy's claims in the Adriatic. 
The Italian people required, desired, and deserved a fair 
and fitting field for legitimate expansion. They are as 
numerous as the French, and have a large annual surplus 
population, which has to hew wood and draw water for 
foreign peoples. They are enterprising, industrious, 
thrifty, and hard workers. Their country lacks some of 

1 Speech of M. Klotz in the Chamber on September 5, 1919. Cf. L'Echo 
de Paris, September 6, 1919. 

43S 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

the necessaries of material prosperity, such as coal, iron, 
and cotton. Why should it not receive a territory rich 
in some of these products ? Why should a large contingent 
of Italy's population have to go to the colonies of Spain, 
France, and Britain or to South American republics for 
a livelihood? The Italian press asked whether the Su- 
preme Council was bent on fulfilling the Gospel dictum, 
"Whosoever hath, to him shall be given. ..." 

One of the first demands made by Italy was for the 
port and town of Djibouti, which is under French sway. 
It was rejected, curtly and emphatically. Other requests 
elicited plausible explanations why they could not be 
complied with. In a word, Italy was treated as a poor 
and importunate relation, and was asked to console her- 
self with the reflection that she was working in the vine- 
yard of idealism. In vain eminent publicists in Rome, 
Turin, and Milan pleaded their country's cause. Adopting 
the principle which Mr. Wilson had applied to France 
and Britain, they affirmed that even before the war 
France, with a larger population and fewer possessions, 
had shown that she was incapable of discharging the 
functions which she had voluntarily taken upon herself. 
Tunis, they alleged, owed its growth and thriving con- 
dition to Italian emigrants. With all the fresh additions 
to her territories, the population of the Republic would be 
utterly inadequate to the task. To the Supreme Council 
this line of reasoning was distinctly unpalatable. Nor 
did the Italians further their cause when, by way of 
giving emphatic point to their reasoning, their press 
quoted that eminent Frenchman, M. d'Estournelles de 
Constant, who wrote at that very moment: "France 
has too many colonies already — far more in Asia, in 
Africa, in America, in Oceania than she can fructify. 
In this way she is immobilizing territories, continents, 
peoples, which nominally she takes over. And it is 

439 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

childish and imprud. 

who s .'.'.era in 

the ve. 

ie may, - 
wvv : Nations. 

I- the long run it is as less Spa a, P 

and Holland knov. this to >t. Do what s 

would. Prance was no; ..' 

.\'.\ ... 

. ." l 
The discussion grow prams 

in the heavily 61 
A I i was made between the Free 

Ion and . :.:■:: o: sixty-rive who flatters hims 

that he can enjoy '.lie's - s on the same s 

when he was only thirty. Little arrows thus bar" 
with biting add often make more enduring 
than si blows. Soon th< 

ween the two as Ions unhappily 

and led to marked - in their respective polk 

which seem fraught with grave [uences in the 

future. 

The Italy c : the Italy of May. 10.15. 

She now knows exactly where sh Is Wi 

unsheathed her sword ro fight ag ie /.'.lies 0:" the 

I a treaty to be bu; a scrap of paper, 
she was heartened by a solemn promise given in wri; 
by her comrades in anus. But when she had accom- 
plished her part of the contract, that document turned 
out to be little more than a Thus 

it was one of tin int ironies of Fate, kalian publicists 

.1. that the people who had mostrj Inst 

that doctrine were indirectly helping it to triumph. Mr. 



1 D'Estournelles do Constant Btefl .. May 15, 

1010. 

440 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

Wilson, unwittingly sapping public faith in written 
treaties, was held up as one of the many pictures in which 
the Conference abounded of the delegates refuting their 
words by acts. The unbiased historian will readily 
admit that the secret treaties were profoundly immoral 
from the Wilsonian angle of vision, but that the only 
way of canceling them was by a general principle rigidly 
upheld and impartially applied. And this the Supreme 
Council would not entertain. 

With her British ally, too, France had an unpleasant 
falling out about Eastern affairs, and in especial about 
Syria and Persia. There was also a demand for the 
retrocession by Britain of the island of Mauritius, but 
it was not made officially, nor is it a subject for two 
such nations to quarrel over. The first rift in the lute 
was caused by the deposition of Emir Faisal respecting 
the desires of the Arab population. This picturesque 
chief, the French press complained, had been too readily 
admitted to the Conference and too respectfully listened 
to there, whereas the Persian delegation tramped for 
months over the Paris streets without once obtaining a 
hearing. The Hedjaz, which had been independent 
from time immemorial, was formally recognized as a 
separate kingdom during the war, and the Grand Sheriff 
of Mecca was suddenly raised to the throne in the Euro- 
pean sense by France and Britain. Since then he was 
formally recognized by the five Powers. His representa- 
tives in Paris demanded the annexation of all the countries 
of Arabic speech which were under Turkish domination. 
These included not only Mesopotamia, but also Syria, 
on which France had long looked with loving eyes and 
respecting which there existed an accord between her and 
Britain. The project community would represent a 
Pan-Arab federation of about eleven million souls, over 
which France would have no guardianship. And yet the 

441 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

written .v.- I never boo:: annulled. Palestine was 

exclude km, and S3 

was to ilted, and instead ( aver to 

ace, as Nf. Cl< ..... was to 

I • s hoot any injunction 

Conference. Mes ia would be autonomous 

under the League of N. s mandatory was 

asked for by the long of the H< r the entire eleven 

mill-. nts 

The ats of the French press on Britain's 

I conventional phraseology, 
bordered on recrirrj cooling 

of friendship between the two nations, and in the course 
of the co ntrov ers y the evil- word "Fashoda" 

wa< irnced The French . V . vV arguments wore 

briefly these: The populations claimed occupy such a 
vast stretch of territory that the sovereignty of the 
Hedjas could hardly be more than nominal and symboli- 
cal. In fact, they cover an area of one-half of the Otto- 
man Empire These different provinces would, in 
reality, be under ation of the Great Power 

which was the ator of this new kingdom, and 

monarch of the Hedjas would bo a mere stalking horse 
of Britain. This, it was urged, * ould a< ace, 

but a masked protectorate, and in the name of the higher 
principles must he prevented Syria must be hand 
over to France with. a;: consulting the population. The 
financial resources of the utterly inadequate 

for the administration of such a vast state as was being 
compacted. Who, then, it was asked, would supply the 
indispei unds? Obviously B who bad been 

providing the Emir Faisal \ ds evei S father 

donned the crown. If this political entity came into 
existence, it would generate continuous friction between 

Prance and Britain, separate comrades in arms, del:: 

44a 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

a vigilant enemy, and violate a written compact which 
should be sacred. For these reasons it should be rejected 
and Syria placed under the guardianship of France. 

The Americans took the position that congruously with 
the high ethical principles which had guided the labors 
of the Conference throughout, it was incumbent on its 
members, instead of bartering civilized peoples like chat- 
tels, to consult them as to their own aspirations. If it 
were true that the Syrians were yearning to become the 
wards of France, there could be no reasonable objection 
on the part of the French delegates to agree to a plebiscite. 
But the French delegates declined to entertain the sug- 
gestion on the ground that Syria's longing for French 
guidance was a notorious fact. 

After much discussion and vehement opposition on the 
part of the French delegates an Inter-Allied commission 
under Mr. Charles Crane was sent to visit the countries 
in dispute and to report on the leanings of their popu- 
lations. After having visited forty cities and towns and 
more than three hundred villages, and received over 
fifteen hundred delegations of natives, the commission 
reported that the majority of the people "prefer to main- 
tain their independence," but do not object to live under 
the mandatory system for fifty years provided the United 
States accepts the mandate. "Syria desires to become a 
sovereign kingdom, and most of the population supports 
the Emir Faisal as Icing." 1 The commission further ascer- 
tained that the Syrians, "who are singularly enlightened 
as to the policies of the United States," invoked and relied 
upon a Franco-British statement of policy 2 which had 
been distributed broadcast throughout their country, 
"promising complete liberation from the Turks and the 
establishment of free governments among the native popu- 

1 The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 24, 1919. 

2 Issued on November 9, 191 8. 

443 



THE INSIDE STOR? OF [H] CE CONFERENCE 

esntl Enl er- Allied 

COB 

ight As : 

to 
bo 

my 

"*Ah. now you are wj 
que- i up 

seonthes - rre. 

s 
in 1 5ss» "was s. ] 

daii| 

5 conctas 
Bri secret neg 

in. And ex 

way, 

S 
i 

sounding 

oe. 
Th:> D the 

rid and i 

g - 

I C ! - 
Per- 
Nations 

.0. 

444 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

to a hearing at the Conference. She had grievances that 
called for redress: her neutrality had been violated, 
many of her subjects had been put to death, and her titles 
to reparation were undeniable. President Wilson, the 
comforter of small states and oppressed nationalities, 
having proclaimed that the weakest communities would 
command the same friendly treatment as the greatest, 
the Persian delegates repaired to Paris in the belief that 
this treatment would be accorded them. But there they 
were disillusioned. For them there was no admission. 
Whether, if they had been heard and helped by the 
Supreme Council, they would have contrived to exist as an 
independent state is a question which cannot be discussed 
here. The point made by the French was that on its own 
showing the Conference was morally bound to receive the 
Persian delegation. The utmost it obtained was that the 
Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monalek, who was 
head of the delegation, had a private talk with President 
Wilson, Colonel House, and Mr. Lansing. These states- 
men unhesitatingly promised to help Persia to secure full 
sovereign rights, or at any rate to enable her delegates 
to unfold their country's case and file their protests 
before the Conference. The delegates were comforted 
and felt sure of the success of their mission. They told the 
American plenipotentiaries that the United States would 
be Persia's creditor for this help and that she would invite 
American financiers to put her money matters in order, 
American engineers to develop her mining industries, and 
the American oil firms to examine and exploit her petrol 
deposits. 1 In a word, Persia would be Americanized. 
This naive announcement of the r61e reserved for American 
benefactors in the land of the Shah might have impressed 
certain commercial and financial interests in the United 



1 Cf. interview with a Persian official, published in the Paris edition of 
The Chicago Tribune, August 19, 191 9. 

445 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

States 

i 

The ruses 

envoys 

was stare - as of 

var at the • 

of Mr. Wilson would infallibly pro\ - successful. But 

scast • of the 

oonths 
ice for Constantinople, and 
mtry*s lations was set 

it 
loubtedry n very ck 

Egypt's status before the outbreak of the World v, 
And Egypt's status could hardly be termed independence 
iceforward Great B ig hold 

.-: the waterways bud 
ghts of railway oo 
se were ours before — the n s die the 

iKcy of the Id ig : nqo And 
it :v ry be argued that this arrang we 

i great ans than the rej 

their own . uos. That, at any rate, is my own 

per> which - I have held ai 

sed. None the less it runs diametrically counter 
to the letter an< of Witoo^aTris'nft, which is now 

see: . a waD high ea out the dwarf 

states, but which the giants ca md 

Against this viol I the oew humai 

French pub! I up. The glaring t of the 

. isgression revolted them, the plight of the Persians 
touched them, and the right of self^etenrunatton strongly 
appealed to them. Was it not largely tor the asserti 
of that right that all the Allied peoples had for five years 

440 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

been making unheard-of sacrifices? What would become 
of the League of Nations if such secret and selfish doings 
were connived at? In a word, French sympathy for the 
victims of British hegemony waxed as strong as the Brit- 
ish fellow-feeling for the Syrians, who objected to be 
drawn into the orbit of the French. Those sharp protests 
and earnest appeals, it may be noted, were the principal, 
perhaps the only, symptoms of tenderness for unpro- 
tected peoples which were evoked by the great ethical 
movement headed by the Conference. 

The French further pointed out that the system of 
Mandates had been specially created for countries as 
backward and helpless as Persia was assumed to be, and 
that the only agency qualified to apply it was either the 
Supreme Council or the League of Nations. The British 
press answered that no such humiliating assumption about 
the Shah's people was being made, that the Foreign Office 
had distinctly disclaimed the intention of establishing a 
protectorate over Persia, who is, and will remain, a sov- 
ereign and independent state. But these explanations 
failed to convince our indignant Allies. They argued, 
from experience, that no trust was to be placed in those 
official assurances and euphemistic phrases which are 
generally belied by subsequent acts. 1 They further 
lamented that the long and secret negotiations which were 
going forward in Teheran while the Persian delegation 
was wearily and vainly waiting in Paris to be allowed to 
plead its country's cause before the great world-dictators 
was not a good example of loyalty to the new cosmic legis- 
lation. Had not Mr. Wilson proclaimed that peoples 
were no longer to be bartered and swapped as chattels? 

1 "Unfortunately, Mr. Lloyd George, who has stripped the Foreign Office 
of real power, has frequently given assurances of this nature, and his acts 
have always contradicted them. As a proof, his last interview with M. 
Clemenceau will serve." Cf. L'Echo de Paris, August 15, 1919, article by 
Pertinax. 

447 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Here the Italians and Rumanians chimed in, reminding 
their kinsmen that it was the same American statesmen 
who in the peace conditions first presented to Count 
Brockdorff-Rantzau made over the German population of 
the Saar Valley to France at the end of fifteen years as 
the fair equivalent of a sum of money payable in gold, 
and that France at any rate had raised no objection to the 
barter nor to the principle at the root of it. They rea- 
soned that if the principle might be applied to one case 
it should be deemed equally applicable to the other, and 
that the only persons or states that could with propriety 
demur to the Anglo-Persian arrangements were those who 
themselves were not benefiting by similar transactions. 

At last the Paris press, laying due weight on the alliance 
with Britain, struck a new note. "It seems that these 
last Persian bargainings offer a theme for conversations 
between our government and that of the Allies," one 
influential journal wrote. 1 At once the amicable sugges- 
tion was taken up by the British press. The idea was to 
join the Syrian with the Persian transactions and make 
French concessions on the other. This compromise would 
compose an ugly quarrel and settle everything for the 
best. For France's intentions toward the people of Syria 
were, it was credibly asserted, to the full as disinterested 
and generous as those of Britain toward Persia, and if the 
Syrians desired an English-speaking nation rather than 
the French to be their mentor, it was equally true that the 
Persians wanted Americans rather than British to super- 
intend and accelerate their progress in civilization. But 
instead of harkening to the wishes of only one it would 
be better to ignore those of both. By this prudent com- 
promise all the demands of right and justice, for which 
both governments were earnest sticklers, would thus be 
amply satisfied. 

1 Le Journal des Debats, August 15, 1919. 

448 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

Our American associates were less easily appeased. In 
sooth there was nothing left wherewith to appease them. 
Their press condemned the "protectorate" as a breach 
of the Covenant. Secretary Lansing let it be known 1 
that the United States delegation had striven to obtain a 
hearing for the Persians at the Conference, but had "lost 
its fight." A Persian, when apprized of this utterance, 
said: "When the United States delegation strove to hin- 
der Italy from annexing Fiume and obtaining the terri- 
tories promised her by a secret treaty, they accomplished 
their aim because they refused to give way. Then they 
took care not to lose their fight. When they accepted a 
brief for the Jews and imposed a Jewish semi-state on 
Rumania and Poland, they were firm as the granite rock, 
and no amount of opposition, no future deterrents, made 
any impression on their will. Accordingly, they had their 
way. But in the cause of Persia they lost the fight, 
although logic, humanity, justice, and the ordinances 
solemnly accepted by the Great Powers were all on their 
side. "... One American press organ termed the Anglo- 
Persian accord "a coup which is a greater violation of the 
Wilsonian Fourteen Points than the Shantung award to 
Japan, as it makes the whole of Persia a mere protectorate 
for Britain." 2 

Generally speaking, illustrations of the meaning of non- 
intervention in the home affairs of other nations were 
numerous and somewhat perplexing. Were it not that 
Mr. Wilson had come to Europe for the express purpose 
of interpreting as well as enforcing his own doctrine, one 
would have been warranted in assuming that the Supreme 
Council was frequently travestying it. But as the Presi- 
dent was himself one of the leading members of that 
Council, whose decisions were unanimous, the utmost 

1 In Washington on August 16, 19 19. 

2 The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 19, 1919. 

449 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

that one can take for granted is that he strove to impose 
his tenets on his intractable colleagues and "lost the 
fight." 

Here is a striking instance of what would look to the 
average man very like intervention in the domestic poli- 
tics of another nation — well-meant and, it may be, benefi- 
cent intervention — were it not that we are assured on the 
highest authority that it is nothing of the sort. It was 
devised as an expedient for getting outside help for the 
capture of Petrograd by the anti-Bolshevists. The end, 
therefore, was good, and the means seemed effectual to 
those who employed them. The Kolchak-Denikin party 
could, it was believed, have taken possession of that 
capital long before, by obtaining the military co-operation 
of the Esthonians. But the price asked by these was the 
recognition of their complete independence by the non- 
Bolshevist government in the name of all Russia. Kol- 
chak, to his credit, refused to pay this price, seeing that 
he had no powers to do so, and only a dictator would sign 
away the territory by usurping the requisite authority. 
Consequently the combined attack on Petrograd was not 
undertaken. The Admiral's refusal was justified by the 
circumstances that he was the spokesman only of a large 
section of the Russian people, and that a thoroughly 
representative assembly must be consulted on the subject 
previous to action being taken. The military stagnation 
that ensued lasted for months. Then one day the press 
brought the tidings that the difficulty was ingeniously 
overcome. This is the shape in which the intelligence 
was communicated to the world: "Colonel Marsh, of the 
British army, who is representing General Gough, organ- 
ized a republic in northwest Russia at Reval, August 12th, 
within forty-five minutes, General Yudenitch being nom- 
inally the head of the new government, which is affiliated 
with the Kolchak government. Northwest Russia op- 

450 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

poses the Esthonian government only in principle because 
it wants guaranties that the Esthonians will not be the 
stepping-stone for some big Power like Germany to con- 
trol the Russian outlet through the Baltic. If the Estho- 
nians give such guaranties, the northwestern Russians are 
perfectly willing to let them become an independent state. ' ' * 

Here then was a "British colonel" who, in addition to 
his military duties, was, according to this account, willing 
and able to create an independent republic without any 
Supreme Council to assist him, whereas professional di- 
plomatists and military men of other nations had been 
trying for months to found a Rhine republic under Dor- 
ten and had failed. Nor did he, if the newspaper report 
be correct, waste much time at the business. From the 
moment of its inception until northwestern Russia stood 
forth an independent state, promulgating and executing 
grave decisions in the sphere of international politics, only 
forty-five minutes are said to have elapsed. Forty -five 
minutes by the clock. It was almost as quick a feat as 
the drafting of the Covenant of Nations. Further, the 
resourceful statemaker forged a republic which was quali- 
fied to transfer sovereignly Russian territory to unrecog- 
nized states without consulting the nation or obtaining 
authority from any one. More marvelous than any other 
detail, however, is the circumstance that he did his work 
so well that it never amounted to intervention. 2 

One cannot affect surprise if the distinction between 
this amazing exploit of diplomatico-military prestidigita- 
tion and intermeddling in the internal affairs of another 
nation prove too subtle for the mental grasp of the aver- 
age unpolitical individual. 

1 The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 24, 1919. 

- After the above was written, a French journal, the Echo de Paris of 
September 19, 191 9, announced that General Marsh declares that his 
agents acted without his instructions, but none the less it holds him re- 
sponsible for this Baltic policy. 

30 451 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

It is practices like these which ultimately determine 
the worth of the treaties and the Covenant which Mr. 
Wilson was content to take back with him to "Washington 
as the final outcome of what was to have been the most 
superb achievement of historic man. Of the new ethical 
principles, of the generous renunciation of privileges, of 
the righting of secular wrongs, of the respect that was to 
be shown for the weak, which were to have cemented the 
union of peoples into one pacific if not blissful family, 
there remained but the memory. No such bitter draught 
of disappointment was swallowed by the nations since 
the world first had a political history. Many of the re- 
sounding phrases that once foretokened a new era of peace, 
right, and equity were not merely emptied of their con- 
tents, but made to connote their opposites. Freedom of 
the seas became supremacy of the seas, which may pos- 
sibly turn out to be a blessed consummation for all con- 
cerned, but should not have been smuggled in under a 
gross misnomer. The abolition of war means, as British 
and American and French generals and admirals have 
since told their respective fellow-citizens, thorough prep- 
arations for the next war, which are not to be confined, 
as heretofore, to the so-called military states, but are 
to extend over all Anglo-Saxondon. 1 "Open covenants 
openly arrived at" signify secret conclaves and con- 
spirative deliberations carried on in impenetrable se- 
crecy which cannot be dispensed with even after the 
whole business has passed into history. 2 The self- 



1 Marshal Douglas Haig. Lord French, the American pacifist, Sydney 
Baker, Senator Chamberlain, Representative Kahn, and a host of others 
have been preaching universal military training. The press, too, with con- 
siderable exceptions, favors the movement. "We want a democratized 
army, which represents all the nation, and it can be found only in universal 
service. . . . Universal service is our best guaranty of peace." Cf. The 
Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 22, 1919. 

t President Wilson, when at the close of his conference with the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations — at the White House — asked how the 

452 



SIDELIGHTS ON THE TREATY 

determination of peoples finds its limit in the rights 
of every Great Power to hold its subject nationalities 
in thrall on the ground that their reciprocal relations 
appertain to the domestic policy of the state. It means, 
further, the privilege of those who wield superior force 
to put irresistible pressure upon those who are weak, 
and the lever which it places in their hands for the pur- 
pose is to be known under the attractive name of the pro- 
tection of minorities. Abstention from interference in the 
home affairs of a neighboring community is made to cover 
intermeddling of the most irksome and humiliating char- 
acter in matters which have no nexus with international 
law, for if they had, the rule would be applicable to all 
nations. The lesser peoples must harken to injunctions 
of the greater states respecting their mode of treating 
alien immigrants and must submit to the control of foreign 
bodies which are ignorant of the situation and its require- 
ments. Nor is it enough that those states should accord 
to the members of the Jewish and other races all the rights 
which their own citizens enjoy — they must go farther and 
invest them with special privileges, and for this purpose 
renounce a portion of their sovereignty. They must like- 
wise allow their more powerful allies to dictate to them 
their legislation on matters of transit and foreign com- 
merce. 1 For the Great Powers, however, this law of 
minorities was not written. They are above the law. 
Their warrant is force. In a word, force is the trump 
card in the political game of the future as it was in that 
of the past. And M. Clemenceau's reminder to the petty 
states at the opening of the Conference that the wielders 



United States had voted on the Japanese resolution in favor of race equality, 
replied: "I am not sure of being free to answer the question, because it 
affects a large number of points that were discussed in Paris, and in the 
interest of international harmony I think I had better not reply." — The 
Daily Mail (Paris edition), August 22, 1919. 

1 In virtue of Article LX of the Treaty with Austria. 

453 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of twelve million troops are the masters of the situation 
was appropriate. Thus the war which was provoked by 
the transformation of a solemn treaty into a scrap of 
paper was concluded by the presentation of two scraps 
of paper as a treaty and a covenant for the moral renova- 
tion of the world. 



XIV ( 

THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 

TO discuss in detail the peace terms which after many 
months' desultory talk were finally presented to 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau would transcend the scope 
of these pages. Like every other act of the Supreme 
Council, they may be viewed from one of two widely 
sundered angles of survey — either as the exercise by a 
victorious state of the power derived from victory over 
the vanquished enemy, or as one of the measures by which 
the peace of the world is to be enforced in the present and 
consolidated in the future. And from neither point of 
view can it command the approval of unbiased political 
students. At first the Germans, and not they alone, 
expected that the conditions would be based on the 
Fourteen Points, while many of the Allies took it for 
granted that they would be inspired by the resolve to 
cripple Teutondom for all time. And for each of these 
anticipations there were good formal grounds. 

The only legitimate motive for interweaving the 
Covenant with the Treaty was to make of the latter a sort 
of corollary of the former and to moderate the instincts 
of vengeance by the promptings of higher interests. On 
this ground, and only on this, did the friends of far- 
ranging reform support Mr. Wilson in his contention 
that the two documents should be rendered mutually 
interdependent. Reparation for the damage done in 
violation of international law and sound guaranties 

455 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

against its recurrence are of the essence of every peace 
treaty that follows a decisive victory. But reparation is 
seldom this and nothing more. The lower instincts of 
human nature, when dominant as they are during a 
bloody war and in the hour of victory, generally out- 
weigh considerations not only of right, but also of en- 
lightened egotism, leaving justice to merge into ven- 
geance. And the fruits are treasured WTath and a secret 
resolve on the part of the vanquished to pay out his 
victor at the first opportunity. The war-loser of to-day 
aims at becoming the war-winner of to-morrow. And 
this frame of mind is incompatible with the temper needed 
for an era of moral fellowship such as Mr. Wilson was 
supposed to be intent on establishing. Consequently, a 
peace treaty unmodified by the principles underlying the 
Covenant is necessarily a negation of the main possibilities 
of a society of nations based upon right and a decisive 
argument against joining together the two instruments. 

The other kind of peace which Mr. Wilson was believed 
to have had at heart consisted not merely in the liquida- 
tion of the war, but in the uprooting of its permanent 
causes, in the renunciation by the various nations of 
sanguinary conflicts as a means of determining rival 
claims, and in such an amicable rearrangement of inter- 
national relations as would keep such disputes from 
growing into dangerous quarrels. Right, or as near an 
approximation to it as is attainable, would then take the 
place of violence, whereby military guaranties would 
become not only superfluous, but indicative of a spirit 
irreconcilable with the main purpose of the League. 
Each nation would be entitled to equal opportunity within 
the limits assigned to it by nature and widened by its 
own mental and moral capacities. Thus permanently to 
forbid a numerous, growing, and territorially cramped 
nation to possess overseas colonies for its superfluous 

456 



THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 

population while overburdening others with possessions 
which they are unable to utilize, would constitute a 
negation of one of the basic principles of the new ordering. 

Those were the grounds which seemed to warrant the 
belief that the Treaty would be not only formally, but 
substantially and in its spirit an integral, part of the 
general settlement based on the Fourteen Points. 

This anticipation turned out to be a delusion. Wil- 
sonianism proved to be a very different system from that 
of the Fourteen Points, and its author played the part not 
only of an interpreter of his tenets, but also of a sort 
of political pope alone competent to annul the force of 
laws binding on all those whom he should refuse to dispense 
from their observance. He had to do with patriotic 
politicians permeated with the old ideas, desirous of pro- 
viding in the peace terms for the next war and striving 
to secure the maximum of advantage over the foe pre- 
sumptive, by dismembering his territory, depriving him 
of colonies, making him dependent on others for his 
supplies of raw stuffs, and artificially checking his natural 
growth. Nearly all of them had principles to invoke in 
favor of their claims and some had nothing else. And 
it was these tendencies which Mr. Wilson sought to 
combine with the ethical ideals to be incarnated in the 
Society of Nations. Now this was an impossible syn- 
thesis. The spirit of vindictiveness — for that was well 
represented at the Conference — was to merge and lose 
itself in an outflow of magnanimity; precautions against a 
hated enemy were to be interwoven with implicit con- 
fidence in his generosity; a military occupation would 
provide against a sudden onslaught, while an approach 
to disarmament would bear witness to the absence of 
suspicion. Thus Poland would discharge the function of 
France's ally against the Teutons in the east, but her 
frontiers were to leave her inefficiently protected against 

457 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

their future attacks from the west. Germany was dis- 
membered, yet she was credited with self-discipline and 
generosity enough bo steel her against the temptation to 
fit by the opportunity of joining together again what 
France had dissevered. The League of Nations was to 
be based upon mutual confidence and good fellowship. 
yet on< most powerful future members was so dis- 

trusted as to be declared permanently unworthy to possess 
any overseas c Gen any*s territory in the Saar 

Valley is admittedly inhabited by Germans, yet for 
fifteen years there is to be a foreign administration there. 
and at the end of it the people are to be asked whether 
they would like to cut the bonds that link them with their 
own state and place themselves under French sway, so 
that a premium is offered for French immigration into 
the Saar Valley. 

Those are a few of the consequences of the mixture 
of the two irreconcilable principles. 

That Germany richly deserved her punishment cannot 
be gainsaid. Her crime was without precedent. Some 
of its most sinister consequences are irremediable. Whole 
sections of her people are still unconscious not only of 
the magnitude. the criminal character, of their mis- 

deeds. NV . s is .. future to be provided 

for. and one of th< sa visions is to influence the 

potential enemy's will for evil if his power cannot be 
alyzed. And this the Treaty failed to do, 
{ Germans, when they learned the conditions, dis- 
cussed them angrily, and the keynote was refusal to siga 
the document. The financial clauses were stigmar. 
as masked slavery. The press urged that during the 
war less than one-tenth of Prance's territory had beer, 
occupied by their countrymen and that even of this only 
a f". >ne of combat. The entire wealth 

of France, they alleged, had been estimated before the war 



THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 

at from three hundred and fifty milliard to four hundred 
milliard francs, consequently for the devastated provinces 
hardly more than one-twentieth of that sum could fairly 
be demanded as reparation, whereas the claim set forth 
was incomparably more. They objected to the loss of 
their colonies because the justification alleged — that they 
were disqualified to administer them because of their 
former cruelties toward the natives — was groundless, 
as the Allies themselves had admitted implicitly by 
offering them the right of pre-emption in the case of the 
Portuguese and other overseas possessions on the very- 
eve of the war. 

But the most telling objections turned upon the clauses 
that dealt with the Saar Valley. Its population is entirely 
German, yet the treaty-makers provided for its occupa- 
tion by the French for a term of fifteen years and its 
transference to them if, after that term, the German 
government was unable to pay a certain sum in gold 
for the coal mines it contained. If that sum were not 
forthcoming the population and the district were to be 
handed over to France for all time, even though the 
former should vote unanimously for reunion with Ger- 
many. Count BrockdorfT-Rantzau remarked in his note 
on the Treaty "that in the history of modern times there 
is no other example of a civilized Power obliging a state 
to abandon its people to foreign domination as an equiv- 
alent for a cash payment." One of the most influential 
press organs complained that the Treaty "bartered 
German men, women, and children for coal; subjected 
some districts with a thoroughly German population 
to an obligatory plebiscite ' under interested supervision ; 

1 One of the three districts of Schleswig. A curious phenomenon was 
this zeal of the Supreme Council for Denmark's interests, as compared with 
Denmark's refusal to profit by it, the champions of self-determination 
urging the Danes to demand a district, as Danish, which the Danes knew 
to be German! 

459 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

severed others without any consultation from the Father- 
land; delivered over the proceeds of German industry 
to the greed of foreign capitalists for an indefinite period ; 
. . . spread over the whole country a network of alien 
commissions to be paid by the German nation ; withdrew 
streams, rivers, railways, the air service, numerous 
industrial establishments, the entire economic system, 
from the sovereignty of the German state by means either 
of internationalization or financial control; conferred on 
foreign inspectors rights such as only the satraps of 
absolute monarchs in former ages were empowered to 
exercise; in a word, they put an end to the existence 
of the German nation as such. Germany would become 
a colony of white slaves. . . ." l 

Fortunately for the Allies, the reproach of exchanging 
human beings for coal was seen by their leaders to be so 
damaging that they modified the odious clause that 
warranted it. Even the comments of the friendly neutral 
press were extremely pungent. They found fault with 
the Treaty on grounds which, unhappily, cannot be rea- 
soned away. "Why dissimulate it?" writes the foremost 
of these journals; "this peace is not what we were led to 
expect. It dislodges the old dangers, but creates new 
ones. Alsace and Lorraine are, it is true, no longer in 
German hands, but . . . irredentism has only changed 
its camp. In 19 14 Germany put her faith in force because 
she herself wielded it. But crushed down under a peace 
which appears to violate the promises made to her, a 
peace which in her heart of hearts she will never accept, 
she will turn toward force anew. It will stand out as the 
great misfortune of this Treaty that it has tainted the 
victory with a moral blight and caused the course of the 
German revolution to swerve. . . . The fundamental 
error of the instrument lies in the circumstance that it 

1 Das Berliner Tageblatt, June 4, 19 19. 

460 



THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 

is a compromise between two incompatible frames of 
mind. It was feasible to restore peace to Europe by 
pulling down Germany definitely. But in order to 
accomplish this it would have been necessary to crush 
a people of seventy millions and to incapacitate them 
from rising to their feet again. Peace could also have 
been secured by the sole force of right. But in this case 
Germany would have had to be treated so considerately 
as to leave her no grievance to brood over. M. Clemen- 
ceau hindered Mr. Wilson from displaying sufficient 
generosity to get the moral peace, and Mr. Wilson on his 
side prevented M. Clemenceau from exercising severity 
enough to secure the material peace. And so the result, 
which it was easy to foresee, is a regime devoid of the 
real guaranties of durability." 1 

The judge of the French syndicalists was still more 
severe. "The Versailles peace," exclaimed M. Verfeuil, 
"is worse than the peace of Brest-Litovsk . . . annexa- 
tions, economic servitudes, overwhelming indemnities, 
and a caricature of the Society of Nations — these con- 
stitute the balance of the new policy." 2 The Deputy 
Marcel Cachin said: "The Allied armies fought to make 
this war the last. They fought for a just and lasting 
peace, but none of these boons has been bestowed on us. 
We are confronted with the failure of the policy of the 
one man in whom our party had put its confidence — 
President Wilson. The peace conditions . . . are inac- 
ceptable from various points of view, financial, territorial, 
economic, social, and human." 3 

It is in this Treaty far more than in the Covenant that 
the principles to which Mr. Wilson at first committed 
himself are in decisive issue. True, he was wont after 
every surrender he made during the Conference to invoke 

1 Le Journal de Genh>e, June 24, 1919. 

2 Cf. L'Echo de Paris, May 12, 1919. s Ibidem. 

461 



THE INSIE 3 OONFERENC 

the Covenanl - he I ea > 

everything 

it is the Treaty ss their 

:id. 
As an eminen: Swiss "No leag 

of nations . -. 

1830 : ig from B Can the future 

rmany from recanstitul ig 
its 5 al unity? C 

j the C;.'- I Can - be 

Magyars, who at pres 

These potec ire so c 

France. For if 

" : 
'.: will se take 

part in it? H 
Austrians, my, 

m their tmi< as I J 

will one day, d 
America will des ack? If 

is of £ 
w the Croats from the Serbs, will British armies cross 
the sea to uphold tfa 

And in the name - would 

ask? 
ssts, and hers .. ne, would be a I by 

such changes. An auld be 

handed. For what i 

It is interesting to no the conditions imposed 

upon Germany were a an influential body 

of Mr. Wilson's Am is who had pinned their 

. i Ph S /.: 



THE TREATY WITH GERMANY 

faith to his Fourteen Points. Their view is expressed 
by their press organ as follows : 1 

"France remains the strongest Power on the Continent. 
With her military establishment intact she faces a Ger- 
many without a general staff, without conscription, with- 
out universal military training, with a strictly limited 
amount of light artillery, with no air service, no fleet, 
with no domestic basis in raw materials for armament 
manufacture, with her whole western border fifty kilo- 
meters east of the Rhine demilitarized. On top of this 
France has a system of military alliances with the new 
states that touch Germany. On top of this she secured 
permanent representation in the Council of the League, 
from which Germany is excluded. On top of that eco- 
nomic terms which, while they cannot be fulfilled, do 
cripple the industrial life of her neighbor. With such a 
balance of forces France demands for herself a form of 
protection which neither Belgium, nor Poland, nor 
Czechoslovakia, nor Italy is granted." 

1 Cf. The New Republic August 13, 1919, p. 43. 



XV 

THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA 

AMONG all the Strang tacts of the many-sided 

JLlL Otttbtttsts of the Leading ^constructive 

vity, the Treaty with Bui] stands out da bold 

relief. It reveals the high-water mark reached by those 
secret, elusive, and decisive influences which swayed so 
many of the m y s t eri ou s decisions adopted by the Con- 

. rice. As Bulgaria disposed of an abundant source 
of those influences, her ehastiser... -takes of some 

of the characteristics of a reward. Not only did she not 

; .is the erous enemy that she shewed herself, 

but she emerged from the ordeal much better oft" than 
sew is states. Unlike Serbia, Rumania. 

Prance, and Belgium, she es the horrors of a fare 

invasion ar. . ssessed and fruetiried all her resources 

vn to the day when the armistice was concluded. 
Her peasant population made huge profits during the 
gn and her led Serbia. Rumac 

: . Greek Mac sent home enormous booty. 

In a word, she is richer and more prosperous than before 

E entered the arena against her protectors and former 
allies. 

For, owing to the intercess her powerful friends, 

she was treated with a degree of indulgence which, 
although expected by all who were initiated into the 
secrets of "open diplomacy," scandalized those who were 
anxious that at Least - mulacrum of justice should 



THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA 

be maintained. Germany was forced to sign a blank 
check which her enemies will one day fill in. Austria was 
reduced to the status of a parasite living on I he bounty of 
the (.in-at Powers and denied the righl of self-determina- 
tion. Even Prance, exhausted by five years' superhuman 
efforts, beholds with alarm her financial future entirely 
dependent upon the ability or inability <>f Germany to 
pay the damages to which she was condemned, 

But the Prussia of the Balkans, owing to the intercession 
of influential anonymous friends, had no such conse 
quences to deplore. Although she contracted heavy debts 
toward Germany, she was relieved of the effort to pay 
them. Her financial obligations were first transferred 1 

to the Allies and then magnanimously wiped OUt by these, 

who then limited all her liabilities for reparations to two 
and a quarter milliard francs. An Infer Allied commission 
in Sofia is to find and return the loot, to its lawful owners, 

but it is to charge no indemnity lor the damage done. 
Nor will it contain representatives of the states whose 
property the Bulgars abstracted. Serbia is allowed 

neither indemnity nor reparation. She is to receive a 
share which the Treaty neglected to fix of the two and a, 
quarter milliard francs on a dale which has also been 
left undetermined. She is not even to get back the 
herds o( cattle of which the BulgSTS robbed her. The 
lawgivers in Paris considered that justice would be met 
by obliging the Bulgars to restore 28,000 head of cattle 
in lieu of the 3,200,000 driven off, so that even if the ill- 
starred Serbs should identify, say, one million more, they 
would have no right to enforce their claim. ' 

Nor is that the only disconcerting detail in the Treaty. 
The Supreme Council, which sanctioned the military oc- 



1 In June, 1919. 

3 The comments on these" terms, published by M. Gauvain in the Journal 
des Dtbats (September 20, 19 1 9), are well worth reading. 

465 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

cupation of a part of Germany as a guaranty for the ful- 
filment of the peace conditions, dispenses Bulgaria from 
any such irksome conditions. Bulgaria's good faith ap- 
peared sufficient to the politicians who drafted the instru- 
ment. "For reasons which one hardly dares touch 
upon," writes an eminent French publicist, 1 "several of 
the Powers that constitute the famous world areopagus 
count on the future co-operation of Bulgaria. We shrink 
in dismay from the perspective thus opened to our gaze." 2 

The territorial changes which the Prussia of the 
Balkans was condemned to undergo are neither very 
considerable nor unjust. Rumania receives no Bul- 
garian territory, the frontiers of 19 13 remaining unal- 
tered. Serbia nets some on grounds which cannot be 
called in question, and a large part of Thrace which is in- 
habited, not by Bulgars, but mainly by Greeks and Turks, 
was taken from Bulgaria, but allotted to no state in par- 
ticular. The upshot of the Treaty, as it appeared to 
most of the leading publicists on the Continent of Europe, 
was to leave Bulgaria, whose cruelty and destructiveness 
are described by official and unofficial reports as unpar- 
alleled, in a position of economic superiority to Serbia, 
Greece, and Rumania. And in the Inter-Allied commis- 
sion Bulgaria is to have a representative, while Serbia, 
Greece, and Rumania, a part of whose stolen property 
the commission has to recover, will have none. 

A comparison between the indulgence lavished upon 
Bulgaria and the severity displayed toward Rumania is 
calculated to disconcert the stanchest friends of the 
Supreme Council. The Rumanian government, in a dig- 
nified note to the Conference, explained its refusal to sign 
the Treaty with Austria by enumerating a series of facts 
which amount to a scathing condemnation of the work 

1 M. Auguste Gauvain. 
- Le Journal des Debcts, September 20, 1919. 

466 



THE TREATY WITH BULGARIA 

of the Supreme Council. On the one hand the Council 
pleaded the engagements entered into between Japan and 
her European allies as a cogent motive for handing over 
Shantung to Japan. For treaties must be respected. 
And the argument is sound. On the other hand, they 
were bound by a similar treaty l to give Rumania the 
whole Banat, the Rumanian districts of Hungary and the 
Bukovina as far as the river Pruth. But at the Con- 
ference they repudiated this engagement. In 1916 they 
stipulated that if Rumania entered the war they would 
co-operate with ample military forces. They failed to 
redeem their promise. And they further undertook that 
"Rumania shall have the same rights as the Allies in the 
peace preliminaries and negotiations and also in discussing 
the issues which shall be laid before the Peace Conference 
for its decisions." Yet, as we saw, she was denied these 
rights, and her delegates were not informed of the sub- 
jects under discussion nor allowed to see the terms of 
peace, which were in the hands of the enemies, and were 
only twice admitted to the presence of the Supreme 
Council. 

It has been observed in various countries and by the 
Allied and the neutral press that between the German 
view about the sacredness of treaties and that of the 
Supreme Council there is no substantial difference. 2 
Comments of this nature are all the more distressing that 
they cannot be thrust aside as calumnious. Again it will 
not be denied that Rumania rendered inestimable ser- 
vices to the Allies. She sacrificed three hundred thousand 
of her sons to their cause. Her soil was invaded and her 
property stolen or ruined. Yet she has been deprived 
of part of her sovereignty by the Allies to whom she gave 
this help. The Supreme Council, not content with her 

1 Concluded in the year 19 16. 

2 Cf . The Daily Mail (Paris edition), September 21, 1919. 

31 467 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

law conferring equal rights on all her citizens, to what- 
ever race or religion they may belong, ordered her to 
submit to the direction of a foreign board in everything 
concerning her minorities and demanded from her a 
promise of obedience in advance to their future decrees 
respecting her policy in matters of international trade 
and transit. These stipulations constitute a noteworthy 
curtailment of her sovereignty. 

That any set of public men should be carried by ex- 
trinsical motives thus far away from justice, fair play, 
and good faith would be a misfortune under any cir- 
cumstances, but that at a conjuncture like the present it 
should befall the men who set up as the moral guides of 
mankind and wield the power to loosen the fabric of 
society is indeed a dire disaster. 



XVI 

THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

IN Mr. Wilson's scheme for the establishment of a 
society of nations there was nothing new but his 
pledge to have it realized. And that pledge has still to 
be redeemed under conditions which he himself has made 
much more unfavorable than they were. The idea itself 
— floating in the political atmosphere for ages — has come 
to seem less vague and unattainable since the days of 
Kant. The only heads of states who had set themselves 
to embody it in institutions before President Wilson took 
it up not only disappointed the peoples who believed in 
them, but discredited the idea itself. 

That a merely mechanical organization such as the 
American statesman seems to have had in mind, formed 
by parliamentary politicians deliberating in secret, could 
bind nations and peoples together in moral fellowship, is 
conceivable in the abstract. But if we turn to the reality, 
we shall find that in that direction nothing durable can 
be effected without a radical change in the ideas, aspira- 
tions, and temper of the leaders who speak for the nations 
to-day, and, indeed, in those of large sections of the 
nations themselves. For to organize society on those 
unfamiliar lines is to modify some of the deepest-rooted 
instincts of human nature. And that cannot be achieved 
overnight, certainly not in the span of thirty minutes, 
which sufficed for the drafting of the Covenant. The 
bulk of mankind might not need to be converted, but 

469 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

oust first be educated, ana m some coun- 
is perhaps >:•/.'. more difficult 

g ttUS I E .'■.:..■ 

h politica] anil 

realize that the b vaster community take 

precedence over those of any part of it And to impress 
these novel views upon the peoples of the world takes 

time. 
An indispensable condition of success is (hat the oom- 
be members together most be entered into 
peoples, not merely by their governments. For 

the masses that the burden of the war lies 
heaviest. It is the bulk oi □ that s 

the soldiers, the money, and the work for the belligerent 
states, and i - the hardships and makes the sacr ifi ces 

requisite to sustain it. Therefore, the peoples are c 

o the abolition of the ol< ing and 

the forging of the new. Moreover, as iy cam- 

paigns are waged with all the resources of the warring 
pies, and as the possession o □ of these resources 

is often both the cause of the conflict and the objective 
of the aggressor, it follows that no mere political enact- 
ments will meet contemporary requirements. An asso- 

ition of nations renouncing the sword as a means of 
settling disputes must also reduce as far as possible the 
surface over which Eriction with its neighbors is likely to 
take plaee. And nowadays most of that surface is eeo- 
nomie. The possession of raw materials is a more 
attraction than territorial aggrandizement. Indeed, the 
latter is coveted mainly as a means of securing or safe- 
guarding the former. On these and other grounds, in 
drawing up a charter for a society of nations, the poUtu 
aspee: should play but a subsidiary part. In Paris it 
was the only aspeet that counted tar anything. 

A parliament of peoples, then, is the only organ that ear. 

4;o 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

imparl viability to a society of nations worthy of the 
name. By joining the Covenant with the Peace Treaty, 
and turning the former into an instrument for the execu- 
tion of the latter, thus subordinating the ideal to the ego- 
tistical, Mr. Wilson deprived his plan of its sole justifica- 
tion, and for the time being buried it. The philosopher 
Lichtenberg ' wrote, "One man brings forth a thought, 
another holds it over the baptismal font, the third begets 
offspring with it, the fourth stands at its deathbed, and 
the fifth buries it." Mr. Wilson has discharged the func- 
tions of gravedigger to the idea of a pacific society of 
nations, just as Lenin has done to the system of Marxism, 
the only difference being that Marxism is as dead as a 
door-nail, whereas the society of nations may rise again. 

It was open, then, to the three principal delegates to 
insure the peace of the world by moral means or by force. 
1 laving eschewed the former by adopting the doctrines of 
Monroe, abandoning the freedom of the seas, and by 
according to Prance strategic frontiers and other privi- 
leges of the militarist order, they might have enlarged 
and systematized these concessions to expediency and 
forged an alliance of the three states or of two, and under- 
taken to keep peace on the planet against all marplots. 
1 wrote at the time: "The delegates are becoming con- 
scious of the existence of a ready-made league of nations 
in the shape of the Anglo-Saxon states, which, together 
with France, might hinder wars, promote good-fellowship, 
remold human destinies; and they are delighted thus to 
possess solid foundations on which a noble edifice can be 
raised in the fullness of time. Tribunals will be created, 
with full powers to adjudge disputes; facilities will be 
accorded to litigious states, and even an obligation will 
be imposed to invoke their arbitration. And the sum 



1 A contemporary of Goethe. His works were republished by Herzog in 
the year 1007. 

471 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

total of these reforms will be known to contemporary 
annals as an inchoate League of Nations. The delegates 
are already modestly disavowing the intention of realis- 
ing the ideal in all its parts. That must be left to coming 
generations; but what with the exhaustion of the peoples, 
their aversion from warfare, and the material obstacles 
to the renewal of hostilities in the near future, it is calcu- 
lated that the peace will not soon be violated. Whether 
more salient results will be attained or attempted by the 
Conference nobody can foretell." ' 

This expedient, even had it been deliberately conceived 
and skilfully wrought out. would not have been an 
adequate solution of the world's difficulties, nor would it 
have commended itself to all the states concerned. But 
it would at least have been a temporary makeshift 
capable of being transmuted under favorable circum- 
stances into something less material and more durable. 
But the amateur world-reformers could not make ap 
their minds to choose either alternative. And the result 
is one of the most lamentable failures recorded in human 
history. 

I placed my own opinion on record at the time as 
frankly as the censorship which still existed for me would 
permit. I wrote: "What every delegate with sound 
political instinct will ask himself is. whether the League 
of Nations will eliminate wars in future, and, if not, he 
will feel conscientiously bound to adopt other relatively 
sure means of providing against them, and these consist 
of alliances, strategic frontiers, and the permanent dis- 
ablement of the potential enemy. On one or other of 
these alternative lines the resettlement must be devised. 
To combine them would be ruinous. Now of what prac- 
tical use is a league of nations devoid of supernational 
forces and faced by a numerous, virile, and united race, 

1 The Daily Telegraph, January rS, 1019. 

47- 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

smarting under a sense of injustice, thirsting for the op- 
portunities for development denied to it, but granted to 
nations which it despises as inferior? Would a league 
of nations combine militarily against the gradual en- 
croachments or sudden aggression of that Power against 
its weaker neighbors? Nobody is authorized to answer 
this question affirmatively. To-day the Powers cannot 
agree to intervene against Bolshevism, which they 
deem a scourge of the world, nor can they agree to 
tolerate it. 

"In these circumstances, what compelling motives can 
be laid before those delegates who are asked to dispense 
with strategic frontiers and rely upon a league of nations 
for their defense? Take France's outlook. Peace once con- 
cluded, she will be confronted with a secular enemy who 
numbers some seventy millions to her forty-five millions. 
In ten years the disproportion will be still greater. Discon- 
tnit.ed Russia is almost certain to be taken in hand by 
Germany, befriended, reorganized, exploited, and enlisted 
as an ally." * 

Conscious of these reefs and shoals, the French govern- 
ment, which was at first contemptuous of the Wilsonian 
scheme, discerned the use it might be put to as a military 
safeguard, and sought to convert it into that. "The 
French," wrote a Francophil English journal published in 
Paris, "would like the League to maintain what may be 
called a permanent military general staff. The duties 
of this organization would be to keep a hawklike eye on 
the misdemeanors, actual or threatened, of any state or 
group of states, and to be empowered with authority to 
call into instant action a great international military force 
for the frustration or suppression of such aggression. 
The French have frankly in mind the possibility that an 
unrepentant and unregenerate Germany is the most 

1 The Daily Telegraph, January 31, 1919. 

473 



THE INSIDE STORY OF 11 IK PEACE CONFERENCE 

likely menace not only to the security of France, but to 
the peace of the world in general." l 

And other states cherished analogous hopes. The 
spirit of right and justice was to be evoked like the 
spirit that served Aladdin, and to be compelled to enter the 
sendee of nationalism and militarism, and accomplish 
the task of armies. 

The paramount Powers prescribed the sacrifices of sov- 
ereignty which membership of the League necessitated, 
and forthwith dispensed themselves from making them. 
The United States government maintained its Monroe 
Doctrine for America — nay, it went farther and identified 
its interests with the Hay doctrine for the Far East.' 
It decided to construct a powerful navy for the defense 
of these political assets, and to give the youth of the 
country a semi-military training/' Defense presupposes 
attack. War. therefore, is not excluded — nay. it is ad- 
mitted by the world-reformers, and preparations for it are 
indispensable. Equally so are the burdens of taxation. 
But if liberty of defense be one of the rights of two or three 
Powers, by what law is it confined to them and denied 
to the others 5 Why should the other communities be 
constrained to remain open to attack? Surely they. too. 
deserve to live and thrive, and make the most of their 

portunities. Now if in lieu of a misnamed League oi 

Nations we had an Anglo-Saxon board for the better 

government of the world, these unequal weights and 

measures would be intelligible on the principle that special 

1 The DaUy Mail i, Paris edition), February 13, 1010. 

Ae-Secretary Hay addressed a note to the Powers in September, 1 809, 

setting forth America's attitude toward China. It is known as the doctrine 

of the "open door." In a subsequent note (July v ;. 1900) he enlarged its 
scope and promulgated the integrity of China. But Russia ignored it and 
tlew her dag over the Chinese customs in Nowvhwang. It was Japan who, 
on that occasion, asserted and enforced the doctrine without outside help. 
■*' General Mareh intimated, when testifying before the House Military 
Committee, that President Wilson approved of universal training, indorsing 
the War Department's army program. — New York Herald ^ Paris edition). 

474 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

obligations and responsibilities warrant exceptional rights. 
But no such plea can be advanced under an arrangement 
professing to be a society of free nations. All that can 
with truth be said is what M. Clcmenceau told the dele- 
gates of the Lesser slates .it the opening of the Conference — 
that the three great belligerents represent twelve million 
soldiers and that their supreme authority derives from 
that. The role of the other peoples is to listen to the 
behests of their guardians, and to accept and execute them 
without murmur. Might is still a source of right. 

It is fair to say that the disclosure of the true base of 
the new ordering, as blurted out by M. Clcmenceau at 
that historic meeting, caused little surprise among the 
initiated. For there was no reason to assume that he, or, 
indeed, the bulk of the continental statesmen, were con- 
verts to a doctrine of which its own apostle accepted only 
those fragments which commended themselves to his 
country or his party. Had not the French Premier 
scoffed at the League in public as in private? Had he 
not said in the Chamber: "I do not believe that the 
Society of Nations constitutes the necessary conclusion 
of the present war. I will give you one of my reasons. 
It is this: if to-morrow you were to propose to me that 
Germany should enter into this society I would not 
consent." l 

"I am certain," wrote one of the ablest and most ardent 
champions of the League in France, Senator d'Estournelles 
de Constant — " I am certain that he [M. Clemenceau] made 
an effort against himself, against his entire past, against 
his whole life, against all his convictions, to serve the 
Society of Nations. And his Minister of Foreign Affairs 
followed him." 2 Exactly. And as with M. Clemenceau, 
so it was with the majority of European statesmen ; most 

1 Bulletin des Droits de /' Homme, No. 10, May 15, 1919. 

2 Journal Officiel, November 21, 19 17. 

475 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

of them made strenuous and, one may add, successful 
efforts against their convictions. And the result was 
inevi table. 

"The governments." we read in the organ of syndical- 
ists, who had supported Mr. Wilson as long as they be- 
lieved him determined to redeem his promises — "the 
governments have acquiesced in the Fourteen Points. . . . 
Hypocrisy. Each one cherished mental reservations. 
Virtue was exalted and vice practised. The poltroon 
eulogized heroism; the imperialist lauded the spirit of 
justice. For the past month we have been picking up 
ideas about the worth of the adhesions to the Fourteen 
Points, and never before has a more sinister or a more 
odious comedy been played. Territorial demands have 
been heaved one upon the other; contempt of the rights 
of peoples — the only right that we can recognize — has 
been expressed in striking terms; the last restraints have 
vanished; the masks have fallen." 1 

From even' country in Europe the same judgment 
came pitched in varying keys. The Italian press con- 
demned the proceedings of the Conference in language 
to the full as strong as that of the German or Austrian 
journals. The Sktmpa affirmed that those who, like 
Bissolati, were in the beginning for placing their trust 
one of the two coteries at the Conference were guilty of a 
fatal mistake. "The mistake lay in their belief in the 
ideal strivings of one of the parties, and in the horror 
with which the cupidity of the others was contemplated, 
whereas both of them were fighting for . . . their inter- 
ests In verity France was no less militarist or 

absolutist than Germany, nor was England less avid than 
either. And the proof is enshrined in the peace treaties 
which have masked the results of their respective vic- 
tories. Versailles is a Brcst-Litovsk, aggravated in the 

1 Le Populaire, February 10, 19 19. 

476 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

same proportion as the victory of the Entente over Ger- 
many, is more complete than was that of Germany over 
Russia. Cupidity does not alter its character, even when 
it seeks to conceal itself under a Phrugian cap rather than 
wear a helmet." 1 

M. Clemenceau's opening utterance about the twelve 
million men, and the unlimited right which such formi- 
dable armies confer on their possessors to sit in judgment 
on the tribes and peoples of the planet, was the true 
keynote to the Conference. After that the leading states- 
men trimmed their ship, touched the rudder, and sailed 
toward downright absolutism. 

The effect of such utterances and acts on the minds of 
the peoples are distinctly mischievous. For they tend 
to obliterate the sense of public right, which is the main 
foundation of international intercourse among progressive 
nations. 

And already it had been shaken and weakened by the 
campaigns of the past fifty years, and in particular by the 
last war. In the relations of nation to nation there were 
certain principles — derivatives of ethics diluted with 
maxims of expediency — which kept the various govern- 
ments from too flagrant breaches of faith. These checks 
were the only substitute for morality in politics. Their 
highest power was connoted by the word Europeanism, 
which stood for a supposed feeling of solidarity among all 
the peoples of the old Continent, and for a certain respect 
for the treaties on which the state-system reposed. But 
it existed mainly among defeated nations when appre- 
hensive of being isolated or chastised by their victors. 
None the less, the idea marked a certain advance toward 
an ethical bond, of union. 

Now this embryonic sense, together with respect for 
the binding force of a nation's plighted troth, were num- 

1 La Stampa, June II, 1919. Cf. L'Humanite, June 13, 1919. 

477 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

bered by the demoralizing influence of the wars of th< 

fifty years. And one of the first and peremptory needs 
of the world was their restoration. This could be ef- 
fected only by bringing the 3, not merely of Eu- 
rope, but of the world, more closely together, by en- 
grafting on them a feeling of elose solidarity, and impress- 
ing them with the necessity of making common cause in 
the one struggle worth their while waging — resistance to 
the forces that militate against human welfare and 
progress. The feeling was widespread that the way to 
effect this was by some form of - dism, by the 
broadening, deepening, and quickening all that was im- 
plied by Europeanism, by co-ordinating the collective 
energies of all progressive peoples, arid causing them to 
converge toward a common and worthy goal. For the 
working classes this conception in a restricted form had 
long possessed a commanding attraction. What they 
aimed at. however, was no more than the catholicity of 
labor. They fancied that after the passage of the tidal 
wave of destructiveness the ground was cleared of most 
of the obstacles which had encumbered it, and that the 
forward advance might begin forthwith. 

What they failed to take sufficiently into account was 
the vis inertia, the survival of the old spirit among the 
ruling orders whose members continued to live and move 
in the. atmosphere of use and wont, and the spirit of hate 
and bitterness infused into all the political classes, to 
dispel which was a herculean task. It was exclusively 
to the leaders of those classes that Mr. Wilson confided 
the realization of the abstract idea of a society of nations. 
which he may at first have pictured to himself as a vast 
family conscious of common interests, bent on moral and 
material self-betterment, and willing to eschew such 
partial advantages as might hinder or retard the general 
progress. But, judging by his attitude and his action, 

'47^ 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

he had no real acquaintance with the materials out of 
which it must be fashioned, no notion of the difficulties 
to be met, and no staying power to encounter and sur- 
mount them. And his first move entailed the failure of 
the scheme. 

As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilson came to the Conference 
with a home-made charter for the Society of Nations, 
which, according to the evidence of Mr. Lansing, "was 
never pressed." The State Secretary added that "the 
present league Covenant is superior to the American 
plan." And as for the Fourteen Points, "They were not 
even discussed at the Conference." * Suspecting as much, 
I wrote at the time : 2 " The President has pinned himself 
down to no concrete scheme whatever. His method is 
electric, choosing what is helpful and beneficent in the 
projects of others, and endeavoring to obtain from the 
dissentients a renunciation of ideas belonging to the old 
national currents and adherence to the doctrines he deems 
salutary. It is, however, already clear that the highest 
ideal now attainable is not a league of nations as the 
masses understand it, which will abolish wars and like- 
wise put an end to the costly preparations for them, but 
only a coalition of victorious nations, which may hope, 
by dint of economic inducements and deterrents, to draw 
the enemy peoples into its camp in the not too distant 
future. This result would fall very short of the expecta- 
tions aroused by the far-resonant promises made at the 
outset; but even it will be unattainable without an 
international compact binding all the members of the 
coalition to make war simultaneously upon the nation 
or group of nations which ventures to break the peace. 
I am disposed to believe that nothing less than such an 
express covenant will be regarded by the continental 

1 Cf. The Chicago Tribune (Paris edition), August 27, 1919. 

2 In The Daily Telegraph, February 8, 1919. 

479 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

Powers of the Entente as an adequate substitute for 
certain territorial readjustments which they otherwise 
consider essential to secure them from sudden attack. 

"Whether such a condition would prevent future 
wars is a question that only experience can answer. 
Personally. I am profoundly convinced, with Mr. Taft, 
that a genuine league of nations must have teeth in the 
guise of supernational, not international, forces. In 
these remarks I make abstraction from the larger question 
which wholly absorbs this — namely, whether the masses 
for whose behoof the lavish expenditure of time, energy, 
and ingenuity is undertaken, will accept a coalition of 
victorious governments against unregenerate peoples as a 
substitute for the Society of Nations as at first conceived." 

The supposed object of the League was the substitution 
of right for force, by debarring each individual state from 
employing violence against any of the others, and by the 
use of arbitration as a means of settling disputes. This 
entails the suppression of the right to declare war and to 
prepare for it, and. as a corollary, a system of deterrents 
to hinder, and of penalties to punish rebellion on the part 
of a community. That in those cases where the law is 
set at naught efficacious means should be available to 
enforce it will hardly be denied; but whether economic 
pressure would suffice in all cases is doubtful. To me it 
seems that without a supernational army, under the 
direct orders of the League, it might under conceivable 
circumstances become impossible to uphold the decisions 
of the tribunal, and that, on the other hand, the coexist- 
ence of such a military force with national armaments 
would condemn the undertaking to failure. 

An analysis of the Covenant lies beyond the limits of 
my task, but it may not be amiss to point out a few of its 
inherent defects. One of the principal organs of the 
League will be the Assembly and the Council. The 

4S0' 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

former, a very numerous and mainly political body, will 
necessarily be out of touch with the peoples, their needs 
and their aspirations. It will meet at most three or 
four times a year. And its members alone will be invested 
with all the power, which they will be chary of delegating. 
On the other hand, the Council, consisting at first of nine 
members, will meet at least once a year. The members 
of both bodies will presumably be appointed by the 
governments, 1 who will certainly not renounce their 
sovereignty in a matter that concerns them so closely. 
Such a system may be wise and conducive to the highest, 
aims, but it can hardly be termed democratic. The 
military Powers who command twelve million soldiers will 
possess a majority in the Council.' 2 The Secretariat alone 
will be permanent, and will naturally be appointed by 
the Great Powers. 

Instead of abolishing war, the Conference described 
its abolition as beyond the power of man to compass. 
Disarmament, which was to have been one of its main 
achievements, is eliminated from the Covenant. As the 
war that was to have been the last will admittedly be 
followed by others, the delegates of the Great Powers 
worked conscientiously, as behooved patriotic statesmen, 
to obtain in advance all possible advantages for their 
respective countries by way of preparing for it. The 
new order, which in theory reposes upon right, justice, 
and moral fellowship, in reality depends upon powerful 
armies and navies. France must remain under arms, 
seeing that she has to keep watch on the Rhine. Britain 
and the United States are to go- on building warships and 
aircraft, besides training their youth for the coming 
Armageddon. The article of the Covenant which lays 
it down that "the members of the League recognize that 

1 The Covenant leaves the mode of recruiting them undetermined. 
- Article IV. 



THE INSIDE STORY OF I HI PEACE CONFERENCE 

the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of 
national armaments to the lowest point consistent with 
national safety,*' ' IS, to use a Russian simile, written 
on water with a fork. Britain, Prance, and the United 
States are already agreed that they will combine to repel 
unprovoked aggression on the part of Germany, That 
evidently signifies that they will hold themselves in readi- 
ness to right, and will therefore make due preparation. 
This arrangement is a substitute for a supernational army, 
as though prevention were not better than eure: that 
it will prove efficacious in the long rim very few believe. 
One clear-visioned Frenchman writes: "The inefficacj 
of the organization aimed at by the Conference constrains 
Franee to live in eontinual and increasing insecurity, 
owing to the falling off of her population." - He adds: 
"It follows from this abortive expedient— if it is to 
remain definitive — that each member-state must protect 
itself, or come to terms with the more powerful ones, as 
in the past. Consequently we are in presence of the 
maintenance of militarism and the regime of armaments." ' 
This writer goes farther and accuses Mr. Wilson of having 
played into the hands of Britain. "President Wilson." 
he affirms, "has more or less sacrificed to the English 
government the society of nations and the question 
of armaments, that of the colonies and that of the free 
dom of the seas. . . ." 4 This, however, is an over state 
ment. It was not for the sake of Britain that the Ameri- 
ean statesman gave up so much; it was for the sake of 
saving something of the Covenant, It was in the spirit 
of Sir Boyle Roche, whose attachment to the British 
Constitution was such that, to save a part of it, he was 
willing to sacrifice the whole. 

1 Article VIII. 

1 M. d'Estournelles de Constant, Bulletin des Droits Jc V Homme, May 

15, 191 Q, p. 45O. 

*lk£ • Ibid*, p. 457. 

48a 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

The arbitration of dispute* is provided for by one of the 
articles of the Covenant; ' but the parties may go to war 
three months later with a clear conscience and an appeal 
to right, justice, sell determination, and the usual ab- 
stract nouns. 

In a word, the directors of the Conference discipl 
their political intelligence on lines of self-hypnotization, 
along which common sense finds if. impossible to follow 
them. There were also among the delegates men who 
thought and spoke in term-, of reason and logic, but their 
voices evoked no echo. One of thern summed up his 
criticism somewhat as follows: 

"During the war our professions of democratic prin- 
ciples v/ere far resonant and emphatic. We were fighting 
for the nations of the world, especially for those who eould 

not successfully fight for themselves. All the peoples, 

great and small, were exhorted to make the most painful 
sacrifices to enable their respective governments to con- 
quer the enemy. Victory unexpectedly smiled on us, 
and the peoples asked that those promi lid be made 

good. Naturally, expectations ran high. What has hap- 
pened ? The governments now answer in effect : ' We will 
promote your interests, but without your co-operation or 
assent. We will make the neca ary arrangements in 
secret behind closed door- . The machinery we are de- 
vising will be a state machinery, not a popular one. All 
that we ask of you is implicit trust. You complain of our 
action in the past. You have good cause. You say that 
the same men are about to determine your future. Again 
you are right. But when you affirm that we are sure to 
make the like mistake;, you are wrong, and we ask you to 
take our word for it. You complain that we are politi- 
cians who feel the weight of certain commitments and the 
fetters of obsolete traditions from which we cannot free 

1 Article XII. 

92 483 



THF INSIDE STORY OF LHi: PEACE CONFERENCE 

eel and 

further the bate tive countries, and thai 

eivable we should devise an organisation which 

looks above and beyond those interests. We ask you. 

you willing, then, to abandon the heritage of our 

fathers to the foreigner?' 

"That the downtrodden peoples in Austria and Ger- 
many have been eman< : .s a moral triumph. But 
why has the beneficent principle that is said to have in- 
spired the deed been restricted in its application? Win- 
has the experiment been tried only in the enemies' eoun- 
5? Or are things quite in order everywhere eke? Is 

ere no injustice in other quarters of the globe- Are 
there no complaints? If there be. why are they ignored? 
Is it because all acts of oppression are to be perpetuated 
which do not take place in the enemy's land: What 
about Ireland and about a do. en other countries and 
peoples? A-.c they skeletons not to be touched? 

"'By debarring the masses from participation in a 
grandiose scheme, the success of which depends upon 
their assent, the governments are indirectly but surely 
encouraging secret combined opposition, and in some 
cases Bolshevism. The masses resent being treated as 
children after having been appealed to as arbiters and 
rescuers. For four and a half years it was they who bore 
the brunt of the war. they who sacrificed their sorts and 
their substance. In the future it is they to whom the states 
will look for the further sacrifices in blood and treasure 
which will be necessary in the struggles which they evi- 
dently anticipate. Well, some of them refuse these sac- 
rifices in advance. They challenge the right of the gov- 
ernments to retain the power of making war and peace. 
That power they are working to get into their own hands 
and to wield in their own way. or at any rate to have a 
say in its exercise. And in order to secure it. some sec- 

4S4 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

tions oi the peoples are making common cause with the 
socialist revolutionaries, while others have gone the length 
of Bolshevism. And that is a serious danger. The agi- 
tation now going on among the people, therefore, starts 
with a grievance. The masses have many other griev 
ances be tides the one just sketched the survivals oi the 
feudal age, the privileges of class, the inequality of oppor 
tunity. And the kernel formed by these is the element oi 
truth and equity which imparts force to all those undei 
ground movements, and enables them to subsist and es 
tend. Error is never dangerous by itself; it is only when 
it has an admixture of truth that it becomes powerful for 
evil. And it seems a thousand pities that the govern- 
ments, whose own interest:; arc at Stake, as Well as those 

of the communities they govern, Bhould go out, of their 
way to provide an explosive element for Bolshevism and 
its less sinister variants." 

The League was treated as a living organism before it 
existed. All the problems which the Supreme Councilors 
found insoluble were reserved for its judgment. Arduous 
functions were allotted to it before it had organs to di\ 
charge them. Formidable tasks were imposed upon it 
before the means of achieving them were devised. It is 
an institution so elusive and elastic that the Pren< h regard 
it as capable of being used as a handy instrument lor 

Coercing the Teutons, who, in turn, look upon it as a 

means "t recovering their place in the world; the Jap- 
anese \\>>\><- it may become a bridge leading to racial 
equality, and the governments which devised it are bent 

on employing it as a lever for their own politico economic 

aims, which they identify with the progress of the human 

race. J low the peoples look upon it the future will show. 

On the Monroe Doctrine in connection with the Lea^u'- 

of Nations the less said the soonest mended. But one 

cannot well say less than this: that any real so< Lety of 

485 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

peoples such as Mr. Wilson first conceived and advocated 
is as incompatible with "regional understandings like the 
Monroe Doctrine" as are the maintenance o\ national 
armaments and the bartering o\ populations. It is im 

material whether one concludes that a Society of Nations 
IS therefore impossible in the present conjuncture or that 
all those survivals o\ the old state system are obsolescent 
and should be abolished. The two are unquestionably 
irreconcilable. 

It would be a mistake to infer from the unanimity with 
which Mr. Wilson's Covenant was finally accepted that 
it expressed the delegates' genuine conceptions or senti- 
ments. Mr. Bullitt, one oi the expert advisers to the 
American Peace Delegation, testified before the Senate 
committee in Washington that State Secretary Lansing 
remarked to him: "1 consider the League of Nations at 
present as entirely useless. The Great Lowers have sim 
ply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. 
England and France, in particular, have gotten out of 
the Treaty everything they wanted. The League of 
Nations can do nothing to alter any unjust clauses of the 
Treaty except by the unanimous consent of the League 
members. The Great Powers will never consent to 
changes in the interests o( weaker peoples." 1 

This opinion which Mr. Bullitt ascribed to Mr. Lansing 
was, to my knowledge, that of a large number of the repre- 
sentatives of the nations at the Conference. Among them 
all I have met very few who had a good word to say of 
the scheme, and of the few one had helped to formulate it, 
another had assisted him. And the unfavorable judg- 
ments of the remainder were delivered after the Covenant 
was signed. 

One of those lea tiers, in conversation with several other 

delegates and myself, exclaimed one day: "The League 

'Cf. The New York Herald (Paris edition), September 14, 1919- 

4 86 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

of Nations indeed! It is an absurdity. Who among 
thinking men believes in its reality?" "I do," answered 
bis neighbor; "hut, like the devils, J believe and tremble. 

J hold that it is a corrosive poison wln< h destroy I much 

that is good and will further much that is bad." A 
statesman who was not a delegate demurred. "In my 
opinion," he said, "it is a response to a demand put for 
ward by the peoples oi the globe, and because of this 
origin something good will ultimately come oi it. Un- 
questionably it is very defective, but in time it- may he — 
nay, mus t be changed ioi the better." The first speaker 
replied: "If you imagine that the League will help 

continental peoples, you are, I am convinced, mistaken. 
It took the United State:, three years to go to the help of 
Britain and Prance. How long do you suppose it will 
take her to mobilize and despat< h troops to su< < or Poland, 
Rumania, or Czechoslovakia? I am acquainted with 
British colonial public opinion and sentiment too often 
misunderstood hy foreigners -and I can tell you that they 
are misconstrued hy those who fancy that they would 
determine action of that kind. If England tells the 
colonies that she needs their help, they will come, because 

their people are flesh of her flesh and hlood of her blood, 

and also because they depend for their defense upon hrr 
navy, and if she were to go under they would go under, 
too. But the continental nations have no such claims 
Upon the British colonies, which would not be in a hurry 
to make sacrifices in order to satisfy their appetites or 
their passions." 

The second speaker then said: "It is possihlc, hut 
nowise certain, that the future League may help to settle 
these disputes which professional diplomatists would have 
arranged, and in the old way, but it will not affect those 
others which are the real eauscs of wars. If a nation be- 
lieves it can further its vital interest hy breaking the peace, 

487 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

the League cannot stop it. How could it? It lacks the 
means. There will he no army ready. It would have to 
create one. Even now, when such an army, powerful and 
victorious, is in the field, the League — for the Supreme 
Council is that and more- cannot get its orders obeyed. 
How then will its behest be treated when it has no troops 
at its beck and call? It is redrawing the map of central 
and eastern Europe, and is very satisfied with its work. 
But, as we know, the peoples of those countries look upon 
its map as a sheet of paper covered with lines and blotches 
of color to which no reality corresponds." 

The constitution of the League was termed by Mr. 
Wilson a Covenant, a word redolent of biblical and puri- 
tanical times, which accorded well with the motives that 
decided him to prefer Geneva to Brussels as the seat of 
the League, and to adopt other measures of a supposed 
political character. The first draft of this document was. 
as we saw, completed in the incredibly short space of some 
thirty hours, so as to enable the President to take it with 
him to Washington. As the Ententophil Echo de Paris 
remarked, "By a fixed date the merchandise has to be 
consigned on board the George Washington" l 

The discussions that took place after the President's 
return from the United States were animated, interesting, 
and symptomatic. In April the commission had several 
sittings, at which various amendments and alterations 
were proposed, some of which would cut deep into inter- 
national relations, while others were of slight moment, 
and gave rise to amusing sallies. One day the proposal 
was mooted that each member-state should be free to 
secede on giving two years' notice. M. Larnaude, who 
viewed membership as something sacrament ally inalien- 
able, seemed shocked, as though the suggestion bordered 
on sacrilege, and wondered how any government should 

1 L'Echo de Paris, February 17, 1919. 

488 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

feel tempted to take such a step. Signer Orlando was of 
.'i different opinion. "However precious the privilege of 

membership may be," he said, "if. would be a comfort 
always to know that you could divest yourself of it at will. 
I am shut up in my room all day working. I do not go 
into tin- open air any oftener than a prisoner might. But 
I console myself with the thought that J can go out when- 
ever I take it into my head. And I am sure a similar 
reflection on membership of the League would be equally 
soothing. I am in favor of the motion." 

The center of interest during the drafting of the Cove- 
nant lay in the clause proclaiming the equality of religions, 
which Mr. Wilson was bent on having passed at all costs, 
if not in one form, then in another. This is one example 
of the occasional visibility of the religious thread which 
ran through a good deal of his personal work at the Con- 
ference. For it is a fact — not yet realized even by the 
delegates themselves — that distinctly religious motives 
inspired much that was done by the Conference on what 
seemed political or social grounds. The strategy adopted 
by the eminent American statesman to have his stipula- 
tion accepted proceeded in this case on the lines of a 
humanitarian resolve to put an end to sanguinary wars 
rather than on those which the average reformer, bent on 
cultural progress, wo aid have traced. Actuality was im- 
parted to this simple and yet thorny topic by a concrete 
proposal which the President made one day. What he is 
reported to have said is briefly this: "As the treatment of 
religious confessions has been in the past, and may again 
in the future be, a cause of sanguinary wars, it seems de- 
sirable that a clause should be introduced into the Cove- 
nant establishing absolute liberty for creeds and con- 
fessions." "On what, Mr. President," asked the first 
Polish delegate, "do you found your assertion that wars 
re still brought about by the differential treatment 

489 



r"*i 



THE [NSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

meted out to religions? Docs contemporary history bear 

out this statement? And. if not, what likelihood is there 
that religious inequality will precipitate sanguinary con- 
flicts in the future?" To this pointed question Mr. Wil- 
son is said to have made the characteristic reply that he 
considered it expedient to assume this nexus between 
religious inequality and war as the safest way of bringing 
the matter forward. If he were to proceed on any other 
lines, he added, there would be truth and force in the 
objection which would doubtless be raised, that the Con- 
ference was intruding upon the domestic affairs of sover- 
eign states. As that charge would damage the cause, it 
must be rebutted in advance. And for this purpose he 
deemed it prudent to approach the subject from the side 
he had chosen. 

This reply was listened to in silence and unfavorably 
commented upon later. The alleged relation between 
such religious inequality as has survived into the twentieth 
century and such wars as are waged nowadays is so ob- 
viously fictitious that one can hardly understand the line 
of reasoning that led to its assumption, or the effect which 
the fiction could be supposed to have on the minds of 
those legislators who might be opposed to the measure 
on the ground that it involved undue interference in the 
internal affairs of sovereign states. The motion was re- 
ferred to a commission, which in due time presented a 
report. Mr. Wilson was absent when the report came up 
for discussion, his place being taken by Colonel House. 
The atmosphere was chilly, only a couple of the delegates 
being disposed to support the clause — Rumania's repre- 
sentative, M. Diamandi, was one, and another was 
Baron Makino, whose help Colonel House would gladly 
have dispensed with, so inacceptable was the condition it 
carried with it. 

Baron Makino said that he entirely agreed with Colonel 

400 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

House and the American delegates. The equality of 
religious confessions was not merely desirable, but neces- 
sary to the smooth working of a Society of Nations such 
as they were engaged in establishing. He held, however, 
that it should be extended to races, that extension being 
also a corollary of the principle underlying the new inter- 
national ordering. He would therefore move the inser- 
tion of a clause proclaiming the equality of races and 
religions. At this Colonel House looked pensive. Nearly 
all the other opinions were hostile to Colonel House's 
motion. 

The reasons alleged by each of the dissenting lawgivers 
were interesting. Lord Robert Cecil surprised many of 
his colleagues by informing them that in England the 
Catholics, who are fairly treated as things are, could not 
possibly be set on a footing of perfect equality with their 
Protestant fellow-citizens, because the Constitution for- 
bids it. Nor could the British people be asked to alter 
their Constitution. He gave as instances of the slight 
inequality at present enforced the circumstance that no 
Catholic can ascend the throne as monarch, nor sit on the 
woolsack as Lord Chancellor in the Upper House. 

M. Larnaude, speaking in the name of France, stated 
that his country had passed through a sequence of em- 
barrassments caused by legislation on the relations be- 
tween the Catholics and the state, and that the introduc- 
tion of a clause enacting perfect equality might revive 
controversies which were happily losing their sharpness. 
He considered it, therefore, inadvisable to settle this 
delicate matter by inserting the proposed declaration in 
the Covenant. Belgium's first delegate, M. Hymans, 
pointed out that the objection taken by his government 
was of a different but equally cogent character. There 
was reason to apprehend that the Flemings might avail 
themselves of the equality clause to raise awkward issues 

491 



llli: INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

and to sow seeds oi dissension. On those grounds he 
would like to see the proposal waived. Signor Orlando 
half seriously, half jokingly, reminded his colleagues that 
none of their countries had. like his, a pope in their 
eapital. The Italian government must, therefore, pro- 
ceed in religious matters with the greatest eireumspeetion, 
and could not lightly assent to any measure capable of 
being manipulated to the detriment of the public interest. 
Hence he was unable to give the motion his support. It 
was finally suggested that both proposals be withdrawn. 
To this Colonel House demurred, on the ground that 
President Wilson, who was unavoidably absent, attached 
very great weight to the declaration, to which he hoped 
the delegates would give their most favorable considera- 
tion. One of the members then rose and said, "In that 
ease we had better postpone the voting until Mr. Wilson 
can attend." This suggestion was adopted. When the 
matter came up for discussion at a subsequent sitting, the 
Japanese substituted "nations" for "raees." 

In the meantime the usual arts of parliamentary emer- 
gency were practised outside the Conference to induce 
the Japanese to withdraw their proposal altogether. They 
were told that to aeeept or refuse it would be to damage 
the cause of the future League without furthering their 
own. But the Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino re- 
fused to yield an inch of their ground. A conversation 
then took place between the Premier of Australia, on the 
one side, and Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, on the 
other, with a view to their reaching a compromise. For 
Mr. Hughes was understood to be the leader ot those 
who opposed any declaration of racial equality. The 
Japanese statesmen showed him their amendment, and 
asked him whether he could suggest a modification that 
would satisfy himself and them. The answer was in the 
negative. To the arguments of the Japanese delegates 

49a 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

the Australian Premier is understood to have replied: 
"I am willing to admit the equality of the Japanese as a 
nation, and also of individuals man to man. But I do 
not admit the consequence that we should throw open our 
country to them. It is not that we hold them to be in- 
ferior to ourselves, but simply that we do not want them. 
Economically they are a perturbing factor, because they 
accept wages much below the minimum for which our 
people are willing to work. Neither do they blend well 
with our people. Hence we do not want them to marry 
our women. Those are my reasons. We mean no of- 
fense. Our restrictive legislation is not aimed specially 
at the Japanese. British subjects in India arc affected 
by it in exactly the same way. It is impossible that we 
should formulate any modifications of your amendment, 
because there is no modification conceivable that would 
satisfy us both." 

The Japanese delegates were understood to say that 
they would maintain their motion, and that unless it 
passed they would not sign the document. Mr. Hughes 
retorted that if it should pass he would refuse to sign. 
Finally the Australian Premier asked Baron Makino 
whether he would be satisfied with the following qualify- 
ing proviso: "This affirmation of the principle of equal- 
ity is not to be applied to immigration or nationalization." 
Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda both answered in 
the negative and withdrew. 

The final act ' is described by eye- wit n esses as fol- 
lows. Congruously with the order of the day, Presi- 
dent Wilson having moved that the city of Geneva 
be selected as the capital of the future League, ob- 
tained a majority, whereupon he announced that the 
motion had passed. 

Then came the burning question of the equality of 

1 On April II, 1919. 

493 



THE INSIDE STORY OF Hit' FEACE CONFERENCE 

osed ■■'■ 
ght to be inserted in 
tie which wa with also in the body 

of the Covenant, . it would be no more fcfc 

tx>ry de\ >r£a.nie eonneetion with the 

^legates delivered speeehes of 
cogent argument and impressivi . ating power, Baron 
Makinc out a very strong ^\iso for the equality of 

nations. Viscount Ofriwfa followed in a trenchant dis- 
use, which was highly appreciated by his hearers, 
irly -■.'.'. of whom recognised the justice of the Japanese 
claim Che Japanese delegates refused to be daisied 
by the ci cumstances was to be represented 

on the Executive O the five Great Powers. 

at the rejection tosed amendment could 

not therefore be construed - : .s a diminution of her prestige. 
This consid< . they retorted, was wholly irrelevant 

to the question whether or no the nations wore to be 
Dgnised as equal. They ended by refusing to with- 
draw their modified amendment and calling tor a vote. 
The result was a majority for the amendment, Mr, 
Wilson thereupon announced that a majority was insuffi- 
cient to justify its adoption, and that nothing less than 
solute unanimity could be regarded as adequate, At 
this a delegate objected: "Mr. Wilson, you have just 
accepted a rity for your own motion respecting 

Geneva; on what grounds, may I ask. do you refuse to 
abide by a majority vote on the amendment of the 
Japanese delegation?" '"The two cases are different,"' 
was the reply. "On the subject of the seat of the League 
unanimity is unattainable." This closed the official 
discussion. 



1 The ward d Japanese amendment tos: "By the endorse* 

. of equality ol tuitions and just treatment oi their 

494 



THE C0VENAN1 AND MINORITIES 

■.<-. time later, it. is assei I, the Rumanians, who 
had supported Mr. Wilson's motion on religious equality, 
were app I on the subject, and informed that it 

would be agreeable to the American delegates to have* 
the original proposal brought up once more. Such a 
motion, it was added, would come with especial propriety 
from the Rumanians, who, in the person of M. Diamandi, 
had advocated it from the outset. But the Rumanian 
delegates hesitated, pleading the invincible opposition 
of the Japanese. They were assured, however, that 
the Japanese would no longer discountenance it. There 
upon they broached the matter to Lord Robert ' 
but he, with his wonted caution, replied that it ■■ 
delicate subject to handle, <■ pecially after the experience 

they had already had. As for himself, he would rather 
leave the initiative to others. Could the Rumanian 

delegates not open their minds to Colon':! House, who 
took the amendment so much to heart' They acted on 
this suggestion and called on Colonel Hon/:. He, too, 
however, declared that it was a momentous as well a* a 

thorny topic, and for that reason had best be referred 
to the head of the American delegation. President Wil 
SOU, having originated the amendment, was the person 
most qualified tO take direct action. It is further affirmed 

that they sounded the President as to the advisability of 
mooting the question anew, but that he declined to face 
another vote, and the matter was dropped for good - 
in that form. 

It was publicly asserted later on that the Japanese 
decided to abide by the rejection of their amendment 
and to sign the Covenant as the result of a bargain on 
the .Shantung dispute. This report, however, was pul- 
verizer] by the Japanese delegation, which pointed out 
that the introduction of the racial clause was decided 
Upon before the delegates left Japan, and when no diffi- 

495 



THE INSIDE STORY OF H1K PEACE CONFERENCE 

culties wore anticipated respecting Japan's claim to have 
that province ceded to her by Germany, and that the 
discussion on the amendment terminated on April nth, 
consequently before the Kiaochow issue came up for dis- 
cussion. As a matter oi fact, the Japanese publicly 
announced their intention to adhere to the League of 
Nations two days 1 before a decision was reached respecting 
their claims to Kiaochow. 

This adverse note on Mr. Wilson's pet scheme to have 
religious equality proclaimed as a means of hindering 
sanguinary wars brought to its climax the reaction of the 
Conference against what it regarded as a systematic 
endeavor to establish the overlordship of the Anglo- 
Saxon peoples in the world. The plea that wars may be 
provoked by such religious inequality as still survives 
was so unreal that it awakened a twofold suspicion in the 
minds of many of Mr. Wilson's colleagues. Most of them 
believed that a pretext was being sought to enable the 
leading Powers to intervene in the domestic concents 
of all the other states, so as to keep them firmly in hand, 
and use them as means to their own ends. And these 
ends were looked upon as anything but disinterested. 
Unhappily this conviction was subsequently strengthened 
by certain of the measures decreed by the Supreme Coun- 
cil between April and the close of the Conference. The 
misgivings of other delegates turned upon a matter which 
at first sight may appear so far removed from any of the 
pressing issues of the twentieth century as to seem wholly 
imaginary. They feared that a religious— some would 
call it racial -bias lay at the root of Mr. Wilson's policy. 
It may seem amazing to some readers, but it is none the 
less a fact that a considerable number of delegates believed 
that the real influences behind the Anglo-Saxon peoples 
were Semitic. 

1 On April ^S, 1919. 

400 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

They confronted the President's proposal on the sub- 
ject of religious inequality, and, in particular, the odd 
motive alleged for it, with the measures for the protec 
tion of minorities which he subsequently imposed on the 
lesser states, and which had for their keynote to satisfy 
the Jewish elements in eastern Europe. And they con- 
cluded that the sequence of expedients framed and 
enforced in this direction were inspired by the Jews, as- 
sembled in Paris for the purpose of realizing their care 
fully thought-out program, which they succeeded in hav- 
ing substantially executed. However right or wrong these 
delegates may have been, it would be a dangerous mistake 
to ignore their views, seeing that they have since become 
one of the permanent elements of the situation. The 
formula into which this policy was thrown by the members 
of the Conference, whose countries it affected, and who 
regarded it as fatal to the peace of eastern Europe, was 
this: "Henceforth the world will be governed by the 
Anglo-Saxon peoples, who, in turn, are swayed by their 
Jewish elements." 

It is difficult to convey an adequate notion of the 
warmth of feeling — one might almost call it the heat of 
passion — which this supposed discovery generated. The 
applications of the theory to many of the puzzles of the 
past were countless and ingenious. The illustrations of 
the manner in which the policy was pursued, and the 
cajolery and threats which were said to have been em- 
ployed in order to insure its, success, covered the whole 
history of the Conference, and presented it through a new 
and possibly distorted medium. The morbid suspicions 
current may have been the natural vein of men who had 
passed a great part of their lives in petty racial struggles ; 
but according to common account, it was abundantly 
nurtured at the Conference by the lack of reserve and 
moderation displayed by some of the promoters of the 

497 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

minority clauses who were deficient in the sense of meas- 
.- What the Eastern delegates said was briefly this: 

"The tide in our countries was flowing rapidly in favor of 
the Jews. All the east Europe..-, governments which had 
ged them were uttering their ».va ,:•>.:. 
only promised to torn over a new leaf. 
Nay, they had already turned it. We. for example, 
altered our legislation in order to meet by anticipation 

legitimate wishes of the Conference and the press 
demands of the Jews. We did quite enough to obviate 
decrees which might impair our sovereignty or lessen our 
prestige. Poland and Rumania issued laws establishing 
solute equality between the Jews mid their own na- 
sals. All discrimination had ceased. Immigrant He- 
ws from Rus--..-. received the full rights of citizenship 
and became entitled to rill any office in the state. In a 
word, all the old disabilities were abolished and the 
fervent prayer of east European governments was that 
the Jewish members of their respective communil 
should be gradually assimilated to the natives and become 
patriotic citizens like them. It was a new ideal. It 
..ccorded to the Jews everything they had asked for. It 
would enable them to show themselves as the French. 
Italian, and Belgian Jews had shown themselves, efficient 
citizens of their adopted countries. 

"But in the flush of their triumph, the Jews, or rather 
their spokesmen at the Conference, were not satisfied 
with equality. What they demanded was inequality to 
the detriment of the races whose dity they were 

enjoying and to their own supposed advantage. They 
were to have the same rights as the Rumanians, the 
Poles, and the other peoples among whom they lived, 
but they were also to have a good deal more. Their 
religious autonomy was placed under the protection of an 
alien body, the League, which is but another name for 

40 S 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

the Powers which have reserved to themselves the 
governance of the world. The method LS to oblige each 
of the lesser states to bestow on each minority the same 
rights as the majority enjoys, and also certain privileges 
over and above. The instrument imposing this obliga- 
tion is a formal treaty with the Great Powers which the 

Poles, Rumanians, and other small states were sum- 
moned to sign. It contains twenty-one articles. The 
first part <>f the document deals with minorities generally, 

the latter with the Jewish elements. The second clause 
of the Polish treaty enacts that every individual who 
habitually resided in Poland on August r, 1914, becomes a 
citizen forthwith. This is simple. Is it also satisfactory? 
Many Frenchmen and Poles doubt it, as we do ourselves. 
On August 1st numerous German and Austrian agents and 
spies, many of them Hebrews, resided habitually in 
Poland. Moreover, the foreign Jewish elements there, 
which have immigrated from Russia, having lost — like 
everybody else before the war — the expectation of seeing 
Polish independence ever restored, had definitely thrown 
in their lot with the enemies of Poland. Now to put 
into the hands of such enemies constitutional weapons is 
already a sacrifice and a, risk. The Jews in Vilna re- 
cently voted solidly against the ineorporation of that 
lily in Poland. 1 Arc they to be treated as loyal Polish 
citizens? We have conceded the point unreservedly. 
But to give them autonomy over and above, to create a 
state within the state, and enable its subjects to call in 
foreign Powers at every hand's turn, against the lawfully 
constituted authorities that is an expedient which does 
not commend itself to the newly emancipated peoples." 
The Rumanian Premier Bratiano, whose conspicuous 

1 The Jewish coalition in Vilna inscribed on its program the union of 

Vilna with Russia There was an overwhelming majority in favor of its 

retention by Poland.— Le Temps, September 14, 1919. The election took 
place on September 7th. 

33 499 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

services to the Allied cause entitled him to a respectful 
hearing, delivered a powerful speech ! before the dele- 
gates assembled in plenary session on this question of 
protecting ethnic and religious minorities. He covered 
ground unsurveyed by the framers of the special treaties, 
and his sincere tone lent weight to his arguments. Start- 
ing from the postulate that the strength of latter-day 
states depends upon the widest participation of all the 
elements of the population in the government of the 
country, he admitted the peremptory necessity of abolish- 
ing invidious distinctions between the various elements of 
the population there, ethnic or religious. So far, he was 
at one with the spokesmen of the Great Powers. Ru- 
mania, however, had already accomplished this by the 
decree enabling her Jews to acquire full citizenship by 
expressing the mere desire according to a simple formula. 
This act confers the full rights of Rumanian citizens upon 
eight hundred thousand Jews. The Jewish press of 
Bucharest had already given utterance to its entire satis- 
faction. If, however, the Jews are now to be placed in a 
special category, differentiated and kept apart from their 
fellow-citizens by having autonomous institutions, by the 
maintenance of the German- Yiddish dialect, which keeps 
alive the Teuton anti-Rumanian spirit, and by being 
authorized to regard the Rumanian state as an inferior 
tribunal, from which an appeal always lies to a foreign 
body — the government of the Great Powers — this would 
be the most invidious of all distinctions, and calculated 
to render the assimilation of the German- Yiddish-speaking 
Jews to their Rumanian fellow-citizens a sheer impos- 
sibility. The majority and the minority would then be 
systematically and definitely estranged from each other; 
and, seeing this, the elemental instincts of the masses 
might suddenly assume untoward forms, which the treaty, 

1 On Saturday, May 31, 1919. 

500 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

if ratified, would be unavailing to prevent. But, however 
baneful for the population, foreign protection is incompa- 
rably worse for the state, because it tends to destroy the 
cement that holds the government and people together, 
and ultimately to bring about disintegration. A classic 
example of this process of disruption is Russia's well-meant 
protection of the persecuted Christians in Turkey. In this 
case the motive was admirable, the necessity imperative, 
but the result was the dismemberment of Turkey and other 
changes, .some of which one would like to forget. 

The delegation of Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Po- 
land upheld M. Bratiano's contentions in brief, pithy 
speeches. President Wilson's lengthy rejoinder, deliv- 
ered with more than ordinary sweetness, deprecated M. 
Bratiano's comparison of the Allies' proposed interven- 
tion with Russia's protection of the Christians of Turkey, 
and represented the measure as emanating from the 
purest kindness. He said that the Great Powers were 
now bestowing national existence or extensive territories 
upon the interested states, actually guaranteeing their 
frontiers, and therefore making themselves responsible 
for permanent tranquillity there. But the treatment of 
the minorities, he added, unless fair and considerate, might 
produce the gravest troubles and even precipitate wars. 
Therefore it behooved the Powers in the interests of all 
Europe, as of each of its individual members, to secure 
harmonious relations, and, at any rate, to remove all 
manifest obstacles to their establishment. "We guaran- 
tee your frontiers and your territories. That means that 
we will send over arms, ships, and men, in case of neces- 
sity. Therefore we possess the right and recognize the 
duty to hinder the survival of a set of deplorable condi- 
tions which would render this intervention unavoidable." 

To this line of reasoning M. Bratiano made answer that 
all the helpful maxims of good government are of univer- 

501 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

sal application, and, therefore, if this protection of minori- 
ties were, indeed, indispensable or desirable, it should not 
be restricted to the countries of eastern Europe, but should 
be extended to all without exception. For it is inadmis- 
sible that two categories of states should be artificially 
created, one endowed with full sovereignty and the other 
with half-sovereignty. Such an arrangement would de- 
stroy the equality which should lie at the base of a genuine 
League of Nations. 

But the Powers had made up their minds, and the spe- 
cial treaties were imposed on the unwilling governments. 
Thereupon the Rumanian Premier withdrew from the 
Conference, and neither his Cabinet nor that of the Jugo- 
slavs signed the treaty with Austria at St. -Germain. 

What happened after that is a matter of history. 

Few politicians are conscious of the magnitude of the 
issue concealed by the involved diplomatic phraseology 
of the obnoxious treaties, or of the dangers to which their 
enactment will expose the minorities which they were 
framed to protect, the countries whose hospitality those 
minorities enjoy, and possibly other lands, which for the 
time being are seemingly immune from all such perilous 
race problems. The calculable, to say nothing of the un- 
ascertained, elements of the question might well cause 
responsible statesmen to be satisfied with the feasible. 
The Jewish elements in Europe, for centuries abominably 
oppressed, were justified in utilizing to the fullest the op- 
portunity presented by the resettlement of the world in 
order to secure equality of treatment. And it must be 
admitted that their organization is marvelous. For years 
I championed their cause in Russia, and paid the penalty 
under the governments of Alexander II and III. 1 The 



1 1 published several series of articles in The Daily Telegraph, The Fort' 
nightly Review, and other English as well as American periodicals, and a 
long chapter in my book entitled Russian Characteristics. 

502 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

sympathy of every unbiased man, to whatever race or 
religion he may belong, will naturally go out to a race Of 
a nation which is trodden underfoot, as were the ill- 
starred Jews of Russia ever since the partition of Poland. 
But equality one would have thought sufficient to meet 
the grievance. Full equality without reservation. That 
was the view taken by numerous Jews in Poland and 
Rumania, several of whom called on me in Paris and 
urged me to give public utterance to their hopes that the 
Conference would rest satisfied with equality and to their 
fear of the consequences of an attempt to establish a 
privileged status. Why this position should exist only 
in eastern Europe and not elsewhere, why it should not 
be extended to other races with larger minorities in other 
countries, are questions to which a satisfactory res; 
could be given only by farther-reaching and fateful 
changes in the legislation of the world. 

One of the statesmen of eastern Europe made a forcible 
appeal to have the minority clauses withdrawn. He took 
the ground that the principal aim pursued in conferring 
full rights on the Jews who dwell among us is to remove 
the obstacles that prevent them from becoming true and 
loyal citizens of the state, as their kindred are in France, 
Italy, Britain, and elsewhere. "If it is reasonable," he 
said, "that they should demand all the rights possessed 
by their Rumanian and Polish fellow-subjects, it is equally 
fair that they should take over and fulfil the correlate 
duties, as does the remainder of the population. For the 
gradual assimilation of all the ethnic elements of the com- 
munity is our ideal, as it is the ideal of the French, Eng- 
lish, Italian, and other states. 

"Isolation and particularism are the negative of that 
ideal, and operate like a piece of iron or wood in the human 
body which produces ulceration and gangrene. All our 
institutions should therefore be calculated to encourage 

503 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

assimilation. If we adopt the opposite policy, we inevi- 
tably alienate the privileged from the unprivileged sec- 
tions of the community, generate enmity between them, 
cause endless worries to the administration and paralyze 
in advance our best-intentioned endeavors to fuse the 
various ethnic ingredients of the nation into a homogene- 
ous whole. 

"This argument applies as fully to the other national 
fragments in our midst as to the Jews. It is manifest, 
therefore, that the one certain result of the minority 
clause will be to impose domestic enemies on each of the 
states that submits to it, and that it can commend itself 
only to those who approve the maxim, Divide et impera. 

"It also entails the noteworthy diminution of the 
sovereignty of the state. We are to be liable to be haled 
before a foreign tribunal whenever one of our minorities 
formulates a complaint against us. 1 How easily, nay, 
how wickedly such complaints were filed of late may be 
inferred from the heartrending accounts of pogroms 
in Poland, which have since been shown by the Allies' 
own confidential envoys to be utterly fictitious. Again, 
with whom are we to make the obnoxious stipulations? 
With the League of Nations? No. We are to bind our- 
selves toward the Great Powers, who themselves have 
their minorities which complain in vain of being con- 
tinually coerced. Ireland, Egypt, and the negroes are 
three striking examples. None of their delegates were 
admitted to the Conference. If the principle which 
those Great Powers seek to enforce be worth anything, it 
should be applied indiscriminately to all minorities, not 



1 "Poland agrees that any member of the Council of the League of Nations 
shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, 
or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council 
may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem 
proper and effective in the circumstances." — Article XII of the Special 
Treaty with Poland. 

504 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

restricted to those of the smaller states, who already 
have difficulties enough to contend against." 

The trend of continental opinion was decidedly opposed 
to this policy of continuous control and periodic inter- 
vention. It would be unfruitful to quote the sharp 
criticisms of the status of the negroes in the United States. 1 
But it will not be amiss to cite the views of two moderate 
French publicists who have ever been among the most 
fervent advocates of the Allied cause. Their comments 
deal with one of the articles 2 of the special Minority Treaty 
which Poland has had to sign. It runs thus: "Jews shall 
not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a 
violation of their Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under 
any disability by reason of their refusal^to attend courts 
of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath. 
This provision, however, shall not exempt Jews from such 
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Polish 
citizens for the necessary purposes of military service, 
national defense, or the preservation of public order. 

"Poland declares her intention to refrain from ordering 
or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held 
on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other 
purposes be compelled to be performed on a Saturday." 

M. Gauvain writes: "One may put the question, why 
respect for the Sabbath is so peremptorily imposed when 
Sunday is ignored among several of the Allied Powers. 
In France Christians are not dispensed from appearing 
on Sundays before the assize courts. Besides, Poland 
is further obliged not to order or authorize elections on a 
Saturday. What precautions these are in favor of the 
Jewish religion as compared with the legislation of many 
Allied states which have no such ordinances in favor 
of Catholicism! Is the same procedure to be adopted 

1 Cf. La Gazette de Lausanne, April 24, 19 19. 

2 Article XI of the Special Treaty, L'Etoile Beige, August 17, 1919. 

50 5 



[HE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

toward the Moslems? Shall we behold the famous Mus 
mans of India, so opportunely drawn from the shade 

by Mr. Montagu, demanding the insertion of clauses '.v x 

Islam: Will the Zionists impose their dogmas 

in Palestine? Is the life of in to be suspended two, 

ee, or four d week in order that religious laws 

may be observed- Catholicism has adapted itself in 
practice to laic Legislation and to the exigencies of modern 
life. It may well seem that Judaism in Poland could do 

. wise. In Rumania, the Jews met with no obstacle 
to the exercise of their religion. Indeed, they had con- 
trived in the Localities to th of Moldavia, where 
they formed a majority, to impose their own customs 
0:1 the res; of the population. Jewish guardians of toll- 

dges are known to have barred the passage of these 
bridges on Saturdays, because, on the one hand, their 
religion forbade them to aeeept money on that day. and. 
on the other hand, they could allow 110 one to pass without 
paying. The Big Four might have given their attention 
to matters more useful or more pressing than enforcing 
respect for the Sabbath. 

"It is comprehensible that M. Bratiano should have 
refused 10 accept in advance the conditions which the 
Four or the Five may dictate in favor of ethnic and 
religious minorities. Rumania before the war was a 
free country governed congruously with the most modern 
prineiples. The restrietions which she had enacted 
respecting foreigners in general, and which were on the 
point of being repealed, did not exceed those which the 
United States and the Dominion of Australia still apply 
with remarkable tenacity. Why should the Cabinets of 
London and Washington take so much to heart the lot 
of ethnic and religious minorities in certain European 
countries while they themselves refuse to admit in the 
Covenant of the Society of Nations the principle of the 



THE C0VENAN1 AND MINORITIES 

equality of races? Their conduct is awakening among 
the state:; 'whose interests are limited' the belief that 
they are the vi< tims of an arbitrary policy. And that IS 
not without danger/' ' 

Another eminent Frenchman, M. Denis Cochin, who 
until quite recently was a Cabinet Minister, wrote: "The 
Conference, by imposing laws in favor of minorities, has 
uselessly and unjustly offended our allies. The:/; laws 
oblige them to respect the usages of the Jew:,, to main- 
tain schools for them. ... I have spent a large part of my 
career in demanding for French Catholic exactly that 
which the Conference imposes elsewhere. The Catholic; 
pay taxes in money and taxes in blood. And yet there is 
no budget for those schools in which their religion is 
taught; no liberty for those schoolmasters who /.'ear the 
ecclesiastical habit. I have seen a doctor in letters, fel- 
low of the university, driven from his class because he- 
was a Marist brother and did not choose to repudiate the 
vocation of his youth. He died of grief. I have seen 
young priests, after the long, laborious preparation neces- 
sary before they could take part in the competition for a 
university fellowship, thrust aside at the last moment 
and debarred from the competition because they wore the 
garb of priests. Yet a year later they were soldiers. I 
have seen Father Schell presented unanimously by the 
Institute and the Professional Corps as worthy to receive 
a chair at the College de France, and refused by the 
Minister. Yet I hereby affirm that if foreigners, even 
though they were allies, even friends, were to meddle with 
imposing on us the abrogation of these iniquitous laws, 
my protest would be uplifted against them, together with 
that of M. Combes. 2 I would exclaim, like Sganarelle's 



1 Le Journal des Dbbals, July 7, 1919. 

* M. Emile Combes was the author of the laws which banished religious 
congregations from Franc.-. 

S07 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

wife, 'And what if I wish to be beaten?' 1 hold tyranny 
in horror, but 1 hold foreign intervention in greater horror 

still. Let Us combat bad laws with all our strength, but 
among ourselves." 1 

The minority treaties tend to transform each of the 
states on which it is imposed into a miniature Balkans, to 
keep Europe in continuous turmoil and hinder the growth 
of the new and creative ideas from which alone one could 
expect that union of collective energy with individual 
freedom which is essential to peace and progress. Mod 
ern history affords no more striking example of the force 
of abstract bias over the teachings of experience than 
this amateur legislation which is scattering seeds oi mis- 
chief and conflict throughout Europe. 

Casting a final glance at the results of the Conference, 
it would be ungracious not to welcome as a precious boon 
the destruction of Prussian militarism, a consummation 
which we owe to the heroism of the armies rather than to 
the sagacity of the lawgivers in Paris. The restoration 
of a Polish state and the creation or extension of the other 
free communities at the expense oi the Central Empires 
are also most welcome changes, which, however, ought 
never to have been marred by the disrupt ive wedge of the 
minority legislation. Again, although the League is a 
mill whose sails uselessly revolve, because it has no corn 
to grind, the mere fact that the necessity oi international- 
ism was solemnly proclaimed as the central idea of the 
new ordering, and that an effort, however feeble, was put 
forth to realise it in the shape of a covenant of social and 
moral fellowship, marks an advance from which there can 
be no retrogression. 

Actuality was thereby imparted to the idea, which is 
destined to remain in the forefront o( contemporary poli- 

1 Lc Figaro, August 21, 1QIQ. L'l\ is, August 10, IQI9. 

508 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

tics until the peoples themselves embody it, in viable 
institutions. What the delegates (ailed to realize is the 
truth that a program of a League Is not a league. 

On the debit side much might be added to what has 
already been said. The important fact to bear in mind — 
which in itself calls for neither praise nor blame— 4s that 
the world-parliament was at bottom an Anglo-Saxon as- 
sembly whose language, political conceptions, sell esteem, 
and disregard of everything foreign wen: essentially Eng- 
lish. When speaking, the faces of the principal delegates 
wen: turned toward the future, and when acting they 
looked toward the past. As a thoroughly English press 
organ, when alluding to the League oi Nations, puts it: 
"We have done homage to that entrancing ideal by 
spatchcocking the Convention into the Treaty. There it- 
remains as a finger post to point the way to a new heaven 
on earth. But we observe that the Treaty itself is a 
good old eighteenth -century piece, drawing its inspiration 
from mundane and practical considerations, and paying 
a good deal more than lip service to the principle of the 
balance of power." ' 

That is a fair estimate of the work achieved by the 
delegates. But they sinned in their way of doing it. If 
they had deliberately and professedly aimed at these 
results, and had Led the world to look for none other, most 
of the criticisms to which they have rendered themselves 
open would be pointless. But they raised hopes which 
they refused to realize, they weakened if they did not de- 
stroy faith in public treaties, they intensified distrust and 
race hatred throughout the world, they poured strong dis- 
solvents upon every state on the European Continent, 
and they stirred up fierce passions in Russia, and then left 
that ill-starred nation a. prey to unprecedented anarchy. 
In a word, they gathered up all the widely scattered ex- 

1 The Morning Post, July 21, 1919. 

509 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

plosives of imperialism, nationalism, and internationalism, 
and, having added to their destruetiveness. passed them 
on to the peoples of the world as represented by the 
League of Nations. Some of them deplored the mess in 
which they were leaving the nations, without, however, 
admitting the causal nexus between it and their own 
achievements. 

General Smuts, before quitting Paris for South Africa, 
frankly admitted that the Peace Treaty will not give us 
the real peace which the peoples hoped for, and that peace- 
making would not begin until after the signing of the 
Treaty. The Echo de Paris wrote: "As for us, we never 
believed in the Society of Nations." ' And again: "The 
Society of Nations is now but a bladder, and nobody 
would venture to describe it as a lantern." : The Bol- 
shevist dictator Lenin termed it "an organization to loot 
the world." s 

The Allies themselves are at sixes and sevens. The 
French are suspicious of the British. A large section of 
the American people is profoundly dissatisfied with the 
part played by the English and the French at the Con- 
ference; Italy is stung to the quick by the treatment 
she received from France, Britain, and the United States; 
Rumania loathes the very names of those for whom she 
staked her all and sacrificed so much; in Poland and 
Belgium the English have lost the consideration which 
they enjoyed before the Conference; the Greeks are 
wroth with the American delegates; the majority of 
Russians literally execrate their ex-Allies and turn to the 
Germans and the Japanese. 

"The resettlement of central Europe," writes an 
American journal, 4 "is not being made for the tranquillity 



1 L'Echo de Paris, April 2q, 1919. ' Ibid., April 14, 1919. 

i The CktCOgo Tribune (Pans edition), September 17, 1919. 
* The New Republic, August 6, 1919. 

5io 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

of the liberated principles, but for the purposes of the 
Great Powers, among whom France is the active, and 
America and Britain the passive, partners. In Germany- 
its purpose is the permanent elimination of the German 
nation as a factor in European politics. . . . We cannot 
save Europe by playing the sinister game now being 
played. There is no peace, no order, no security in it. 
. . . What it can do is to aggravate the mischief and 
intensify the schisms." i 

A distinguished American, who is a consistent friend 
of England, 1 in a review article affirmed that the pro- 
posed League of Nations is slowly undermining the Anglo- 
American Entente. "There is in America a growing 
sense of irritation that she should be forever entangled 
in the spider-web of European politics." . . . And if the 
Senate in the supposed interests of peace should ratify 
the League, he adds, "In my judgment no greater harm 
could result to Anglo-American unity than such reluctant 
consent." 2 

Some of Mr. Wilson's fellow-countrymen who gave 
him their whole-hearted support when he undertook to 
establish a r6gime of right and justice sum up the result 
of his labors in Paris as follows : 3 

"His solemn warning against special alliances emerged 
as a special alliance with Britain and France. His re- 
peated condemnations of secret treaties emerges as a 
recognition that 'they could not honorably be brushed 
aside,' even though they conflicted with equally binding 
public engagements entered into after they had been 
written. Openly arrived at covenants were not openly 
arrived at. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic 
barriers was applied to German barriers, and accom- 

1 Mr. James B. Beck. 

1 The North American Review, June, 1919. 

* Cf. The New Republic, August 6, 191 9, pp. 5, 6. 

5ii 



THE INSIDE STORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

panied by the blockade of a people with whom we have 
never been at war. The adequate guaranties to be given 
and taken as respects armaments were taken from Ger- 
many and given to no one. The 'unhampered and un- 
embarrassed opportunity for the independent determina- 
tion of her own political development' promised to Rus- 
sia, and defined as the 'acid test,' has been worked out 
by Mr. Wilson and others to a point where so cautious 
a man as Mr. Asquith says he regards it with 'bewilder- 
ment and apprehension.' The righting of the wrong done 
in 1 87 1 emerges as a concealed annexation of the boundary 
of 1 814. The 'clearly recognizable lines of nationality' 
which Italy was to obtain has been wheedled into an- 
nexations which have moved Viscount Bryce to denounce 
them. 'The freest opportunity of autonomous develop- 
ment' promised the peoples of Austria-Hungary failed 
to define the Austrians as peoples. ..." 

Whatever the tests one applies to the work of the 
Conference — ethical, social, or political — they reveal it 
as a factor eminently calculated to sap high interests, to 
weaken the moral nerve of the present generation, to fan 
the flames of national and racial hatred, to dig an abyss 
between the classes and the masses, and to throw open the 
sluice-gates to the inrush of the waves of anarchist inter- 
nationalities. Truth, justice, equity, and liberty have 
been twisted and pressed into the service of economico- 
political boards. In the United States the people who 
prided themselves on their aloofness are already fighting 
over European interests. In Europe every nation's hand 
is raised against its neighbors, and every people's hand 
against its ruling class. Every government is making 
its policy subservient to the needs of the future war which 
is universally looked upon as an unavoidable outcome of 
the Versailles peace. Imperialism and militarism are 
striking roots in soil where they were hitherto unknown. 

512 



MAP 241950 



THE COVENANT AND MINORITIES 

In a word, Prussianism, instead of being destroyed, has 
been openly adopted by its ostensible enemies, and the 
huge sacrifices offered up by the heroic armies of the fore- 
most nations are being misused to give one half of the 
world just cause to rise up against the other half. 



THE END 










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